Honble Dr. CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dt. 28.7.1997 (Annx. 9), by which petitioners services have been terminated. (2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner had been appointed temporarily as Lecturer in Botony Department in the respondent University vide order dated 27.10.1969. She stood confirmed on 14.12.1972 and later on promoted as Associate Professor on 24.12.87. She proceeded on leave for doing the Post Doctoral Research in the United States of America and stayed there from 29.8.90 to 15.10.96. Petitioner came to India on 16.10.96 and went back to U.S.A. again after applying for leave on 24.12.96. Petitioner sent several applications and FAX messages from there seeking extension of her leave on medical ground. She also sent a letter dated 19.3.97 stating that if her leave could not be extended, she may be given voluntary retirement. However, her services stood terminated vide order dated 28.7.97. Hence this petition. (3). Mr. B.D. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that petitio- ner was a permanent and confirmed employee who had served for more than twenty-five years in the University and she could not have been terminated so unceremoniou- sly. His entire case is that under no circumstance, the service of a confirmed employee can be terminated without holding an enquiry. Moreso, an agreement between the parties had been entered into at the time of appointment, which provided a detailed procedure of termination in case of misconduct etc., which has not been followed. (4). Mr. J.P. Joshi, learned counsel for respondent University, has raised the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed by petitioner through the Power of Attorney-holder, which is not permissible and it is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as the termination order dated 28.7.97 has been challenged by filing the petition on 13.5.98. Moreso, full- fledged enquiry was not required to be held for the reason that the petitioner was never sanctioned the leave and she was informed, vide, telegram on 7.9.97 (Annx. R/2) that the learned Vice Chancellor had refused to grant the leave and a notice dated 22.2.97 (Annx. R/3) was also served upon her to show cause why her services be not terminated being wilfully absent from duty. R/2) that the learned Vice Chancellor had refused to grant the leave and a notice dated 22.2.97 (Annx. R/3) was also served upon her to show cause why her services be not terminated being wilfully absent from duty. Petitioner did not file any reply to the said show cause, hence the order has been passed terminating her services in view of the provisions of Clause (5) of the Ordinance 327 of the University. (5). The issue of filing a writ petition through Power of Attorney-holder is no more res-integra as it has been considered by the Honble Apex Court time and again. In Charanjit Lal Choudhary vs. Union of India & ors. (1), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the legal rights that can be enforce in writ jurisdiction must ordinarily be the rights of the petitioner himself/herself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. ``The right that can be enforced under Article 226 shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto, this rule may have to be relaxed or modified. (6). In the State of Orissa vs. Madan Gopal (2), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the language of the Article itself shows that the issue of writs or directions by the Court is founded only on its decision that a right of the aggrieved party has been infringed. (7). Again, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered this issue in Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietory) Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal & ors. (3), and held that except in a writ of habeas corpus or quo warranto, the person can approach the Court only for redressal of his personal grievances. (8). In State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Suraj Prakash Kapur (4), the Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``The existence of a right and the infringement thereof are foundation of the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court u/Art. 226 of the Consti- tution. The right that can be enforced u/Art. 226 of the Constitution shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the applicant. (9). The right that can be enforced u/Art. 226 of the Constitution shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the applicant. (9). In State of Orissa vs. Ramchandra Dev (5), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the concluding words of Article 226 indicate that before a writ or appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened. (10). Thus, it becomes quite clear that a party can enforce its individual right through writ jurisdiction. While seeking issuance of writs like habeas corpus and quo warranto, there may be an exception. (11). In Gaddle Venkataswara Rao vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & ors. (6), the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``.....that `ordinarily the petitioner who seeks the filing of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition. (12). In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar Hazi Bashir Ahmed & ors. (7), nearly a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, while explaining the scope of the writ jurisdiction, emphasised that it can be resorted to only by an aggrieved person. The Court observed as under:- ``Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the contents and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioners interest and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English Courts have sometime put a restriction and sometime a wide construction on the expression `aggrieved person. However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or `standing to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. (13). In Cyril E. Fernandex vs. Sr. Myria Lydia & ors. (8), the Apex Court held that a person who is ``directly concerned with the grievance can maintain the writ petition. (14). In Municipal Waraseoni & Anr. vs. Satish Chandra Jain & Anr. (13). In Cyril E. Fernandex vs. Sr. Myria Lydia & ors. (8), the Apex Court held that a person who is ``directly concerned with the grievance can maintain the writ petition. (14). In Municipal Waraseoni & Anr. vs. Satish Chandra Jain & Anr. (9), the Honble Supreme Court held that writ is maintainable only by the aggrieved party and not by some one else and a person cannot be permitted to maintain a writ only by stealing the language of any person who was in real sense aggrieved. (15). In the instant case, it has been submitted by Mr. Purohit that writ petition has been preferred by the aggrieved party Dr. Daksha Sankhla for redressal of her grievances through the power of attorney-holder. Therefore, the principle laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the judgments referred to above, is not applicable. The submission seems to be attractive but hollow in substance, for the reason that the law prohibits to do something indirectly which is prohibited to be done directly. It is settled proposition of law that what cannot be done ``per directum is not permissible to be done per obliquum, meaning thereby, whatever is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be effected by an indirect or circuitous contrivance on the principles of ``quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur omne per quod devenitur ad illud. (16). In Jagir Singh vs. Ranbir Singh (10), the Apex Court observed that an Authority cannot be permitted to evade a law by ``shift or contrivance. While deciding the said case, the Honble Supreme Court placed reliance on the judgment in Fox vs. Bishop of Chester (11), wherein it has been observed as under:- ``To carry out effectually the object of a Statute, it must be construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined. (17). Thus, it is crystal clear that law prohibits to do something indirectly which is prohibited to be done indirectly. (18). In a case like this, it becomes immaterial whether the power of attorney-holder files a case in his name for the person aggrieved or person aggrieved files a case through the power of attorney-holder. Therefore, the petition is not maintainable. (19). Even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that the writ petition is maintainable, it does not have any merit. Therefore, the petition is not maintainable. (19). Even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that the writ petition is maintainable, it does not have any merit. The undisputed facts are that petitioner left for U.S.A. without prior sanction of leave; her leave application was not accepted; she was informed telegraphically on 7.1.97 that her leave application had been rejected and she should come back and join; a show cause notice dated 22.7.97 had also been served upon her but she did not submit any reply to it, rather sent the application dated 19.3.97 seeking voluntary retirement; and her services stood terminated on 28.7.97. (20). Admittedly, petitioner remained absent without leave for more than seven months. Inspite of the fact that she had been informed that her leave had not been sanctioned and a show cause notice, as why her services be not terminated for being wilful absent, had already been served upon her but she did not file any reply to the same. In such a situation, the question does arise whether it was necessary for the University to hold a full- fledged enquiry. (21). The principles of natural justice require to be considered in its correct perspective. In fact, the said principles are ingrained in the mind of every-body, thus, known as principles of natural justice and require observance. (22). One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is Auti alter-am par-tem, i.e. no man should be condemned unheard. In Dr. Bentleys case. i.e. R vs. University of Cambridge (12), the Kings Bench traced the history of principles of natural justice and observed that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden and even ``God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. (23). In Painter vs. Liverpool Oil Gas Light Co. (13), it was held that ``a party is not to suffer in person or in purse without an opportunity of being heard. (24). Even if there is no provision in the statute about giving of notice, if the order in question adversely affects the rights of an individual, the notice must be given. (Vide East India Commercial Co. vs. Collector of Customs (14). The notice must be clear, specific and unambiguous and the charges should not be vague and uncertain. (24). Even if there is no provision in the statute about giving of notice, if the order in question adversely affects the rights of an individual, the notice must be given. (Vide East India Commercial Co. vs. Collector of Customs (14). The notice must be clear, specific and unambiguous and the charges should not be vague and uncertain. (Vide Management of the N.R. Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. vs. Industrial Tribunal (15). The object of notice is to give an opportunity to the individual concerned to present his case and therefore, if the party is aware of the charges or allegations, a formal defect would not invalidate the notice, unless the prejudice is caused to the individual. (Vide Bhagwan Datta Shastri vs. Ram Ratanji Gupta (16) and Fazal Bhai Dhala vs. Custodian General, Evacuee Property (17). The party should also be given a reasonable time to file reply to the charges. (Vide State of J & K vs. Haji Wali Mohammad & Ors. (18). (25). Where a notice regarding one charge has been given, the person cannot be punished for a different charge for which no notice or opportunity of being heard was given to him. (Vide Annamuthado vs. Oilfields Workers (19) and Govindsinh vs. G. Subbarao (20). (26). In Ridge vs. Baldwin (21), it was held that ``the power of dismissal could not be exercised without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard and without observing the principles of natural justice. (27). A similar view was reiterated in State of Orissa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei (22). (28). In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (23), the passport of the petitioner was impounded by the Government of India ``in public interest, without according an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before taking the impugned action. The order was found to be violative of the principles of natural justice. (29). In Malik Ram vs. State of Raj. (24), the scope of hearing was confined by the enquiry officer only to the hearing of arguments and rejected the application of the appellant to lead oral or documentary evidence. The Supreme Court disapproved it observing that the delinquent should have been given an opportunity to lead evidence. (30). (29). In Malik Ram vs. State of Raj. (24), the scope of hearing was confined by the enquiry officer only to the hearing of arguments and rejected the application of the appellant to lead oral or documentary evidence. The Supreme Court disapproved it observing that the delinquent should have been given an opportunity to lead evidence. (30). In Bishambhar Nath Kohli vs. State of U.P. (25) in revision proceedings, the Custodian General accepted new evidence produced by one party, but no opportunity was given to the other side to meet with the same. The Supreme Court held that the order stood vitiated for non-observance of the principles of natural justice. (31). In State of Kerala vs. K.T. Shaduli Grocery Dealer etc. (26), right of cross examination of witnesses was held to be necessary. (32). Thus, settled legal proposition remain that principles of natural justice are inbuilt in the statutory rules and require observance unless the same stand excluded by the rules itself. The adjudicating authority must be impartial and without any interest or bias of any type; where the adjudicating authority is exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, the order must be made by that authority and that power cannot be delegated or sub- delegated to any other officer; the adjudicating authority must give full opportunity to the affected person to produce all the relevant evidence in support of his case; the adjudicating authority must disclose all material placed before it in the course of the proceedings and cannot utilize any material unless the opportunity is given to the party against whom it is sought to be utilized; the adjudicating authority must give an opportunity to the party concerned to rebut the evidence and material placed by the other side; and in disciplinary proceedings under Article 311 of the Constitution of India against the civil servants and in cases of domestic inquiries by employers against their employees under the factory laws. (33). However, the principle of natural justice had to be considered in the context of the fact situation and in view of the Scheme the Rules applicable in a particular case. If an employee remains absent for more than a stipulated period and the statutory rules or standing orders provide for automatic termination of his services in such an eventuality, without holding inquiry or giving opportunity of being heard, observance of principle of natural justice is mandatory proposition. If an employee remains absent for more than a stipulated period and the statutory rules or standing orders provide for automatic termination of his services in such an eventuality, without holding inquiry or giving opportunity of being heard, observance of principle of natural justice is mandatory proposition. Honble Supreme Court has categorically held in a catena of decisions that a statutory rule is void if it stipulates for automatic termination of services of an absenting employee after expiry of a stipulated period. (Vide Punjab Land Development And Reclamation Corporation Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Ors. (27), Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. vs. Mulu Amra (28), D.K. Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (29), Scooters India Ltd. vs. Vijay E.V. Eldred (30), Uptron India Ltd. vs. Smt. Shammi Bhan (31), and Scooters India Ltd. vs. M. Mohammad Yaqub & Anr. (32). (34). However, there may be circumstances where absence from duty, at the start, may not be a misconduct but absence of the employee stretches abnormally giving rise to a presumption that the employee is no more interested to continue in service or has voluntarily abandoned the job. Whether in such a case, before termination, a notice or inquiry is required? In M/s. Jeewan Lal Ltd., Calcutta vs. Its Workmen (33), and Shahoordul Haque vs. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar & Anr. (34), the Honble Supreme Court held that in such a case, ``long unauthorized absence may reasonably give rise to an inference that such service is intended to be abandoned by the employee. Being a case of abandonment of service, no notice/inquiry is required. In State of Haryana vs. Om Prakash & Anr. (35), the Honble Apex Court explained the distinction between `retrenchment and `abandonment from service, observing that termination contemplates an act on the part of the employer which puts an end to service to fall within the definition of the expression `retrenchment and in case the workman does not report for duty, it would amount to abandonment of service by the employee of his free will and the employer would have done nothing, whatsoever, to put an end to his employment and, therefore, the case does not fall within the meaning of `retrenchment. (35). A similar view has been taken by this Court in Vijay Singh Charan vs. Management, Shri Swetamber Nakoda Parshwnath Tirth Mewa Nagar & Anr. (36). (36). (35). A similar view has been taken by this Court in Vijay Singh Charan vs. Management, Shri Swetamber Nakoda Parshwnath Tirth Mewa Nagar & Anr. (36). (36). In Chairman, Board of Mining Examination & Chief Inspector of Mines & Anr. vs. Ramjee (37), the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``Natural justice is not unruly horse, no lurking land line, nor a judicial cure all. If fairness is shown by the decision/maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and fundamentals of such essential process, properly being conditioned by facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt- that is the conscience of the matter. (37). The Apex Court has reiterated time and again that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula and its application would depend upon the scheme and policy of the statute and relevant circumstances involved in a particular case. (Vide Union of India vs. P.K. Roy & ors. (38), Channabasappa Basappa Happali vs. State of Mysore (39), and Kumaon Mandal Vikash Nigam Ltd. vs. Girja Shankar Pant & ors. (40). (38). In S.L. Kapoor vs. Jag Mohan (41), the Honble Supreme Court has observed that where on admitted or undisputed facts, only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue the writ to compel the observance of the principles of natural justice as it would amount to issuing a futile writ. Similarly, in State of U.P. vs. O.P. Gupta (42), the Honble Supreme Court has observed that the Courts have to see whether non-observance of any of the principles enshrined in statutory rules or principles of natural justice have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. Thus, it can be held that even if in a given case there has been some deviation from the principles of natural justice but which has not resulted in grave injustice or has not prejudiced the cause of the delinquent, the Court is not bound to interfere. Thus, it can be held that even if in a given case there has been some deviation from the principles of natural justice but which has not resulted in grave injustice or has not prejudiced the cause of the delinquent, the Court is not bound to interfere. This Court does not function as a Court of Appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority, rather it has limited power of judicial review to the departmental proceedings in which appreciation of evidence is not permissible. The Court can review only to correct the error of law or fundamental procedural requirements which lead to manifest injustice or Court can interfere with the impugned order if the same has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. (Vide Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Bhola Nath Singh & ors. (43). (39). In Syndicate Bank vs. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association (44), the Honble Supreme Court dealt with a similar case and held that where a show cause notice is served upon the delinquent employee and the employee chooses not to respond to the said notice even after expiry of the notice- period, the employer has a right to presume that the employee does not want to say anything and he is no more interested in the services of the employer. The Court observed as under:- ``It is no point laying strength on the principles of natural justice without understanding their scope or real manner. There are two assential elements of natural justice which are : (a) no man shall be a judge in his own cause; and (b) no man shall be condemned either civilly or criminally without being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge made against him. In course of time by various judicial pronouncements.....the bank had followed the requirement (of law).....Under these circumstances it was not necessary for the bank to hold an enquiry before passing the order. An enquiry would have been necessary if Dayananda had submitted his explanation which was not acceptable to the bank or contend that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join by the bank. Nothing of the like has happened here. An enquiry would have been necessary if Dayananda had submitted his explanation which was not acceptable to the bank or contend that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join by the bank. Nothing of the like has happened here. Assuming for a moment that enquiry was initiated, evidence led before the Tribunal clearly showed that notice was given to Dayananda and it is he who defaulted and offered no explanation for his absence from duty and did not report on duty within thirty days of the notice.....It is undoubtedly relevant on the principles of natural justice by the Tribunal and even by the High Court has certainly led to a miscarriage of justice as far as the bank if concerned. The conduct of Dayananda, as an employee of the bank, had been astounding. (40). In Punjab & Sind Bank & ors. vs. Sakattar Singh (45), the Honble Supreme Court impliedly approved the law laid in Syndicate Bank (supra) and held that if the employee has no intention to join duty and does not turn up inspite of notice, nor gives an explanation for his absence satisfying the Management that he has not taken up another employment or avocation and that he has no intention of joining the duty, the employee will be deemed to have retired from service on expiry of the time fixed in the notice. If the employee furnishes satisfactory explanation and comes after expiry of the notice, he may be allowed to work without prejudice to the right of the employer to take action against him under the law. In such a case, termination of service will not amount to punishment but would be a discharge simplicitor from the service. The Court observed as under:- ``Thus, there is no punishment for misconduct but only to notice the realities of the situation resulting from long absence of an employee from work with no satisfactory explanation thereto. The principles of natural justice cannot be examined in vaccum without reference to the fact-situation arising in the case....It also realises the futility of continuation with a situation when an employee, without, appropriate intimation to the Management, is playing trount. The principles of natural justice cannot be examined in vaccum without reference to the fact-situation arising in the case....It also realises the futility of continuation with a situation when an employee, without, appropriate intimation to the Management, is playing trount. If the respondents had submitted an explanation regarding his unauthorised absence or placed any material before the Court that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join the duty, enquiry may have been initiated but not otherwise. (41). In Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution vs. Educational Appellate Tribunal & Anr. (46), the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``Giving an opportunity or an enquiry is a check and balanced concept that no ones right be taken away without giving him/her opportunity or when enquiry in a given case or where the statute requires. But this cannot be in a case where allegations and charges are admitted and no possible defence is placed before the Authority concerned. What enquiry is to be made when one admits violations....In case where the facts are almost admitted, the case reveals itself and is apparent on the face of the record, and inspite of opportunity no worthwhile explanation is forthcoming as in the present case, it would not be a fit case to interfere with the termination order. (42). In Aligarh Muslim University vs. Mansoor Ali Khan (47), the Apex Court held that holding enquiry in a case where there can be no answer to the charges, would be a useless formality. Similar view has been reiterated in Union of India & Anr. vs. Mustafa & Najibai Trading Co. & ors. (48), Dr. J. Shashidhara Prasad vs. Governor of Karnataka & Anr. (49), M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India (50), and Designated Authority (Anti Dumping Directorate), Ministry of Commerce vs. Haldor Topsoe A/S. (51). (43). In H.C. Sarin vs. Union of India (52), the Honble Apex Court placed reliance upon the judgment of Lord Denning in R. vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex-parte Mugal (53), wherein it has been observed as under:- ``The rule of natural justice must not be stretched too far. Only too often, the people who have done wrong seek to invoke `the rule of natural justice so as to avoid the consequences. (44). Only too often, the people who have done wrong seek to invoke `the rule of natural justice so as to avoid the consequences. (44). Thus, in view of the above, it cannot be held that in each and every case, non-observance of principles of natural justice would vitiate the order. It has to be understood in the context and facts-situation of each case and requirement of statutory Rules applicable therein. (45). It is settled legal proposition that every action complained of is to be tested on the touch stone of doctrine of prejudice. (Vide Maj. G.S. Sodhi vs. Union of India & ors. (54), Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & ors. vs. B. Karunakar & ors. (55), State Bank of Patiala & ors. vs. S.K. Sharma (56), S.K. Singh vs. Central Bank of India & ors. (57), Rajendra Singh vs. State of M.P. (58), Mansoor Ali Khan (supra); and Monika Jain vs. State of Rajasthan & ors. (59). (46). In K.L. Tripathi vs. State Bank of India (60), Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent...there must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirement of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with, and so on so forth. (47). The instant case requires to be considered in the light of the aforesaid legal proposition. The requirement of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with, and so on so forth. (47). The instant case requires to be considered in the light of the aforesaid legal proposition. The impugned order dated 28.7.97 reveals the following reasons:- (i) Petitioner availed the leave for doing Post Doctoral Research Work but did not submit any result/progress of the so- called research work inspite of being asked; (ii) Staying away from the work creates an impression that the employees are scrupulously serving the University; (iii) Petitioner had already been granted more than five years leave, therefore, it was not possible to grant further leave; (iv) Petitioner proceeded on leave without getting the leave sanctioned in advance and without taking permission to leave the Headquarters; (v) Petitioner did not join the service even after refusing the sanction of leave applied for; (vi) Petitioner did not submit any reply to the notice to show cause why her services be not terminated; and (vii) Petitioners conduct made it explicit that she was no more interested in the Universitys service. (48). In addition to that, it is evident that petitioner did not turn upto the date of termination of her services. She was knowing what was the case against her. She had been given an opportunity to defend herself. She did not place any medical certificate, on the basis of which her leave applications could have been considered. One fails to understand even if enquiry was held against her, what stand she could have taken in such a fact-situation. (49). It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that petitioners services stood terminated in terms of the Ordinance No. 327/5 for remaining absent from duty without leave. The said ordinance reads as under:- ``The leave could be sanctioned by the Vice Chancellor on merit, considering the facts and circumstances of each application, provided it is supported by relevant document. (50). Clause 5 of the said Ordinance reads as under:- ``An employee who remains absent after the expiry of his leave, is not entitled to leave salary during the period of such absence. Wilful absence from the duty involves forfeiture of appointment. The Vice Chancellor may condone such period of wilful absence treating it as extraordinary leave (without pay). (50). Clause 5 of the said Ordinance reads as under:- ``An employee who remains absent after the expiry of his leave, is not entitled to leave salary during the period of such absence. Wilful absence from the duty involves forfeiture of appointment. The Vice Chancellor may condone such period of wilful absence treating it as extraordinary leave (without pay). (51). Ordinance 320, read with Appendix-B and Schedule-II provides for a procedure for imposing the punishment on delinquent. The punishment can be imposed on the ground of grave misconduct and/or persistent negligence on duty and the same provides for issuing the charge sheet, giving an opportunity to the delinquent to defend himself and lead evidence in support of his case. Such term has also been incorporated in the agreement entered into by the parties at the time of employment. (52). If both these ordinances are read together and it is presumed that there was an agreement between the parties which provided for holding a full-fledged inquiry in case of wilful absence or any other misconduct or persistent negligence, the question does arise; whether not holding such an inquiry has vitiated the order of termination? (53). Petitioner left India without prior sanction of her leave and without permission from the learned Vice Chancellor to leave the Headquarters. She was informed telegraphically that her leave application had been rejected. Petitioner failed to produce any kind of Progress Report regarding his Post-Doctoral Research Work before the respondent University. She was given this facility for betterment of the students of the University and to serve the institution in a better way. In absence of any proof of such Research Work, the purpose of granting leave stood defeated. She did not produce any medical certificate before the respondent University to satisfy the Authorities concerned that she was not able to join the institution. Thus, in such a fact-situation, the law does not require any interference with the impugned order of termination. (54). In absence of allegations of malafides against any individual or impleading him by name, the issue : whether her application for voluntary retirement ought to have been accepted, is not worth consideration. If the petitioner herself had behaved in such a casual and irresponsible manner, there was no obligation on the part of the University to accept her application for voluntary retirement. (55). It has further been submitted by Mr. If the petitioner herself had behaved in such a casual and irresponsible manner, there was no obligation on the part of the University to accept her application for voluntary retirement. (55). It has further been submitted by Mr. Purohit that in large number of cases, the respondent-University has granted the leave exceeding the period provided under the Rules and petitioner has been refused this concession, thus, it violates the mandate of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the impugned order is liable to be quashed. The submission made by Mr. Purohit is devoid of any merit for the reason that it is settled law that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate an illegality or give benefit of a wrong order, nor illegality once committed can be pleaded to legalise other illegal act. (Vide Harpal Kaur Chahal vs. Director, Punjab Instructions & Anr. (61), Sneh Prabha vs. State of U.P. & ors. (62), Jaipur Development Authority vs. Daulat Ram Jain (63), State of Haryana vs. Ram Kumar Maan (64), M/s Faridabad Ct. Scan Centre vs. Director General, Health Services & ors. (65), and Jalandhar Improvement Trust vs. Sampuran Singh (66). (56). In view of the above, it remains undisputed that petitioner had availed the maximum permissible extraordinary leave for a period of five years. Over and above, she remained on leave for a further period of one year and after completing six years, when she applied for further extension, her application was rejected. Petitioner was informed that her leave application had been rejected and was asked to join the institution. Petitioner did not pay any heed to it. She was issued a notice to show cause, which she considered, for the reasons best known to her, not to reply at all. Thus, in a case like this, there was no occasion for the respondent University to hold a full-fledged inquiry to prove the delinquency. Moreso, provisions of Clause 5 of Ordinance 327 does not require such a course. Even if it is so required, holding such an inquiry could have been a useless formality. I find no ground to interfere with the impugned order. (57). Petition does not present any feature warranting interference in equitable jurisdiction. Petition is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.