JUDGMENT: The accused, who was found guilty of offence under Sec.3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 by the Sessions Judge, Srivilluputhur in Special Case No.88 of 1993, convicted and sentenced to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500 has come forward with this instant appeal. 2. The facts leading to the appeal are briefly as under: P.W.1 Muthiah is the District Secretary of a political party known as United Democratic Front. P.W.2 is said to be executive committee member. P.W.3 is said to be the member of that Party. According to the prosecution, there was some land available near Krishnan Koil which was a Government poramboke land, which was in occupation of the accused and certain others. On 10.9.1992, P.W.1 to P.W.3 with other party men installed a name board of their party in that vacant site. On 12.9.1992, the board was found removed regarding which P.W.1 gave a complaint to the Taluk Police about the removal of the Board. But Taluk police did not take any action. On 14.9.1992 at about 6.00 p.m., P.W.1 to P.W.3 were walking near the over bridge near krishnan Koil, when they came across the accused, the accused called them by their Community name and scolded them stating that he was thrown out the board. According to the prosecution, the accused scolded: Regarding this, P.W.1 preferred a complaint to the respondent and the respondent has investigated the matter and submitted the final report before the Sessions Judge. The sessions Judge took the matter on his file in Special Case No.88 of 1993. The learned Sessions Judge examined six witnesses and marked seven documents, of the prosecution side. The accused neither examined any witnesses nor produced any documents. After trial, the learned Sessions Judge, came to the conclusion that the accused has committed an offence punishable under Sec.3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989, convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Sessions Judge the appellant has come forward with this instant appeal. 3. Heard both sides. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant stresses three points before me. (a) The evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3 is conflicting and contradicting; (b) No independent witness had been examined; and (c) There is delay in preferring the complaint. 5. 3. Heard both sides. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant stresses three points before me. (a) The evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3 is conflicting and contradicting; (b) No independent witness had been examined; and (c) There is delay in preferring the complaint. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant took me through evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3. I have also perused the documents. According to the learned counsel, there are conflicts in the evidence regarding the time of occurrence. The learned counsel for the appellant points out that in the course of his evidence, P.W.1 had stated that the occurrence took place at about 6.45 p.m., P.W.2 had stated that the occurrence took place at about 5.45 p.m. and P.W.3 had stated that the occurrence took place about 6.45 p.m. The learned counsel further points out that the evidence given by P.W.1 is still more conflicting with the documentary evidence. In Ex.P-1, the complaint, he had stated that the occurrence took place at 6.45 p.m., whereas in his evidence he had stated that the occurrence took place at 6.00 p.m. I feel it is not as if the witnesses viz., P.W.1 to P.W.3 are all very learned persons who very conscious about the time. Therefore, the deviation in the evidence regarding the time may not be of much importance. 6. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the witnesses are not corroborating each other as to the place of occurrence. Of course, I find a point in the argument. P.W.1 had stated that the incident took place near the bridge near Krishnan Koil. According to him, the incident took place about five meters away from the bridge. Whereas P.W.2 had stated that the incident took place on the bridge but not indicated any direction. P.W.3 had stated that the incident took place to the south of the bridge. In fact while P.W.1 had stated that the incident took place near the bridge, P.W.2 had stated that while they were returning from Krishnan Koil the incident took place, where as P.W.3 had stated that while they were going towards the Krishnan Koil to the south of the bridge, the occurrence took place. In Ex.P-6 sketch, it would show that the incident took place to the north of the bridge and not to the south. In Ex.P-6 sketch, it would show that the incident took place to the north of the bridge and not to the south. Though the Investigating Officer has marked several land marks, he had not pointed out where the Krishnan Koil is situated. Krishnan Koil does not come with the vicinity shown in the sketch or the Investigating Officer had left out marking the Krishnan Koil. Since the said marking might not be in support of the prosecution case, I feel that there is a point in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. 7. There is also conflicting evidence as to where exactly the incident took place. Witnesses examined as P.W.1 to P.W.3 are not independent witnesses. P.W.1 is the District Secretary, P.W.2 is the executive committee member. P.W.3 is the ordinary member of the particular political party. They are all interested witnesses. Further P.W.2 and P.W.3 belonged to the same community to which P.W.1 belongs. It is not as if the incident was not witnessed by other persons; P.W.3 himself had stated that at the time of incident there were a large gathering and people from Krishnan Koil were also present. Further in the complaint, F.I.R. and even in the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3, there is a reference to one Krishnan Achari a witness who was present at the time when the accused was scolding P.W.1, Krishnan Achari tried to intervene and tell the accused that he can speak in the civilized manner. Krishnan Achari seem to be a more competent witness. He does not belong to the community of either accused or the complainant. There is no reason, as to why the prosecution had not examined Krishnan Achari as a witness. Of course it is within the domain of the prosecution to conduct examination of witnesses of their choice. The non-examination of Krishnan Achari, when considered with the surrounding circumstances, generates that P.W.2 and P.W.3 belonged to the same community. There is also conflict and contradiction. The said non-examination only lead to interference that if examined Krishnan Achari might not have supported the prosecution case. 8. The non-examination of Krishnan Achari, when considered with the surrounding circumstances, generates that P.W.2 and P.W.3 belonged to the same community. There is also conflict and contradiction. The said non-examination only lead to interference that if examined Krishnan Achari might not have supported the prosecution case. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant also cited two authorities reported in Koran Singh v. State of M.P., 1992 Crl.L.J. 3053 and Haridas v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 Crl.L.J. 122 stressed that only when the incident took place within the public view it would attract provisions of Sec.3(1)(x) and also to stress that contradiction in the evidence of prosecution witnesses would show that the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. 9. In the instant case, the learned Sessions Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence and thus he came to the wrong conclusion, I am inclined to allow the appeal. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge, is set aside. The conviction passed on the accused is set aside. The fine amount, if paid by accused shall be refunded.