JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. — Land measuring Ac. 0.413 decimals in village Raghunathpur under Tahsil Chhatrapur in the district of Ganjam was acquired by the State for public purpose. The Notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on August 9, 1992. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded a compen¬sation of Rs. 2,785.30 paise. The original claimant having filed an application for reference under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisi¬tion Act, the Collector referred the case to the Subordinate Judge, Chhatrapur and the reference case was registered as MJC No.80 of 1987. It appears that at the time of hearing of the said M.J.C. no one appeared on behalf of the claimant and the Subordi¬nate Judge, Chhatrapur by his judgment and order dated October 30, 1989 disposed of the said case by enhancing the solatium from 12% per annum to 13% per annum. After about 5 years on May 2, 1994, N. Budhiamma filed First Appeal No. 181 of 1994 alongwith an application for condonation of delay in this Court. 3. In the application for condonation of delay the appel¬lant stated that about 15 days prior to filing of the First Appeal she came to know from a co-villager that the High Court in F.A.No. 195 of 1985 determined the market value of another piece of adjoining land acquired under the same Notification at Rs. 50,000/- per acre and that after coming to know about such deter¬mination of market value she decided to file the First Appeal. She also took the plea that she was an illiterate widow coming from rustic village and did not get proper legal advice to file appeal against the ex parte judgment and award of the Subordinate Judge. The Hon’ble Single Judge by his order dated August 9, 1994 refused to condone the delay on the ground that there was gross delay which was not satisfactorily explained, and dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation. An application for recalling the said order was filed (Misc. Case No. 594 of 1994). By order dated August 25, 1994 said misc. case was also rejected. Against the said order of the Hon’ble Single Judge the present A.H.O. is filed by N. Budhiamma (since deceased). 4. Mr. An application for recalling the said order was filed (Misc. Case No. 594 of 1994). By order dated August 25, 1994 said misc. case was also rejected. Against the said order of the Hon’ble Single Judge the present A.H.O. is filed by N. Budhiamma (since deceased). 4. Mr. Rath, appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the Hon’ble Single Judge should have adopted a liberal attitude while considering the application for condonation of delay and should have kept in mind the dictum of the Supreme Court that a litigant does not derive any benefit by making delay in filing an appeal or application. Mr. Rath has referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantanag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others), AIR 1988 SC 897 (G. Ramagowda Major v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore) and AIR 2000 SC 2306 (State of Bihar and others v. Mameshwar Prasad Singh and another). In all those decisions the Supreme Court emphasized the desirability of deciding the lis on merit than dismissing on grounds of limitation in appropriate cases. But that does not mean that the provisions of the Limitation Act should be completely ignored and a person has the freedom of filing cases whenever he likes. What has been laid down by the Supreme Court is that, the explanation offered should be analysed liberally and unless there is unrea¬sonable and inordinate delay due to gross negligence, Court should condone the same if some acceptable explanation is there. 5. In the present case the appellant is an illiterate widow. In fact, she never thought of filing any appeal and was satisfied with the compensation given till she came to learn that the High Court awarded much higher compensation for acquisition of an adjoining land under the same Notification. The said judg¬ment of the High Court was delivered on February 15, 1990. The First Appeal was filed four years thereafter and the present A.H.O. was filed on September 20, 1994. After death of the original appellant her son has filed application for substitution almost one year thereafter. 6. Mr. Rath has further stated that the original appellant was a Purdahnasin lady and as such it was not possible for her to know the legal provisions and consequences thereof. After death of the original appellant her son has filed application for substitution almost one year thereafter. 6. Mr. Rath has further stated that the original appellant was a Purdahnasin lady and as such it was not possible for her to know the legal provisions and consequences thereof. Though it is not possible to accept that the original appellant was a purdah¬nasin lady inasmuch as the appellant herself came to Cuttack and affirmed the affidavit to the application for condonation of delay, but then, she was no doubt a rustic, illiterate village widow. She was not able to read and write as would be evident from the pleadings and affidavits where she has put her L.T.I. Thus, she depended entirely on the legal advice given by her Advocate. The decision of this Court in F.A.No. 95 of 1985 en¬hancing the cost of the land to Rs. 50,000/- per acre in respect of adjacent lands of Late Budiamma, which are part of the lands acquired under the same land acquisition Notification pronounced on 15.2.90. Admittedly the said decision was not published in any law journals and it cannot be presumed that a common man can know about the judgment. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all citizens including the State as litigants are to be treated equally and the law is to be administered in an evenhand¬ed manner. Awarding a paltry sum of Rs. 8000/- per acre to the deceased land owner, at the same time awarding @ Rs. 50,000/- per acre for a similarly situated land seems to be shockingly dis¬criminatory. Of course, law of limitation is harsh and by efflux of time a litigant is stripped off his rights and cannot enforce the same. At the same time the legislature has conferred the power to condone the delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to parties and to dispose of the matters on merit. As has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collec¬tor, Land Acquisition, Anantanag (supra), the expression ‘suffi¬cient cause’ implied by legislature is adequately illustrative to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, that being the legal purpose for existence of the institution of the Courts. As has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collec¬tor, Land Acquisition, Anantanag (supra), the expression ‘suffi¬cient cause’ implied by legislature is adequately illustrative to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, that being the legal purpose for existence of the institution of the Courts. Further, in a dispute between the State and a citizen technicalities should not stand on the way to defeat a justified claim, as has been held by this Court in the case of Balaram Das v. State of Orissa and others (F.A.No. 339 of 1977, unreported). 7. Admittedly, N. Budhiamma hails from a remote rural area and is an illiterate rustic widow belonging to the down-trodden class of the society. In a country like ours, where there is so much poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, it would not be fair to presume that every one knows the correct position of law much less judgment-made-law. It is not difficult to visualise the fact that people like N. Budhiamma finds it extremely difficult to rush to the Court in proper time. In the present case, N. Bud¬hiamma has explained the delay and applying the ratio of the decision of the apex Court and to do substantial justice, it would be just and equitable to take a liberal view. 8. The disputed lands were acquired as long back as in the year 1992 and more than 8 years have lapsed in the meantime. No useful purpose would, therefore, be served by remanding the matter once again for fresh disposal. Further, most of the facts are admitted and the only dispute which remains to be adjudicated is regarding the situation/location of the present lands vis-a-vis the lands which were involved in First Appeal No. 195 of 1985 in which this Court determined the market value to be Rs. 50,000/- per acre. 9. To decide this controversy, by order dated April, 6, 2001, we called upon the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate to take instructions from the Land Acquisition Officer as to whether the land of the appellant and the lands involved in First Appeal No. 195 of 1985 are similar in nature and/or situated in the same vicinity. Thereafter, by the order dated April, 11, 2001, we directed the Land Acquisition Officer, Chhatrapur to appear before this Court personally with all relevant records. Thereafter, by the order dated April, 11, 2001, we directed the Land Acquisition Officer, Chhatrapur to appear before this Court personally with all relevant records. In pursu¬ance of the said direction, the Land Acquisition Officer, Chhatrapur appeared in person and produced the records on May 1, 2001. Perusal of records and the Map of the locality clearly reveals that the lands involved in the present case are in the same locality to the lands involved in First Appeal No. 195 of 1985 and further, they are situated in the same vicinity. Howev¬er, the nature of the lands in dispute are ‘DRY’ whereas the lands involved in F.A.No. 195 of 1985 were ‘Rainfed’. 10. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in mind the consistent view of the apex Court and this Court, we are of the considered opin¬ion that the valuation of the ‘DRY’ lands should be 1/3rd of the valuation of the ‘Wetlands’, which comes approximately to Rs. 16,300/- per acre. The total lands acquired being Ac. 0.413 dec., the compensation calculated at the rate fixed above comes to roughly Rs. 6,500/-. Taking into consideration the chequered career of the litigation and the conduct of parties, we feel that awarding a compensation of Rs. 6,000/- for the total lands would be just and equitable. It is made clear that the appellants shall not be entitled for any interest on the amount awarded but would be entitled to all other statutory benefits in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. 11. The A.H.O. is, accordingly, allowed in part. The im¬pugned order dismissing the First Appeal on the ground of limita¬tion is set aside subject to the stipulations made in the preced¬ing paragraphs. PRADIPTA RAY, J. I agree. A.H.O. allowed in part.