D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two matters are proposed to be dispose of by a common order and judgment. ( 2 ) THE prayer in this Civil Application is for vacating the ad-interim order passed in SCA No. 9381/2000 on 6-9-2000. No counter affidavit has been filed to this Civil Application. However, since the SCA No. 9381/2000 has been finally heard, the fate of this Civil Application will depend upon the fate of the Special Civil Application. ( 3 ) THE brief facts giving rise to this Special Civil Application are as follows : ( 4 ) BEFORE September, 1999, the petitioner was working as Pharmacist on contract basis under the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 with the respondent, ONGC Ltd. Subsequently, the petitioner was converted from contract labour to regular Pharmacist on contractual basis. On 7-9-1999, the respondent issued an advertisement in newspaper "gujarat Samachar" for the post of Pharmacist. Since the petitioner was already working as Pharmacist on contract basis, accordingly he appeared before a duly constituted selection committee of the respondent and the petitioner was selected as Pharmacist out of 31 candidates who appeared for interview before the selection committee. ( 5 ) THE petitioner received appointment letter dated 29/30-9-1999 offering appointment for the post of Pharmacist in the respondents dispensary purely on contract basis. He resumed duties on 12-10-1999. Initial appointment was for a fixed period of one year, which was subsequently extended through letter dated 13-7-2000 for a further period of one year from 1-8-2000. The respondent issued a circular dated 11/13-7-2000 calling for the names of departmental candidates for five posts of Junior Pharmacist. The petitioner was already working on contractual basis. He also made an application dated 24-7-2000 in pursuance to the said circular being a departmental candidate. He appeared for interview on 24-8-2000 but, he was not selected in the said interview. The petitioner has, therefore, challenged the action of the respondent in keeping the petitioner on contractual basis against clear vacancy and avoiding issuing regular and permanent appointment order under the garb of holding the interview. It is alleged that such action has been taken by the respondent with a view to keep the case of the petitioner under exception of sec. 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. But, this section does not apply in case of clear vacancy. It is alleged that such action has been taken by the respondent with a view to keep the case of the petitioner under exception of sec. 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. But, this section does not apply in case of clear vacancy. It is also alleged that the action of the respondent is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. It is further averred that the action of the respondent Corporation is against the certified Standing Orders, inasmuch as, the petitioner has completed 240 days in a period of 12 consecutive months and he became temporary employee, hence, he is entitled to be converted to the regular employee of the respondent and is further entitled to various benefits which the regular employees of the respondent are entitled. The interview taken by the respondent is alleged to be an eye-wash with a view to favour somebody. ( 6 ) WITH these averments, the prayer of the petitioner is for quashing the contractual agreement between the petitioner and the respondent contained in Annexure-d with declaration that the petitioner has acquired temporary status in service and is entitled to all benefits at par with the permanent and regular employees. ( 7 ) SEVERAL counter affidavits have been filed by the respondent Corporation. In short, the stand of the respondent Corporation is that the petitioner was appointed on contractual basis and he accepted the appointment fully knowing and understanding the terms of appointment, hence, a person who was appointed on contractual basis for a fixed term can not seek regularization nor he can seek absorption on permanent basis and claim monetary benefits which are given to permanent employees of the Corporation. It is also the stand of the Corporation that in the interview, in pursuance of the advertisement which was held on 24-8-2000, several candidates appeared but the petitioner was not successful in that interview, hence, he could not be appointed. It is also stated that the agreement Annexure-d was signed by the petitioner fully knowing its contents, hence, it can not be quashed. ( 8 ) I have heard the arguments of Shri TR Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri RH Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent. The record, affidavit and counter affidavits have also been perused. It is also stated that the agreement Annexure-d was signed by the petitioner fully knowing its contents, hence, it can not be quashed. ( 8 ) I have heard the arguments of Shri TR Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri RH Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent. The record, affidavit and counter affidavits have also been perused. ( 9 ) ANNEXURE-a is a report dated 16-1-1998, in which, it was mentioned that sanctioned strength of Pharmacist is seven, against which, filled in are six regular plus one on contractual basis. On superannuation of two Pharmacists, the shortage against the sanctioned posts will be three. In this view of the matter, it was requested that earlier action be taken to fill up the vacant posts. It seems that keeping in view this report, on 7-9-1999 vide Annexure-b advertisement was given in "Gujarat Samachar", in which, it was clearly specified that suitable and interested persons on job contract basis for a period of one year may apply in the following categories. Category- (1) is Pharmacist and the post was one. In the note of advertisement, it was mentioned that job is purely contractual and does not carry liability on ONGC for regular appointment at any stage. Note-2 provides that agreement is to be entered for job on contract post, etc. Thus, it was clear in the advertisement that applications were invited for job contract inter alia for Pharmacist and such job was purely contractual and there was no liability of ONGC, namely, the respondent for regular appointment of candidates at any stage. Reading fully well this advertisement, the petitioner applied and he was selected in interview held on 14-9-1999 vide Annexure-c dated 29/30-9-1999. In this letter of appointment also, it was indicated that the job was purely on contract basis (full time) and it was for a fixed period of one year which could be extended for another year on approval by the competent authority. One of the conditions of the appointment letter was that the petitioners appointment will be purely temporary on contract basis for a period of one year and can be discontinued at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. One of the conditions of the appointment letter was that the petitioners appointment will be purely temporary on contract basis for a period of one year and can be discontinued at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. Thus, the nature of appointment which flows from the appointment letter Annexure-c is that, it was purely temporary appointment on contract basis for a period of one year which could be discontinued at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. It, therefore, implies that even before completion of one year the appointment could be terminated without notice and without assigning any reason. Annexure-d is the agreement. Para-1 of the agreement shows that the contract was for a period of one year from 14-10-1999 and would come to an end on 1-7-2000 without any further notice. It was further mentioned that the period of contract can be extended on the same rates and terms and conditions for further period of one year if approved by the competent authority. Para-10 of the agreement provides that, except remuneration/benefits/terms mentioned herein, the Pharmacist shall not be entitled to claim regularization in employment or any other benefits/terms whatever either during the period of his engagement or after the termination of this agreement. The agreement was signed by the petitioner and it is difficult to accept the contention raised on his behalf that fraud was committed by the Corporation. In face of the above terms and conditions, there remains no ground for quashing and setting aside the agreement Annexure-d. ( 10 ) ANNEXURE-e is the copy of application dated 22-6-2000 of the petitioner requesting for one years extension because his contractual appointment was going to expire on 31-7-2000. In response of this application, the respondent gave reply dated 13-7-2000 Annexure-f that the competent authority had approved engagement of the petitioner for a period of one year with effect from 1-8-2000. In this also, it was clearly mentioned that the engagement of the petitioner was purely temporary on contract basis for a period of one year and can be discontinued at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. The petitioner was required to submit an agreement on non-judicial stamp paper of Rs. 20=00. In this also, it was clearly mentioned that the engagement of the petitioner was purely temporary on contract basis for a period of one year and can be discontinued at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. The petitioner was required to submit an agreement on non-judicial stamp paper of Rs. 20=00. Shri TR Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, argued that the agreement executed in consequence of Annexure-f was nothing but fraud and indicates in what manner the Corporation was practising fraud. His contention was that the stamp paper was purchased on a subsequent date whereas, the agreement was executed on a prior date. However, since that agreement has not been brought on record, nor its xerox copy, it can hardly be said that any fraud has been committed by the Corporation. Annexure-f itself indicates that the stamp paper was to be purchased by the petitioner and not by the respondent. Consequently, there was no occasion for the Corporation to practise fraud. As and when the stamp paper was purchased, on a subsequent date agreement was executed, and if it was made effective with an earlier date, namely, with effect from 1-8-2000, it was done to favour the petitioner and not to defraud him. ( 11 ) ANNEXURE-g is the application of the petitioner in response to the letter dated 13-7-2000 regarding various vacancies. The petitioner applied for the post of Pharmacist. In this application also, the petitioner mentioned that he was working as Pharmacist on contract basis since 12-10-1999. In face of this admission that the petitioner was working on contract basis, it does not lie in his mouth to say that he became temporary employee or permanent employee of the Corporation. ( 12 ) ON 9-8-2000, a memorandum was prepared by the Corporation, in which, candidates were invited to appear for interview on 24-8-2000 for appointment on the post of Junior Pharmacist on a term base for a period of four years. The petitioner did apply in response of this memorandum and advertisement. He appeared for interview but, he was not selected, as it appears from the counter affidavit filed by the respondent. No rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner that he was selected in the interview. The petitioner did apply in response of this memorandum and advertisement. He appeared for interview but, he was not selected, as it appears from the counter affidavit filed by the respondent. No rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner that he was selected in the interview. Moreover, this was also a term appointment for a period of four years and it will be deemed to be fixed term appointment and not regular appointment. ( 13 ) THERE is justification in the counter affidavit as to why contractual appointments were made. The justification is that, since regular appointment could not be made and looking to the requirement of the dispensary, it was thought proper to make appointment on contract basis for a period of one year, which could be extended for another period of one year provided the competent authority approved such extension. ( 14 ) THERE is thus, overwhelming evidence to show that the petitioner was appointed for a fixed term of one year on contract basis and this was purely temporary appointment which could be terminated without notice and without assigning any reason. The agreement Annexure-d was also executed between the parties on the same lines, where also, the nature of appointment of the petitioner is disclosed and admitted to be contractual appointment on temporary basis for a period of one year liable to be extended for another period of one year on approval by the competent authority. If this is so, then it is difficult to accept the contention of Shri Mishra that the petitioner having completed 240 days of service in a year is entitled to be considered as permanent employee. There are rules for appointment in the Corporation. Regular appointment can not be made in violation of those rules even for a fixed term appointments for a period of four years. Applications were invited from Employment Exchange and also from the departmental candidates, and after processing those applications, interviews were held and meritorious candidates were selected but, the petitioner could not succeed. As such, the petitioner can not be considered to be either permanent or temporary employee of the Corporation. Applications were invited from Employment Exchange and also from the departmental candidates, and after processing those applications, interviews were held and meritorious candidates were selected but, the petitioner could not succeed. As such, the petitioner can not be considered to be either permanent or temporary employee of the Corporation. ( 15 ) SHRI Mishra has drawn my attention to the certified Standing Order orders for contingent employees of the Corporation Annexure-j, and relying upon this, especially para-2, he contended that the contingent employees could be classified only under two heads : (a) Temporary and (b) Casual. A worker who has been on the rolls of the Commission and has put in not less than 180 days of attendance in any period of 12 consecutive months shall be a temporary workman, provided that a temporary workman who has put in not less than 240 days of attendance in any period of 12 consecutive months and who possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Commission may be considered for conversion as regular employee. It is further provided that a workman who is neither temporary nor regular shall be considered as casual workman. Shri Mishra further argued that certified Standing Orders have statutory force and no agreement like Annexure-d could be got executed in violation or in contravention of Standing Orders. Reliance was placed upon the Apex Courts verdict in B. R. P. S. PARISHAD v. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. A. I. R. 1990 S. C. 1801 and BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v. MAHARASHTRA GENERAL KAMGAR UNION 1999 S. C. C. (L and S) 361. There can be no dispute that Standing Orders after certification acquire statutory force, but in the instant case, Shri Rajni H. Mehta has rightly contended that the petitioner is not governed by the certified Standing Orders, inasmuch as, he was appointed for a fixed term of one year, which was liable to be extended for another period of one year after seeking approval of the competent authority. At this stage, it would be relevant to point out sec. 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which defines retrenchment. According to sec. 2 (oo) retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include inter alia sub-sec. 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which defines retrenchment. According to sec. 2 (oo) retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include inter alia sub-sec. (bb) the termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein. It is thus clear from sec. 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act that there can be a contract of employment for a fixed period, and if there is such contract then the employer can terminate the service of the employee on expiry of the contract or in terms of the stipulation contained in the contract. In view of this, it further implies that fixed term contract of employment is not prohibited under the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, the appointment of the petitioner for a fixed term of one year can not be said to be illegal or contrary to the provisions contained in the certified Standing Orders Annexure-g. ( 16 ) SHRI Mishra has referred to the pronouncement in DHARANGADHRA CHEMICAL WORKS LTD. v. STATE OF SAURASHTRA and ORS. 1957 (1) L. L. J. 477 and argued that the relationship of employer and employee is to be determined on the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in this case. He has referred the following observations :"the line between an independent contractor and a servant is often a very fine one; it is a mixed question of fact and law, and the Judge has to find and select the facts which govern the true relation between the parties as to the control of the work, and then he or the jury has to say whether the person employed is a servant or a contractor. "in my view, this observation of the Apex Court does not apply to the facts of the case before me because, here it is not to be decided whether the petitioner was a servant or an employee of the Corporation or a contractor. "in my view, this observation of the Apex Court does not apply to the facts of the case before me because, here it is not to be decided whether the petitioner was a servant or an employee of the Corporation or a contractor. The nature of his employment is determined from the various material placed on record and referred to above to be an employment for a fixed period of one year terminable without notice and without assigning any reason. ( 17 ) SHRI Mishra has also referred to the Apex Courts verdict in WESTERN INDIA MATCH COMPANY LTD. v. WORKMEN (1974) 3 S. C. C. 330. It was laid down in this case that, as long as the Standing Order is in force, it is binding on the Company as well as the workmen. To uphold the special agreement would mean giving a go-by to the Acts principle of three-party participation in the settlement of terms of employment. So we are of opinion that the inconsistent part of the special agreement is ineffective and unenforceable. It was a case arising out of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was further laid down in this case that, the terms of employment specified in the Standing Order would prevail over the corresponding terms in the contract of service in existence on the enforcement of the Standing Order. While the Standing Orders are in force, it is not permissible to the employer to seek statutory modification of them so that there may be one set of Standing Orders for some employees and another set for the rest of the employees. To my mind, this case is also distinguishable for two reasons. Firstly, the petitioners appointment was not under the certified Standing Orders, on the other hand, his appointment was for a fixed term of one year and secondly, there was no move of the Corporation seeking modification of the statutory Standing Orders, hence, no benefit of this case can be given to the petitioner. ( 18 ) SHRI Mishra also contended that the contract contained in Annexure-d is not enforceable, hence, it has to be struck down. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the Apex Courts verdict in CENTRAL INLAND WATER TRANSPORT CORPORATION LTD. v. BROJO NATH A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 1571. Special reference was made by Shri Mishra of para-20 of this judgment. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the Apex Courts verdict in CENTRAL INLAND WATER TRANSPORT CORPORATION LTD. v. BROJO NATH A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 1571. Special reference was made by Shri Mishra of para-20 of this judgment. Referring to mandate of Art. 14 of the Constitution, the Apex Court observed that the principle is that courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract entered into between the parties who are not equal in bargaining power. In the case before me, it can hardly be said that either the whole of the agreement contained in Annexure-d or any clause therein is unfair and unreasonable in its nature. Looking to the requirement and exigency of the situation, the Corporation had rightly decided to engage a Junior Pharmacist for a fixed term of one year till regular appointment is made. All terms and conditions were mentioned in the advertisement, as well as, in the appointment letter and extended appointment letter and also in the agreement. Consequently, it is not a case where the agreement Annexure-d or any clause in Annexure-d is unreasonable or unfair. Consequently, the Court can not quash and set aside Annexure-d. It may also be mentioned that on the request of the petitioner his contract of service for a fixed term was extended upto 31-7-2001 vide para-3 (i) of further affidavit-in-reply dated 7-3-2001 and para-15 of additional affidavit-in-reply dated 21-11-2000. It is also mentioned in para-3 of Civil Application No. 2823/2001 that upon interviews held on 24-8-2000 and the recruitment action inviting applications from eligible individuals through the Employment Exchange and Departmental Circular candidates were selected and one Junior Pharmacist has joined the project on regular appointment on 5-9-2000 and another on 18-12-2000 and the petitioner was not selected. In view of these events, the interim order dated 6-9-2000 in the Special Civil Application can not be permitted to be continued. ( 19 ) FURTHER, in view of the above discussions, I do not find any merit in Special Civil Application No. 9381/2000. The result, therefore, is that the Special Civil Application fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to cost. ( 19 ) FURTHER, in view of the above discussions, I do not find any merit in Special Civil Application No. 9381/2000. The result, therefore, is that the Special Civil Application fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to cost. ( 20 ) IN view of my observation above that the interim order can not be continued, the Civil Application has to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The interim order dated 6-9-2000 is vacated for two reasons. Firstly, on the ground what is stated while deciding the Special Civil Application and secondly, because the Special Civil Application has been dismissed the interim order automatically goes away. There shall not be any order as to cost in the Special Civil Application. April___, 2001. [ D. C. Srivastava, J. ] /sakkaf Shri TR Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner requests for continuance of interim order so as to enable him to file LPA. Interim order is extended upto June 13, 2001 as such. .