JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 30.11.99 (Annx. 1), by which the Additional District Collector, Barmer has accepted the revision filed by respondent No. 5 under the provisions of Section 97 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (for short, 'the Act, 1994'). 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the Gram Panchayat, Mokalsar had issued a Patta in favour of the petitioner on 4.6.88 in pursuance of the Resolution dated 15.1.86. The said allotment was challenged by the respondent No. 5 by filing the revision No. 1/97 before the respondent No. 2 under Section 97 of the Act, 1994. After hearing the parties, the said revision has been accepted vide impugned order dated 30.11.99 to (Annx. 1). Hence this petition. 3. The facts involved herein depict that the land in dispute, at one time, was in the physical possession of the respondent No. 5 and a Patta had been issued in favour of one Pokar Mal in 1980. The said allotment was challenged in the revision, which was allowed by the Additional District Collector vide order dated 6.2.89 (Annx. R/1) by an ex-parte order as no notice had been served upon said Pokar Mal and he had also made a will in favour of respondent No. 5 on 3.9.85. Pokar Mal died on 17.10.92 and when the said respondent No. 5 applied for permission for construction on the said plot on 16 6.97, at that time he came to know that the allotment in favour of Pokar Mal had already been quashed. He also came to know that the allotment had been made in favour of the present petitioner. Respondent No. 5 filed the revision before the respondent No. 2 under Section 97 of the Act, 1994 on various grounds including that Patta had been issued in violation of rules 265 of 278 of the Rajasthan Panchayat (General) Rules, 1961 (for short, `the Rules, 1961'). The respondent No. 2 decided the said petition recording the following findings of facts : "(1) The land had already been allotted to one Pokar Mal in 1980 and revision petition against that allotment was pending before the Revisional Authority. The respondent No. 2 decided the said petition recording the following findings of facts : "(1) The land had already been allotted to one Pokar Mal in 1980 and revision petition against that allotment was pending before the Revisional Authority. The same was decided, ex parte against Pokar Mal, on 6.2.89; (2) As the matter was sub judice, the land in dispute was not available for allotment prior to the date of cancellation of allotment in favour of Pokar Mal; (3) The question of passing the resolution for allotment in favour of the present petitioner on 15.1.86 and the sale deed in pursuance thereof dated 4.6.88. are inconsequential; (4) While making the allotment in favour of the present petitioner, rules 255-278 of Rajasthan Panchayat (General) Rules, 1961 had not been followed; (5) While making the allotment in favour of the present petitioner, he had been shown having possession over the land in dispute for a long time, which was not factually correct; (6) Even there had been manipulations while making the allotment and depositing the amount for the said allotment; and (7) The proceedings had been completed in a hurried manner without observing the Rules. In view of the aforesaid findings of facts, the allotment in favour of the petitioner was contrary to the Rules and without jurisdiction for the reason that the land was not available for allotment. In such a case, Writ Court does not require to interfere even if there is some illegality or technical breach of so law or Rules. 4. This Court has very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution as per the law laid down in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 38 , wherein it has been held that, even the errors of law cannot be corrected that even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution and the power can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal etc. has resulted in grave injustice. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal etc. has resulted in grave injustice. (Vide Constitution Bench judgments of the Apex Court in D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58 ; and Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division & Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398 ). For interference under Article 227, the finding of facts recorded by the Authority should be found to be perverse or patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. (Vide Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 15 SC 1895 ; Rukmanand Bairoliya v. the State of Bihar & ors., AIR 1971 SC 746 ; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & ors., AIR 1980 SC 1896 ; Laxmikant R. Bhojwani v. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 ; Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Pravinbhai Jasbhai Patel & ors., (1097) 7 SCC 300 ; M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. v. 20 Sub-Judicial Magistrate & ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 ; and Virendra Kashinath Ravat & ors. v. Vinayak N. Joshi & ors., (1999) 1 SCC 47 .It is well settled that power under Article 227, is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up set conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. (Vide Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni & Ors., (1998) 3 SCC 341 ; Chandra Bhushan v. Beni Prasad & Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 70 ; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevate & ors. v. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171 ; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. v. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 143 . Unless the findings are patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal position on record, exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution may not be justified and in that eventuality disturbing the findings of facts would amount to jurisdictional error. (Vide Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Anr., (1999) 4 SCC 1 ). Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. (Vide Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Anr., (1999) 4 SCC 1 ). Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (Vide Union of India & ors. v. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521 . Similarly, in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that there is no justification for the High Court to substitute its view for the opinion of the Authorities/Courts below as the same is not permissible in proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. 5. Similarly, a Full Bench of this Court in Chiman Lal v. State of Rajasthan & ors., 2000 (2) RLW 911 , vide judgment and order dated 18.2 2000, has considered the aspect of interference in allotment at a very belated stage and held that the revisional powers can be exercised at any time provided (i) the order has been obtained by fraud; (ii) order is so obtained by misrepresentation or collusion with public authority by the private party; (iii) order is against public interest: (iv) the order is without jurisdiction, (v) order is in clear violation of the statutory rules or provision of the Act; and (vi) order is void/void ab initio being against public policy or otherwise.The Court further observed as under : "The Common Law doctrine of public policy can be enforced wherever an action affects/offends public interest or where harmful result of permitting the injury to the public at large is evident. In such type of cases, revisional power can be exercised by the Authority at any time either suo moto or as and when such orders are brought to their notice." 6. In Maharaja Chintamani Sararnath v. State of Haryana & ors., (1999) 8 SCC 16 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that even it the order is found to be bad/illegal/without jurisdiction, the Courts may not interfere if setting-aside the order amounts to reviving an invalid order" 7. Similar view had been reiterated in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & ors., AIR 1966 SC 828 . 8. Mr. Similar view had been reiterated in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & ors., AIR 1966 SC 828 . 8. Mr. Joshi has submitted that under Section 97 of the Act, 1994, the revisional powers had been conferred upon the Government of Rajasthan and the Government has delegated the powers. vide Notification No. F. 4 (138/LSG/58/417) dated 1.1.1962, to be exercised by the District Collector and as in the instant case the revisional powers have been exercised by the Additional Collector, the order impugned is without jurisdiction, Mr. Singhvi has submitted that the definition of `Collector' contained in Clause (vi) of Section 2 of the Act, 1994 is inclusive and provides that `Collector' includes `Additional Collector', therefore, the powers, which have been delegated to the Collector, can be exercised by the Additional Collector also. In support of his submission, Mr. Singhvi placed reliance on the judgment in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. & Anr., JT 1996 (1) SC 8 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P & ors., (1986) 1 SCC 939 and held as under : "In the matter of construction of enabling statute, the principle applicable is that if the legislature enables something to be done, it gives power at the same time by necessary implication to do every thing which is undispensable for the purpose of carrying out a purpose in view. (See : Craies on Statute, 7th Edn. 258). It has been held that the power to make a law with respect to any subject carries with it all the ancillary and incidental power to make the law effective and workable and to prevent evasion." Mr. Singhvi further placed reliance upon the majority judgment in Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr v. Company Law Board & ors., AIR 1967 SC 295 , wherein it was held as under: "But the maxim `delegatus non potest delegare' must not be pushed too far. The maxim does not embody a rule of law. It indicates a rule of construction of a statute or other instrument conferring an authority. Prima facie, a discretion conferred by a statute on any authority is intended to be exercised by that authority and by no other. The maxim does not embody a rule of law. It indicates a rule of construction of a statute or other instrument conferring an authority. Prima facie, a discretion conferred by a statute on any authority is intended to be exercised by that authority and by no other. But the intention may be negatived by any contrary indications in the language, scope or object of the statute. The construction that would best achieve the purpose and object of the statute should be adopted." Be that as it may, the issue does not require consideration as the petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction before the Additional District Collector. 9. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in M/s. Pannalal Binjraj & ors. v. Union of India & ors., AIR 1957 SC 397 , explained the scope of estoppel observing that once an order is passed against a person and without raising any objection he submits to the jurisdiction or complies with such order, he cannot be permitted to challenge the said order for the reason that such conduct of that person would disentitle him for any relief before the Court. Similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425 ; Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow & ors., AIR 1976 SC 2428 ; Maj Chander Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullan Khan & ors., AIR 1978 SC 1814 ; Karan Pal v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 774 , Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla & ors., AIR 1986 SC 1043 ; Prasun Roy v. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority & ors., AIR 1988 SC 205 ; State of Punjab v. Krishan Niwas, AIR 1997 SC 2349 ; Union of India & ors. v. N. Chandrasekharan, AIR 1998 SC 795 ; Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb, AIR 1999 SC 2089 ; Suneeta Aggarwal v. State of Haryana & ors., (2000) 2 SCC 615 ; and Municipal Commissioner, Calcutta & ors. v. Salil Kumar Banerjee & ors., (2000) 4 20 SCC 108 . 10. In M/s. Power Control Appliances & ors. v. Sumeet Machines (P) Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 448 , the Apex Court observed as under : "Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the right It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim. v. Salil Kumar Banerjee & ors., (2000) 4 20 SCC 108 . 10. In M/s. Power Control Appliances & ors. v. Sumeet Machines (P) Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 448 , the Apex Court observed as under : "Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the right It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim. It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as involved in laches. In Harcourt v. White, 54 ER 382 , Sir John Romilly said. It is important to distinguish mere negligence and acquiescence. Therefore, acquiescence is one facet of delay...... If the acquiescence in infringement amounts to consent, it will be a complete defence as was laid down in Mouson (J.G.) & Co. v. Boehm, (1884) 26 Ch.D. 406 . The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the interference of a licence sufficient to create a new right in the defendant as was laid down in Rodgers v. Nowill, (1847) 2 DeGM & G. 614 ." 11. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel) which is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. Similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. v. K.P. Rohila, 1998 RLW 342 . 12. In the instant case as the allotment had been made in flagrant violation of the Statutory Rules, the same cannot be saved and is liable to be struck down. Thus the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant any review of revisional order by which the allotment in favour of the petitioner has been cancelled. 13. Thus, in view of the above, I find no force in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******