JUDGMENT R.C. Chopra, J. - This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeks quashing of FIR No. 270/99 under Sections 186/ 353/ 307/ 34. IPC. and Sections 25/27/54/59. Arms Act, registered with Police Station, Chanakyapuri. New Delhi and the proceedings arising therefrom. A challan has already been filed on the basis of the aforesaid FIR and the proceedings are pending before the Trial Court. 2. The facts relevant for disposal of this petition briefly stated are that on 23-7-1999 K.P. Singh. SI, Anti-Robbery Cell of the Crime Branch received a secret information that some dreaded criminals of U.P. would be coming to Ashoka Hotel. Chanakyapuri to kidnap some traders for heavy ransom. On the basis of this information a raiding party was organised, which was headed by one A.C.P. The police team reached Ashoka Hotel, Chanakyapuri at about 11:30 a.m. and took position waiting for the criminals to come. At about 11.45 a.m. one Maruti Zen and one Opel Astra entered the hotel premises. The informer pointed out towards the vehicles and informed the SI that they were the criminals, who would not hesitate to open fire even on the police party. The police team found that there was a large crowd in the lobby and the porch and as such, it decided not to immediately confront the occupants of those two cars, who had entered the hotel after alighting from the cars. They started waiting for them. At about 12.15 p.m. the persons (including the present petitioner) came out and got seated in their respective cars. According to the prosecution, the petitioner was sitting on right side of the back seat of Opel Astra. When a Head Constable and a Constable gave a signal to these vehicles to stop, the petitioner allegedly pointed his mouser towards the police party and his other colleague named Azad Singh, who was on the left seat in front portion of the car, took out his rifle and pointed the same at the police party. Another person whose name later transpired as Ram Pratap and was sitting alongwith the petitioner on the back seat exhorted the driver Mithu to run over the police officers. He thereupon tried to run over the police officers. In the meanwhile driver of the Zen car started firing at the police party with his pistol. Another person whose name later transpired as Ram Pratap and was sitting alongwith the petitioner on the back seat exhorted the driver Mithu to run over the police officers. He thereupon tried to run over the police officers. In the meanwhile driver of the Zen car started firing at the police party with his pistol. The police officers tried to stop his car by hitting it with their sticks. The police party tried to block road also by placing their Armada vehicle but driver of the Zen car whose name later on came to be known as Sri Ram @ Saria Pehlwan fired shots at the driver of the Armada even. Under these circumstances. SI K.P. Singh with a view to protect his own life and lives of the other staff and in the interest of public safety fired two shots with his service revolver towards driver of the Zen car, one of which hit the driver who fell on the left side of the vehicle and thereafter his car hit a three-wheeler scooter which was standing there. Four persons sitting in Opel Astra including the present petitioner came out of their car and by pointing their arms towards the police tried to escape, but were over powered. The driver of Zen car was lying injured in his car and a pistol was found lying near his legs. He was taken to the Hospital where he was declared dead. A pistol was recovered from Zen car - with one live cartridge and one live cartridge magazine. A mouser was recovered from the possession of the petitioner which had one bullet in its chamber with six additional bullets. Nine live cartridges were recovered from the bag also kept on the back seat of Opel Astra. One rifle with five live rounds was also recovered from co-accused of the petitioner. Recovered arms and ammunition were seized and sealed into parcels. A Rukka was sent to the police station, on the basis of which an FIR was registered and after necessary investigations, a challan as aforesaid was filed against the petitioner and his other co-accused. 3. I have heard Mr. R.K. Anand, Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Anil Soni, Standing Counsel for the State. 4. A Rukka was sent to the police station, on the basis of which an FIR was registered and after necessary investigations, a challan as aforesaid was filed against the petitioner and his other co-accused. 3. I have heard Mr. R.K. Anand, Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Anil Soni, Standing Counsel for the State. 4. Before adverting to the contentions raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his plea for quashing the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom, this Court must remind itself that the powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C vested in the High Court are to be exercised to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. The powers are not aimed at interfering with normal course of judicial proceedings. It is only in exceptional cases where the Court is satisfied that an FIR is groundless, does not disclose any offence and the proceedings arising therefrom are an abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court can invoke its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code and come to the rescue of the person being victimised. This course can be adopted when the averments made in the FIR even if accepted in entirety do not make out any offence. While exercising these powers, however, the Court would not embark upon any inquiry as to whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not as these have to be taken at their face value. In State of Bihar v. Murad AU Khan1; Mrs. Dhanakshmi v. R. Prasana Kumar2, Apex Court issued guidelines that the High Court would be justified to exercise its inherent powers and quash the proceedings, but justification for interference would be only when the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous. vexatious or oppressive. The judgments in State of Bihar v. Raj Narain Singh3; State of U.P. through CBI, SPE, Lucknow v. R.K. Srivastava4 are also relevant to the questions raised in this petition. Pre-judging the prosecution case by examining its weaknesses and contradictions is not permissible. 5. vexatious or oppressive. The judgments in State of Bihar v. Raj Narain Singh3; State of U.P. through CBI, SPE, Lucknow v. R.K. Srivastava4 are also relevant to the questions raised in this petition. Pre-judging the prosecution case by examining its weaknesses and contradictions is not permissible. 5. A perusal of the F.I.R. report under Section 173, statements of the witnesses and other material being relied upon by the prosecution prima facie shows that the FIR against the petitioner is neither groundless nor it can be said that it does not disclose commission of any offence whatsoever or the ingredients of the offence are not alleged even. When the police party signalled the cars to stop in one of which the petitioner was also seated the petitioner pointed his mouser towards one of the policemen. Some of his other co-accused also did so and the one who was sitting on the back seat of the Opel Astra with the petitioner exhorted the driver of the car to run over the police officers. It appears that actually an attempt was made to run over the police officers. The occupants of the Zen car, who had come with the petitioner to Ashoka Hotel and were going back with him, also tried their best to escape and in that effort. even firing was resorted to by the driver of Zen car on the police party. The driver of the Armada belonging to the police was also tried to be shot at and in response when the police opened fire, driver of Zen car got hit and was fatally injured. Arms and ammunition was recovered from the petitioner and his co-accused. It is true that the petitioner is raising a defence that the had a licence for mouser, but the prosecution says that it was not a valid licence. Some other arms recovered from co-accused of the petitioner were without any licence. Therefore, the challan filed against the petitioner and his co-accused is for commission of offences under Sections 186/ 353/ 307/34, IPC and under Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the impugned FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom are an abuse of the process of law and prosecution has nothing to show that the accused had gone to the spot to commit any offence. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the impugned FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom are an abuse of the process of law and prosecution has nothing to show that the accused had gone to the spot to commit any offence. It is also submitted that no empty shells were recovered from the Zen car to show that the driver had started firing and no finger prints of the deceased were lifted from the pistol found in the Zen car. It is argued that the entire episode was a make-believe story to shield the police officers, who had killed an innocent citizen. It is submitted that there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner had committed any offence inasmuch as merely pointing a mouser towards a police officer did not constitute an offence under Section 186 or 353, IPC. It is also submitted that Section 34, IPC cannot be invoked against the petitioner for commission of offence under Section 307, IPC as he was not sitting in the Zen car nor he had exhorted anybody to run the car over the police officers. It is also submitted that the petitioner and others in the cars did not know that the party asking them to stop, was a police party and as such, they were not bound to stop their cars on their asking. Keeping in view the parameters, laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C., it can be stated at the outset that while considering the prayer for quashing an FIR under Section 482 of Cr. P.C, High Court has to accept the allegations made in the FIR at their face value. At this stage, pre-judging the prosecution case by examining its weaknesses or contradictions is not permissible. The Court can quash an FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom only when it is shown that the averments made in the FIR even if accepted in their entirety do not constitute any offence. 7. At this stage, pre-judging the prosecution case by examining its weaknesses or contradictions is not permissible. The Court can quash an FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom only when it is shown that the averments made in the FIR even if accepted in their entirety do not constitute any offence. 7. The contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the prosecution has no material to prove that the petitioner and his colleagues had gone to Ashoka Hotel for commission of an Offence and as such, the police party had no right to stop them, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the police officers even on the basis of a suspicion that some one is likely to commit an offence, have the authority to question him so that commission of an offence may be prevented. In this case, not only that the petitioner and his accomplices committed various acts of commission and omission, as enumerated in the FIR, they were also found fully armed and some of the weapons were without licence even. Therefore, it cannot be said that the signal of the police officers to the petitioner and his accomplices to stop was unwarranted and illegal and as such, it could be flouted. Some of the policemen were in uniform also and as such, it cannot be said that the petitioner and his accomplices did not know that police team was asking them to stop. The contention that no empty shells were recovered from the Zen car or that no finger prints of the deceased were lifted from the pistol found in the Zen car, are not to be examined by this Court. These submissions can be more appropriately made before the Trial Court for consideration. The pointing of his mouser towards the police officers by the petitioner prima facie suggests commission of an offence under Sections 186 and 353, IPC inasmuch as on seeing the mouser being aimed at him, the police officer must have got terribly shaken obstructing him in discharge of his official duties. It will also be a matter for consideration by the Trial Court as to whether Section 34, IPC or any other provision holding the petitioner vicariously liable for offence under Section 307, IPC is made out OF not. It will also be a matter for consideration by the Trial Court as to whether Section 34, IPC or any other provision holding the petitioner vicariously liable for offence under Section 307, IPC is made out OF not. Not only the driver of the car in which the petitioner was sitting, tried to run over, the police officer but the occupants of the other car, who had come with the petitioner and were moving out with the petitioner, had opened fire on the police party it is alleged that even after corning out of the car, the petitioner and his accomplices had tried to run away by showing the arms to the police officers. It, therefore, cannot be said that the impugned FIR does not disclose any offence whatsoever and as such, is liable to be quashed. 8. In view of the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered view that the impugned FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom are not liable to be quashed as prayed. The petition, therefore, stands dismissed. 9. Nothing stated herein shall be taken as an expression of opinion on merits of the case pending before the Trial Court. Petition dismissed. 1. AIR 1989 SC 1 . 2. AIR 1990 SC 494 . 3. 1991 Cr1.L.J. 1416. 4. AIR 1989 SC 2222 .