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2001 DIGILAW 286 (AP)

Y. Sreeranganayaki v. B. V. Subba Rao

2001-03-16

G.BIKSHAPATHY

body2001
ORDER : G. Bikshapathy, J. The Contempt Case is filed alleging disobedience of the orders of this Court in Writ Petition No. 33671 of 1998 dated 3-12-1998. 2. The application was filed on 19-11-1999. This Court issued notice before admission on 9-12-1999. Subsequently a counter has been filed by the respondent contending that the contempt case is barred by limitation on the ground that it was not admitted within one year from the date of the cause of action and therefore the contempt case has to be dismissed. 3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Mr. M.V. Ramana Reddy has submitted that the question of limitation may be decided as a preliminary issue before going into the merits of the contempt case. 4. The writ petition was filed seeking writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the authorities in not extending the benefit of the proceedings of the Commissioner of Collegiate Education dated 20-4-1998. The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 3-12-1998 with the following directions: "The second respondent-College shall implement the order of the first respondent dated 20-4-1998 in respect of the petitioner, if she falls within the guidelines issued in the aforesaid proceedings, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." 5. The contempt case is filed complaining deliberate violation of the orders of this Court referred to above originally on 18-11-1999 but it was returned for compliance of certain office objections and finally it was received by the Registry on 3-12-1999. It is the case of the respondent that the contempt case was not admitted within the time prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. While this Court disposed of the writ petition on 3-12-1998 the contempt case was filed on 10-11-1999 but it was not admitted even till today. Therefore the contempt petition is not maintainable. 6. The issue that arises for consideration is whether this Court is entitled to entertain the contempt case beyond the time stipulated under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act? 7. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent contends that under Section 20 of the Act the Court is entitled to initiate any proceedings for contempt within a period of one year from the day on which the contempt was alleged. 7. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent contends that under Section 20 of the Act the Court is entitled to initiate any proceedings for contempt within a period of one year from the day on which the contempt was alleged. He further submitted that the contempt proceedings can be initiated under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and also this Court is entitled to invoke the power under the Constitution being a Court of record under Article 215 and that it is entitled to exercise the power to punish for contempt of itself. Even while exercising the power under Article 215 the limitation as prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act has to be adhered to as held by Justice Jagannadha Rao as he then was in the case reported in The Advocate General of A.P. v. A.V. Koteswara Rao, 1984 (1) ALT 69 and the said decision was approved by the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal, AIR 2000 SC 1136 . 8. The issue that arises for consideration is whether the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is applicable to the proceedings initiated by the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India? 9. Now it is well settled by a catena of decisions that the initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act for brevity) should confine to the limitation under Section 20 of the Act and the Act complaint of should be brought to the notice of this Court within a period of one year. It is not only filing contempt case but the Court should have applied its mind and issue notice after application of mind either for proceeding for the contempt of the Court or for punishment. The mere presentation of the petition would not amount to initiation of contempt proceedings and it has a distinct connotation. The Supreme Court in the recent case which was relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in Om Prakash Jaiswal (2 supra) observed in para 17 as follows: "The jurisdiction to punish for contempt is summary but the consequences are serious. The Supreme Court in the recent case which was relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in Om Prakash Jaiswal (2 supra) observed in para 17 as follows: "The jurisdiction to punish for contempt is summary but the consequences are serious. That is why the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings in contempt as also the jurisdiction to punish for contempt in spite of case of contempt having been made out are both discretionary with the Court. Contempt generally and criminal contempt certainly is a matter between the Court and the alleged contemnor. No one can compel or demand as of right initiation of proceedings for contempt. Certain principles have emerged. A jurisdiction in contempt shall be exercised only on a clear case "having been made out. Mere technical contempt may not be taken note of. It is not personal glorification of a judge in his office but an anxiety to maintain the efficacy of justice administration system effectively which dictates the conscience of a judge to move or not to move in contempt jurisdiction. Often an apology is accepted and the felony condoned if the judge feels convinced of the genuineness of the apology and prestige of the Court having been restored. Source of initiation of contempt proceedings may be suo motu, on a Reference being made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or on Reference made by a Subordinate Court in case of criminal contempt. A private party or a litigant may also invite the attention of the Court to such facts as may persuade the Court in initiating proceedings for contempt. However, such person filing an application or petition before the Court does not become a complaint or petitioner in the proceedings. He is just an informer or relator. His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the Court. It is thereafter for the Court to act on such information or not to act though the private party or litigant moving the Court may at the discretion of the Court continue to render its assistance during the course of proceedings. His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the Court. It is thereafter for the Court to act on such information or not to act though the private party or litigant moving the Court may at the discretion of the Court continue to render its assistance during the course of proceedings. That is why it has been held that an informant does not have a right of filing an appeal under Section 19 of the Act against an order refusing to initiate the contempt proceedings or disposing the application or petition filed for initiating such proceedings. He cannot be called an aggrieved party. There is no dispute about the proposition that the contempt case has to be admitted within one year from the date of the alleged contempt of the orders of this Court. But the most important question that arises for consideration is whether the said limitation can be made applicable to the proceedings under Article 215 of the Constitution. For the purpose of contempt the High Court was declared as the Court of record under Article 215 and it has been vested with all powers of such Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Thus, the Constitution has specifically conferred plenary powers on the High Court under Article 215. The learned Senior Counsel submits that this issue also was decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court Justice Jagannadha Rao (as he then was) and he held that the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Act is not only applicable to the proceedings initiated under the Contempt of Courts Act but also the proceedings attracted to cases of High Court also. He has made this observation referring to the case dealt with by the Supreme Court in Board of Revenue, Uttar Pradesh v. Vinay Chandra, AIR 1981 SC 723 wherein the Supreme Court was considering the question whether the High Court could suo motu take cognisance of a contempt of a subordinate/inferior Court when it was not moved in either of the two modes mentioned under Section 15(2) of the 1971 Act and in that connection the Supreme Court referred to Article 215 of the Constitution of India and observed that the only limitations upon Article 215 are those contained in the contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Supreme Court observed that entry 14 of List III of Seventh Schedule is to this effect contempt of Court but not including contempt of the Supreme Court. A provision analogous to Article 215 is Article 129 which preserves to the Supreme Court all the powers of a Court of record including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The Supreme Court further observed that Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court as the Court of Record which included the power to punish the contempt of itself. The Supreme Court also observed in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1625 that there are no curbs on the powers of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself except those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. The learned judge after referring to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in J.P. Gupta v. Chakarvarty, 1975 Crl.LJ. 164(All.) observed as follows: "30. The law may therefore be summarised as follows: The Constitution declared in Art. 215 that the High Court is a Court of Record the High Court has therefore an inherent power to punish the contempt of itself the power having been declared by the Constitution cannot surely be abrogated by an ordinary law but can certainly be regulated. The Constitution has made a clear provision for the passing of such a law by Parliament or the State Legislature as provided in Article 19(2). Entry 14 of List III and Entry 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. The procedural restrictions regarding the quantum of punishment as made in Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and regarding the period within which contempt proceedings are to be initiated as made in Section 20 of the said Act are not ultra virus of Article 215. Nor is it permissible to read down Section 12 or Section 20 by restricting their operation to cases other than the contempt of the High Court covered by Article 215. Both Section 12 and Section 20 apply to cases initiated by the High Court for contempt of itself as well as to cases of contempt of the subordinate Courts. Nor is it permissible to read down Section 12 or Section 20 by restricting their operation to cases other than the contempt of the High Court covered by Article 215. Both Section 12 and Section 20 apply to cases initiated by the High Court for contempt of itself as well as to cases of contempt of the subordinate Courts. The tenor of the judgment of the Supreme Court dealing with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, in my opinion leaves no doubt that Section 20 was held to apply to cases of contempt of the High Court itself. That answers the first question arising in this case." It is to be noted that the issue which fell for consideration before the learned judge was whether the contempt case filed under the provisions of the Act was within the time prescribed under Section 20 of the Act. But whether the, limitation prescribed under Section 20 is also applicable to the proceedings initiated under Article 215 of the Constitution of India did not fall for consideration. In the process of deciding the issue the learned Judge observed that the limitation fixed under Section 20 is also applicable to the proceedings under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The ratio laid down by the learned Single Judge with regard to the limitation of proceedings of the provisions of the Act stipulated under Section 20 was approved by the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Jaiswal (2nd cited supra), namely, the interpretation of the expression "Initiate any proceedings for contempt" the Supreme Court in that regard delineated certain situations touching on this expression in para 14 which is extracted below. "In order to appreciate the exact connotation of the expression 'initiate any proceedings for contempt' we may notice several situations or stages which may arise before the Court dealing with contempt proceedings. These are: (i) (a) a private party may file or present an application or petition for initiating any proceedings for civil contempt, or (b) the Court may receive a motion or reference from the Advocate General or with his consent in writing from any other person or a specified Law Officer or a Court subordinate to High Court. (ii) (a) the Court may in routine issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against or. (ii) (a) the Court may in routine issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against or. (b) the Court may issue notice to the respondent calling upon him to show-cause why the proceedings for contempt be not initiated. (iii) The Court may issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against calling upon him to show cause why he be not punished for contempt." Tracing out the concept of contempt and the need to exercise the power to punish the contemnor the Supreme Court observed in para 16 as follows: "A look at the concept of contempt and need for care and circumspection to be exercised before initiating proceedings for contempt would show the necessity for enacting Section 20 and devising therein the concept of 'initiation of proceedings for contempt'. Availability of an independent judiciary and an atmosphere wherein judges may act independently and fearlessly is the source of existence of civilisation in society. The writ issued by the Court must be obeyed. It is the binding efficacy attaching with the commands of the Court and the respondent for the orders of the Court which deter the aggrieved persons from taking the law in their own hands because they are assured of an efficacious civilised method of settlement of disputes being available to them wherein they shall be heard and their legitimate grievances redeemed. Any act or omission which undermines the dignity of the Court is therefore viewed with concern by the society and the Court treats it as an obligation to zealously guard against any onslaught on its dignity. In Re. Clements Republic of Costa Ric v. Erlanger (1877 46 LJCh. 370, 385, Sir George Jessel M.R. said: It seems to me that this jurisdiction of committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited, should be most jealously and carefully watched and exercised. If I may say so, with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of Judges, to see whether there is no other mode which is not open to the objection of arbitrariness and which can be brought to bear upon the subject. I say that a judge should be most carefully to see that the cause cannot be fairly prosecuted to a hearing unless this extreme mode of dealing with persons brought before him on accusation of contempt should be adopted. I say that a judge should be most carefully to see that the cause cannot be fairly prosecuted to a hearing unless this extreme mode of dealing with persons brought before him on accusation of contempt should be adopted. I have myself had on many occasions to consider this jurisdiction and I have always thought that, necessary though it may be, it is necessary only in the sense in which extreme measures are sometimes necessary to preserve men's rights, that is if no other pertinent remedy can be found, probably that will be discovered after consideration to be true measure of the exercise of the jurisdiction." The Supreme Court in the case in The Commissioner, Agra v. Rohtas Singh, 1997 (10) Supreme 319 observed: "A contempt proceedings is often described as a quasi-criminal proceeding because it results in punishment for the contemnor. The proceeding, however, cannot be equated with the prosecution of a criminal by the State. Contempt proceedings are essentially a matter between the Court and the contemnor. Contempt jurisdiction enables the Court to ensure proper administration of justice and maintenance of the Rule of Law. It is meant to ensure that the Courts are able to discharge their functions properly, unhampered and unsullied by wanton attacks on the system of administration of justice or on officials who administer it and to prevent wilful defiance of orders of the Court or undertakings given to the Court. That is why the Supreme Court and the High Court have an inherent power to punish for contempt even de hors legislation pertaining to contempt of Court." Referring to the definition of contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act the Supreme Court observed as follows: "This is apparent also from the definition of "contempt" under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Two types of contempt are defined. Under Section 2(b), civil contempt means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. Two types of contempt are defined. Under Section 2(b), civil contempt means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. While criminal contempt is defined under Section 2(c) to mean the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by sign, or by visible representations, or otherwise), of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings, or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. From this definition it is clear that the Courts' power to punish for contempt is a power which is required in furtherance of proper administration of justice and presenting the authority of the Court. This power is expressly preserved under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. That is why the question of contempt is a question which is essentially between the Court and the contemnor." Thus the power of contempt exercised by this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution is de hors the powers under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. It is no doubt true that while exercising powers under the provisions of the Act, limitation has to be applied as stipulated under Section 20 of the Act but can such limitation be allowed to come in the way of the High Court while exercising the power under Article 215 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court was very categoric that the power under Article 215 is expressly preserved to the High Court and that this power is de hors the legislation pertaining to the Contempt of Courts Act. This view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 (8) SCALE 366 wherein it was held as follows: 'In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India ( 1998 (4) SCC 409 ) the plenary power and contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court came up for consideration of this Court and in that context Articles 129, 142, 144 and 215 of the Constitution were noticed. This Court held that the Courts of record enjoy power to punish for contempt as a part of their inherent jurisdiction; the existence and availability of such power being essential to enable the Courts to administer justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner and to uphold the majesty of law and prevent interference in the due administration of justice. No act of Parliament can take away that inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Record to punish for contempt and Parliament's power of legislation on the subject cannot be so exercised as to stultify the status and dignity of the Supreme Court and/or the High Courts though such a legislation may serve as a guide for their determination of the nature of punishment which a Court of Record may impose in case of established contempt; Power to investigate and punish for contempt of itself vesting in Supreme Court flows from Articles 129 and 142 (2) of the Constitution, independent of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (para 21). Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for the punishment which shall ordinarily be imposed by the High Court in the case of an established contempt. This section does not deal with the powers of the Supreme Court to try or punish a contemnor in committing contempt of the Supreme Court or the Courts subordinate to it (paras 28, 29, 37). Though the inherent power of the High Court under Article 215 has not been impinged upon by the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, the Act does provide for the nature and types of punishments which the High Court may award. The High Court cannot create or assume power to inflict a new type of punishment other than the one recognised and accepted by Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971." 10. Referring to Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India the Supreme Court had categorically laid down that the power to punish for contempt is the inherent power unfettered by any other legislation on the subject. Referring to Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India the Supreme Court had categorically laid down that the power to punish for contempt is the inherent power unfettered by any other legislation on the subject. The Supreme Court in para 9 of the judgment in T. Sudhakar Prasad case (7 cited supra) held as follows: "Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India declare Supreme Court and every High Court to be a Court of Record having all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. These articles do not confer any new jurisdiction or status on the Supreme Court and the High Courts. They merely recognise a pre-existing situation that the Supreme Court and the High Courts are Courts of record and by virtue of being Courts of Record have inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt of themselves. Such inherent power to punish for contempt is summary. It is not governed or limited by any rules of procedure excepting the principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable. It cannot be taken away or whittled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to the Constitution. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and not in derogation of Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated by the said two Articles." (emphasis supplied) In view of these two authoritative pronouncements wherein the Apex Court clearly ruled that the inherent power to punish for contempt can be exercised de hors the provisions of the legislation. The Supreme Court clearly held that the power under Article 215 was exclusively reserved to the High Court being the Court of Record to punish the contemnor. Can it be said that the limitation under Section 20 of the Act can fetter such powers. Even though the learned Single Judge held that procedure prescribed under Section 20 would also govern the field while initiating action under Article 215, with great respect that was not the intendment of the constitutional provision. Moreover the learned Judge was dealing with the limitation under Section 20 of the Act but the issue had not arisen under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Moreover the learned Judge was dealing with the limitation under Section 20 of the Act but the issue had not arisen under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge intended to lay down the law of limitation while exercising the powers under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, I am of the clear view that under Article 215 of the Constitution of India gives an independent and exclusive power to the High Court to punish for contempt of its orders unfettered by the limitational embargo prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. When the Constitution did not place any such limitation while drafting the Article 215 this Court is provide^ with complete discretion to deal with the matter. Of course when dealing with the matter under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act this Court is bound to apply the question of limitation under Section 20 but when the issue is being dealt with under Article 215 the question of limitation would not apply. It is purely discretion of this Court either to entertain the contempt case or not, whether the contempt is initiated suo motu or otherwise. 11. Admittedly in the instant case the contempt case is not admitted even (ill today beyond the period of one year. Even though directions were granted in 1998 the orders of this Court have not been complied with and the application was filed beyond one year's period. But that will not make any difference in the eye of law. This Court is entitled to convert the application filed under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and treat it as an application under Article 215 of the Constitution. This can be done to preserve the majesty of law and the decorum and dignity of the High Court. Therefore, even though the application under the Contempt of Courts Act is barred by time yet this Court takes cognizance under Article 215 of the Constitution of India uninhibited by any limitation and proceed with the matter. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent is rejected. 12. Post the Contempt Case for further/hearing on 23-3-2001.