Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner is seeking the relief of writ of certiorari against an order passed by the first respondent dated 10.12.1993. By that order, the first respondent has pointed out to the petitioner that the petitioner was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Nilgiris Udhagamandalam to undergo rigorous Imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- that she was convicted for an offence under Section 366 I.P.C. and also convicted for the offence under Section 5(1) (b) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act The authority further says that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D. Coimbatore has reported this conviction to the Department and therefore, a notice was given to her whereby she was asked to show-cause as to why Telephone No. 424993 working in her name should not be disconnected. The communication further proceeds to suggest that the representation sent by the petitioner dated 20.9.1993 was considered and it was found that the petitioner had committed violation of Rules 416 (2) (C), 421 and 427 of the Indian Telegraph Rules and therefore, it was decided to disconnect the telephone with effect from 18.12.1993. It is this communication, which has been challenged by the petitioner. 2. Counter has been filed by the 4th respondent Deputy Superintendent of Police, who has been joined as a party respondent to this petition. He points out in his counter affidavit that the petitioner P.T. Thangam with her close friend Tr. D. Ethiraj and Tr.P. Krishnan abducted two girls from Ooty. It is pointed out that the said Ethiraj was himself a Deputy Superintendent of Police while P. Krishnan was a Traffic Reserve Sub-Inspector, Ooty town. It is then pointed out in the counter that the petitioner P.T. Thangam was a notorious brothel keeper running a brothel house at her residence and she was running it for over twenty years and was in the habit of procuring girls for her brother house under the pretext of offering them good jobs at Madras, that she was a history-sheeter and she was provided with telephone connection bearing No. 424993 for her residence at Madras. It is then contended that she had been using the telephone for the above said immoral trade of brothel running. It is then contended that she had been using the telephone for the above said immoral trade of brothel running. It is then pointed out that she was convicted in a criminal case which went on against her for offences under Section 120-B, 366 419 and 109 I.P.C. and Sec 5(1) (b) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act. It is generally on these grounds that the Deputy Superintendent of Police proceeds to suggest the reason for the action which he had proposed to the Telephone Authority for being taken against the petitioner. 3. In their counter, the Department merely suggests that a showcause notice was given to which the petitioner already pointed out that she had filed an appeal against the said conviction which has been relied upon by the Department as a basis to snap her telephone connection and that the said Criminal appeal was pending before the High Court vide Crl. Appeal No. 62 of 1992. The Department then suggests that they were acting under Rule 416(2) (c) to disconnect the telephone, on account of their being satisfied that the Indian Telegraph Rules are violated by the Subscriber. In short, the whole thrust of the Department is that the petitioner has violated the Indian Telegraph Rule No. 427. 4. It will therefore be better to consider Rule 427. The Rule merely says that a subscriber shall be personally responsible for the use of his telephone and that no telephone shall be used to disturb or irritate any person or for transmission of any message or communication which is of an indecent or obscene nature or is calculated to annoy any person or to disrupt the maintenance of public order or in any other manner contrary to any provision of law. Unfortunately, for the Department, there is nothing on record to suggest that any of these things has been done in respect of this telephone. The only circumstances available with the Department is that the petitioner has been convicted for an offence under Section 366 I.P.C as also under Section 5(1) (b) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act along with some other allied sections. However, even that conviction is not final because an appeal against the same is pending before this court. Merely because a person is convicted, that by itself would not give a handle to the Department to disconnect the telephone. However, even that conviction is not final because an appeal against the same is pending before this court. Merely because a person is convicted, that by itself would not give a handle to the Department to disconnect the telephone. A thorough enquiry would have to be made and it has to be found by way of fact that the petitioners telephone was used for indecent purposes and that it was used to disturb or irritate any person by transmitting indecent or obscene message which were calculated to annoy any person or that, such messages were sent from that telephone as were enough to disturb the maintenance of public order. Unfortunately, we see from the impugned order passed by the authorities that there is absolutely nothing in the order mentioning that the petitioner was convicted and the Deputy Superintendent of Police had sent the recommendation to disconnect the telephone. In fact, a look at the explanation given by the petitioner is sufficient to suggest that the petitioner had herself pointed out in her explanation that the case against her was a foisted one and that the appeal was pending against the conviction. She had also pointed out that she had already given detailed explanation. Even before this court the learned counsel contended that there was nothing on record to show that the telephone was used in any incorrect manner. 5. In their counter, even Rule 421 was tried to be relied upon by the Department in which there is a power to disconnect the telephones. All that is stated in that rule is that where the Divisional Engineer is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is necessary to do so, he may after giving the subscriber a notice in writing for a period which shall not except in emergent cases be less than 7 days, disconnect the telephone, and in such case, the subscriber shall be entitled to refund of rent for the unexpired portion of the period for which connection or service was given. In so far as Rule 421 is concerned, that power can be used only after recording the proper reasons which would therefore give the discretion to the court to test whether the reasons are sufficient and proper. In this case, the reason given is the conviction of the petitioner which has also not been finalised as yet. In so far as Rule 421 is concerned, that power can be used only after recording the proper reasons which would therefore give the discretion to the court to test whether the reasons are sufficient and proper. In this case, the reason given is the conviction of the petitioner which has also not been finalised as yet. That would be hardly a reason. Therefore, this Rule will not apply and the reliance of the Telephone Authority on that rule is inconsequential. 6. From the impugned order, it is seen that the authority had relied upon both Rule 416 (2) (c) and 421 besides Rule 427. Under Rule 416 (2) (c), the Telephone Authority can reject any application for connection of a new telephone or for providing any similar service or for alteration of any existing service. Therefore, it is obvious that, that rule will not apply in case of disconnection. The sub rule ‘c’ says that the Telephone Authority can reject any such application on the basis of a report made by any Gazetted Officer of the Central Government or a State Government recommending in the interests of maintenance of law and order, not giving of such a connection. The rule is wholly inapplicable here, because in this case, the telephone connection was already given and there will be therefore no question. 7. In the result, it is held that the order disconnecting the telephone would be incorrect in law and would be liable to be quashed. It is accordingly quashed and the writ petition is allowed. No costs. W.M.P 34504/93 is closed.