JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J.—The judgment and decree of learned District Judge, Bilaspur dated April 17, 1995, is under challenge in this second appeal. 2. The facts are few and not disputed. The land subject matter of dispute, hereinafter referred to as the "disputed land" alongwith other lands was owned and possessed by Bhangi Ram to the extent of half share. The other half share was owned by Shri Chaudhary, brother of Bhangi Ram. Bhangi Ram died some where in 1955 before coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (the Act for short) leaving behind his widow Ramku. After the death of Bhangi Ram, two documents were executed between Ramku and Chaudhary on March 2, 1955. First document, (Ext. DW1/B), purports to be sale in respect of the entire share of deceased Bhangi Ram in favour of Chaudhary by Ramku. Second document (Ext. DW1/A), purports to be an agreement, by which Chaudhary left 12 bighas 1 biswas of land out of the share of deceased Bhangi, for the maintenance of Ramku. It was stipulated in the agreement that Ramku will have life interest in this land and Chaudhary will be entitled to its possession after her death. 3. Ramku filed the suit, out of which this appeal arises, before the learned Sub Judge, Ghumarwin in March, 1984 praying for declaration that she, in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, has become full owner in possession of the suit land which measures 6 bighas 16 biswas. 4. The suit was resisted by Chaudhary defendant on the grounds: (a) the defendant gave this land, alongwith other land, to Smt. Ramku on March 2, 1955 for her "maintenance till her life". Therefore, the provisions of Section 14(i) of the Act are not attracted and the disputed land is liable to revert back to him after the death of Ramku, (b) Ramku had filed a suit before learned Senior Sub Judge, Bilaspur, in 1971 for possession of the land, left by her husband, sold to defendant Chaudhary by her on March 2, 1955 and, therefore, Ramku cannot maintain the present suit. 5. 5. Learned trial Court vide its judgment dated April 10, 1987 returned findings that in the facts of this case, limited rights of Ramku in the land, including the disputed land, given to her for maintenance were enlarged in full ownership in view of the provisipns of Section 14(1) of the Act. The question whether the present suit is maintainable in view of the earlier suit was not urged before the learned trial Court. 6. During the pendency of the suit, Ramku died and she was abstituted by her daughter Ajudhia. The suit was decreed. Aggrieved, Chaudhary defendant filed an appeal before the learned District Judge. Learned District Judge upholding the findings of the trial Durt, by impugned judgment and decree, dismissed the appeal. 7. Still not satisfied, defendant Chaudhary approached this Court this appeal. The appeal was admitted on July 14, 1995 on the following substantial questions of law : (a) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is applicable? (b) Whether the suit for declaration filed by the respondent/ plaintiff is hit by the principle of res- judicata? 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. The only question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act would be applicable in the facts of the case: (a) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is applicable? 9. It is not disputed that Ramku had life interest in the estate of her husband after his death. Defendant, by document Ext. DW1/ B dated 2.3.1955, got a sale registered, in respect of the share of Bhangi, in his favour from Ramku. By another document (DW1/ A), executed simultaneously, 12 bighas 1 biswas of land, including the disputed land, was reconveyed to Ramku for her maintenance till her life. The question, therefore, is whether Ramku became full owner of the land under Section 14(1) of the Act after it came into force in 1956. Section 14 reads: "14. By another document (DW1/ A), executed simultaneously, 12 bighas 1 biswas of land, including the disputed land, was reconveyed to Ramku for her maintenance till her life. The question, therefore, is whether Ramku became full owner of the land under Section 14(1) of the Act after it came into force in 1956. Section 14 reads: "14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.—(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.— Explanation.—In this sub-section "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, nor by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." 10. It may be noticed that any property possessed by a Hindu female, irrespective of how it was acquired, becomes her absolute property after coming into force of the Act in view of the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act. Thus, restrain or limitations on the part of the Hindu female in respect of the property given to her as maintenance till her life and possessed by her in that capacity ceased. Under sub-section (1) of Section 14, a female inherits the property without any limitations. Sub-section (2) to Section 14 is exception to sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) applies where Hindu female acquires and possess the property in recognition of her preexisting right, whereas, sub-section (2) applies where Hindu female gets the property for the first time without any pre-existing rights over such property. Sub-section (2) to Section 14 is exception to sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) applies where Hindu female acquires and possess the property in recognition of her preexisting right, whereas, sub-section (2) applies where Hindu female gets the property for the first time without any pre-existing rights over such property. The Apex Court in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others v. Veddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs.} AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1944, interpreting the scope of Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Act, noticed that sub-section (1) and Section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance whether such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was subsequently acquired or possessed. In such a situation, female Hindu become the full owner of the property. Sub-section (2), it was observed, is in the nature of proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and it being an exception to a provision calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic condition of a woman in Hindu society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1). Their Lordships furhter observed: "......It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob subsection (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section (1)". 11. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the possession of Ramku on the disputed land was not pursuant to the pre-existing rights of maintenance. The argument is that Ramku divested herself of any right, title or interest in the land of her husband including disputed land after its sale to defendant Chaudhary. It was Chaudhary who taking pitty on Ramku gave some land, including the disputed land, to her for her maintenance till her life. In these circumstances, submits learned Counsel for the appellant, Ramku came to acquire the suit land not in recognition of her pre-existing right of maintenance in her husbands estate but pursuant to an agreement with Chaudhary, Ext. DW2/B, which gave her only life interest for the purpose of maintenance. The submission does not stand the test of legal scrutiny. 12. In these circumstances, submits learned Counsel for the appellant, Ramku came to acquire the suit land not in recognition of her pre-existing right of maintenance in her husbands estate but pursuant to an agreement with Chaudhary, Ext. DW2/B, which gave her only life interest for the purpose of maintenance. The submission does not stand the test of legal scrutiny. 12. It is no longer res-integra that even if property in question : is possessed by a female Hindu in lieu of her right to maintenance against the estate of her husband or the joint family property, such female Hindu would become full owner of such property in view of the fact that her right of maintenance is traceable to the right against her husbands estate. 13. In Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai and others, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1493, Hindu female acquired a property, on the death of her husband, before the commencement of the Act. The acquisition was limited as widows estate. The widow lost possession of the property on account of transaction in favour of an alienee by a registered document of sale. This property was re-transferred to her by the alienee after coming into force of the Act by a registered document. Thus widows interest which she had parted, was restored back to her. On these facts, Their lordships observed in para 5 : "5. On an analysis of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, it is evident that the legislature has abolished the concept of limited ownership in respect of a Hindu female and has enacted that any property possessed by her would thereafter be held by her as a full owner. Section 14(1) would come into operation if the property at the point of time when she has an occasion to claim or assert a title thereto. Or, in other words, at the point of time when her right to the said property is called into question. The legal effect of Section 14(1) would be that after the coming into operation of the Act there would be no property in respect of which it could be contended by anyone that a Hindu female is only a limited owner and not a full owner. The legal effect of Section 14(1) would be that after the coming into operation of the Act there would be no property in respect of which it could be contended by anyone that a Hindu female is only a limited owner and not a full owner. (We are for the moment not concerned with the fact that sub-section (2) of Section 14 which provides that Section 14(1) will not prevent creating a restricted estate in favour of a Hindu female either by gift or will or any instrument or decree of a Civil Court or award provided the very document creating title unto her confers a restricted estate on her). There is nothing in Section 14 which supports the proposition that a Hindu female should be in actual physical possession or in constructive possession of any property on the date of the coming into operation of the Act. The expression possessed has been used in the sense of having a right to the property or control over the property. The expression any property possessed by a Hindu female whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act on an analysis yields to the following interpretation: (1) Any property possessed by a Hindu female acquired before the commencement of the Act will be held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. (2) Any property possessed by a Hindu female acquired after the commencement of the Act will be held as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner— Since the Act in terms applies even to properties possessed by a Hindu female which are acquired after the commencement of the Act, it is futile to contend that the Hindu female shall be in possession of the property before the commencement of the Act. If the property itself is acquired after’ the commencement of the Act, there could be no question of the property being either in physical or constructive possession of the Hindu female before1 the coming into op -eration of the Act. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that possession, physical or constructive, or in a legal sense, on the date of the coming into operation of the Act is not the sine qua non for the acquisition of full ownership in property. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that possession, physical or constructive, or in a legal sense, on the date of the coming into operation of the Act is not the sine qua non for the acquisition of full ownership in property. In fact, the intention of the legislature was to do away with the concept of limited ownership in respect of the property owned by a Hindu female together. Section 4 of the Act (it needs to be emphasised) provides that any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu or Custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in the Act. The legislative intent is, therefore, abundantly loud and clear, to erase the injustice and remove the legal shackles by abolishing the concept of limited estate, or the womens or widows estate-once and for all. To obviate hair-splitting, the legislature has made it abundantly clear that whatever be the property possessed by a Hindu female, it will be of absolute ownership and not of limited ownership notwithstanding the position obtaining under the traditional Hindu Law. Once it is shown that at the point of time when the question regarding title to property held by a Hindu female arises, she was possessed of the property on that date, in the eye of law, the property held by her would be held by her as full owner and not as limited owner. In other words, all that has to be shown by her is that she had acquired the property and that she was possessed of the property at the point of time when her title was called into question. When she bought the property from the alienee to whom she had sold the property prior to the enforcement of the Act, she acquired the property within the meaning of the explanation to Section 14(1) of the Act. The right that the original alienee had to hold the property as owner (subject to his right being questioned by the reversioner on the death of the female Hindu from whom he had purchased the property) was restored to her when she got back the right that she had parted with. Whatever she had lost earlier, was now regained by her by virtue of the transaction. Whatever she had lost earlier, was now regained by her by virtue of the transaction. The status quo ante was restored in respect of her interest in the said property. In the eye of law, therefore, a transaction by which the vendee of the Hindu female acquired an interest in the said property was reversed and the Hindu female was restored to the position prevailing before the transaction took place. In other words, in the eye of law, the transaction stood obliterated or effaced. What was done by virtue of the document executed in favour of the transferee was undone. Such would be the consequence of a retransfer by the alienee in favour of a Hindu female from whom he had acquired an interest in the property in question. Thus, on the date on which her right to the property was called into question, she was possessed of the property which she had inherited, from her husband she having by then re-acquired and regained what she had lost And by virtue of the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, the limitation which previously inhere in respect of the property disappeared upon the coming into operation of the Act. It is no longer open to anyone now to contend that she had only a limited ownership in the said property and not a full ownership, the concept of limited ownership having been abolished altogether, with effect from the coming into operation of the Act" (Emphasis supplied) 14. In the present case, though the widow Ramku alienated the share of her husband in the joint property to Chaudhary, brother of her husband, but at the same time, Chaudhary had reconveyed some of the property, including the suit land, to Ramku under an agreement rcognising her maintenance right on the estate of her husband. The conclusion is inevitable that at the time of coming into force of the Act, Ramku was in possession of the suit property in recognition of her pre-existing rights. In these circumstances, sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act would come into play blossming the limited rights of Ramku into full ownership rights over the disputed land. The question is accordingly answered. (b) Whether the suit for declaration filed by the respondent/ plaintiff is hit by the principle of res judicata. 15. This question was not stressed before me during the course of hearing. The question is accordingly answered. (b) Whether the suit for declaration filed by the respondent/ plaintiff is hit by the principle of res judicata. 15. This question was not stressed before me during the course of hearing. Otherwise also, the present suit cannot be said to be barred by the principles of res judicata. It is true that Ramku filed a suit before the learned Senior Sub Judge, Bilaspur in the year 1971 for possession of the land which she had alienated to defendant Chaudhary by a sale deed dated 2.3.1955. The suit was filed on the allegations that she was not being given maintenance as agreed to by the defendant Chaudhary. In that case, it was found, on the admission of Ramku, that Ramku infact was given 12 bighas and 12 biswas of land by Chaudhary for her maintenance. It is for this reason that the suit of Ramku for possession was dismissed. 16. In order to succeed on the plea of res judicata, it must be proved that matter in the present suit was directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit. Admittedly, the question whether limited right of Ramku for maintenance in the disputed land got enlarged into full ownership rights, in view of the provision of Section 14(1) of the Act, was not in issue in the previous suit filed by Ramku. A matter cannot be directly in issue unless it has been alleged by one party. As noticed earlier, that suit was filed on the ground that maintenance as stipulated in the agreement was not being provided by the defendant. The suit in the circumstances cannot be said to be barred by the principles of res judicata (See : Lonankutty v. Thomman and another, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1645). 17. The question is accordingly answered. 18. No other point is urged before me. 19. In result, appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.