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2001 DIGILAW 290 (ALL)

JINTENDRA ALIAS JEETU v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE

2001-03-27

M.KATJU, S.K.JAIN

body2001
M. KATJU, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Governmentadvocate. The petitioner has challenged the impugned notice dated 25-1-2001, under Section 3 (1) of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1971, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. The said notice is reproduced below :- ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Bhim Sain Tyagi v. State of U. P. through D. M. Mahamaya Nagar, 1999 (2) JIC 192 : (1999 All LJ 1845) and has submitted that in view of the said decision the impugned notice is invalid. We are not in agreement with the submission. ( 3 ) WE have carefully perused the decision of the Full Bench in Bhim Sain Tyagis case (supra) and we are of the view that the said decision is distinguishable. In our opinion, all that the above Full Bench decision as well as the decision in Ramji Pandey v. State of U. P. , 1981 ALJ 897 : (1981 Cri LJ 1083) say is that mere mention of some first information reports in the show cause notice is not sufficient compliance of the requirements of Section 3 of the Act, since the Act requires that the general nature of the material allegations must also be given. In our opinion, this only means that it is not sufficient to merely mention the case crime number, Section of I. P. C. . and name of the police station relating to an FIR in the show cause notice. In addition to the above, the show cause notice must also mention briefly what has been alleged in the FIR (though it is not necessary to reproduce the entire FIR ). and name of the police station relating to an FIR in the show cause notice. In addition to the above, the show cause notice must also mention briefly what has been alleged in the FIR (though it is not necessary to reproduce the entire FIR ). Section 3 (1) and (2) of the Act state :" (1) where it appears to the District Magistrate- (a) that any person is a Goonda; and (b) (i) that his movements or acts in the district are causing, or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property; or (ii) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is engaged, or about to engage, in the district or any part thereof, in the commission of any offence punishable under Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII, or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, or under the U. P. Excise Act, 1910, or in the absence of any such offence, and (c) that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence against him by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property -the District Magistrate shall by notice in writing inform him of the general nature of the material allegations against him, in respect of clauses (a), (b) and (c) and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. (2) The person against whom an order under this Section is proposed to be made shall have the right to consult and be defenced by a counsel of his choice and shall be given a reasonable opportunity of examining himself, if he so desires, and also of examining any other witnesses that he may wish to produce in support of his explanation, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing the District Magistrate is of opinion that the request is made for the purpose of vexation or delay. " ( 4 ) A careful perusal of the impugned notice shows that the general nature of material allegations against the petitioner have been mentioned therein. These general nature of material allegations are that the petitioner is a notorious goondas who has created terror in the locality by his criminal activities. He forcibly extracts money from the public of the locality and in fact this is his source of livelihood. These general nature of material allegations are that the petitioner is a notorious goondas who has created terror in the locality by his criminal activities. He forcibly extracts money from the public of the locality and in fact this is his source of livelihood. People are terrorised by him an even the police is not able to catch hold of him and nobody is willing to file a first information report or give evidence against him. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel, for the petitioner submitted that there must be a criminal case pending against the petitioner before a notice under Section 3 of U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1971 could be issued. We do not agree with this submission. There are goondas who create such terror that nobody is willing to file a first information report against them and hence obviously no case will be pending against them. In Harsh Narain v. D. M. Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 762, a Division Bench of this Court held that it is not necessary that there should be a criminal case pending against a goonda to invoke the provisions of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act. In fact it is to deal with such bad elements that the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1971 was enacted. If people were willing to give evidence and file first information reports against such persons, there would have been no need to enact the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, and the ordinary criminal law i. e. Cr. P. C. and IPC would have been sufficient to deal with the situation. It is only because in our society there are such elements who terrorise the public and commit all kinds of crimes and forcibly extract money from the public and the ordinary law was found to be inadequate to deal with them that a special law was required to deal with such situations. ( 6 ) THE validity of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act has been upheld by this Court in Raja v. State, 1972 All LJ 83. ( 7 ) WE are, therefore, of the view that the decision in Bhim Sain Tyagi case (supra) is clearly distinguishable. The general nature of the material allegations have been mentioned in the impunged notice and hence we find no illegality in the same. ( 7 ) WE are, therefore, of the view that the decision in Bhim Sain Tyagi case (supra) is clearly distinguishable. The general nature of the material allegations have been mentioned in the impunged notice and hence we find no illegality in the same. The Supreme Court in Executive Engineer v. R. K. Singh, 1995 (8) JT 331 : ( AIR 1996 SC 691 ) and this Court in Bhunesh Misra v. State, 1998 (36) ACC 355, have held that the Court should not ordinarily interfere with a show cause notice. Acccordingly, this petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed. .