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2001 DIGILAW 290 (HP)

MEENAKSHI CHITKARA v. UNION OF INDIA

2001-10-15

K.C.SOOD

body2001
JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J.—This second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree of learned Additional District Judge (I) Shimla dated June 11, 1992. Litigation is of long standing and has a chequered history. Facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal may be noticed : 2. The area and boundaries of Lauriston Estate located in Lower Kaithu of Shimla town, is a question which has defied solution for forty years of the protracted litigation. 3. Arthur Ville rechristened as Lauriston was once owned and possessed by Mrs. AWC Bowder who sold this Property to Captain Malik Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana by a registered sale deed dated October 21, 1913 (Exhibit P6). The mutation was attested on January 4, 1921. Adjacent to this property, towards west, is located the estate known as Newton Ville which once belonged to one Mrs. W.J.S. Britts. The property was destroyed in fire. The vacant site of this estate was also purchased by Captain Malik Umar Hayat Khan. It is the admitted position that Captain Malik Umar Hayat Khan was the owner of three Estates. Lauriston, Newton Ville and Garden View, which are in contiguity, immediately before the partition of the Country in the year 1947. After the partition of the country, all these three Estates, Lauriston, Newton Ville and Garden View became Evacuee properties and vested with the defendant No. 1 Union of India under Administrative Evacuee Property Act, 1950. 4. In the year 1954, Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jullundur, on behalf of defendant No. 1, invited sealed tenders, for the sale of Evacuee Properties as mentioned in the pamphlet "Exhibit Dl". The property listed at Sr. No. 137 was Lauriston Evacuee No. 239/4. The original Plaintiff, Mr. Tek Chand Chitkara, Advocate (now represented by his legal representatives in this appeal as appellants) made a tender for Lauriston on September 11, 1954 for rupees 16,000. The letter of tender (Exhibit P2) reads : "COPY TENDER From Shri Tek Chand Chitkara S/o L. Kotu Ram. Advocate, Green View, Simla. To The Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jullundur. Dear Sir, I hereby offer to purchaser for a sum of Rs. 16,000 (Rupees Sixteen thousand only) the evacuee property known as Ev. No. 239/4 known as "Lauriston" all lands appertenant to it. 2. I have understood the terms and conditions as stated in the Invitation of Tender and my tender is subject to the said conditions and terms. 3. Dear Sir, I hereby offer to purchaser for a sum of Rs. 16,000 (Rupees Sixteen thousand only) the evacuee property known as Ev. No. 239/4 known as "Lauriston" all lands appertenant to it. 2. I have understood the terms and conditions as stated in the Invitation of Tender and my tender is subject to the said conditions and terms. 3. I attach herewith, as security deposit, a Bank Draft on The Punjab National Bank Ltd. Jullundur City in your favour for a sum of Rs. 800 (Rupees Eight Hundred). Yours faithfully, Sd/- Tek Chand Chitkara Advocate. Dated 11.9.1954 No. 644595 Dated 11.9.1954 For Rs. 800 detached. Sd/ Joga Singh 16.11.1954 Attested Sd/- Managing Officer (HQS) Office of the Regional Settlement Commissioner". 5. The tender of the plaintiff was accepted by a letter (Exhibit P3). The Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jullundur, conveyed to the plaintiff that it was decided to transfer the property Serial No. 137, "Lauriston" Evacuee No. 239/4, Lower Kaithu, Shimla w.e.f. March 1, 1955. He was also informed that sale would only be confirmed after the scrutiny of the claims for compensation and payment of balance amount, if any. 6. The case of the plaintiff, as spelled out in the last amended plaint, was that he tendered for Lauriston including the lands appurtenant thereto which was accepted by the defendant No.l without any demure, condition or change. According to the plaintiff, the entire consideration amount was paid to the defendant-Union of India and provisional ownership certificate was issued to the plaintiff and he, therefore, became owner of this estate. It is the further case of the plaintiff that Newton Ville which was destroyed in fire and subsequently purchased by Captain Malik Umar Hayat Khan, became part of Lauriston being land appurtenant to Lauriston Estate and plaintiff after purchase of Lauriston became owner of the Lauriston as well as Newton Ville. The entire Lauriston Estate thus was comprised in Khasra Numbers 141 Min, 141/2, 143, 144, 160, 163, 159, 161, 162, 164, 599/163 and 158 new Khasra Numbers of which, as shown in the revenue record, are 260, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 286, 287, 288, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317 and 398 as per Misal Hakiat for the year 1975-76 measuring 20 bighas 6 biswas. The plaintiff, it was pleaded, was given possession of the major portion of the lands and properties purchased by him under the Tender from the defendant No.l but possession of cattle shed and compound therewith comprised in Khasra Numbers 160, 161, 162, 163 and part of Khasra Number 159, new Khasra Numbers 276, 277, 278, 279, 280 and 281 was not given to him despite several demands made by the Defendant No. 1. His representations were rejected by the concerned authorities. Subsequent appeals, revisions and review were also dis-allowed. It is the case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 on June 11, 1959 illegally sold the cattle shed and lands attached thereto (Newton Ville) to Jaswant Ram defendant No. 2. The sale was confirmed on April 24, 1960. The cattle shed was on rent with defendant No. 3 at a monthly rental of rupees 17. It is the case of the plaintiff that after the purchase of the Lauriston by Capt.Malik Umar Hayat Khan, the properties comprised in Khasra Numbers 160, 161, 162, 163 and part of Khasra Numbers 159 became part of the Lauriston and, thus, plaintiff became owner of this property in view of the sale of Lauriston Estate to him. The plaintiff claim possession of this property on the basis of title. 7. Plaintiff prayed for a grant of decree for declaration that he is owner in possession of Khasra Numbers 260, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 286, 287, 288, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317 and 398 measuring 20 bighas 6 biswas and for possession of the land comprised in Khasra Nos. 276, 277, 278, 279, 280 and 281 along with cattle shed built thereon and the compound etc. The plaintiff also claimed possession of Khasra Number 398 if he was found not to be in possession of the same. 8. The defendants resisted the suit. Allegations were controverted. According to the defendants, plaintiff never became owner of Lauriston as he did not pay the entire amount of consideration. So far the property other than "lauriston" namely, "Newton Ville" was concerned, the defendants took a stand in their respective written statements that this property was never sold to the plaintiff nor he ever possessed the same. According to the defendants, two Estates Lauriston and Newton Ville were separate and distinct estates with built up properties. So far the property other than "lauriston" namely, "Newton Ville" was concerned, the defendants took a stand in their respective written statements that this property was never sold to the plaintiff nor he ever possessed the same. According to the defendants, two Estates Lauriston and Newton Ville were separate and distinct estates with built up properties. Both the properties are separated by a municipal road. It was also the case of the defendants that it was only built up area located on the lauriston estate as mentioned in the pamphlet at Sr. No. 137 Evacuee No. 239/4 which was sold to the plaintiff and not the entire estate of Lauriston. The plaintiff, it was pleaded, cannot claim any other land except the built up area. 9. There is no dispute that Newton Ville was purchased by the defendant No. 2 in public auction. 10. At this stage, it may be noticed that suit was filed in the year 1961. The learned trial Court by its judgment dated November 30, 1961 decided issue Nos. 1 to 6 and held under Issue No. 6 that the sale certificate was not issued in favour of the plaintiff, therefore, title in the property did not pass to the plaintiff and property still formed part of the compensation pool. The Civil Courts, therefore, did not have the jurisdiction, under Section 36 of the Displaced Persons (C&R) Act, 1954, to entertain the suit. The trial Court without deciding the remaining issues rejected the plaint. 11. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the judgment of the trial Court before the District Judge, Ambala. The District Judge, Ambala confirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Learned District Judge took a view that transfer of the property would only be complete when formal deed of transfer is executed. In second appeal filed against the orders of the District Judge, it was contended that the title to the property passed to the plaintiff as soon as his tender was accepted and amount of consideration was paid. This contention of the appellant was rejected. In second appeal filed against the orders of the District Judge, it was contended that the title to the property passed to the plaintiff as soon as his tender was accepted and amount of consideration was paid. This contention of the appellant was rejected. In Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench, of the Delhi High Court, which then had the jurisdiction over the then Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, held that the suit of the plaintiff was maintainable in the Civil Courts and remanded the case to the trial Court for disposal of the remaining issues in accordance with law. 12. After the case was remanded to the trial Court, plaintiff amended his plaint and issues No. 7 to 17 were settled afresh, in addition to issue Nos. 1 to 6 framed on July 13, 1961. The suit of the plaintiff for possession of the land comprised in Khasra Numbers 160, 161, 162, 163 and part of Khasra Number 159 together with the cattle shed built thereon and lands forming compound of thecattle shed was decreed. A decree for rupees 500 for the past mesne profits and future mesne profits at the rate of rupees 17 per month was also passed against the defendant No. 2. Both defendants No. 1 and 2 carried appeal(s) before the learned District Judge. Learned Additional District Judge who heard the appeal, allowed an application for amendment of the plaint and the suit was again remanded to the trial Court for deciding the case afresh in accordance with law. 13. By judgment and decree dated January 1, 1983, the trial Court (Sub Judge 1st Class (2) Shimla) decreed the suit of the plaintiff and declared the plaintiff to be the owner of the entire suit land including the cattle shed and vacant land attached to the same and also passed a decree for possession in respect of the land comprised in Khasra Numbers 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281 and 398. A decree for mesne profits of rupees 500 was passed against the defendant No. 2 for the period till March 21,1961 and for rupees 4412.65 paise from 22.3.1961 to the date of passing of the decree against the defendant No. 2. Future mesne profits against defendant No. 2 were also allowed. 14. Dis-satisfied, all the defendants filed separate appeals which were accepted on August 16,1985 by the then learned Additional District Judge, Shimla. Future mesne profits against defendant No. 2 were also allowed. 14. Dis-satisfied, all the defendants filed separate appeals which were accepted on August 16,1985 by the then learned Additional District Judge, Shimla. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed in its entirety. In second appeal (RSA No. 211 of 1985), the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court was set-aside and case was again remanded back to the learned Additional District Judge for decision afresh in accordance with law. In second appeal (RSA) No. 211 of 1985), it was found that the suit of the plaintiff could not have been dismissed in its entirety. 15. It was observed that it was not the case of any of the parties that the plaintiff had not been sold Lauriston and, therefore, the first appellate Court could not have denied the relief to "the plaintiff to which he was entitled to". The case on remand, was re-heard by the learned Additional District Judge, Shimla. The appeals of the defendant No. 1 and that of Defendants No. 2 and 3 were accepted and the appeal of the plaintiff was dismissed. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed in its entirety. The dismissal of the suit was in dis-regard to the observations made by this Court in RSA No. 211 of 1985. While remanding the case back to the learned District Judge, this Court observed that the learned Additional District Judge, in his earlier judgment, fell in error in dismissing the plaintiffs suit "in toto". This Court also observed that in case it was found that the entire property as claimed by the plaintiff was not sold to him, he could not have been denied the relief with respect to part of the property which was sold to him. The Court pointed out : "It was not the case of any of the parties to the controversy that the plaintiff had not been sold even an inch of land. On the other hand, the observations made by the learned first appellate Court clearly show that he was of the opinion that some part of the property known as Lauriston has positively been sold to the plaintiff by the Union of India. If so, it beats all comprehension as to how relief with respect to that part of the property could be denied to the plaintiff. If so, it beats all comprehension as to how relief with respect to that part of the property could be denied to the plaintiff. The above mentioned erroneous approach has also resulted in there being no findings whatsoever as to which part of the property was sold to the plaintiff and with respect to which part he had failed to establish his title." 16. Despite the observations noticed above, learned Additional District Judge in his wisdom proceeded to dismiss the suit in its entirety 17. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs are in another round of second appeal. 18. Before proceeding further, it may be fruitful to notice certain events which took place during the pendency of this un-usually protracted litigation. 19. Admittedly, as noticed earlier, Captain Malik Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, was the owner of the three adjoining estates Lauriston, Garden View and Arthur Ville. All these three estates became Evacuee Property on the partition of India and vested in the defendant No.l Union of India through its custodian under Section 8 of the Administrative Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The Custodian came in possession of all these three estates. Lauriston was purchased by plaintiff Tek Chand Chitkara under sealed tender. "Garden View" was purchased by Shri Kesho Ram Khurana in open auction and "Newton Villa" was purchased by Shri Jaswant Ram, defendant No. 2 also by open auction. All these three properties were sold by popular names of the Estates without detailing the area or identifying the estates by Khasra numbers/revenue record numbers. Dispute regarding the boundaries of these three Estates arose as early as 1956. Correspondence was exchanged between the original plaintiff and the Settlement Commissioner, Jullundur regarding the area of Lauriston purchased by the plaintiff (Exts. PW5/L and PW5/Q). On January 21, 1958, the Regional Settlement Commissioner wrote to the plaintiff Tek Chand Chitkara informing that these three estates were inspected by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner (Sales) on January 11, 1956 for demarcating the boundaries and that plaintiff was found entitled to the possession of Lauriston and the land attached to it measuring 5715 sq. yards. In accordance with the entry in the municipal record. The plaintiff was requested to surrender the possession of "Newton Ville" and the land attached to it to the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala immediately (Ext. D4). The document (Ext. yards. In accordance with the entry in the municipal record. The plaintiff was requested to surrender the possession of "Newton Ville" and the land attached to it to the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala immediately (Ext. D4). The document (Ext. D4) reads: "REGISTERED A.D. No. RSCJ/9/S/45/58/ST Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Office of the Regional Settlement Commissioner. 397-L, Model Town, Jullundur, To Shri Tek Chand Chitkara, Advocate, Lauriston, Simla-3. Sub: Demarcation of boundaries of Lauriston, Garden View and Newton Villa, Lower Kaith, Simla. Dear Sir, I am directed to inform you that above mentioned properties were inspected by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner (Sales) on 11th January, 1956 for demarcating the boundaries. As per your tender you are entitled to the possession of Lauriston and the land attached to it measuring in all 5715 sq. yards. In accordance with the entry in the Municipal records. The demarcation of the said properties will be made by the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala in accordance with the entries in the Municipal records. You are therefore requested to surrender the possession of Newton Villa and the land attached to it to the District Rent and Managing Officer, Ambala, immediately. Yours faithfully, For Regional Settlement Commissioner." However, again by an order dated June 12, 1958 (Ext. D2/Y) the District Rent Managing Officer, Shimla decided that the purchaser of "Lauriston" will get 5670 sq. yards of land and the purchaser of "Garden View" will get 4185 sq. yards. Two paths run through these properties. It was decided to keep the area of the two paths common between the two Estates which was 400 sq. yards. The District Rent Managing Officer, Shimla, therefore decided that an effective area of 5470 sq. yards. And 3985 sq. yards will go to the purchasers of "Lauriston" and "Garden View", respectively. 20. The dispute, could not be settled and, ultimately, Shri Kesho Nath Khurana, purchaser of "Garden View", filed a suit against the plaintiff Tek Chand Chitkara and Union of India for possession of the land comprised in Khasra Numbers 267, 272, 273 measuring 1800 sq. yards, which land is also subject of the present suit. The suit was filed on the premise that the land comprised in these three khasra numbers formed part of "Garden View" and Tek Chand Chitkara was in illegal possession over this land. yards, which land is also subject of the present suit. The suit was filed on the premise that the land comprised in these three khasra numbers formed part of "Garden View" and Tek Chand Chitkara was in illegal possession over this land. In that suit, Tek Chand Chitkara took a stand that the land in question formed part of Lauriston which was purchased by him. The dispute was finally decided by the judgment of this Court in RSA No. 63 of 1969 (Kesho Nath Khurana v. Union of India and Tek Chand Chitkara) dated August 14, 1981 (Ext. PA/2). It was held that these three khasra numbers, namely, 267, 272 and 273 are not part of "Garden View" and Kesho Nath Khurana could not be "held to be the owner of this property". It was further observed that these khasra numbers being on the western side of the road formed part of Lauriston. The Court held : ".....Thus, the oral evidence produced by the parties also does not help the appellant in establishing that the disputed khasra numbers are part and parcel of the "Garden View" purchased by him vide Ext P-3. On the other hand, it is proved that these khasra Nos. are part and parcel of the Lauriston estate sold to defendant No. 2 (Tek Chand Chitkara). , (Emphasis supplied) 21. Shri Kesho Nath Khurana filed SLP (C) No. 963 of 1981 against the judgment of this Court which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on November 18, 1983. Thus, the boundary dispute between the Garden View and Lauriston came to be settled and adjudicated. It was finally decided that Khasra Nos. 267, 272 and 273 formed part of "Lauriston" Estate. 22. So far the boundary dispute between Newton Ville and Lauriston is concerned, the dispute was compromised by the plaintiffs with the respondents, i.e., the legal heirs of Shri Jaswant Ram, the purchaser of Newton Ville as also Shri Mast Ram Gwala, respondent No. 3, who was in possession of the cow shed. The legal representatives of deceased Jaswant Ram, purchaser of Newton Ville, filed an application for the deletion of the name of respondents No. 2 (a) to 2 (h), presently owners of Newton Ville. In view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, this application was allowed and name of respondent-owners of Newton Ville stood deleted. The legal representatives of deceased Jaswant Ram, purchaser of Newton Ville, filed an application for the deletion of the name of respondents No. 2 (a) to 2 (h), presently owners of Newton Ville. In view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, this application was allowed and name of respondent-owners of Newton Ville stood deleted. Respondent No. 3 also made an application that his name be deleted from the array of respondents as no relief was claimed against him by the plaintiffs. This application was also allowed. Thus, the Us now remains only between the plaintiff-appellants and the Union of India. 23. During the course of hearing, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellants contended that in view of the settlement with the owners of "Newton Ville" and "Garden View", no boundary dispute in respect of "Lauriston Estate" remains to be settled. 24. It is true that after the settlement of dispute between the owners of three estates, normally, this litigation should have seen its burial. The Union of India, however, was un-yielding because it had taken a stand in the written statement that title to the property purchased under sealed tender by the plaintiff did not pass to him for want of issuance of formal sale certificate or execution of the transfer deed and also for the reason that entire sale consideration was not paid by the plaintiff. 25. It may be noticed that the plaintiff, in view of the cloud raised on his title by the stand of Union of India that ownership of "Lauriston Estate" did not pass to plaintiff, amended the plaint in the year 1981 to seek declaration of his title that he was the owner in possession of the land subject matter of dispute measuring 20 bighas 6 biswas, which also included the land comprised in Khasra "numbers 267, 272 and 273 which was claimed by the purchaser of the "Garden View" as part of "Garden View" and also for possession of land comprised in khasra numbers 276, 277, 278, 279, 280 and 281 along with cattle shed built thereon forming part of compound, part of "Newton Ville". In fact, as noticed earlier, the stand of the plaintiff was that "Newton Ville" was gutted in fire before its purchase by Captain Malik Umar Hayat Khan Hwana, the vacant site of "Newton Ville" lost its individual identity and became part of land appurtenant to "Lauriston". 26. In fact, as noticed earlier, the stand of the plaintiff was that "Newton Ville" was gutted in fire before its purchase by Captain Malik Umar Hayat Khan Hwana, the vacant site of "Newton Ville" lost its individual identity and became part of land appurtenant to "Lauriston". 26. During the course of hearing, in view of the settlement of the dispute of the appellants with the owners of "Newton Ville", the plaintiff-appellants gave up their claim to any part of the property or land which comprise "Newton Ville". Appellants confined their claim to the land comprised in khasra numbers 260, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 and 273 measuring 8 bighas 3 biswas (7335 sq. yards) which comprised "Lauriston" as sold to the plaintiff and is in possession of the plaintiffs. 27. This appeal was admitted on July 30, 1992 without framing any question of law. 28. After having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the subsequent events, the substantial question of law which arise for consideration is: "Whether the findings of the learned Additional District Judge that "Lauriston" was not sold to the plaintiff are conjectural, de hors of evidence on record and without foundation. If so, whether the appellants are owners in possession of the property/estate comprised in Khasra numbers 260, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 and 273 measuring 8 bighas 3 biswas (7335 sq. yards)." 29. Out of the land and property to which the plaintiffs restrict their claim, land comprised in Khasra Numbers 267, 272 and 273 measuring 1800 sq. yards was held to be part of "Lauriston" by this Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 63 of 1969 (Kesho Nath Khurana v. Union of India and Tek Chand Chitkara) as notice earlier. This finding has become final between the present contesting parties. 30. So far the remaining land is concerned, it may be noticed that sale deed Ext. DW5/P executed on 24.3.1908, by which "Arthur Ville" rechristened "Lauriston" was sold to AWC Bowder, described the area of this estate as 7324 sq. yards. This finding has become final between the present contesting parties. 30. So far the remaining land is concerned, it may be noticed that sale deed Ext. DW5/P executed on 24.3.1908, by which "Arthur Ville" rechristened "Lauriston" was sold to AWC Bowder, described the area of this estate as 7324 sq. yards. The relevant part of the sale deed reads: ".....The said vendors as such trustees do hereby grant convey and sell for an inheritance in fee simple in possession free from incumbrances charges and demands all those hereditaments messuages and premises situate in Simla formerly called as Arthur Ville and now as Lauriston and which is more particularly described in the map or plan hereto annexed and is bounded and butted as follows that is to say-North by Bishen Singhs Mohalla East by Granville lodge, Jiwan Singhs land and Garden view south by Public Road West by Public Road, Newton Ville and Ram Datts land or howsoever otherwise bounded and butted or reputed so to be and containing by measurement 7324 square yards or there abouts of land together with all buildings, yards, garden trees, fences, hedges, ditches, ways, sewers, drains, water courses, liberaties, easements, appurtenances, fittings, fixtures and furniture whatsoever......." 31. Mrs. AWC Bowde, 5 years later, sold "Lauriston" to Captain Malik Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana vide sale deed dated October 7, 1913 (Exhibit P6). The relevant portion of the sale deed read : ".....She the said vendor both hereby grant unto the said vendee his heirs and assigns all the lands and premises situated in Kaithu Shimla and specified in the Schedule hereunder written". Schedule of the property reads : "Lauriston Estate situated in Kaithu in the town of Shimla and formerly known as Arthur Ville bounded on the North by Salig Rams land on the South by Sobh Rams field, on the East by Ram Naths land and on the West by Vhandoroos land as per plan attached." 32. Now the plan attached to the Schedule Ext. PW3/A on record shows the area of the "Lauriston Estate" to be 7324 sq. yards. There is no evidence to the contrary. 33. It, thus, is manifest that the area of "Lauriston Estate" was about 7324 sq. yards. The total area of Khasra Numbers to which the plaintiffs restrict their claim comes to 8 bighas 3 biswas 7335 sq. yards) as follows: Sr. yards. There is no evidence to the contrary. 33. It, thus, is manifest that the area of "Lauriston Estate" was about 7324 sq. yards. The total area of Khasra Numbers to which the plaintiffs restrict their claim comes to 8 bighas 3 biswas 7335 sq. yards) as follows: Sr. No. Khasra No. Area in Bighas In Sq. Yds. (Approx.) 1. 260 3-02 bighas 2790 Sq. yards 2. 267 0-14 biswas 630 Sq. yards. 3. 268 0.05 biswas 225 Sq. yards 4. 269 1.02 bighas 990 Sq. yards 5. 270 1.02 bighas 990 Sq. yards 6. 271 0.12 biswas 540 Sq. yards 7. 272 0.09 biswas 405 Sq. yards 8. 273 0.17 biswas 765 Sq. yards Total 8-03 (Bigha 8.03 biswas) 7335 Sq. yards 34. The area as claimed by the appellants, after restricting their claim tallies with the area of "Lauriston" as mentioned in the two sale deeds referred to above. Exhibit PW3/C and PW5/B where the area of the "Lauriston Estate" has been mentioned as 7324 sq. yards. 35. It may also be pertinent to note here that the owners of "Newton Ville" did not claim the area comprised in the khasra numbers, noticed above, to which the plaintiffs restrict their claim. In the written statement filed by the purchaser of "Newton Ville", Shri Jaswant Ram, defendant No. 2, claimed the ownership only in respect of khasra numbers 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 559/163 and 164. In reply to para 4 of the plaint, defendant pleaded: "The plaintiff could not become owner of the alleged property without issue of any document of title to him. Khasra Numbers 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 599/163 and 164 stand transferred to defendant No. 2 (vide Ex-4/ A&B) who is paying taxes of the said Newton Villa Estate and is owner thereof for lawful valuable consideration and sale certificate has also been issued to defendant No. 2 Ex-D-2/A". 36. Thus, even according to Jaswant Ram, defendant No. 1 "Newton Ville" comprised of khasra numbers 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 599/ 163 and 164 corresponding to new Khasra numbers 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 287, 286 and 288, 398, 311, 312, 313, 314 and 317. The plaintiff-appellants have given up their claim over these khasra numbers. 37. 36. Thus, even according to Jaswant Ram, defendant No. 1 "Newton Ville" comprised of khasra numbers 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 599/ 163 and 164 corresponding to new Khasra numbers 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 287, 286 and 288, 398, 311, 312, 313, 314 and 317. The plaintiff-appellants have given up their claim over these khasra numbers. 37. It may also be significant to note that according to the Union of India, defendant No. 1, "Newton Ville" was separate property and did not form part of "Lauriston Estate" sold to the plaintiff Tek Chand Chitkara. The Regional Settlement Commissioner in his letter dated January 21, 1958 (Ext. D4) specifically informed the plaintiff that he was entitled to "Lauriston" and land attached to it "measuring in all 5715 sq. yards on the basis of the municipal records". 38. The unequivocal stand of the defendant-Union of India was that "Lauriston" comprised only of 5715 sq. yards. It may be recalled that purchaser of "Garden View", namely, Kesho Nath Khurana claimed, in a suit filed by him against the plaintiff Tek Chand Chitkara to which Union of India was party, that the land comprised in Khasra Numbers 267, 272 and 273 measuring 1800 sq. yards, was part of "Garden View". This claim was rejected finally and it was held that these three khasra numbers form part of Lauriston. If 1800 sq. yards area of these Khasra Numbers is added to 5715 sq. yards, the area of "Lauriston", as was conceded by the Union of India before the filing of this suit by Tek Chand Chitkara or Kesho Nath Khurana owner of the "Garden View", comes to 7515 sq. yards. This area is roughly equal to the area to which the plaintiffs restrict their claim. 39. It is admitted position that Capt. Malik Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana was the owner of "Lauriston", "Garden View" and "Newton Ville". It is the case of defendant No. 1 that all these three properties became Evacuee Properties and vested in the Union of India. It therefore is evident that with the sale of these three properties, nothing was left with the defendant No.l. Union of India. In fact, it is not the case of Union of India that any part of these properties was left with the Union of India defendant No.1 or remain unsold. 40. It therefore is evident that with the sale of these three properties, nothing was left with the defendant No.l. Union of India. In fact, it is not the case of Union of India that any part of these properties was left with the Union of India defendant No.1 or remain unsold. 40. The inevitable conclusion from the evidence on record is that "Lauriston Estate" consisted of Khasra Numbers 260, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 and 273 measuring 7335 sq. yards or round about which was sold to the plaintiff Tek Chand Chitkara. 41. So far the question of passing of the title of Lauriston to plaintiff Tek Chand Chitkara, is concerned, Mr. K.D. Batish, learned Additional Advocate General, contended that no valid title to the property, in the absence of execution of valid sale certificate/deed passed to plaintiff Tek Chand Chitkara. I need not go into this question in detail with reference to evidence on record and law as the question has finally been decided in LPA No. 6 of 1967 arising out of the present suit (1968 DLT 284) The Division Bench of then Delhi High Court held that execution of the deed of transfer under sub-rule (7) of Rule 91, after the realization of the full price, has to be regarded as ministerial act. In para 20 of the judgment (LPA No. 6 of 1967) it was observed : ".....If the said reasoning of the Supreme Court applies, and is adopted, it has to be held that in the case of a sale by tender under Rule 92, the title passes when the full price is realized, and if that view that the intention behind the Rule 91 is that title shall pass when the full price is realized, is correct, the execution of the deed of transfer under sub-rule (7) of Rule 91, after the realization of the full price, has to be regarded as only ministerial act, just as it has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that the issue of a sale certificate under sub-rule (14) of Rule 91 is only a ministerial act". 42. 42. This Court in RSA No. 63 of 1969, copy of which is placed on the record as Exhibit PA/1, in a dispute between Kesho Nath Khurana and the present plaintiff Tek Chand Chitkara to which the Union of India was party, held that the valid title of "Lauriston" passed to Tek Chand Chitkara though formal sale deed was not executed which was to follow in due course. It will be appropriate to state that these observations were made by the Division Bench on a question of law referred to it by a Single Bench of this Court to the effect," Whether the order dated 21.1.1963 made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner is final and binding in the present appeal, and if so, what is its effect upon the point in controversy in the present appeal." The Division Bench dismissed the appeal after answering the question of law on the ground "that the other questions involved in the appeal are questions of facts and they have been conclusively determined by the two courts below". Shri Kesho nath Khurana, feeling aggrieved, filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set-aside the dismissal of the appeal for the reason that the Division Bench ought not to have dismissed the appeal after answering the question of law and ought to have sent the same back to the Single Judge after deciding the question of law referred to them (See : Kesho Nath Khurana v. Union of India and others, 1982 SC 1177). After receipt of the answer to the question of law in the appeal, the Single Judge dismissed the appeal of Kesho Nath Khurana. 43. In this view of the matter non-issuance of the sale certificate after the receipt of full sale consideration is not material and cannot divest the plaintiff-appellants of their title to the property "Lauriston" sold to Tek Chand Chitkara under sealed tender. 44. In the end, Mr. Batish, learned Additional Advocate General made a half hearted attempt to contend that the appeal is liable to be dismissed as substantial question of law does not arise in this case. The contention is fallacious and does not stand scrutiny. It is true that this Court in second appeal will not reappraise the evidence, on finding of fact, to come to a conclusion different to the First Appellate Court. The contention is fallacious and does not stand scrutiny. It is true that this Court in second appeal will not reappraise the evidence, on finding of fact, to come to a conclusion different to the First Appellate Court. In the present case, the impugned findings of the learned Additional District Judge that the plaintiffs were not owners of any part of the suit property including "Lauriston" which, even according to the stand of the defendants in their written statements, was purchased by the plaintiff, are not referable to any evidence on record and are without any foundation. 45. A finding by a First Appellate Court without any foundation in the pleadings or evidence, raises, in my view, substantial question of law. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another, (1999) 3 Supreme Court Cases 573, it was observed that even findings of fact concurrently recorded by the trial Court as also by the lower appellate Court could be up set in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if it is shown that the findings were perverse, based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record, no reasonable person could come to the conclusion arrived at by the First Appellate Court. 46. In the present case, there is total lack "of appreciation of the evidence and pleadings on record by the First Appellate Court. In D.S. Thimmappa v. Siddaramakka, (1996) 8 Supreme Court Cases 365, the Apex Court held that where the first appellate Court failed to draw proper inference from proved facts and to apply law in proper perspective, the High Court would be justified, in second appeal, in drawing proper inference from such proved facts. In Santosh Hazari v. Pursushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By Lrs., (2001) 3 Supreme Court Cases 179, it was observed: "The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133 (l)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessary be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta, the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons Ltd. V. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd., the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subha Rao v. Noony Veeraju: When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law" and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether ,a question of law raised in the case is substantial: The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 47. Again, in Kulwant Kaur and others v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by Lrs. and others, (2001) 4 Supreme Court Cases 262, Their Lordships emphasized that though in second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. To conclude : (a) The plaintiffs are the owners in possession of "Lauriston" comprised in Khasra Numbers 260, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 and 273 measuring 7335 sq. To conclude : (a) The plaintiffs are the owners in possession of "Lauriston" comprised in Khasra Numbers 260, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 and 273 measuring 7335 sq. yards; (b) The title of the plaintiffs on this land is not defective in the absence of the non-issuance/execution of the sale certificate/deed; (c) The findings of learned Additional District Judge that plaintiffs were not owners of any part of the suit property including "Lauriston" which admittedly was purchased by the plaintiff under sealed tender, was based on conjectures and surmises, de hors of the evidence on record and without any foundation; The question is accordingly answered. 48. In result, the appeal is partly accepted. The impugned judgment and decree of learned Additional District Judge is set-aside. The suit of the plaintiff-appellants is partly decreed. The plaintiffs/appellants are declared to be owners in possession of "Lauriston" comprised in Khasra numbers 260, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 and 273 measuring 7335 sq. yards situate in mauza Kaithu, Tehsil and District Shimla. 49. In the facts and circumstances of this case, parties are left to bear their own cost. Appeal allowed. -