B. A. Khan ( 1 ) DR. S. K. Mahajan, a Non-Resident Indian Doctor, practising in america and running his own hospital there died in a road accident on Delhi-Jaipur highway on 3. 2. 95. Appellants (his L. Rs.) filed claim Suit 325/95 and claimed compensation of Rs. 54 crores and so on the ground that his annual income was US $ 9 lacs and his age 47 years. For this they examined the widow of deceased Doctor and also placed on record his income-tax returns for 1991 to 1994 (Ext. P/x to P/x3) which were certified by an American Public Accountant Mr. Akram G. Namou and certified by the Consulate General of India at Cichago. These reports showed the net income of the deceased at $ 5,02,937, his taxable income $4,72,696 and $ 1,63,492 paid by him as tax for 1994. ( 2 ) TRIBUNAL determined the age of the deceased at 47 years and assessed his income at $ 4,72,696 and deducted tax paid amount of $ 1,63,492 from it to work out the net carry home income at $ 3,09,204. It further deducted 2/3rd of this amount on account of his personal expenses to determine the loss of dependency at $ 1,03,068. It then applied a multiplier of 7 to it after taking in regard the age of the parents of the deceased which ranged from 70 to 76 and the judgment of Supreme court in GMKSRTC v. Sushma Thomas, 1994 (2) SCC 176 =i (1994) ACC 346 (SC) to work out the compensation at $ 7,21,476. It again deducted the social security benefit and the insurance money totalling $ 3/22,900 received by appellants 1-4 to reduce the net compensation payable further to $ 2,16,44,280 and applied a conversion rate of Rs. 30 per dollar to award compensation of Rs. 1,19,57,280 with 12% interest. ( 3 ) APPELLANTS feel dissatisfied with this and have filed this Appeal for enhancement of compensation on a number of grounds. I have already dismissed the connected counter Appeal filed by respondent Insurance Company (R-) challenging tribunal award dated 6. 7. 98 and that facilitates examination of this Appeal on merit. ( 4 ) APPELLANTS case in short is that Tribunal had committed a mistake in assessing the net income of the deceased which was $ 5,02,937 as per his income tax returns and not $ 4,72,696 which was the taxable income. 7. 98 and that facilitates examination of this Appeal on merit. ( 4 ) APPELLANTS case in short is that Tribunal had committed a mistake in assessing the net income of the deceased which was $ 5,02,937 as per his income tax returns and not $ 4,72,696 which was the taxable income. It is pointed that Tribunal had wrongly taken the taxable income of $ 4,72,696 as the income of the deceased and not the net income and had then deducted the tax paid amount from it to determine the carry home salary at $ 3/09,204 when it ought to have been US $ 3,39,445, a difference of $ 28,000. 00 or so. ( 5 ) APPELLANTS second grievance is that Tribunal had wrongly deducted 2/3rd of the amount from the assessed income to determine the loss of dependency which ran counter to the settled legal position whereby only 1/3rd was deductible. It is submitted that it stands fortified now by the statutory sanction contained in Section 163-A of MVA as amended on 14. 11. 1994 which carried a note for the guidance of courts suggesting a reduction of 1/3rd of the assessed income for personal expenses of deceased. It is pointed out in this regard that the Courts in this country had disallowed deductions exceeding 1/3rd. Reliance in this regard is placed on judgments of the Supreme Court in Hardev Kaur v. RSTC, 1992 (2) SCC 567 =1 (1992) acc 603 (SC), GMKSRTC v. Sushma Thomas (supra) and a DB judgment of this court in case of a foreign national in Klaus Mittalbochest v. East India Hotels, 1997 (1) ACC page 1=65 (1997) DLT 428 and paras 102 and 103. ( 6 ) IT is further claimed that less than 1/3rd of the assessed income was being deducted for self-expenses of deceased in America also. Reference in this regard is made to some cases figuring in American jurisprudence Volume 22-A wherein self expenses were deducted at the rate ranging from 15% to 29%. It is lastly urged that tribunal had only assessed net income of the deceased and not his gross income which was admittedly $ 9 lacs thus making a substantial deduction/cut, which was not further liable to be aggravated by a 2/3rd deduction. It is lastly urged that tribunal had only assessed net income of the deceased and not his gross income which was admittedly $ 9 lacs thus making a substantial deduction/cut, which was not further liable to be aggravated by a 2/3rd deduction. ( 7 ) APPELLANTS third complaint is that Tribunal had applied a very low multiplier of 7 as against 13 prescribed by Schedule appended to Section 163-A. It is submitted that reliance on Supreme Court judgment in Sushma Thomas case was not in order because that judgment was delivered on 6. 1. 93 and the amendment in mva appending Schedule II to Section 163-A was brought in force on 14. 11,1994. It is also explained that though Supreme Court had found defects in this Schedule in UPSRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 =1 (1996) ACC 592 (SC), but it had not found any fault with the column prescribing multiplier for different age groups and, therefore. Tribunal was bound to follow this and apply multiplier of 13 provided for the age group of 45 years and onwards. Reliance in this regard is also placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Rattan Lal Mehta v. Rajinder kapoor, 1996 ACJ 372=11 (19960 ACC 1 which hinted at different mistakes in other columns of the second schedule but not the column prescribing multiplier for different age levels. ( 8 ) APPELLANTS further grievance is that Tribunal had made unwarranted deductions from the determined compensation amount for social security benefits and insurance amount received by appellants 1-4 herein by placing wrong reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R. M. K. Veluswami, 1962 (1) SCR 929 . It is submitted that the amount payable on both counts was the result of the contribution made by the deceased during his lifetime which was otherwise payable to appellants even if he had died a natural death. Support for this is drawn from the latest Supreme Court judgment in Mrs. Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, JT 1998 (6) SC 418=vii (1998) SLT 585=11 (1998) ACC 512 (SC) distinguishing the judgment in Gobald Motor s case and holding that there was no co-relation between such like payments and the accident claim under MVA and that amounts received in this regard were not deductible. Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, JT 1998 (6) SC 418=vii (1998) SLT 585=11 (1998) ACC 512 (SC) distinguishing the judgment in Gobald Motor s case and holding that there was no co-relation between such like payments and the accident claim under MVA and that amounts received in this regard were not deductible. ( 9 ) APPELLANTS last grievance is that Tribunal had allowed the conversion of the dollar into rupee at the then rate of Rs. 30. 00 per dollar, when the conversion rate to be applied was that of the Appellate Court judgment. Attention in this regard is invited to the Supreme Court judgment in Forasol v. ONGC, 1984 (Supp) SCC 263 holding that relevant date for conversion of the awarded amount from foreign currency to Indian currency was the date of the judgment. It is pointed out that this judgment had allowed the rate of conversion which was applicable even on the date of Appellate Court judgment. In short it is claimed that conversion rate as on date should be applied to the compensation amount awarded in American currency. ( 10 ) THERE is no doubt that Tribunal had committed an error in assessing the net income of the deceased at $ 4,72,696 when it should have been $ 5,02,939 as reflected in the 1994 income-tax return of the deceased, which was on record. Therefore, if that was to be taken the net income and tax amount of $ 1,63,492 was deducted from it, the carry home salary of the deceased would be $ 3,39,445 and not $ 3,09,204 as taken by Tribunal. This mistake is accordingly corrected and carry home income of the deceased is held to be $ 3,39,445. ( 11 ) COMING to the next question whether 2/3rd of the assessed income was deductible for personal expenses of the deceased or 1/3rd as was in vogue in this country pursuant to various Supreme Court judgments and now backed up by statutory sanction as contained in Second Schedule appended to Section 163-A of mva as amended on 14. 11. 1994, it seems to me that Tribunal had unnecessarily diverted to the American life-style to presume that an American national was spending more on himself and less on his family/dependants. There was no warrant for such an inference because there was no material before Tribunal to suggest so. 11. 1994, it seems to me that Tribunal had unnecessarily diverted to the American life-style to presume that an American national was spending more on himself and less on his family/dependants. There was no warrant for such an inference because there was no material before Tribunal to suggest so. It appears that Tribunal had devolved into American life-style for nothing to propound a new formula/method applicable to foreign nationals who become accident victims in this country. There was no warrant for it to depart from established legal position prevailing in this country and to look to distant postures purposelessly. After all, the accident had taken place here and it was the law of this country which would govern the case and there was hardly any need to divert new areas to take a different view in the matter and to evolve a new principle in the process. Even if it was assumed that the deceased had taken loan or had incurred debts, it was only to contribute to assets which admittedly were generating resources and supplementing the income of the deceased from which loss of dependency was to be determined. Therefore, looking at it from either angle tribunal seems to have fallen in error by ordering 2/3rd deduction from the assessed income for self-expenses of the deceased and to work out the loss of dependency on this basis. ( 12 ) IT is unnecessary to refer to Supreme Court judgments laying down that 1/3rd amount of the assessed income was deductible for personal expenses of the deceased accident victim. Judgments cited by appellants Counsel in this regard should suffice in the circumstances leaving no scope or doubt that any other method could be applied to work out the dependency. Apart from it. Tribunal had already glossed over undisputed $ 9 lacs gross income of the deceased. Having done that it was too much to order further 2/3rd deduction a specious thesis of hi-fi American life-style. The deduction thus made was unjustified and impermissible and only 1/3rd deduction could be made for self-expenses of deceased to work out the dependency at $ 2,26,297. ( 13 ) THERE is no doubt that multiplier applied by the Tribunal was far low in the facts and circumstances of the case considering that the deceased was 47 and that age of his parents ranged between 69-73 years. ( 13 ) THERE is no doubt that multiplier applied by the Tribunal was far low in the facts and circumstances of the case considering that the deceased was 47 and that age of his parents ranged between 69-73 years. It is also well established that a suitable multiplier was to be selected by considering the age of the deceased and that of his parents and now also by taking in regard the chart contained in the Second schedule appended to Section 163-A of MVA which provides a guideline for selecting the multiplier as held by the Supreme Court in Trilok Chandra s case (1996) 4 SCC 362 . That being so, a multiplier of 10 would be appropriate and ought to be applied in the circumstances. Proceeding thus, the compensation amount would come to $ 2,26,297x10 = $ 22,62,970. ( 14 ) DEDUCTIONS made by Tribunal on account of social security benefits and insurance amount received by appellants 1-4 was also unwarranted and so was the reliance on Supreme Court judgment in Gobald Motor s case misplaced because much water had flowed down since and the latest judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject in H. C. Rebello s case had now set the controversy at rest holding that such like deductions could not be made. Going by that no deduction of $ 3,22,900 could be ordered by the Tribunal to reduce the amount of compensation further. ( 15 ) I accordingly hold that appellants were entitled to a total compensation of $ 22,62,970. But the matter does not rest at that because the amount awarded in american currency would have to be converted into Indian rupee and in this the dispute still persists on the rate of conversion. While claiming Rs. 59 crores compensation appellants had calculated the earnings of the deceased at Rs. 30 per dollar perhaps the rate prevalent on 20. 4. 95 when they filed their claim petition and tribunal also allowed the conversion at the same rate vide impugned award dated 6. 7. 98. It also awarded 12% interest from the date of claim petition to payment to compensate Appellants for delayed payment as also for any variation in the conversion rate during its pendency. 4. 95 when they filed their claim petition and tribunal also allowed the conversion at the same rate vide impugned award dated 6. 7. 98. It also awarded 12% interest from the date of claim petition to payment to compensate Appellants for delayed payment as also for any variation in the conversion rate during its pendency. But Appellants want the rate of conversion as on the date of this judgment on the strength of Supreme Court judgment in Forasol v. ONGC (supra) which was later followed by Court in Renusagar v. GEC, 1994 supp. 1 SCC 644, and holds ground till date. ( 16 ) I have gone through the celebrated judgment in Forasol s case which discusses and analysis a number of judgments of English Courts including that in havan, Jugoslavenska and Miliango s cases along with a Single Bench and a Division bench judgments of this Court which favoured one date or the other for conversion of the currency. It then sets out five dates out of which to chose keeping in view the principle that Court must select a date which puts the claimant/s in the same position in which he would have been had the respondent discharged he ought to have done given regard to the fact that rate of exchange was not a constant but liable to fluctuate even violently. Then judgment takes stock of Indian Court conditions and finally rules that rate of conversion applicable would be as on the date of judgment/decree. It goes a step further to hold that in case such judgment/decree was challenged in Appeal, the Appellate Court should follow the same procedure as that of Trial Court to ascertain the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of appellate decree provided that the decree under Appeal was not satisfied meanwhile and also claimant/decree-holder subscribed an affidavit specifying the rate of exchange on the date of decree and undertaking that he would make good the deficiency in the Court fees, if any. The judgment concludes thus : "52. For the above reason, it is not possible for us to accept the date of payment or realisation of the decretal debt as the proper date for the rate of conversion. 53. The judgment concludes thus : "52. For the above reason, it is not possible for us to accept the date of payment or realisation of the decretal debt as the proper date for the rate of conversion. 53. This then leaves us with only three dates from which to make our selection, namely, the date when the amount become payable, the date of filing of the suit and the date of the judgment, that is, the date of passing the decree. It would be fairer to both the parties for the Court to take the latest of these dates, namely, the date of passing the decree, that is, the date of the judgment. " ( 17 ) IN case of any Appeal being taken against such judgment, it provides as under: ". . . . . . . IN the event of the decree being challenged in appeal or other proceedings and such appeal or other proceedings being decided in whole or in part in favour of the plaintiff, the Appellate Court or the Court hearing the application in the other proceedings challenging the decree should follow the same procedure as the trial Court for the purpose of ascertaining the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of its appellate decree or of its order on such application or on the date nearest or most nearly preceding the date of such decree or order. If such rate of exchange is different from the rate in the decree which has been challenged, the Court should make the necessary modification with respect to the rate of exchange by its appellate decree or final order. " ( 18 ) FOLLOWING all this, I have no option but to hold that appellants are entitled to a total compensation of$ 22,62,970. 00, but since they had received a substantial part of the amount awarded by Tribunal at the prevalent exchange rate, then, therefore, only enhanced amount of $ 18,64,394 was required to be converted into indian currency at the prevalent exchange rate on date. For this appellants are required to subscribe an affidavit specifying the exchange rate of US dollar into indian rupee as on 12. 3. 2001 and also an undertaking that they would deposit the deficit Court fee, if any, as determined by JR (J) on the awarded amount within two weeks. For this appellants are required to subscribe an affidavit specifying the exchange rate of US dollar into indian rupee as on 12. 3. 2001 and also an undertaking that they would deposit the deficit Court fee, if any, as determined by JR (J) on the awarded amount within two weeks. ( 19 ) THIS appeal is, accordingly, allowed and appellants are found entitled to a total compensation of $ 22,62,970. 00 which includes enhanced amount of $ 18,64,394. No interest shall, however, accrue on the enhanced amount. Respondent insurance Company is directed to satisfy the remaining part of the award and pay the outstanding amount to appellants in the following ratio: appellant No. 1 23. 90% appellant Nos. 2 to 4 22. 58% appellant Nos. 5 and 6 04. 18% ( 20 ) THE Registry shall also release the remaining deposited amount pursuant to impugned Tribunal award in the same ratio. ( 21 ) WHEN this judgment was about to be pronounced. Attorney of Appellant nos. 1-6 Ms. Kamlesh Mahajan, Advocate submitted an affidavit seating on oath that the prevalent on date exchange buying rate of US dollar into Indian rupee as per Reserve Bank of India was Rs. 47. 30 per dollar. Learned Counsel for appellant, however, waived to charge 30 paise and wanted conversion to be made @ Rs. 47 only. Accordingly, out of total compensation amount of $ 22,62,970 enhanced amount of $ 18,64,394 would have to be multiplied by Rs. 47 which in Indian currency would come to Rs. 8,76,26,518. 00 and which shall be payable to Appellants in addition to amount awarded to them by Tribunal in the prescribed ratio and after deducting the amount already received by them within four months from receipt of this order.