JUDGMENT - F.I. REBELLO, J.:---Apart from this petition there are several other pending petitions on the same issue. Parties who would be directly affected by the outcome were allowed to intervene and address the Court. Rule. Respondents waive service. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner hands over draft amendment. Amendment allowed in terms of the in the course of the proceedings. With the consent of the parties heard forthwith. 3. The petitioners to the petition, are owners of what are known as six seater auto rickshaws, who were earlier allowed to ply within the entire limits of Pune Municipal Corporation. They are all holders of individual contract carriage permits, issued by respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 at its meeting dated 7th November, 1994 approved six seater auto rickshaw with diesel engines as a public service vehicle and decided to issue permits for six seater auto rickshaw in Pune Region. This decision was opposed by the rickshaw panchayat, Pune, a Union representing three seater auto rickshaw owners. On 10th November, 1994 the said rickshaw Panchayat held demonstrations demanding that permits should not be issued for six seater auto rickshaws. The then Chief Minister intervened and suggested to the respondent No. 1, to conduct a detailed study in the matter of issuing permits to six seater auto rickshaw. Pursuant to that a Committee was constituted which gave its report and findings on 18th April, 1995. The Committee which was constituted on 17th November, 1994 by the Regional Commissioner were directed to examine the following issues:--- (1) The effect of three seater and six seater diesel driven auto rickshaws on the roads of Pune City. (2) The pollution that would be caused due to diesel driven auto rickshaw. (3) The likely effect on business of 3 seater petrol driven rickshaw. The Committee gave its findings which are as under:--- (1) In so far as the traffic on the road, it opined that there was an increase in all types of vehicles in Pune City. The operation of diesel auto rickshaws would not have any significant effect on the traffic. (2) Pollution: The Committee recorded that according to Pollution Control Expert, Regional Transport Officer, Medical Expert and A.R.A.I. Expert, the smoke emitted by petrol vehicles is more harmful than the smoke emitted by diesel vehicles and hence diesel auto rickshaws would not have any significant effect on pollution. (2) Pollution: The Committee recorded that according to Pollution Control Expert, Regional Transport Officer, Medical Expert and A.R.A.I. Expert, the smoke emitted by petrol vehicles is more harmful than the smoke emitted by diesel vehicles and hence diesel auto rickshaws would not have any significant effect on pollution. (3) On the issue whether the business of the owners of petrol auto rickshaw operators would be affected, it proceeded to hold that considering the then strength of petrol rickshaws and the probable production of diesel auto rickshaws, if passengers and rickshaw operators were to choose diesel auto rickshaws, it would take 10 years to replace petrol rickshaws. The Committee then stated that in view of the increase in population of Pune city and increase in the number of educated unemployed youth it was the policy of the Government to issue permits to public service vehicles. From the point of view of economy and profits, diesel auto rickshaws seemed to be more convenient. In view of the public policy of the Government for industrialisation of rural areas, the Committee stated that the study team had no objection for permits being issued to diesel auto rickshaws. A meeting of the 1st respondent was convened and the report submitted by the study team was discussed in detail. It was decided, acting on the advice of the Police Commissioner, that the permits be issued for Pune Region, Pimpri-Chinchwad and Solapur, except in the areas of certain Police Stations in view of traffic problems for 6 plus 1 diesel auto rickshaws. It was further decided that diesel rickshaws of sitting capacity of 3 plus 1 should be issued permits for entire Pune city and Pune District. 4. The 1st respondent subsequently at another meeting held on 4th October, 1997, took a decision that the permits issued to six seater auto rickshaw for Pune city and Pune District except Samarth Khadak and Pharaskhana Police Station limits be modified and the said vehicles be allowed to ply outside the limits of Pune, Pimpri Chinchwad and Solapur Municipal Corporation in Pune District. It was further resolved that permits be granted to ply in Pune cantonment, Khadki cantonment and Dehu Road cantonment. The owners and drivers of six seater auto rickshaws, if they resided within the limits of Pune Municipal Corporation, were permitted to bring the rickshaw empty without passengers, within the Municipal limits. It was further resolved that permits be granted to ply in Pune cantonment, Khadki cantonment and Dehu Road cantonment. The owners and drivers of six seater auto rickshaws, if they resided within the limits of Pune Municipal Corporation, were permitted to bring the rickshaw empty without passengers, within the Municipal limits. Decision was further taken that permit holders be issued a notice of 30 days in daily newspaper. It was further resolved that permit may be issued to all those who have been issued letters of intent until 20th October, 1997 and who presently own rickshaws. It was noted that the decision to stop issuing permits is a temporary decision and the authority would take a decision regarding auto rickshaws permits after the study on the number of vehicles in the city. Subsequent to this and consequent to that decision, a petition came to be filed before this Court being Writ Petition No. 5198 of 1997 by Krantiveer Six Seater Auto Rickshaw Sanghatana. An affidavit was filed on behalf of the Regional Transport Authority by one Ramkrishna S. Lodhe, Regional Transport Officer, Pune and Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Pune. In the said affidavit it was set out that the decision taken on 4th October, 1997, by the 1st respondent was published in various newspapers in the city. The members of the public from those cities who came to know that the 1st respondent was going to ban six seater auto rickshaws in those cities, sent postcards/letters to the authorities of the 1st respondent, requesting them not to ban six seater auto rickshaw from Pune, Pimpri-Chinchwad and Solapur City as the local bus services in city were not adequate and were inconvenient to the public. On the contrary, six seater auto rickshaws were more convenient, useful and cheaper farewise than local bus services and three seater auto rickshaws. The 1st respondent held a meeting on 24th November, 1997 and after considering the various aspects, felt that it was not fair to ban six seater auto rickshaws, as they had originally been granted permit to ply in Pune city, apart from the fact that they are a small minority. The 1st respondent held a meeting on 24th November, 1997 and after considering the various aspects, felt that it was not fair to ban six seater auto rickshaws, as they had originally been granted permit to ply in Pune city, apart from the fact that they are a small minority. The affidavit discloses that the 1st respondent also discussed the issue on traffic congestion in the city caused by use of six seater auto rickshaws and came to the conclusion that the traffic problems and using six seater auto rickshaws as a stage carriage and plying the auto rickshaws overloaded was a question of administration, and can be solved by imposing penalties. The affidavit further noted that considering the above it was decided by the 1st respondent not to ban the auto rickshaws in Pune, Pimpri Chinchwad and Solapur cities. It was also decided that the ban should not be lifted immediately for fear that three seater auto rickshaw owners/drivers would create a law and order problem. The decision that no additional rickshaws should be registered till the study was completed regarding the carrying capacity of Pune city, was confirmed. In view of the said affidavit the writ petition was not pressed and was disposed of as withdrawn by order of this Court dated 31st March, 1998. 5. A specimen of the permit issued has been annexed with the petition. The permit shows that the areas for which the permit is valid is the whole of Pune District. The period is between 3rd June, 1997 to 2nd June, 2002. The permit issued was subject to the conditions attached thereto. It included a condition that the 1st respondent after notice of not less than one month could vary the condition of the permit and attach to the permit further conditions as also any other conditions. 6. In the meantime, on a call attention motion being tabled in the Legislative Council the Minister for Transport made a statement under Rule 46 of the Rules of Legislative Council. The said statement sets out that a representation was made by the Pune Rickshaw Drivers Action Committee demanding a ban on six seater auto rickshaws within Pune Municipal Corporation and other Corporation. The decision of R.T.A. had led to an adverse effect on the business of persons operating three seater rickshaws. Similarly, the association of six seater rickshaws represented their case. The decision of R.T.A. had led to an adverse effect on the business of persons operating three seater rickshaws. Similarly, the association of six seater rickshaws represented their case. It was noted in the statement that there should not be any unhealthy competition between the rickshaw-drivers and no clashes should erupt between them. Considering that the Government policy was also to be determined. The Government after consultation with those concerned took a decision which involved (1) ban on plying of six seaters rickshaws in the erstwhile units of Pune and other Municipal Corporations. However, six seaters rickshaws were allowed to ply upto the stops fixed on five roads in Pune Municipal Corporation. In other Municipal Corporations too the Regional Transport Authorities would determine the steps after discussing the issue with concerned rickshaw drivers and other's association. (2) A high powered Committee presided over by the Transport Minister will be constituted to examine all the issues pertaining to the welfare of rickshaw operators and drivers. The Committee was to include the representatives of rickshaw operators, and others. The statement further set out that no new rickshaw permits will be issued in the Municipal Corporations of Mumbai, Thane, Pune, Nagpur, Aurangabad, Solapur and Nashik having a population of more than five lakhs. A decision regarding granting of permits in other parts of the State would be considered in consultation with the Central Government. 7. On 9th June, 1998 the State Transport Authority met and under Item No. 5 they considered the following subjects:--- "To consider the question of issuing corrections (directions) to the Regional Transport Authorities to fix the operational jurisdiction of 3 + 1 seater and 6 + 1 seater auto rickshaws under section 68(3)(a) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988." The minutes recorded that the State Transport Authority took note of the contents of the agenda note and circumstances leading to the statement made by the Honourable Minister for Transport on 23rd April, 1998 in both the Houses of the State Legislature and noted the gist of the statement. The authority noted that the Government had not issued any separate direction in that behalf. After noting various other aspects more importantly the traffic congestion caused on roads, the severe pollution problem occasioned, smooth flow of traffic, avoidance of unhealthy competition, etc., it felt the need for intervention by the State Transport Authority. The authority noted that the Government had not issued any separate direction in that behalf. After noting various other aspects more importantly the traffic congestion caused on roads, the severe pollution problem occasioned, smooth flow of traffic, avoidance of unhealthy competition, etc., it felt the need for intervention by the State Transport Authority. The authority took a review of the situation and its likely implications in the areas under different Regional Transport Authorities. The minutes record that the State Transport Authority, after careful deliberations resolved to issue directions to the Regional Transport Authorities except Regional Transport Authority of Aurangabad as the matter was pending before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 3490 of 1996 and decided as under:--- (a) To restrict the plying of 6 + 1 seater auto rickshaws outside all Municipal Corporation areas so that they do not ply within the City Corporation limits. Immediate steps be taken to implement the decision in accordance with the procedure laid down as per M.V. Act, 1988. (b) Steps should be decided for plying these 6 + 1 seater auto rickshaws on the outskirts of old Municipal Corporation limits in consultation with the Municipal Commissioners and the auto rickshaw owners and drivers Unions. Under no circumstances, such stops should be provided within the old limits of the Municipal Corporation area. (c) Regional Transport Authorities should hold a meeting immediately to carry out the directions as stated above. This decision of the State Transport Authority was conveyed amongst others to the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Pune by letter of the same date i.e. 9th July, 1998 (Letter of 9-6-1998). 8. Pursuant to the said communication the Regional Transport Authority, Pune, held a meeting on 15th February, 1999 and took the following decision:- "Six seater auto rickshaw permit holders are allowed to ply their vehicles outside the erstwhile limits of Pune and Pimpri-Chinchwad Municipal Corporation in the rest of Pune District." It then noted the points on the roads where the six seater auto rickshaws could ply. As the conditions of the permit were to be modified pursuant to the resolution, it directed that permit holders be given a notice of thirty days under section 74(2)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It further observed that permit holders should note that the above condition will be enforced after 30 days from the date of the notice. As the conditions of the permit were to be modified pursuant to the resolution, it directed that permit holders be given a notice of thirty days under section 74(2)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It further observed that permit holders should note that the above condition will be enforced after 30 days from the date of the notice. It seems that notice was sent to the permit holders under certificate of posting/by hand. The decision and the notice issued on 16th February, 1999 was challenged by some of the holders of contract carriage permits including the petitioners herein before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which stayed the notice dated 16th February, 1999. By order dated 7th April, 2000 the State Transport Appellate Tribunal upheld the notice and dismissed the appeals. Pursuant to that, the present batch of writ petitions. 9. In the meantime another petition came to be filed before this Court which was numbered under Stamp No. 13432 of 2000 which subsequently has been registered as Writ Petition No. 2350 of 2000. A learned Single Judge of this Court on 24th April, 2000 after hearing parties ordered that the petitioners may be permitted to make representation before the State Transport Authority, in respect of the Resolution Nos. 7/98 and 8/98 passed by the State Transport Authority in its 190th meeting held on 9th June, 1998 and that the State Transport Authority be directed to consider the representation of the petitioners after hearing them within the time granted by this Court. A specific direction was given, that after hearing the representations, the State Transport Authority was to give a reasoned order and produce the copy of the order in the Court not later than 5th July, 2000. In the meantime the operation of the notice dated 16th February, 1999 issued by the Regional Transport Authority was to stand suspended. It is not necessary to advert to the other aspects of the order. Pursuant to that, the State Transport Authority recorded its decision. The said decision now forms part of the petition, pursuant to the draft amendment handed over and which has been allowed. The decision of the S.T.A. records various aspects of the matter including the petitions filed before this Court and the decision of the Regional Transport Authorities. Pursuant to that, the State Transport Authority recorded its decision. The said decision now forms part of the petition, pursuant to the draft amendment handed over and which has been allowed. The decision of the S.T.A. records various aspects of the matter including the petitions filed before this Court and the decision of the Regional Transport Authorities. Extract from the order reads as under:--- "It is noted that the Minister for Transport had made a policy statement on the floor of the Legislature that 6 seater auto rickshaws would not be permitted to ply within the Municipal Corporation limits of Pune. Such a statement not only laid down the policy of the Government in this regard, but it also amounted to an assurance on the floor of the House which needed to be fulfilled within a prescribed time frame as per the Rules of the business of the Legislature. It was in furtherance of these, that the State Transport Authority passed the said Resolution No. 7/98 in this regard. The contention of the learned Advocates on behalf of the 6 seater auto rickshaws that there were no specific directions from the Government to pass such a resolution under section 68(3)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, thus, cannot be agreed to. In any case it is not as if the State Transport Authority cannot independently exercise and discharge its functions. It is incumbent upon S.T.A. to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and policies in the larger interest of the public and this can be done even in the absence of any particular direction under section 67 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In the present case the S.T.A. was of the considered view that such decision was in public interest." The decision thereafter records that the issue of pollution caused by 6 seater auto rickshaws run on diesel, is a matter of conflicting opinions, whether diesel is a less polluting fuel than petrol or not. Earlier it was felt that different pollutants which were carcinogenic were more in petrol engines than in diesel ones. However, subsequent studies revealed that the small particulate matter which is emitted from diesel engines not only settles down in the lungs causing respiratory ailments but also causes cancer. Earlier it was felt that different pollutants which were carcinogenic were more in petrol engines than in diesel ones. However, subsequent studies revealed that the small particulate matter which is emitted from diesel engines not only settles down in the lungs causing respiratory ailments but also causes cancer. In the light of the studies, it is now generally felt that pollution caused from diesel vehicles is more harmful for public health than by the petrol vehicles. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has taken a very strong action against polluting diesel vehicles. The decision then records that during the hearing it was clearly revealed that the 6 seater auto rickshaws are basically running as stage carriages, which is contrary to the conditions of permit. It then notes that the basic business and method of operation is such that they necessarily operate as stage carriage picking up passengers at intermediate points and dropping them by abruptly stopping on the roads. Their practice of picking up or setting down passengers itself can create obstruction to smooth of vehicular traffic. The frequent stoppages and starting of their engines, definitely lead to excessive emissions of exhaust gases which in the opinion of S.T.A. is bad for the health of road users. The level of noise pollution caused by the use of 6 seater auto rickshaws is also very high. The manner of operation also comes in competition with the operation of Pune Municipal Transport and Pimpri-Chinchwad Municipal Transport, the two city transport services running stage carriages. The opposition from P.M.T. P.C.M.T. therefore, was natural and well founded. For all the aforesaid reasons it held that the restriction imposed on the area of operation by the S.T.A. is in order. 10. On behalf of the respondent No. 2 Shri C.P. Sawalkar, A.R.T.O. has filed an affidavit. Various objections have been taken which I need not advert to. It may, however, be worth mentioning that the affidavit notes that the petitioners had approached State Transport Appellate Tribunal by preferring an appeal under section 89(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The resolution passed by the S.T.A. or R.T.A. had not been challenged. Then it sets out various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act regarding grant of stage carriage permits. The resolution passed by the S.T.A. or R.T.A. had not been challenged. Then it sets out various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act regarding grant of stage carriage permits. In para 7 it is stated that the policy decision to ban 6 seater in certain areas was taken in pursuance to the directions issued to R.T.A. by the S.T.A. under section 68(4) of the Act, for which, no notification is necessary. The affidavit further notes that though the petitioners were granted contract carriage permits, the six seater auto rickshaws were in fact collecting passengers in between, whenever and wherever available. Reliance is placed on the report of the officers of the R.T.O. It is then pointed out that the monopoly to run as a State carriage is that of M.S.R.T.C. It also sets out that the six seater auto rickshaws were accepting passengers more than the capacity. Their engines were causing lot of noise as well as air pollution. The seriousness of pollution has been an accepted fact by this Court also, that is why directions are given in Mumbai to ban diesel taxies. It is contended that a conscious decision has been taken by both the S.T.A. as well as R.T.A. by consulting the experts in the field. It is, therefore, not open for the petitioners to seek judicial review of the said decision. It is then set out that the R.T.A. considering section 68(4) of the M.V. Act is bound to give effect to the directions issued by the S.T.A. It is pointed out that this is not for the first time that such ban has been imposed. In the case of Mumbai, no contract carriage, except 4 seater taxi cabs, are permitted to ply in some parts of Mumbai. Such ban is in force for more than a decade. In view of the directions of this Court the decision taken by the S.T.A. was placed on record along with affidavit of Shri B.D. Sawant. 11. I may now set out the submissions made on behalf of the parties. On behalf of the petitioners it is contended as under:--- (a) The direction to ban operation of six seater auto rickshaws could have been given only in the manner prescribed under section 67 of the M.V. Act, by the Government issuing a notification. That has not been done. On behalf of the petitioners it is contended as under:--- (a) The direction to ban operation of six seater auto rickshaws could have been given only in the manner prescribed under section 67 of the M.V. Act, by the Government issuing a notification. That has not been done. There is no other power in the S.T.A. Consequently, the decision by the S.T.A./R.T.A. purporting to act under section 68 of the M.V. Act is without jurisdiction and consequently liable to be set aside. (b) The decision of the S.T.A. in the alternative amounts to abdication of the power conferred on it. The S.T.A. has acted at the behest of the State Government based on the statement made by the Minister for Transport in the Assembly. The S.T.A. could not have so acted on the said statement, as it could have only acted, if a notification had been issued by the State Government. On that count also the decision is without jurisdiction. (c) The decision to ban six seater auto rickshaws discloses total non-application of mind in as much as material already considered and found not sufficient to justify the ban of operation of six seater auto rickshaws has again being considered for giving effect to the same purpose. (d) The condition of the permit could be varied only if it was a condition. In the instant case plying in a particular area is not a condition of permit. This could have been done only by the State Government by issuing a notification under section 115 of the M.V. Act. That has not been done and consequently the order is also liable to be set aside. On behalf of the respondents the learned Advocate General has contended as under:--- (e) The decision of the S.T.A. is an exercise in sub-ordinate legislation pursuant to the power conferred in it under section 68 of the M.V. Act. Once that be so there is no question of any hearing being given to the respondents. In the instant case assuming that this Court had directed hearing to the S.T.A., that does not mean that the S.T.A. could not have come to its own decision. In the matter of policy it is for the authority conferred with the power to take a decision. Consideration or non-consideration is irrelevant unless totally absent. That is not the case. In the instant case assuming that this Court had directed hearing to the S.T.A., that does not mean that the S.T.A. could not have come to its own decision. In the matter of policy it is for the authority conferred with the power to take a decision. Consideration or non-consideration is irrelevant unless totally absent. That is not the case. In the instant case the decision records that the decision has been taken based on following reasons:--- (1) The contract carriage permit holders were operating as State carriages. Material considered was reports of the office of the R.T.O. placed before it. (2) The pollution caused by diesel engines had effect on the health of citizens at large. This would be a relevant consideration for the exercise of the power. (3) Noise pollution was occurred caused by operation of six seater vehicles on account of consistent stopping and starting of the vehicle. (4) The problem caused to movement of traffic by stopping the vehicles in between to carry passengers. (5) Unhealthy competition caused to the two city transport services run by the Corporation which were adversely affecting them. (f) It is contended that this is not a case of legitimate expectation. The petitioners were fully aware of the condition of the permit namely that it was open to the authorities to amend the conditions or incorporate new conditions. Once that be so the doctrine of legitimate expectation would not apply and consequently also the decision taken cannot be faulted. 12. The first question, therefore, that will have to be examined and answered; did the S.T.A. have the power to pass the resolution which is the subject matter of the present challenge? The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that there is no such power conferred by section 68. A perusal of section 68(3) it is contended would indicate that it is only for the purpose of co-ordinating and regulating the activities and policies of the Regional Transport Authority. This would not include the power to take a decision to ban plying of vehicles or varying the conditions of the permit. Such a power, however, is expressly contained in section 67. The State Government by virtue of the powers contained under section 67(1)(a) could issue directions for the matters however, therein including what is set out under section 67(1). This would not include the power to take a decision to ban plying of vehicles or varying the conditions of the permit. Such a power, however, is expressly contained in section 67. The State Government by virtue of the powers contained under section 67(1)(a) could issue directions for the matters however, therein including what is set out under section 67(1). However, this power can be exercised, considering the proviso only after a draft to that effect is published in the Official Gazette and after considering any objections and suggestions that may be received. It is, therefore, contended that these being a specific power conferred on the State Government, the State Transport Authority would have no power under section 68. The decision of the S.T.A. itself reveals that its decision is based in exercise of its powers under section 68(3). It will, therefore, have to be examined whether in fact the decision as taken can be said to be a decision under section 68(3). A careful reading of the provisions of section 68(3) will indicate that the power conferred on the authority is to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and policies of the Regional Transport Authorities. The Regional Transport Authorities themselves have been conferred powers under section 69. These include the power to grant permits. Considering that will it be possible or permissible to hold that this power of the R.T.A. can be co-ordinated or regulated by the S.T.A. in order to have a uniform policy in an area or region of the State. The very purpose of having the State Transport Authority which exercises jurisdiction through the State is with a view to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and policies of the R.T.As. and that would include the power to ensure that the Regional Transport Authorities function within certain parameters. Otherwise it is possible that the Regional Transport Authorities functioning in adjoining areas in the same State could independently take decisions regarding functioning and movement of traffic in their area which may not be in the larger public interest or interest of the State. The entire policy of section 68(3) is the need or desire to provide for a uniform policy for an area or areas which in the power of the S.T.A. is required in public interest. The entire policy of section 68(3) is the need or desire to provide for a uniform policy for an area or areas which in the power of the S.T.A. is required in public interest. In my opinion, therefore, there is absolutely no difficulty in holding that there is a specific power conferred under section 68(3), in the State Transport Authority, for the purpose of regulating the activities and policies of the Regional Transport Authorities, by issuing directions including the direction to either allowing the movement of six seater auto rickshaws or not. Once such a power is there pursuant to sub-section (4) of section 68, the State Transport Authority can issue directions to the Regional Transport Authorities. In my opinion, therefore, the argument on behalf of the petitioners that there is no such power and the power is vested only in the State Government under section 67 is devoid of any merits. Section 67 is a power independent of the power conferred on the S.T.A. under section 68(3). The S.T.A. is an independent statutory authority created by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, to regulate the functioning of the various Road Transport Authorities in the State. If that be the case, those powers are independent of the power conferred in the State Government. No doubt if the State Government under section 67 issues the directions the S.T.A. would be bound to comply with the directions as contained therein. It is open to the Legislature in exercise of its power to confer powers on one or more delegate, for the purpose of exercise of power of sub-ordinate legislation. In the instant case both the State Government and the S.T.A. are its delegates conferred with the power to be exercised in the manner set out. Whether the power is quasi judicial or legislative will be considered hereafter. In the instant case there is no notification by the State Government as contemplated under section 67. However, the State Transport Authority considering the statement made on the floor of both the Houses of Legislature on behalf of the Government, speaking through the Minister for Transport could have noted the same and considered the same for issuing directions under section 68(3). However, the State Transport Authority considering the statement made on the floor of both the Houses of Legislature on behalf of the Government, speaking through the Minister for Transport could have noted the same and considered the same for issuing directions under section 68(3). In our system of governance, where there is division between the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary, the statement made by the Minister in the Legislature is a statement of policy made by the Government of the day which has to be carried out by the executive and other authorities to give effect to the statute. In the instant case the State Transport Authority could have noted the said statement made on behalf of the Government. The decision in fact notes, that it has taken note of the said statement made in both Houses of the State Assembly by the Minister. Considering that to my mind since the power is located in section 68(3) the power could be exercised independently. The power could be exercised taking note of various circumstances, which would include the policy statement of the Government. I, therefore, atleast have no hesitation in holding that the S.T.A. could take note of the statement made in both Houses of the Legislature while exercising its power under section 68(3) to issue directions to regulate the traffic within the areas of the R.T.A. 13. Having said so, the next question, is what is the nature of this power. Is it a power in subordinate legislation or is it a quasi judicial power? Section 68(3) contemplates a decision making process. There is no dispute which is being decided between two individuals. What is being decided is in fact a policy decision. At this stage itself it may be necessary to note the distinguishing features between legislative and judicial power. In the case of (Bates v. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone others)1, 1972(1) W.I.R. 1373, the issue before the Chancery Division was regarding fixation of fees of Solicitors and whether they had a right to be heard on fixation of fees. Whilst so considering the nature of the power conferred the Court observed as under:--- ".....................Let me accept that in the sphere of the so-called quasi judicial the rules of natural justice run, and that in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness. Whilst so considering the nature of the power conferred the Court observed as under:--- ".....................Let me accept that in the sphere of the so-called quasi judicial the rules of natural justice run, and that in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness. Nevertheless, these considerations do not seem to me to affect the process of legislation, whether primary or delegated. Many of those affected by delegated legislation, and affected very substantially, are never consulted in the process of enacting that legislation; and yet they have no remedy. Of course, the informal consultation of representative bodies by the legislative authority is a commonplace; but although a few statutes have specifically provided for a general process of publishing draft delegated legislation and considering objections (see, for example, the Factories Act, 1961, Schedule 4), I do not know of any implied right to be consulted or make objections, or any principle upon which the courts may enjoin the legislative process at the suit of those who contend that insufficient time for consultation and consideration has been given. I accept that the fact that the order will take the form of a statutory instrument does not per se make it immune from attack, whether by injunction or otherwise; but what is important is not its form but is nature, which is plainly legislative." Useful reference may now be made to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of (Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. another)2, 1987(2) S.C.C. 720 . In this case the issue was the fixation of the price of drugs under the Essential Commodities Act the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1979. It was contended on behalf of the various Pharmaceutical Companies that they had a right to be heard in the decision making process as they would be directly affected by the decision. In that context considering the scope of legislative power the Apex Court has in para 7 of the said judgment observed as under:--- "The third observation we wish to make is, price fixation is more in the nature of a legislative activity than any other. It is true that, with the proliferation of delegated legislation, there is a tendency for the line between legislation and administration to vanish into an illusion. It is true that, with the proliferation of delegated legislation, there is a tendency for the line between legislation and administration to vanish into an illusion. Administrative, quasi judicial decisions tend to merge in legislative activity and, conversely, legislative activity tends to fade into and present an appearance of an administrative or quasi judicial activity. Any attempt to draw a distinct line between legislative and administrative functions, it has been said, is difficult in theory and impossible in practice. Though difficult, it is necessary that the line must sometimes be drawn as different legal rights and consequences may ensue. The distinction between the two has usually been expressed as 'one between the general and the particular'." Let us, therefore, examine section 68 of the M.V. Act to note whether the power exercised under section 68(3) is in the nature of quasi judicial or an exercise in sub-ordinate legislation. This is relevant as it is seriously contended on behalf of the petitioners that there is non-application of mind by the S.T.A. in as much as it has not taken into consideration the relevant factors and/or placed reliance on the same material which was relied upon to reject the earlier objections to the plying of six seater auto rickshaws within the Municipal Limits of the Corporation. The power under section 68(3) is in the nature of policy making power. The nature of this power can be further examined from sub-section (4) of section 68, which contemplates that for the purpose of exercising and discharging the powers and functions specified in sub-section (3), a State Transport Authority may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, issue directions to any Regional Transport Authority, and the Regional Transport Authority shall, in the discharge of its functions under this Act, give effect to and be guided by such directions. In other words the power under section 68(4) exercised under section 68(3) is the power to issue direction by one statutory authority constituted under the Act to another statutory authority constituted under the Act. There is no hearing involved. A single individual or a group of individuals cannot contend that they have a right to be heard as their individual rights would be affected. The power is to issue directions. There is no hearing involved. A single individual or a group of individuals cannot contend that they have a right to be heard as their individual rights would be affected. The power is to issue directions. Once the power is to be exercised for effecting a general policy, that power can only be said to be an exercise of power of subordinate legislation. Once it is the power in exercise of sub-ordinate legislation, there is no right to be heard in any determinate group where it is not so provided, though it is possible that the decision making body may invite objections, hear suggestions and consider them while forming its opinion. That does not mean that the decision making process or authority making decision is bound to accept the suggestions that have been put before it or for the Court for that matter to enquire as to whether the suggestions or objections have been considered and if the suggestions or objections have not been considered to hold that the decision is vitiated. There is another essential distinction between legislative function and quasi judicial function. Whereas in the case of legislative function an action taken without hearing or non-consideration of material would not suffer, in case it is an exercise of quasi judicial power it would have to be set aside. In the instant case considering the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 68 it is clear that the power conferred is purely an exercise in subordinate legislation. The State Transport Authority acts as a delegate on behalf of the Legislature. This exercise of power is now often delegated by Legislature as it is not possible to contemplate or imagine all possible situations while enacting a statute. It is for that purpose that the Legislature make a provision to provide for a rule making power recognising specific authorities to make rules as a delegate of the Legislature. In yet other instances, it may be the decision making process to authorities constituted, specified or recognised to make policy decision. All these are found under section 68(3) and 68(4). Therefore, it is clear the power under sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 68 is clearly a legislative power. 14. In yet other instances, it may be the decision making process to authorities constituted, specified or recognised to make policy decision. All these are found under section 68(3) and 68(4). Therefore, it is clear the power under sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 68 is clearly a legislative power. 14. Once it is held that the power is legislative the question is to what extent the suggestions or for that matter the objections raised by the petitioners herein had to be considered and what is the extent of judicial review by this Court in the exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. I may once again advert to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India another v. Cynamide India Ltd. (supra). The Apex Court in para 5 of the judgment has observed as under:--- "We wish to make it clear that legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not subject to rules of natural justice. In the case of Parliamentary legislation, the proposition is self-evident. In the case of sub-ordinate legislation, it may happen that Parliament may itself provide for a notice and for a hearing-there are several instances of the Legislature requiring the sub-ordinate legislating authority to give public notice and a public hearing before say, for example, levying a municipal rate, in which case the substantial non-observance of the statutorily prescribed mode or observing natural justice may have the effect of invalidating the sub-ordinate legislation. But, where the Legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice of hearing, no one can insist upon it and it will not be permissible to read natural justice into such legislative activity. Occasionally, the legislature directs the sub-ordinate legislating body to make such enquiry as it thinks fit before making the sub-ordinate legislation. In such a situation, while such enquiry by the sub-ordinate legislating body as it deems fit is a condition precedent to the sub-ordinate legislation, the nature and the extent of the enquiry is in the discretion of the sub-ordinate legislating body and the sub-ordinate legislation is not open to question on the ground that the enquiry was not as full as it might have been. The provision for such enquiry as it thinks fit is generally an enabling provision, intended to facilitate the sub-ordinate legislating body to obtain relevant information from all and wherever source and not intended to vest any right in anyone other than the sub-ordinate legislating body. It is the sort of enquiry which the Legislature itself may cause to be made before legislating, an enquiry which will not confer any right on anyone." In the instant case when the learned Single Judge of this Court directed the State Transport Authority to give a hearing what the order essentially meant was, that the petitioners be given an opportunity to place the material before the State Transport Authority before it took the policy decision. This was not pursuant to a finding by this Court that the S.T.A. was acting as a quasi judicial authority. That decision was neither in issue nor answered nor decided. After examining the various provisions of the Act, all that can be said is that this Court considering the contrary stands, felt the need to give to the parties an opportunity to place all the material that they had, before the S.T.A. and as such permitted them the opportunity of placing that material before the S.T.A. That does not mean that the S.T.A. was bound by the material and/or it had to give reasons as to why it has considered or rejected the said material. That, however, does not mean that the sub-ordinate law making body can act arbitrarily. Every action of it must be informed by reason. Even an authority making sub-ordinate legislation must ensure that the sub-ordinate legislation satisfies the test of Article 14 viz. non-arbitrariness, fairness and reasonableness. Therefore, in the instant case the hearing though given, was only in aid of the decision making process and not an exercise of quasi judicial power. I may now refer to the judgment in the case of (Krishnan Kakkanth v. Government of Kerala others)3, 1997(9) S.C.C. 495 . That was a case in the matter of Government issuing contracts. There was a provision in the contract to extend the contract for a further period. In that case the Government authority decided, though the Contractor sought for extension, not to extend the contract. That was a case in the matter of Government issuing contracts. There was a provision in the contract to extend the contract for a further period. In that case the Government authority decided, though the Contractor sought for extension, not to extend the contract. In the challenge to the action the Court was examining, whether if the decision was taken as a matter of public policy and public interest, then the extent to which the Court in law can review the same. The question posed by the Apex Court was whether the reasonableness of restriction has to be determined from the standpoint of general public interest and circumstances relating to the trade or business in question and not from, the standpoint of interest of the person on whom the restriction imposed even if restriction operates on him harshly. Answering the issue the Apex Court held that to ascertain unreasonableness and arbitrariness in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution, it is not necessary to enter upon any exercise for finding out the wisdom in the policy decision of the State Government. It is immaterial whether a better or more comprehensive policy decision could have been taken. It is equally immaterial if it can be demonstrated that the policy decision is unwise and is likely to defeat the purpose for which such decision has been taken. Unless the policy decision is demonstrably capricious or arbitrary and not informed by any reason whatsoever or it suffers from the vice of discrimination or infringes any statute or provisions of the Constitution, the policy decision cannot be struck down. It should be borne in mind that except for the limited purpose of testing a public policy in the context of illegality and unconstitutionality, courts should avoid "embarking on unchartered ocean of public policy". 15. Having said so the question now is whether the decision taken by the S.T.A. can be said to suffer from arbitrariness or is capricious. It is true that the earlier decisions of the authority did take into consideration, same or similar considerations, which earlier it found not to be relevant or sufficient to take a policy decision to ban six seater auto rickshaw. It is true that the earlier decisions of the authority did take into consideration, same or similar considerations, which earlier it found not to be relevant or sufficient to take a policy decision to ban six seater auto rickshaw. Some of the same aspects which the authority at that time found to be irrelevant for the purpose of deciding to grant contract carriage permits for diesel vehicles, six seater auto rickshaw it has subsequently found to be relevant. It must however, be noted that at the relevant time in so far as air pollution it was felt that pollution caused by petrol engines was more hazardous than that caused by diesel engines. Also that the problem caused by running the auto rickshaw as State carriage could be minimised by enforcement or levying penalties. As noted in the earlier part of the judgment the authority itself has now noted the fact that the new material has come which indicates that suspended particulates now released into air, through diesel engines are apart from being carcinogenic also cause a lot of respiratory ailments. The fact must be borne in mind as pointed out by the learned Advocate General that one of the members of the Committee was also a member appointed by this Court to submit a report to this Court on the effect of banning of diesel taxis who had changed over from petrol engines to diesel engines. Even otherwise there is today available a large mass of material or research done in various countries including our own. The results are available and published in various journals. This material indicates that particulate released from diesel engines are much higher than those from other fuels. The study conducted in this country on behalf of the Centre for Science and Environment by Swedish Consultants Peter Ahlvik and Ake Brandberg at Ecotraffic have brought out the effect of emission from diesel engines. Apart from that studies done by the California Air Resources Board, the South Coast Air Quality Management District of California, the German Federal Environment Agency do indicate based on the studies as available that emission from diesel engines are more carcinogenic. Apart from that studies have also revealed that asthma and allergy is on the increase in the area where emission from diesel engines are more. (Source material issue of May, 15th 2000 "Down to Earth"). Apart from that studies have also revealed that asthma and allergy is on the increase in the area where emission from diesel engines are more. (Source material issue of May, 15th 2000 "Down to Earth"). It is possible to argue that there can also be opinions in so far as petrol engines are concerned. That, however, cannot prevent the legislature or its delegate in taking steps to protect the health of its citizens even if the knowledge is insufficient as may be argued by some. Therefore, consideration by the authorities that the diesel engines causes air pollution was vital material which was taken into consideration. Similarly the authorities considered the reports by their inspectors which indicated that the six seater vehicles stop to take passengers, resulting thereby in affecting the movement of vehicles. Noise pollution occasioned by the engine and constant stopping and starting and also the adverse financial effect on the two State Transport Corporation in running the buses were also taken into consideration. It cannot be said that these were the relevant factors. Each of these factors by itself was relevant. It is possible that any acts of Legislature or an exercise in sub-ordinate legislation must result in hardship to some. However, the State, cannot in larger public interest merely because some citizens are bound to suffer be prevented from taking steps which are in the larger interest of the community or public at large. In the instant case the decision of the S.T.A is based on relevant criteria and on material available before it. In my opinion, therefore, the decision of the S.T.A. cannot be faulted. It does not suffer from arbitrariness nor can it be said that the right to carry on trade or profession has been affected as the State in the exercise of powers under section 19(1)(g) can impose reasonable restrictions. In the instant case it is not as if the petitioners individuals are totally barred from carrying on their trade. Firstly the six seater rickshaws are still entitled to carry on the trade, but limited to particular routes, within certain limits. Such reasonable restrictions cannot be said to have affected the petitioners' right to life and livelihood. It does not mean that the State could not have banned diesel vehicles altogether. That is not in issue here as what is in issue, is only the decision on running of six seater auto rickshaw. Such reasonable restrictions cannot be said to have affected the petitioners' right to life and livelihood. It does not mean that the State could not have banned diesel vehicles altogether. That is not in issue here as what is in issue, is only the decision on running of six seater auto rickshaw. Therefore, I find no substance in so far as the challenge to the decision of the S.T.A. 16. The next argument is that, as no restrictions have been imposed on three seater diesel rickshaws would also indicate that the action is arbitrary. That is also benefit of merit as the classification between the two types of diesel auto rickshaws would be reasonable. No material at least has been placed on record to show why such a classification is unreasonable or has no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It would be apparent that the problem caused by operation of three seater diesel rickshaw would be less harmful than by six seater diesel vehicles. 17. Lastly, it was contended that the power to vary the condition of permit could only be exercised considering section 115 of the Motor Vehicles Act. That argument is again devoid of any merit. The permit itself provides the area in which the vehicle has to be run. Once the permit itself so provided, that would be a condition of the permit. Once that being a condition of the permit, it was within the power of the R.T.A. pursuant to the directions issued to it by the S.T.A. under section 68(4) to alter the conditions of the permit. In my opinion, therefore, I find no fault with the decision of the R.T.A. in taking the decision which they have done after complying with the requirement as to notice as contemplated, for effecting change in the condition of the permit. 18. Having said so the only limited question is whether the petitioners had any legitimate expectation in contending that they had invested large amounts in purchasing the vehicle and, that as they were permitted to run within the city areas they had atleast the legitimate expectation that atleast for the duration of the terms of the permit, the condition would not be varied. The decision of the respondents, therefore, it has been contended, is contrary to the principles of promissory estoppel and/or against the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The decision of the respondents, therefore, it has been contended, is contrary to the principles of promissory estoppel and/or against the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Really speaking there are no pleadings in so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation. The pleadings are that the action is arbitrary. In so far as promissory estoppel is concerned the law is now settled that it will not apply to legislation. Once having held that the exercise is in the nature of sub-ordinate legislation that argument is not available apart from the fact that the permit itself contains a clause of adding additional conditions. The only other question then would be of legitimate expectation. The Apex Court in the case of (State of West Bengal others v. Niranjan Singha)4, 2001(2) S.C.C. 326 has articulated this concept of legitimate expectation. The Apex Court has held as under :--- "The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" is only an aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution in dealing with the citizens in a non-arbitrary manner and thus, by itself, does not give rise to an enforceable right but in testing the action taken by the Government authority whether arbitrary or otherwise it would be relevant." Thus it is clear that the doctrine of legitimate expectation enables a Court to examine whether the action of the authority considering its earlier stand is arbitrary. In the instant case in my opinion the same would not at all arise. The petitioners were fully aware when they were issued permit that the permit would be subject to alterations of the conditions of imposing new conditions. Once that be so the doctrine of legitimate expectation would not come to the aid of the petitioners. Having said so I must also reject that contention. 19. In my opinion, therefore, the challenge as raised to the decision are bereft and devoid of any merit. Rule discharged. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Learned Counsel for the petitioners prays for stay of the order for a period of 4 weeks. Considering that there was a stay operating in favour of the petitioners, order not to be given effect to for a further period of sixteen weeks from today considering the ensuing summer vacation and the pending work with the Personal Assistant. Learned Counsel for the petitioners prays for stay of the order for a period of 4 weeks. Considering that there was a stay operating in favour of the petitioners, order not to be given effect to for a further period of sixteen weeks from today considering the ensuing summer vacation and the pending work with the Personal Assistant. Parties/authorities to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar/P.A. of this Court. Rule discharged. -----