VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petitioner prays for issue of a writ of certiqrari to quash annexure-E in No. LAW. 30. LAC. 98 dated 13. 3,1998 issued by the first respondent. ( 2 ) IT is (he case of the petitioner that in pursuance of the notification issued by the Government on 10. 1. 1991, he has applied and was appointed as Munsiff by the Government of Karnataka, by notification No. LAW. 117. LAC. 91 dated 25. 6. 1991 in exercise of the powers conferred under. Article 234 of the Constitution of India in accordance with the provisions of the Karnataka Civil Services (Recruitment) (Amendment) Rules, 1983. The petitioner was at SI. No. 1 in the list prepared in the order of merit and he joined the service on 15. 7. 1991. After successfully completing two months munsiff training. he was posted to Ankola Munsiff and JMFC Court, where he worked till August 1992. It is submitted that Ankola Bar is very small one and most of the Advocates come from Karwar and kumta. ( 3 ) THE petitioner was transferred from Ankola Munsiff and JMFC Court to Chittapur in Gulbarga District in September, 1992. On the ground of health problem, due to climatic condition, he voiced for a transfer and was transferred to Kolar in December, 1992, where he worked up to April, 1994. From there he was transferred to Mangalore where he had worked from June 1994 to October 1994 as a I Add ). Munsiff Court arid latter in October 1994 to April 1995 as II Addl. Munsiff, In April 1995 he was asked to take additional charges of prl. Munsiff Court. It is claimed that though he was trying his level best to reach the target prescribed, for lack of proper cooperation or otherwise in the Bar, he could not reach the target. But however he kept the average disposal showing the progress in the disposal of the cases in June 1996 and March 1997, his quota of disposal was a fixed by the High Court. ( 4 ) IN August 1996 he was made JMFC from Principal Munsiff Court, Bantwal, and his junior was made Prl. Munsiff, though the petitioner had shown the maximum disposal during that period. In march 1997, the petitioner was again transferred to Afzalpur which is a remote place in Gulbarga District. ( 4 ) IN August 1996 he was made JMFC from Principal Munsiff Court, Bantwal, and his junior was made Prl. Munsiff, though the petitioner had shown the maximum disposal during that period. In march 1997, the petitioner was again transferred to Afzalpur which is a remote place in Gulbarga District. It is submitted that filing of original suit is about 50 per year and even I. P. c. cases also comparatively less than any other place. The Bar strength was also very low, inasmuch as, only four permanent Advocates were practicing and the Court was established only in November 1993. Despite low filing, the petitioner had disposed of as many as 4 suits in March 1997 along with three IPC cases and 2 Misc. cases in april 1997. During May 1997, the High Court introduced the Pilot project for Gulbarga District. Under the said project, the requisite disposal was fixed at 24 unit i. e. , 24 original suits in a month. Two ipc cases are equal to one original suit and six cases in other laws were equal to one unit i. e. , one original suit. During June 1997 to september 1997, the petitioner had reached the full target and in october 1997 on account of vacation and earned leave the petitioner had completed half quota. During November 1997 and also in december 1997, on account of vacation, he had completed half target. Sn January 1998 he had reached 24 unit by disposing the number of IPC and Original Suit cases. In February 1998 on account of Ramzan and also on account of election, the disposal rate was low as the attendance of the Advocates was lean. Still, the petitioner had completed his half quota of disposal of about 12 suits. In March 1998 also the petitioner had disposed of 3 original suits and 12 IPC cases. By March 1998, the petitioner was able to bring down the pendency of original suits to only at 40 and as many as 200 IPC cases were disposed of in Afzalpur, apart from disposal of more than 60 other law cases and 125 Misc. cases. ( 5 ) AS required under the Probation Rutes, the petitioner was required to pass Kannada language examination. cases. ( 5 ) AS required under the Probation Rutes, the petitioner was required to pass Kannada language examination. He made an application during 1996 through the District Judge Mangalore and the said application was rejected by the KPSC as the same was not endorsed by the District Judge, Mangalore. Therefore, he lost the chance to appear for the Kannada language examination during 1996. Again appeared for the Kannada language examination during december 1997, in pursuance of the application made by him in october 1997. Results were declared on 27. 2. 1998 by the KPSC declaring that the petitioner has provisionally become eligible for viva voce on the basis of the result of the Kannada written examination of the Departmental Examination I. Petitioner was asked to appear before the Commission for Kannada viva voce on 18. 3. 1998 at 10 a. m. In the mean time the petitioner received notification dated 13. 3. 1998 on 27. 3. 1998 under the name of the governor, the Government has discharged him with immediate effect. The said order was passed in exercise of the powers conferred under rule 5 sub-clause (b) of the Probation Rules and the Governor has alleged that the petitioner is unsuitable to hold the post as he has not completed the probation period satisfactorily. ( 6 ) THE petitioner was appointed in pursuance of the notification mentioned above, he was required to undergo two years probation period and training and pass Kannada language examination. He has admittedly and satisfactorily completed the training and further he was successful in the written test of the Departmental Kannada examination. Despite the petitioner having completed the Kannada language Examination and also having undergone training and the period of probation for two years, the notification have been issued, which according to the petitioner is not proper. Having worked for a period of more than two years, after the completion of two years probation period, he ought to have been confirmed. No prior notice was given before the discharge, no reason was assigned to the said notification, except mentioning unsuitable. At no point of time, between Juiy 1991 to March 1998, the petitioner was issued with any notice regarding unsuitability of his service. No prior notice was given before the discharge, no reason was assigned to the said notification, except mentioning unsuitable. At no point of time, between Juiy 1991 to March 1998, the petitioner was issued with any notice regarding unsuitability of his service. The petitioner was not even made known as to his probation period was extended or not; inasmuch as, at no point of time the petitioner was intimated that he has not completed the probation period satisfactorily. In turn, the petitioner has been continued in the service even after the period of two years and the petitioner has been working continuously from july 1991 to March 1998. Hence, it is deemed that the petitioner's probation period has been completed satisfactorily after a lapse of a period of two years and the notification of discharge is totally contrary to the provisions of the Rules and also the principle of natural justice. Thus, the petition came to be filed. ( 7 ) IN the objection statement filed by respondents 1 and 2, signed by the Government pleader, it is submitted that in view of the poor performance of the petitioner in discharging of his duty, he was required to be transferred on a number of occasions from September to March 1998 primarily. The petitioner who was working at Ankola sought transfer to Chittapur and again from Chittapur to Kolar; at kolar he served for a period of four months. Again in April 1994, the petitioner was transferred to Mangalore. During his stay in Mangalore also his performance was very poor and disposal was very low. Accordingly the said remarks were entered in the service register. Again in June 1996 the petitioner was transferred to Bantwal as his work was not satisfactory. Even then he has not improved his performance. The confidential report of the petitioner for the period from 7. 6. 1995 to 10. 11. 1995 shows that his performance was very poor. His promptitude in disposal of the old cases, industry, aptitude for hard work and readiness to take up responsibility are all shown to be poor. Again the petitioner, in view of the aforesaid fact, was transferred to Afzalpur in Gulbarga District. But there was no improvement in the performance of the petitioner. The ground shown by the petitioner for low disposal of the cases is of fow filing of rates which cannot be accepted. Again the petitioner, in view of the aforesaid fact, was transferred to Afzalpur in Gulbarga District. But there was no improvement in the performance of the petitioner. The ground shown by the petitioner for low disposal of the cases is of fow filing of rates which cannot be accepted. The contention of the petitioner that he was able to bring down the pendency of the original suit by serving at Afzalpur is only self serving contention. At no point of time the petitioner has reached the quota then fixed by the High Court with regard to the disposal of the cases by the lower Courts. In view of the fact that the petitioner in spite of several instructions being given did not improve himself in his performance, he was dismissed from service as unsuitable to hold the post. ( 8 ) IT is further submitted that merely because the petitioner has passed Kannada Language examination and has completed the training and the period of probation, does not entitle, him to be declared that his performance is satisfactory so as to enable him to hold the post in a substantive capacity. Since the discharge of the petitioner was not by way of the punishment and the said is discharge simpliciter, the question of holding any enquiry prior to the order of discharge does not arise. ( 9 ) IT is also submitted that merely because the petitioner has worked for a period of two years, it does not mean that he has completed the period satisfactorily and it does not give him any right to claim declaration to the effect that he has satisfactorily,completed the period of probation and he does not get any right to hold post in substantiate capacity. Since the petitioner has been discharged during the period of probation which is discharge simpliciter, question of granting opportunity does not arise and the question of application of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India does not arise. ( 10 ) IT is only when the order of discharge is "waived" of an enquiry has to be conducted and the principle of natural justice have to be followed. In the instant case discharge is not by way of punishment. ( 10 ) IT is only when the order of discharge is "waived" of an enquiry has to be conducted and the principle of natural justice have to be followed. In the instant case discharge is not by way of punishment. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the Impugned order passed under rule 5 (i) (b) of the Probationary Rules, 1977, Merely because the word "unsuitabiiity" does not find a place in the service records and the same has not been intimated to him, the same cannot be a ground to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order. ( 11 ) IT is also contended that the petitioner did not get through Kannada Language Examination as required under Rule 5 of the karnataka Civil Services (Kannada Language Examination) Rules even after lapse of 7 years from the date of entry into service and despite sufficient opportunity being given to the petitioner to pass the same. Thus it was resisted. ( 12 ) A rejoinder was filed by the petitioner wherein it is reiterated that because of frequent transfers it was not possible for the petitioner to show his performance above the normal. Despite the transfer the petitioner did work to the best of his ability and has shown his best performance and has given average disposal and some times more than the average. ( 13 ) IT is common knowledge of every one that if the Courts are loaded with heavy work, disposal would automatically increase. Wherever the petitioner was posted in heavy Courts, loaded with heavy work, there the performance of the petitioner was above the average. But most of the time, the petitioner was posted to light courts, like Ankola, Kolar and Afzalpur, wherein there is less number of original suits. As against this, in places like Buntawal, wherein the petitioner has worked for a period of eight months, there his performance is above normal/average. ( 14 ) DESPITE frequent transfers effected to the petitioner, evenplaces where he was transferred, there he was further transferred from I Addl. to II Addl. and from II A'ddl. to HI Addl. likewise. In this process, it became difficult for the petitioner to concentrate in place and got disposed of more number of cases. In spite of all this, the petitioner had maintained average disposal of cases. to II Addl. and from II A'ddl. to HI Addl. likewise. In this process, it became difficult for the petitioner to concentrate in place and got disposed of more number of cases. In spite of all this, the petitioner had maintained average disposal of cases. The contention of the respondents that the petitipner has sought transfer from Ankola to Chittapur and Chittapur to Kolar, is denied by the petitioner. It was submitted by the petitioner that he was not communicated with adverse remarks for a period from 7. 6. 1995 to 10. 11. 1995 but as admitted by the respondents the petitioner was not communicated with confidential reports every year. ( 15 ) THE sequence of events was also given by the petitioner which is as follows: 15. 7. 1991 Petitioner joined the service and he completed 2 years of probation period on 14. 7. 1993. There is no extension of probation period either before 14. 7. 1993 or subsequent thereto; 16. 7. 1991 to Aug. 92 Petitioner served as Munsiff and JMFC Ankola. Sep. 92 to Nov. 93 Petitioner served as Munsiff and JMFC Chittapur, Gulbarga Dec. 93 to Apr. 94 Petitioner served as Addl. Munsiff & JMFC Kolar. June 94 to Oct 94 Petitioner served as 1st Addl. Munsiff, Mangalore. Oct. 94 to Apr. 95 Petitioner served as II Addl. Munsiff, Mangalore. Apr. 95 to Jun 96 Petitioner served as I Addl. Munsiff, Mangalore, June 96 to Aug 96 Petitioner served as Prl. Munsiff, Bantwala, an entry in the confidential report of low disposal. Aug 96 to Mar 97 Petitioner served as Addl. Munsiff & JMFC Bantwala. Mar 97 to Mar 98 Petitioner served as Munsiff & JMFC Afzalpur. Dec. 97 Petitioner appeared for the Kannada Language Examination 27. 2. 1998 Petitioner was declared successful in the Kannada Language written examination, via voce on 18th Mar, 98. Result announced on 24th April 1998, awaiting results discharge effected. 13. 3. 1998 Petitioner was discharged from service by his excellency the then Governor of Karnataka on the ground of unsuitable to hold the post of Civil Judge (Jr. Divn. ). ( 16 ) RELIANCE was placed on the dictum in AIR 1964 SC 806 , for the proposition that where an employee continuing for more than six years after the probation period, he is deemed to have been confirmed and no automatic termination. Divn. ). ( 16 ) RELIANCE was placed on the dictum in AIR 1964 SC 806 , for the proposition that where an employee continuing for more than six years after the probation period, he is deemed to have been confirmed and no automatic termination. Reliance also was placed in THE STATE OF PUNJAB vs DHARAM SINGH wherein the supreme Court held that if the employees are allowed to continue beyond the probation period without extension of the probation period he is deemed to have been confirmed. In the dictum in DAYARAM dayal vs STATE OF M. P. wherein it is held that where the maximum period of probation is fixed by rules on completion of such maximum period of probation, termination without inquiry vitiates article 311, and it is a deemed confirmation. In DIPTI PRAKASH banerjee vs SATVENDRA NATH BOSE NATIONAL CENTRE for BASIC SCIENCES, CALCUTTA AND OTHERS, the Supreme court has held that discharge of probation on selection is punitive or simpliciter depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. In PUSHPA AGGARWAL vs U. P. S. C. AND OTHERS, the Supreme court held that probation period not extended nor the case was considered immediately after two years, such employees are entitled for relief as claimed. Reliance was also placed in V. P. AHUJA vs state OF PUNJAB, wherein the Supreme Court held that order of termination of probationer on the ground of unsatisfactory work is stigmatic and regular inquiry and an opportunity of being heard is a must, in NAR SINGH PAL vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS, the supreme Court held that termination of casual employee after ten years who attains the status of temporary employee, cannot be terminated without regular inquiry. ( 17 ) THE specific contention of the petitioner is that by virtue offrequent transfer from one place to another with insufficient of workload available of a particular Court, he could not reach the target. A perusal of the objection statement as well as the records available clearly indicate that the only ground on which the petitioner was discharged was that he has not reached the minimum quota fixed for disposal. It is unfortunate that no other records was produced by the Government Pleader nor any records was brought to the notice of this Court. A perusal of the objection statement as well as the records available clearly indicate that the only ground on which the petitioner was discharged was that he has not reached the minimum quota fixed for disposal. It is unfortunate that no other records was produced by the Government Pleader nor any records was brought to the notice of this Court. ( 18 ) IT has been repeatedly pointed out that whenever a rule mnisiis issued it is the duty of the respondent especially a Government to place before the Court the concerned records for the Court to come to a conclusion on the materials available after perusing the records. In this case despite repeated requests no records were produced before this Court. It is unfortunate that when a life of a Judicial officer is at stake and the matter is pending for more than nearly three years, nobody has moved a little finger to produce to justify the action taken by the Government and other respondents. Therefore, the matter has to be decided only on the basis of the objection statement, the High Court Record produced lately and the authorities relied upon by the parties. ( 19 ) THE question that arises for consideration is whether the finding regarding completion of probation is sustainable? ( 20 ) THE Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations Rules), 1966 speaks about the provision. Rule 4 says that the period of probation may be made for the reasons to be recorded in writing be extended by the Governor or the Government by such period as he or it deems fit. (ii) By any other appointing authority by such period not exceeding half the prescribed period of probation. (Underlining is mine ). Rule 5 (1) speaks about consideration of suitability for confirmation of the probation. Rule 5 (b) contemplates: "if the appointing authority decides that the probationer is not suitable to hold the post, it shall, unless the period of probation is extended under Rule 4, by, order, discharge him from service". The notification No. LAW 130 LAC 82, Bangalore dated 24. 8. 1983, published in the Karnataka Gazette in Part IV 2c (i) means the schedule about the probation of Munsiff. This what it says:"probation :- Two years. During the period of probation he must undergo such training as may be prescribed by the High Court of Karnataka. The notification No. LAW 130 LAC 82, Bangalore dated 24. 8. 1983, published in the Karnataka Gazette in Part IV 2c (i) means the schedule about the probation of Munsiff. This what it says:"probation :- Two years. During the period of probation he must undergo such training as may be prescribed by the High Court of Karnataka. " ( 21 ) APPLYING the Rule 4 (2) it means that the period of probation cannot be extended more than one half of the prescribed period of probation; that means, in all not beyond three years. This aspect has not been considered by the respondents nor any explanation is forthcoming for non-consideration of the same. ( 22 ) THE Government Pleader relied upon the judgment in H. F. SANGATl vs R. G. HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA7, for the proposition that the impugned order does not cast any stigma on the appellant. In fact that was a case where the question of conducting any enquiry during the probation has been held to be not necessary in the circumstances of that case. It is also seen that all the relevant materials that are placed before the Administrative committee and the Committee, formed an opinion as to the unsuitability of the two appellants and that opinion is communicated to and accepted by the Full Court. The Government Pleader is not able to give any facts to apply the same principle adopted by the court in that case. The rejoinder filed by the petitioner clearly says "it is further submitted that the complete record of the petitioner was not placed before the Administrative Committee and consequently the Administrative Committee erred in forming an opinion that the petitioners service is not satisfactory. " This rejoinder was filed as early as on 13. 10. 1998 and none of the respondents have cared to place before this Court any documents on record to controvert such averments in paragraph 6 of the statement mentioned above. ( 23 ) IT is also not the case of the respondent in the counter that the period of probation was extended by any communication whatsoever. One is not able to understand the beginning of paragraph 8 which says "it is only where the order of discharge is waived of. ( 23 ) IT is also not the case of the respondent in the counter that the period of probation was extended by any communication whatsoever. One is not able to understand the beginning of paragraph 8 which says "it is only where the order of discharge is waived of. " it is admitted in the counter that the petitioner was working for more than seven years and no other charge except that- he was not reaching the target was ever made. To the specific contention of the petitioner that he could not reach the target because there was no case to be disposed of has not been properly met by the respondents in the objections. In fact in paragraph 4 of the objection statement, it is mentioned "however, the ground shown by the petitioner for low disposal at Afzalpur is the low filing rates which cannot be accepted. " it is further submitted that the contention of the petitioner that he was able to bring down the pendency of the original suit by serving at Afzalpur is only a self serving contention. There is a reference to the confidential report between 7. 6. 1995 to 10. 11. 1995 and if there be any remarks made therein it should have been communicated to the petitioner which appears to have not been done. If there be any less disposal and not reaching the target, the petitioner should have been informed about the same and be given an opportunity. The repeated submission made by the petitioner is only that he was prepared to work hard but there was no case to be disposed of. This aspect of the case has not been controverted properly by the respondent at all. The petitioner referred to various circumstances where he was posted and he has given reason for such less disposal as to non-filing of the case, about the Advocate not appearing, about the Advocates from town and other place coming. These are all vital aspects and which has to be taken into consideration by the respondent. The respondent ought to have at teast particulars for which period less disposals are given or objection to a specific allegation made; non-filing of detailed objection, is certainly fatal to the case of the respondent and to the defence of the respondent. These are all vital aspects and which has to be taken into consideration by the respondent. The respondent ought to have at teast particulars for which period less disposals are given or objection to a specific allegation made; non-filing of detailed objection, is certainly fatal to the case of the respondent and to the defence of the respondent. ( 24 ) HERE is a Judicial Officer who cared to work hard but he finds that he was not able to get much work or given to work. If really there were vacancy available, he should have been at least posted to a place where there was a heavy work and his capacity should have been tested. This has not been done and no opportunity has been given to the petitioner to remedy and wrong if he has done and such non-providing of opportunity especially to a judicial officer is not fair nor reasonable. It can be judicially made note of that in some Courts there are heavy arrears and there was only one judge and in certain Courts there are two Judges and there are no cases at all. ( 25 ) THOUGH the case itself is posted for Judgment several times, despite directions, no file were produced. But later the learned government Pleader sought permission to produce the file from the second respondent which is titled as Report on the Character and work of the petitioner. A perusal of the file shows the following facts. The report of the District Judge for the period from 10. 3. 1997 to 31. 7. 1997 is available; the report of the District and Sessions Judge gulbarga has certified that the officer's work and quality of judgment is satisfactory. Promptitude in disposal of the cases (a) current-good, (b) old - satisfactory. On industry and aptitude for hard and heavy work, the record is "yes, industrious. and again 'hard work'. On column Readiness to take up responsibility, the recorded answer is "yes". On the attitude towards subordinate and alleged conduct and dignity inside Court and outside Court, outlook towards members of the Bar and public are supposed to be not good and not satisfactory. But on the question of reputation, it is mentioned as Honesty Good. Integrity Good, Impartiality Yes. Over-all view, the record is, "his work is satisfactory. " Special remarks, if any, "prepared to take up responsibility. " (underlining mine ). But on the question of reputation, it is mentioned as Honesty Good. Integrity Good, Impartiality Yes. Over-all view, the record is, "his work is satisfactory. " Special remarks, if any, "prepared to take up responsibility. " (underlining mine ). I am not able to understand the reason why this was not brought to the notice of the Administrative judge as I find that under the seal Administrative Judge the signature of the Administrative Judge was not obtained. For the purpose of record, I am enclosing the original itself and the carbon copy is available and that is sufficient for the purpose of the file. The copy of the same marked as Ex. A. ( 26 ) FOR the period from 1. 8. 1997 to 31. 12. 1997, except saying suddenly jumps to the conclusion, no adverse remark is found'. On the other hand, best remarks are available in line with the earlier remarks. This was when the petitioner was working in Gulbarga. Here also the signature of the Administrative Judge was not obtained for the reasons best known. That means it was not brought to the notice of the Administrative Judge and also to the Committee, evidently. A copy of the original of this report is also enclosed herewith marking it as Ex. B. ( 27 ) FOR the period 1. 1. 1996 to 26. 5. 1996, the officer was working as I Addl. Munsiff and JMFC Mangalore. The C. R. reads 'quality of judgment satisfactory, Promptitude in disposal of the cases, current in disposal of the cases current and old satisfactory and every other column including reputation as to honesty, integrity and impartiality is good. This is signed by the Administrative Judge as well who has made the following endorsement. "the CR relates to a period when I was not the AJ. I have no reason to differ with the remarks recorded by the DJ on Cl. (1) to (9) and Cl. (10), over all view is satisfactory. "this was signed by the Administrative Judge, a senior Judge of the High Court, Brother Justice R. V. Raveendran on 21. 4. 1997. A note also was given by the Registrar General to the following effect:"hon'ble the Chief Justice (Hon'bfe Sri R. P. Sethi) assumed office on 29. 6. 1996 and His Lordship had no opportunity to observe the performance of the officer at the relevant time. 4. 1997. A note also was given by the Registrar General to the following effect:"hon'ble the Chief Justice (Hon'bfe Sri R. P. Sethi) assumed office on 29. 6. 1996 and His Lordship had no opportunity to observe the performance of the officer at the relevant time. Hence, remarks not recorded by His Lordship as Accepting Authority vide. GOB. II. 193/96 dt. 27. 7. 1996,"the original also is enclosed along with the judgment for the purpose of record and marked as Ex. C. A communication was addressed to the petitioner in respect of the Confidential Report from 7. 6. 1995 to 10. 11. 1995 wherein the promptitude in respect of the current cases was certified by the District Judge Mr. V. G. Sabhahit, as he then was. One would rather wonder as to why Mr. Sabhahit as the District Judge did not question him when he was a District judge but has chosen to communicate to the officer after two years and after the very same District Judge had become the Registrar general of this Court. Such a conduct really smells something bad beyond imagination. It is significant to note that for the above period upto 1995 the signature of the Administrative Judge is obtained on 21. 4. 1997. My Brother Justice Raveendran has frankly written that he was not the Administrative Judge during the period. The Chief justice also was not there as could be found by the endorsement made by the registrar General on 23. 5. 1997. A copy of the letter as well as the report is marked as Ex. D and E and made part of the judgment. ( 28 ) FOR the period from 1. 1. 1995 to 22. 5. 1995, all the columns have been filled in as satisfactory and it was signed by the District judge Mangalore Mr. S. R. Venkatesha Murthy, who became later a judge of the High Court. The same remarks are found in report by the Administrative Judge on the note about the Chief Justice. This is also marked as Ex. F. ( 29 ) FOR the period from June 1994 to December 1994, the same District Judge Mr. Venkatesha Murthy and the Administrative Judge had found everything satisfactory about the officer. They only advised him that he should improve better and such a communication is sent promptly by the then Registrar General Mr. This is also marked as Ex. F. ( 29 ) FOR the period from June 1994 to December 1994, the same District Judge Mr. Venkatesha Murthy and the Administrative Judge had found everything satisfactory about the officer. They only advised him that he should improve better and such a communication is sent promptly by the then Registrar General Mr. M. P. Chinnappa, who has now became a High Court Judge. That copy is also taken from the file and marked as Ex. G. ( 30 ) FOR the period 1. 1. 1994 to 24. 5. 1994 the report shows complete satisfaction on every aspect signed and approved by the administrative Judge on 15. 4. 1995. That copy is marked as Ex. H. ( 31 ) FOR the period from 1. 1. 1993 to 9. 12. 1993, (corrected with pencil as 13,1. 1993 to 9. 12. 1993) Mr. B. K. Sanglad, who later became a High Court Judge, has said that the officer should make efforts to be better and in fact in the 'special remarks column', the learned District Judge has mentioned that the officer requires good guidance and encouragement. The records of CJ, Justice G. T. Nanavati has not recorded as he has no opportunity to observe the officer and an endorsement to that effect is found. This is also filed as Ex. l along with the judgment. ( 32 ) FOR the period 7. 9. 1992 to 28. 12. 1992 when the officer was working in Chittapur, everything is found to be satisfactory, confirmed by the Administrative Judge, with a note that CJ, Justice S. B. Majmudar had no opportunity to observe the officer. This is also filed as Ex. J. ( 33 ) BETWEEN the period 1. 1. 1992 to 31. 8. 1992, columns 3,4 and 11 was shown as poor and a special remark was made by the District judge indicating that the officer was not able to reach the quota. This was communicated to the office on 16. 12. 1993. The copy of the record is marked as Ex. K. ( 34 ) FOR the period from 16. 9. 1991 to 31. 12. 1991, the remark of the District Judge as well as the Administrative Judge was "satisfactory" on all the columns. The copy is also enclosed with the judgment for the appreciation and marked as Ex. 12. 1993. The copy of the record is marked as Ex. K. ( 34 ) FOR the period from 16. 9. 1991 to 31. 12. 1991, the remark of the District Judge as well as the Administrative Judge was "satisfactory" on all the columns. The copy is also enclosed with the judgment for the appreciation and marked as Ex. L. ( 35 ) THUS in all, it may be seen that except during the period 1. 1. 1992 and 31. 8. 1992 wherein the officer was not able to reach the quota, during no other period such a complaint was made. In fact, even during one more period the complaint by the District Judge mr. Sabhahit, wherein he observed that current cases of disposal is 'satisfactory and the officer must dispose of more cases and reach the quota every month. Except these two periods, the record do not show that there was non-fulfilment of quota during the tenure of the officer in that particular Court. In such circumstances, it is certainly not fair to discharge the officer on the ground that he has not reached the quota. It is again repeated that no other complaint is made against him anywhere in the CR. Another important thing to be noted is that the report of the officer was not brought to the notice of the administrative Judge for the reasons not known; either there was no Administrative Judge during that time and even then the remarks are not brought to the notice of the Chief Justice as the concerned chief Justice was not available during that particular period. Therefore, the question of accusing a man for no fault of him is certainly not proper and certainly not justified. When people are doing justice to others, Justice should be done to them. Justice denied to public at large certainly will affect the litigant at large, but justice denied to 'justice' itself is a big wrong and that cannot be compensated in any terms of any kind except reinstatement of the officer concerned. ( 36 ) MY views are reiterated on perusal of the records available on the High Court and which was produced by the Government pleader at later point of time. ( 36 ) MY views are reiterated on perusal of the records available on the High Court and which was produced by the Government pleader at later point of time. ( 37 ) THE learned Government Pleader relied upon the dictum of this Court in L. KUMARA CHANDRA vs STATE OF KARNATAKA8 wherein a Division Bench has held as follows:"mere expiry of the period of probation does not result in automatic confirmation of a probationer . The general principle of law is that a probationer continues to be a probationer until he is confirmed or discharged from service. The only exception to this Rule is the cases in which the rules regulating recruitment and probation fix a maximum period of probation and there is no provision for extension of the period of probation. in the present case, sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Probation Rules expressly provides that the period of probation may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended by the Governor. In view of Rule 11, the petitioner were continuing on probation even after the expiry of the period of probation. After the challenge to the recruitment and appointments failed finally, the continued period of probation came to an end and at that stage action was taken so consider the cases of all the persons including the petitioners to find out as to whether they were suitable for being confirmed as members of judicial service or there were grounds to discharge any of them. For these reasons the contention that they must be deemed to have been automaticalty confirmed after the expiry of period of two years, is plainly inconsistent with the provisions of probation Rules. "but in the very same judgment the following observation is made. "the Appointing Authority can form an opinion about the suitability of a probationer on the basis of the incidents which disclose an attitude or tendency, which might constitute the basis to adjudge him unsuitable for confirmation. "but in the very same judgment the following observation is made. "the Appointing Authority can form an opinion about the suitability of a probationer on the basis of the incidents which disclose an attitude or tendency, which might constitute the basis to adjudge him unsuitable for confirmation. In such a case the following two conditions must be fulfilled: (i) The incidents must be such as would disclose an attitude or tendency on the part of the probationer as would constitute a reasonable basis (or taking the view that the probationer is not suitable for the post to which he was appointed on probation and from discharging him from service; (ii) An opportunity should be given to the probationer having due regard to the rule of natural justice to ascertain the truth of the incidents and they should have been admitted or indisputable or proved. Rule 6 empowers the Appointing Authority to discharge a probationer even without waiting till the completion of the period of probation. The object of the Rule is that if shortly after the appointment of a person as a probationer, it comes to the notice of the Appointing Authority that there are grounds to say that the probationer is not suitable for the post to which he is appointed, there is no necessity to match his work and performance for the whole of the period of probation and there is no necessity to keep him on probation till the end of the period of probation and to discharge him at the end of the period of probation. In such a case, the requirement of the Rule is that the ground on the basis of which the Appointing Authority comes to the conclusion that the probationer is unsuitable for the post must be set out in the order of discharge and in cases when such discharge order is made by a subordinate Appointing Authority, such an order must have the approval of the next higher authority. " ( 38 ) THE above Judgment instead of helping the Government is against the stand taken by the Government. The Division Bench has clearly held that in case of work and performance opinion should be formed on the basis of the reports. If such opinion is so formed, they are unassailable. " ( 38 ) THE above Judgment instead of helping the Government is against the stand taken by the Government. The Division Bench has clearly held that in case of work and performance opinion should be formed on the basis of the reports. If such opinion is so formed, they are unassailable. But in this case all the reports which have been referred to by me above clearly show that the reports are in favour of the petitioner and there was no two opinion about the same. Consequently, this judgment is in favour of the petitioner instead of the same being held against the petitioner. ( 39 ) ANOTHER case of GANGANAGAR ZILA DUGDH UTPADAKSAHKARI SANGH LTD. vs PRIYANKA JOSHI AND ANOTHER was relied upon to show that when probationer was dismissed with one line, it does not amount to stigma. This will not apply to the facts of this case as in the present case a reason is given as to why he was discharged from the service. Reliance also was placed upon the judgment of the Single Judge of this Court in KARIAPPA basalingappa DODDAMANI vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA for the proposition that dismissal during the period of probation on th ground of unfitness for confirmation is not a stigma. Apart from the fact that whether it is a stigma or not when the report itself does not disclose that the officer was unsuitable, the further consideration do not arise. Therefore, the decision relied upon by the learned government Pleader does not come to his aid at all. ( 40 ) AS against the reliance placed by the Government pleader, I find AIR 1964 SC 806 , where an employee who has been working continuously for a period of six years is deemed to have been confirmed. In AIR 1968 SC 1210 it is clearly mentioned which is referred to above that the employees are allowed to continue beyond the probation period without extension of the probation period he is deemed to have been confirmed. In AIR 1997 SC 3269 there is a deemed confirmation extended for the judicial officer where maximum period of probation was fixed by the rules and on completion of maximum period of probation the termination was made without inquiry and that was held to be vitiated under Article 311. In AIR 1997 SC 3269 there is a deemed confirmation extended for the judicial officer where maximum period of probation was fixed by the rules and on completion of maximum period of probation the termination was made without inquiry and that was held to be vitiated under Article 311. As rightly pointed out by the Supreme Court in AIR 1999 SC 983 the discharge of probation on selection is punitive or simpliciter depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. In AIR 1999 SC 2116 makes it clear that the probation period not extended nbt the case was considered immediately after two years and such employees are extended with time. Finally, the dictum in AIR 2000 SC 1080 , the law has been laid down that order of termination of probation on the ground of unsatisfactory work is stigmatic and regular opportunity of being heard is a must. ( 41 ) IN the above circumstances, this Court is constrained to set aside the order of discharge and allow the Writ Petition as prayed for. Rule made absolute. --- *** --- .