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2001 DIGILAW 299 (PAT)

Jitendra Prasad Singh v. Bihar State Electricity Board And Others

2001-04-03

SHIVA KIRTI SINGH

body2001
Judgment Shiva Kirti Singh, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has filed this writ application for a writ of Mandamus to command the respondents to reinstate him in service on the ground of his acquittal in a criminal case by an appellate Courts order dated 14-7-1999. 3. Some relevant facts which are not in dispute as well as some of the documents on record disclose that petitioner was engaged on ad hoc basis for training and operation in a power sub-station of Bihar State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) on 17-11-1984. He was directed to submit original ITI certificate of Electrical trade as well as Matriculation certificate along with original marks-sheet. As appears from Annexure-2, petitioner obtained provisional appointment on the post of Switch Board Operator Grade-II on 6-2-1985 after producing the aforesaid documents. It further appears from Annexure-3 that the authorities of the Board in course of verifying the genuineness of petitioners certificate from the department concerned of Labour and Employment, Government of Bihar came to know through official correspondence that petitioners ITI certificate produced at the time of employment was fake and illegal. Thereafter, a show-cause notice was served on the petitioner vide Memo No. 922 dated 26-4-1986 as to why his service should not be terminated for the act of obtaining employment dishonestly and fraudulently by producing a fake ITI certificate bearing No. 162993. Since no show-cause was received hence, vide office order contained in Memo No. 1727 dated 6-5-1986 (Annexure-3), the petitioners services were terminated with immediate effect. A criminal case was also instituted against the petitioner under Secs. 420/466/ 468/471/120-B of the IPC on the basis of a written report dated 26-4-1986 made by the Electrical Superintending Engineer concerned. Petitioner was charge-sheeted and convicted by the trial Court, on 20th August, 1991. In the appeal, however, the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Patna acquitted the petitioner vide judgment dated 14-4-1999 (Annexure-5) by holding that the prosecution had not been able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubts. After the said judgment, petitioner sent a legal notice dated 25-4-2000 (Annexure-6) addressed to the Secretary of the Board wherein a stand was taken that his services were illegally terminated vide order dated 6-8-1986 contrary to mandatory provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and without holding a departmental proceeding. After the said judgment, petitioner sent a legal notice dated 25-4-2000 (Annexure-6) addressed to the Secretary of the Board wherein a stand was taken that his services were illegally terminated vide order dated 6-8-1986 contrary to mandatory provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and without holding a departmental proceeding. It was further mentioned in the said notice that the petitioner had been acquitted in criminal charges by the appellate Court. 4. Since the Board did not give relief to the petitioner, he filed a writ application in the Court bearing C.W.J.C. No. 6686/2000. The records of that case disclose that in the said writ application also, the petitioner had made a prayer to direct the respondents to recall the order dated 6-5-1986 and allow the petitioner to join his service on the ground that he was acquitted in the criminal case. He had also prayed for quashing of the order dated 6-5-1986. The said writ application was disposed of on 25-7-2000 vide order contained in Annexure-7 which runs as follows: After some argument, as prayed, learned Counsel for the petitioner is permitted to withdraw this writ petition with a liberty, however, to the petitioner to pursue the matter before the authority concerned". Thereafter, the petitioner filed a representation dated 21-8-2000 before the Chairman of the Board. The Board decided to ignore the said representation and thereafter, the petitioner filed the instant writ application. 5. On behalf of the petitioner, it was submitted that the authorities of the Board have acted arbitrarily in ignoring the representation and in denying the prayer made for revocation of termination order dated 6-5-1986 after he was acquitted of the criminal charge relating to the same allegations on which his services were terminated. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner, the order of termination passed against the petitioner had to be treated as illegal in view of judgments of the apex Court in the case of Sulekh Chand and Salek Chand V/s. Commissioner of Police and Ors. 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 674, and also judgments of this Court in the case of Mani Ram Yadav V/s. Union of India, 2000(1) PLJR 239 and in the case of Javed Shoukat V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. 2000(2) PLJR 552 . 6. 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 674, and also judgments of this Court in the case of Mani Ram Yadav V/s. Union of India, 2000(1) PLJR 239 and in the case of Javed Shoukat V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. 2000(2) PLJR 552 . 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Board raised an objection to the maintainability of this second writ application filed by the petitioner for basically the same reliefs and on same grounds in view of law laid down by the apex Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service V/s. S.T.A. Tribunal, Gwalior -- . On merits, the stand of the Board was that petitioner had obtained employment by practising fraud and once such fraud was detected at the initial stage of employment, Board was fully justified in terminating his services after giving him show-cause notice. It was further submitted that although the petitioner knew of the termination order as would appear from subsequent conduct, he did not challenge the same in any Court till he was acquitted in the criminal case in the year, 1999. After so much delay, the main ground for challenging the termination order is solely based upon the judgment of acquittal but this ground cannot succeed in view of several judgments of the apex Court and a recent judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 31-1-2001 in LPA No. 1217/2000, The Bihar State Electricity Board V/s. Braj Kishore Singh and Ors.. 7. In view of rival submissions, the main question falling for decision is whether the termination order passed against the petitioner on charges of fraud and forgery, etc. is rendered illegal only on account of acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case. This question is no longer res integra in view of recent judgments of the apex Court-(i) -- , Nelson Motis V/s. Union of India, (ii) -- , Senior Superintendent of Post Offices V/s. A. Gopalan, and (iii) -- , M. Paul Anthony V/s. Bharat Gold Mine Limited. In the case of Nelson Motis (supra), one of the points which fell for consideration was whether the disciplinary proceedings could have continued in the face of acquittal in the criminal case. The Court held that the plea has no substance and does not merit. In the case of Nelson Motis (supra), one of the points which fell for consideration was whether the disciplinary proceedings could have continued in the face of acquittal in the criminal case. The Court held that the plea has no substance and does not merit. After a detailed consideration, the Court further observed that the nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental proceeding and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding. While considering similar proposition in the case of Senior Superintendent of Post Offices (supra), the apex Court noticed the case of Nelson Motis, and while placing reliance upon the same further reasons were added to support the proposition noticed above by holding that in a criminal case the charge has to be proved by the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceedings the standard of proof for proving the charge is preponderance of probabilities. On such view, the apex Court in that case upheld the charge in the departmental proceedings of fraudulent withdrawal in spite of acquittal by the criminal Court on such charge. In the case of M. Paul Anthony (supra), the apex Court in para 22 of the judgment came to five definite conclusions which ultimately support the stand of the respondent-Board. The Division Bench of this Court in judgment passed in LPA No. 1217/2000 placed reliance upon the aforesaid judgments of the apex Court and came to hold that a departmental proceeding and a criminal trial can go on simultaneously with respect to the same allegations and success of the delinquent employee in one cannot be a ground for dropping the other proceeding. 8. So far as judgment in the case of Sulekh Chand and Salek Chand (supra), relied upon by the petitioner is concerned, that case related to a claim for promotion and in that context, the Court held that since the judgment acquitted the employee concerned of the charge of corruption on merits hence, such a charge could not stand in the way of his promotion. Although, that judgment was a very short one but it was twice emphasized in that judgment that the acquittal was on merits and had the same acquittal been on technical grounds, the authorities would have been entitled to conduct departmental inquiry on the same allegations and take appropriate disciplinary action. Although, that judgment was a very short one but it was twice emphasized in that judgment that the acquittal was on merits and had the same acquittal been on technical grounds, the authorities would have been entitled to conduct departmental inquiry on the same allegations and take appropriate disciplinary action. In the case of Mani Ram Yadav (supra), this Court interfered with the dismissal order on account of subsequent acquittal in the criminal case because the employee had been dismissed from service on the basis of his conviction in the criminal case. In the case of Javed Shoukat (supra), the Court examined the facts in detail and noted that the inquiry officer had categorically recorded in his inquiry report that it would not be possible and wise to take a decision when criminal case on the same charge is pending. The Court further noticed the contents of the judgment of the acquittal and found that the victim girl had totally denied the involvement of the person concerned in the crime. Thus, it is found that the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are of no help in supporting the proposition advanced by him that the disciplinary action would automatically fail on account of subsequent acquittal on the same charge in a criminal case. 9. From the judgments noticed earlier, it is clear that in spite of acquittal in a criminal case, departmental proceeding and disciplinary actions can remain unaffected. In such cases like the present one, the Court is called upon to apply its mind to all the relevant facts and especially to the contents of the judgment of acquittal before coming to a finding whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the disciplinary action would be illegal arbitrary or mala fide. The judgment of acquittal can be of some help to the employee concerned in cases where the acquittal is on merits and contains positive finding to dislodge the allegations and charges levelled in the departmental proceeding. In cases where the acquittal is on technical grounds or based upon benefit of doubt without any positive finding in favour of the delinquent on the merit of relevant charge/allegation, the delinquent employee cannot derive any advantage for the purpose of challenging the departmental action solely on the basis of such judgment of acquittal. 10. In cases where the acquittal is on technical grounds or based upon benefit of doubt without any positive finding in favour of the delinquent on the merit of relevant charge/allegation, the delinquent employee cannot derive any advantage for the purpose of challenging the departmental action solely on the basis of such judgment of acquittal. 10. In the present case, a perusal of the judgment of acquittal contained in Annexure-5 shows that the Court held that the prosecution had not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts only because the contents of the letter issued by the Examination Controller had not been proved in accordance with law and the letter in question was in the nature of secondary evidence based upon entries in the register which was not produced in Court. In the context of all, the relevants facts, this Court is of the opinion that the appellate Court acquitted the petitioner on technical rules of evidence and there is no positive finding that upon evidence and materials the certificate produced by the petitioner was found to be genuine. In such facts and circumstances, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case by itself cannot render the order of termination of his service illegal and invalid. Thus, it is found that the main ground urged on behalf of the petitioner has no substance. The other materials on record do not warrant any interference with the order dated 6-5-1.986 contained in Annexure-3 which was not challenged by the petitioner in any Court of law for 13 years, till he was acquitted in the criminal case. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds no merit in this application and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. 11. Since the writ application has been dismissed on merits hence, it is not necessary to discuss the objection raised on behalf of the Board regarding maintainability of the second writ application although, in order to be fair to learned Counsel for the Board, prima facie, there appears to be some substance in the said objection because while permitting the withdrawal of the earlier writ application no specific liberty was granted to the petitioner to move this Court again. 12. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.