JUDGMENT T.N. Vallinayagam, J.—The appeal is by the appellants who are aged 42 years and 37 years complaining of inadequacy of compensation paid to their 14 years old boy, who died in the accident on 16.5.1997, being hit by the bus No. TN 29-N 0805. The Tribunal has granted a sum of Rs. 50,000/ and not satisfied with the same, the appellant is before this Court. The factum of the accident and negligence has not been questioned as it is a claimants' appeal. 2. It is in evidence that a boy had studied up to 7th Standard and left the school. The age of the boy was given as 14 in the P.M. report. No attempt has been made to prove the date of birth of the boy by producing any other document. The dictum of this Court in Managing Director, KSRTC Vs. Annappa Vaidya, ILR (1985) KAR 2979 , rendered by Justice M.N. Venkatachalaiah (as he then was) is to the following effect: It is true that children of very young age are subject to all the risks of life such as illness, accident, death and there was also the possibility that his or her parents might or might not survive him or her. The education and maintenance of the child could itself be a substantial burden for the future and that the whole matter was so beset with "doubts, contingencies and uncertainties" that there was hardly any substantial or intelligible basis for an estimate of pecuniary loss for the future. The events of the future were so distinct and remote that the whole matter reduced itself to a mere speculative possibility. In such cases no award could be made under the pecuniary head of loss of prospective income and only an award under the head of "loss of expectation of life- in a conventional figure was permissible". ...The Principle on which compensation for the 'loss of pecuniary benefit', either present or prospective, is awarded is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit can be established by showing that though the deceased had not attained full age and full earning capacity, there are prospects of future contributions to the claimants. But this expectation must be a reasonable expectation and not a mere speculative possibility. But this expectation must be a reasonable expectation and not a mere speculative possibility. That is the reason why in cases of very young child parents cannot recover because the child was subject to all risks of illness, accident and death and there can be no adequate basis for speculation one way or the other. (iv) cases of death of adolescent children, however, are somewhat different and are representative of the class of cases where awards are not pecuniary losses which are purely prospective. Parents would have incurred the costs of upbringing of children and of training them. They are on the verge of reaping some financial return from a grateful and a dutiful child though not at the movement of death yet receiving any benefit. In those cases the possibility of prospect pecuniary gains is not unreasonable and is, therefore, compensatable. (v) There are some special distinctions that must be noticed in Indian conditions. The loss of the parents may not be limited to prospective pecuniary losses, in terms of money contributions. Dependency consists not only of financial contributions, either present or prospective, but also of the value of goods and services. It will be unrealistic to think particularly, in the context of Indian life that adolescent children would not be in a position to contribute some services to the family. In the conditions of rural life boys and girls offer services to the family in many ways and are even known to take care of a small time family business or avocation. How these services should be sounded in terms of money would again turn upon the facts of a particular case. This loss of services is not merely prospective. It is both present and prospective. Prospectively, in later life the services which Indian parents look forward to from a grown up son, apart from those merely of emotional exhaustively enumerated. It appears that it may not also be permissible to think in terms of setting off the value of these services against the expenses of food, shelter and raiment of the children. These expenses are liable to be set off not against the value of their services but against the joys and other rewards off family life and the many, many ways in which children enliven, and bring meaning to a home as they alone could do. 3. These expenses are liable to be set off not against the value of their services but against the joys and other rewards off family life and the many, many ways in which children enliven, and bring meaning to a home as they alone could do. 3. The learned Counsel for the appellant would contend that as per the Division Bench ruling of this Court, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- is payable. On the other hand, it is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Respondent as per the judgment in Miscellaneous First Appeal 1772 of 1999, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- is payable for the death of the child. I find here is a boy who was not educated and whose education was stopped beyond 7th Standard and he was allowed to go and work as a cleaner. His future were marred by the parents themselves. However, taking a via media view between the view of the learned Single Judge as well as the decision of Justice Venkatachaliah and the one delivered by the Division Bench and noting the fact that the appellant is the only son for the family as mentioned in the petition, I deem it proper to grant a sum of Rs. one lakh as compensation. 4. The appeal is allowed. The interest granted is confirmed.