Judgment :- M. Ramachandran, J. A common question has arisen to be decided in this group of Original Petitions. Justifiability of demand of penal interest levied under paragraph 38(1) of the Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Scheme is challenged. Sri. C.C. Thomas counsel appearing for the petitioner in O.P. No. 6879 of 1999 had led the arguments. I had opportunity hear M/s. L.G. Potti, Raghu Kottappuram, Ramachandran Nambiar and Ravikumar and who had dealt with various aspects of the claims. Mr. K.K. Babu, Standing Counsel had represented the Board, and Sri. Murali Purushothaman, Government Pleader, appeared for the Government, which is made respondent in some of the Original Petitions. O.P. No. 6879 of 1999 is of a representative nature of the batch of cases and I may advert to the facts and exhibits made available therein. 2. The petitioner was a contractor of toddy shops for the year 1994-95, the duration of the licence period being from 1.4.1994 to 31.3.1995. The Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Act and the Scheme framed thereunder necessitates a contractor to pay contributions towards the statutory welfare fund. Under S.8 of the Act, the contribution which shall be paid by the employer to the Fund is 8% of the wages for the time being payable. In addition, employees contribution at an equal rate is to be deducted and paid over to the Fund. Additionally, 5% of the wages also is payable towards gratuity. 3. Authorised officers are empowered to determine the amount from the employer under the provisions of the Act and Scheme and such officers have been conferred with powers of enquiry, including inspection and discovery. 4. The Act provides for provisional assessment of contribution, and S.8A may be extracted herein below: "(1) Every employer shall, pending determination under S.8 of the amount due from him in any year, pay every month by way of advance contribution an amount equivalent to one-twelth of the amount payable annually in respect of his employees according to the latest determination under the said section. Provided that every employer, in respect of whom an order of determination under S.8 has not been made at any time, shall pay every month by way of advance contribution an amount equivalent to one¬twelth of the amount of contribution payable by him under S.4 in respect of his employees according to the best of his judgment. Provided that every employer, in respect of whom an order of determination under S.8 has not been made at any time, shall pay every month by way of advance contribution an amount equivalent to one¬twelth of the amount of contribution payable by him under S.4 in respect of his employees according to the best of his judgment. Provided further that where advance contribution is paid by an employer according to the best of his judgment, a statement showing the manner in which such judgment was made by him shall be produced at the time of payment." The petitioner has paid the advance contributions as envisaged under S.8A. Such contribution becomes payable on every 5th day of succeeding month, and the amount payable is 'an amount equivalent to one¬twelth of the amount payable annually in respect of his shop according to the latest determination'. It is averred that whenever there were belated payments, interest was paid then and there. After the tenure of the contract, the final determination had been completed by the Inspector, by order dated 31.1.1996 and balance as assessed was paid. But after years, a demand had come for payment of interest, for the period from 10.4.1995 to 31.1.1996, a copy of which is produced as Ext. P1. It was on the basis of a Circular, dated 13.8.1998, viz., Ext. P2, which in turn drew sustenance from S.8B of the Act. Ext. P2 reminded the Officers their duty to complete the assessments taking note of the requirement for levying the penal interest payable in appropriate cases. S.8B had been introduced by way of an amendment by Act 3/19996 and was in the following terms: "8B: Power to rectify errors, etc.: (1) The Chief Welfare Fund Inspector or any other Welfare Fund Inspector who has passed an order under sub-s.(1) of S.8 against which no appeal has been made to the Government as provided in sub-s.(5), may, on application or otherwise, at any time within four years from the date of passing such order, rectify any error apparent on the face of the record. Provided that no such rectification, which has the effect of enhancing the amount determined, shall be made unless the employer concerned has been given a reasonable 'opportunity of being heard: Provided further that the time limit mentioned in this sub-section shall not be applicable for a period of six months from the date of commencement of the Kerala Toddy Workers Welfare Fund (Amendment) Act, 1996, in the case of an order made under sub-s.(1) of S.8 which is prejudicial to the interest of the fund. (2) Where any such rectification has the effect of reducing the amount determined, the officer concerned shall make refund to the employer en titled thereto or adjustment against further contribution of the employer according to his option. (3) Where any such rectification has the effect of enhancing the amount determined, the provision of this Act and the Scheme made thereunder shall apply to every such order of 'enhancement, as if such determination has been made under sub-s.(1) of S.B." 5. Obviously proceedings culminating in the demand as if it was a case of rectification of an error resulted in Ext. P1. The submission is that Exts. P1 and P2 are not sustainable in law, they being exproprietory in nature. The delay in the final assessment was not for any reasons attributable to the petitioner, and the petitioner ; was liable to pay interest for delayed payments only after the final determination under S.8 of the Act. He referred to paragraph 38 of the Scheme and pointed out that there was never any reference to interest when the statements were to be finalized. What has been attempted is a step without jurisdiction, and it was not a case of rectification as envisaged by the statute, and since the demand is in respect of a period of time before the date of issue of the final order, the levy was without authority of law. Rest of the petitioners have also raised identical contentions, the only reference being the date of issue of final determination order. They submitted that the delay of the part of respondents for passing final orders should not result in prejudice to them. 6. Sri. Thomas had referred to the decision reported in Joseph v. District Collector (1999 (1) KLT 694) where Mr. Justice J.B. Koshy interpretated a demand made under S.15 of the Kerala Building Tax Act. They submitted that the delay of the part of respondents for passing final orders should not result in prejudice to them. 6. Sri. Thomas had referred to the decision reported in Joseph v. District Collector (1999 (1) KLT 694) where Mr. Justice J.B. Koshy interpretated a demand made under S.15 of the Kerala Building Tax Act. S.15 gave similar powers as S.8B for rectifying an assessment within a period of three years of the date of assessment The learned judge on the facts held that the word 'rectification' had only a restricts meaning, and on the strength of the term, a reassessment, as had been done, was never warranted. But the principle does not appear to be relevant here, since, it is not a case of reassessment, but an attempt to levy the claim for the omitted element of interest, on the dues as assessed. 7. The counsel thereafter drew parallels with the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, and particularly to S.23(3) thereof. The provision (excluding the subsequent amendments) runs as following: "(3) If the tax or any other amount assessed or due under this Act is not paid by any dealer or other person within the time prescribed therefore in this Act or in any Rule made thereunder and in other cases within, the time specified therefore in the notice of demand, or within the time allowed for its payment by the appellate or re visional authority, as the case may be, or if payment is permitted in installments by any of the authorities empowered in this behalf, any such installment is to be paid within the time specified, therefore, the dealer or other person shall pay, by way of penal interest in the manner prescribed, in addition to the amount due, a sum equal to (a) one per cent of such amount for each month or part thereof for the first three months after the date specified for its payment; (b) two percent of such amount for each month or part thereof subsequent to the first three months aforesaid." It is submitted that the authorities under the said Act had harboured a doubt as to whether interest was payable on the tax due, irrespective of the assessment or return. According to him, the issue has been given a quietus by the Supreme Court, in the decision reported in Maruti Wire Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, 1st Circle, Mattancherry, (2001) 9 KTR 273 (SC) = (2001 (2) KLT 100). It had been held that a legislative causus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. The operative portion of the decision is as follows: "A failure to file return of taxable turnover may render the assessee liable for any other consequences or penal action as provided by law but cannot attract the liability for payment of penal interest under sub-s.(3) of S.23 of the Act on the parity of reasoning that if a return of turnover would have been filed on the due date, then the tax as per return would have become due and payable on that date." 8. The counsel also referred to the earlier decisions on the subject, and submitted that the levy proposed was bad, misconceived, and without jurisdiction. The liability befell on a contractor finally only after a proceedings of quasi judicial nature, as envisaged 'under S.8 of the Act. The power for adjudication after a hearing, he submitted would become otiose if a pragmatic view is not taken and would be meaningless. 9. Sri. Potti, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners invited the attention of the Court to S.4 of the Act, highlighting that payment to the employees was on the wages payable for the time being. Therefore, an adjudication alone would have finally adjudged the real liability, and therefore, the delay in finalisation could not have resulted in levying of penal interest. He had referred to the determination procedures and especially the phraseology of S.9. Interest was payable on arrears to be recovered. Arrears could have been arrived at only after an assessment and never before. Reliance was placed on Maruti Wires case (supra) and the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, referred to therein, viz., J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer (1994 (94) STC 422). It was submitted that any provision made in a statute for charging or levying interest on delayed payment of tax was to be construed as substantive law and not adjectival law. Consequently, the position, according to him, was that the demand for interest till the date of final determination create anomalies never intended by statute. It was submitted that any provision made in a statute for charging or levying interest on delayed payment of tax was to be construed as substantive law and not adjectival law. Consequently, the position, according to him, was that the demand for interest till the date of final determination create anomalies never intended by statute. The law, never expected a contractor to predict final payment and pay it before hand. The other counsel also urged more or less identical arguments. According to Mr. Raghu, the levy was unauthorised and interfered with the rights envisaged under Art.300A of the Constitution of India. 10. Mr. Babu appearing for the respondent-Board submitted that the analogies placed by the counsel on Sales Tax Law or Building Tax Act was misconceived. There was no challenge about the validity of S.8B of the Act, and the Board could insist for rectification up to a period of four years, and all the claims pertianed to periods well within the upper limit. He submitted that except in Trichur District, in other centres, the officers had omitted to incorporate the interest as was to be leviable, and Ext. P2 was issued to altert them about the omission, and the process was indeed a rectification of error inadvertently committed. Ext. P2 did not cast any fresh liability as such, and Ext. P1 was authorised by paragraph 38 of the Scheme. 11. The Standing Counsel referred to the process of assessment as followed under the statute. Under S.8, the contractors had a statutory obligation to submit returns in Form No. 4A. Under S.8A(2) the advance contribution become payable on or before the 5th day of succeeding months. Paragraph 38 in fact gave a grace period, as the returns, and payment envisaged under the Section were to be sent not later than ten days after the close of the month. At the end of the period of contract, that is, latest by 10th of April, statute cast a duty on the individual contractor to send a consolidated statement showing the total amount of wages of each month and the welfare, fund payable by him for the year, the amount remitted under S.8A and the amount payable by him as balance, as addressed to the Chief Welfare Fund Inspector. A copy thereof was to be sent to the Inspector concerned as well. A copy thereof was to be sent to the Inspector concerned as well. A determination was not relevant, as the eii'17,"ver nad to only ensure that contributions about the wages payable for the period of contract siCC.11 remitted by 10th April. The point urged was that the parallels had not relevance, and the Writ Petitions therefore deserved to be dismissed. As far as the. levy of Interest, Mr. Babu submitted that a Division Bench of this Court in CM. Joseph v. State, 2000 (3) KLT 377 = (2000 (2) KLJ 595) had upheld the levy in respect of Abkari contractors, and the position was not different in any material aspects'. 12. I find considerable force in the submissions sc made by Standing Counsel. S.8B authorises levy of interest, even in cases where the assessment had reached finality, and as submitted, it is only a process of rectification, and therefore permissible and do not make any inroads into the assessment. These being cases of payment of arrears of Welfare Fund 'the uncertainty that might be there in the case of a tax liability can never be pleaded. In fact, there is no scope for urging any contentions of that nature. S.8A stipulate payment of advance contribution, on prescribed lines, and there is no ambiguity whatsoever. One-twelth of the latest assessment is payable every month and the balance within upper time limit prescribed by paragraph 38. The contract statutorily ends on 31st of March, and within 10 days thereof consolidated statements are to be furnished, and the employer can claim back any excess payments made, or in the case of underpayment, it has to be remitted before 10m of April. Thus the condition is specific in that amounts due as contribution mandatorily has to be paid by the 10th day of date of expiry of contract. From the said date, the dues become transformed as arrears. 13. Being wages, statute prescribe for maintenance of proper records, and the work involved is only a tabulation. As contributions are directly to be paid over, a dispute even for the sake of dispute hardly arises. What is insisted is the payment in consonance with the statements, and the final payment on the consolidated statements at the end of the contract period. Only arithmatic is involved, and the legal nicities projected have no place in the context. 14. As contributions are directly to be paid over, a dispute even for the sake of dispute hardly arises. What is insisted is the payment in consonance with the statements, and the final payment on the consolidated statements at the end of the contract period. Only arithmatic is involved, and the legal nicities projected have no place in the context. 14. J.K. Synthetics case arose when a demand had been raised in the circumstance that amount of freight charged in respect of sale of cement did not form originally part of the sale price as understood by the assessee and when the law was ultimately clarified it became payable. Likewise, in ih&Maruti Wire Industries case, the assessee did not file a return relating to his imports, and the Court, taking notice of the wording of the section, as it stood before amendment, had decreed the claim for penal interest on assessment made about the escaped turnover. S.23(3A) has presently attempted to plug the hole. However, I have to agree with Sri. K.K. Babu that the legal position discussed will have little application in a welfare fund statute, wherein the contractor/ employer was not to be enlightened-by a final determination order as to his actual liability. The amount of contribution therefore fell due on 10th day of expiry of the contract. A demand for penal interest thereafter was justified in view of the charging provisions. The demand is authorised, legal and sustainable. 15. In this view, I have to uphold Ext. P1 order and the impugned orders in the other connected cases. The Original Petitions are therefore dismissed. Parties are directed to suffer their costs.