JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C J. (Oral) :- This appeal is filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Judge 1st Class (I). Kangra at Dharamshala on March 20. 1998 in Civil Suit No.313 of 1998 and confirmed by the Court of District Judge, kangra at Dharamshala on March 31. 1999 in Civil Appeal No.51-K/XIII-1998. By the said decree, the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. The dismissal of the suit has been assailed by the present appellants. 2. For appreciating the controversy raised in present appeal, few relevant facts may now be stated; The appellants were original plaintiffs and respondents were original defendants and they will be referred to as such in this judgment. The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the defendants.Originally, the suit was filed by one Chamaru claiming to be owner of j the property bearing Khata No.31 Khatauni No. 105. Khasra No.567 admeasuring 0-40-22 Hectares situated at Mohal Parei. Mouza Nerti. Tehsil and District Kangra. During the pendency of the suit Chamaru died and the present appellants/plaintiffs, who claimed to have acquired proprietary rights over the suit land left by deceased Chamaru came to be substituted as heirs and legal representatives of Chamaru. 3. The case of the plaintiff in the plaint was that he was the owner and was cultivating the suit land as a tenant of Dina Nath. defendant No. 1. against payment of Galla Batti. Defendant No.l Dina Nath. in collusion with defendant No.2 Munshi Ram. executed a mortgage deed in favour of defendant No.2 and mutation was attested. It was. however, the say of the plaintiff that the possession was never I parted with by him and he was not ejected from the suit land. He continued to cultivate the land all throughout. In 1988. however, the defendants started interfering with peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. The plaintiff was. therefore, constrained to file a suit restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession. It was further case of the plaintiff that since he was in possession of the suit land as tenant, in accordance with the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The plaintiff was. therefore, constrained to file a suit restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession. It was further case of the plaintiff that since he was in possession of the suit land as tenant, in accordance with the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act1), he became the owner and all rights, title and interests of the land owner got extinghished and with effect from the appointed day vested in the tenant free from all encumbrances. The appointed day was February 21. 1974. Thus, the plaintiff Chamaru became the owner of the suit land. Thereafter, the defendants had no right, title or interest therein. It was. therefore, prayed that the suit deserved to be decreed. 4. A written statement was filed on behalf of contesting defendant No.l. It was stated that after the death of Dina Nath. defendant No. (defendants 1 (a) to l (f) after the deat of defendant No. 1) became owners of the property. It was. inter alia, contended that the suit was time barred, it was not maintainable at law. the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, the plaint was not properly valued, the plaintiff was stopped by his own act in filing and conducting the suit. On merits, it was stated that the plaintiff was tenant of the suit land but he abandoned his tenancy rights as he was very old and unmarried. Since he was not capable and fit to cultivate the land, he did not continue as a tenant. No proprietary rights, therefore, were conferred upon him under the Act. Moreover, the tenant surrendered possession in 1973. Thereafter, the suit land was mortgaged in favour of defendant No.2 by defendant No. 1. It was. therefore, prayed that the suit was liable to be dismissed. 5. So far as defendant No.2 is concerned, he is a near retrieve of plaintiffs who have been substituted as heirs and legal representatives of deceased Chamaru. Defendant No.2 had stated in the written statement that he had not contest the claim of the plaintiffs and he had no objection if the suit of the plaintiffs is decreed. Thus, the contest remained between the plaintiffs on one hand and defendant No.l on the other. 6. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, several issues were framed by the trial Court. Thus, the contest remained between the plaintiffs on one hand and defendant No.l on the other. 6. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, several issues were framed by the trial Court. After appreciating the evidence on record, the oral as well as documentary, the trial Court held that the plaintiff Chamaru was teant of the suit land. It also held that it was not proved that in the revenue record entries were made contrary to law. According to the trial Court, neither Chamaru nor plaintiffs got ownership rights under the provisions of the Act as in 1973 Chamaru abandoned tenancy rights and voluntarily surrendered possession of such land to defendant No. 1. The trial Court also held that though the plaintiffs relied upon the registered will executed by him when he was not in sound and disposing state of mind. On the basis of such will, no rights got accrued in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court observed that the suit fled by the plaintiff was not Within time and as the plaintiff had not come with clear hands and suppressed material facts, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The trial Court accordingly was pleased to dismiss the suit. 7. Being aggrieved by the decree of the trial Court, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal. The first appellate Court re-appreciated the evidence on record and held that the trial Court had not committed any error of fact or of law in dismissing the suit. It confirmed the findings recorded by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. It is against the said decree that the present appeal is filed by the plaintiffs. 8. On September 24. 1999. the appeal was admitted by this Court on following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether both the Courts below erred in coming to a conclusion that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had abandoned his teancy qua the suit land in spite of the fact that there is no evidence in support of alleged abandonment? 2. Whether both the Courts below erred in coming to the conclusion that when the suit land was mortgaged, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was not in possession of the entire suit land in the face of evidence on record that the mortgage was effected qua only a part of the suit land? 3. 2. Whether both the Courts below erred in coming to the conclusion that when the suit land was mortgaged, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was not in possession of the entire suit land in the face of evidence on record that the mortgage was effected qua only a part of the suit land? 3. Whether the finding of both the learned Courts holding that the will is not a valid will, in spite of cogent evidence on record to the contrary are sustainable in the eyes of law? 4. Whether both the learned Courts below misread, overlooked and ignored the compromise effected between the appellants and respondent No.2 (mortgagee)? 5. Whether the findings of both the learned Courts below on issue No.7. i.e. Limitation are legally sustainable? , 9. The matter is now called out for final hearing. 1 have heard Ms. Abhilasha Kumari. learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. V.D. Khidtta. learned counsel for the respondents. 10. Ms. Abhilasha Kumar raised several contentions at the time of hearing of the appeal. It was contended that there is a error of law committed by both the Courts in not considering the documentary evidence on record, which clearly went to show that Chamaru was in possession of land all throughout. When Chamaru was in physical possession of the suit land as tenant on the "appointed day, by operation of law. he became owner of the property. Once a tenant became owner of the land, no action could have been taken against him and both the Courts have committed serious error in ignoring the vital fact. A substantial question of law is. thus, involved in the appeal. It was further contended that though both the Courts have held that Chamaru surrendered tenancy rights, and also handed over possession to defendant No.l. there is no evidence on record to that effect. A grievance was voiced by Ms. Abhilasha Kumari that the trial Court has observed at more than one place that it was an "admitted fact that Chamaru handed over possession of suit land to defendant No.l. but the said statement is factual ly incorrect. Moreover, an error of law has been committed by the trial Court in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. Abhilasha Kumari that the trial Court has observed at more than one place that it was an "admitted fact that Chamaru handed over possession of suit land to defendant No.l. but the said statement is factual ly incorrect. Moreover, an error of law has been committed by the trial Court in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. It was the case of Chamaru in the plaint itself that initially he was tenant of defendant No.l. as in possession in that capacity and was cultivating the land. In 1974. he became the owner and continued to remain in possession and also in cultivation of the land. It was only in 1988 that his possession was sought to be disturbed by respondent No.l and he filed a suit. The trial Court was. Therefore no right in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. Irrelevant and extraneous considerations were taken into account by the Courts below regarding acquiescence, waiver and other factors. The Courts below were also not right contended the learned counsel, that the Will executed by Chamaru was not legal and valid. It was also urged that unnecessary and undue importance was given to certain matters, such as. Chamaru was taken by the plaintiffs at the place were the will was executed and got registered, the expenses were borne by the plaintiffs etc. When the plaintiffs case was that Chamaru was bachelor and was staying with them, and the Will was to be executed in their favour, expenses obviously were borne by the plaintiffs. But all throughout. Chamaru was hale and hearty, was in sound and disposing state of mind and with his free will, he executed the document (Will) in favour of the plaintiffs which was registered in accordance with law. It was also proved from the evidence of two attesting witnesses and an Advocate who was present at the relevant time. It was. therefore, submitted that both the Courts below have erred in holding that the will has not legal and valid. An argument was also advanced that the in the revenue records, entries were made in favour of defendant No. 1 but those entries were recorded behind the back of the plaintiffs and w ithout missing any notice or giving opportunity to them. The entries, therefore, cannot come in the way of the plaintiffs and deprive them of their light. An argument was also advanced that the in the revenue records, entries were made in favour of defendant No. 1 but those entries were recorded behind the back of the plaintiffs and w ithout missing any notice or giving opportunity to them. The entries, therefore, cannot come in the way of the plaintiffs and deprive them of their light. But even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that such entries were made or that oral mortgage was executed by defendant No.l in favour of defendant No.2. Chamaru continued to be a tenant irrespective of entries in Revenue Records or execution of mortgage. Thereafter, under the provisions of the Act. he become the owner. On all these grounds, it was submitted that both the Courts have committed a error of law. which requires to be corrected in exercise of powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code) and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 11. Mr. Khidtta. learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the decree passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the first appellate Court. He submitted that on the basis of the evidence on record the trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs and the findings recorded were confirmed by the first Appellate Court. According to the him. the matter is in the realm of appreciation and re-appreciation of evidence. Under the provisions of Section 100 of the Code, such concurrent findings of fact are not open to challenge inasmuch as they do not fall within the expression "substantial question of law".-He. therefore, submitted that even if this Court is of the opinion that as a trial Court or as a first Appellate Court, on the basis of the evidence on record, it might have taken different view is no ground to interfere with those findings and substitute its own findings. 12. Regarding abandonment of tenancy rights by Chamaru. as also handing over of possession by him to defendant No. I. the counsel submitted that both the courts have considered oral evidence on record and on that basis, reached a conclusion that Chamaru gave up tenancy rights in 1973 and handed over possession to defendant No.l. Only thereafter, defendant No.l executed an oral mortgage in favour of defendant No.2. According to Mr. Khidtta. According to Mr. Khidtta. the lower appellate Court was within its jurisdiction to draw an inference that even if the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession of the suit land after mortgage by defendant No.l in favour of defendant No.2. such possession of plaintiffs was not as tenants of the suit land or as successors of Chamaru or under the will executed by Chamaru in their favour but through defendant No.2 as they were near relatives of defendant No.2. The said circumstance, therefore, cannot carry the case of the plaintiffs further. Regarding entries in the revenue record, it, was submitted that as a reasonable and prudent man. the plaintiffs would have immediately objected to such entries but nothing had been done by them. The counsel also contended that if the plaintiff was claiming possession as tenant and according to him he was paying Galla Batai. there must be something-to prove that fact, but no evidence and/or receipt had been produced on the specious plea that those receipts were with third person. It was also submitted that the trial Court was right in holding that the suit was barred by limitation in the light of the findings recorded that possession of the suit land was handed over by Chamaru to defendant No.l as early as in 1973. Regarding Will, the learned counsel submitted that no doubt, the will was registered. But the said circumstance would onl\ go to show that such Will was prepared and produced and it was registered. The said circumstance, however, does not establish that the Will was legal, valid and was executed by Chamaru in sound and disposing state of mind. That fact will have to be established on the basis of evidence on record. The counsel submitted that in the instant case, it was admitted by PW-1 himself that deceased Chamaru was not in sound and disposing state of mind at the time of execution of Will. If in the light of the above admission of PW-1. both the courts below have held that the will could not be relied upon, by no stretch of imagination, it can ] be said that error of law can be said to have been committed, which i requires interference under Section 100 of the Code. He. therefore submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. both the courts below have held that the will could not be relied upon, by no stretch of imagination, it can ] be said that error of law can be said to have been committed, which i requires interference under Section 100 of the Code. He. therefore submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, in my opinion, it cannot be said that by dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff on the basis of evidence on record, any error of law was committed by both the Courts which deserves interference. It is no doubt true that at some places, some observations were made by the trial Court without there being such evidence on record. For instance, it is on record that Chamaru was teat of the suit land. According to the plaintiffs, he continued to remain tenant and became owner in accordance with the provisions of the Act with effect from the appointed day1. It is also their case that Chamaru continued to remain in possession and his possession was sought to be disturbed for the first time in the year 1988. which necessitated filing of suit by him. On the other hand, it was the case of defendant No.l that Chamaru was tenant in the year 1973. but since he was bachelor, was of an old age and was unable to cultivate the land personally. he abandoned tenancy rights in favour of defendant No.l and also handed over possession of the suit land. Now. at some places, the trial Court has observed that it was an "admitted fact" that Chamaru surrendered possession to defendant No.l and defendant No.l continued to remain in possession till he mortgaged property to defendant No.2. Ms. Abhilasha Kumari. learned counsel for the appellants, in my opinion, was right in commenting upon the above statement in the judgment of the trial Court and in submitting that nothing had been pointed by learned counsel for defendant No.l as to whether such admission was made either by PW-1 or by his witnesses. Thus, to the extent that "admittedly" the possession of suit land was handed over by deceased Chamaru to defendant No. 1 is not borne out from the record of the case. 14. But then, on the basis of other evidence and particularly testimonies of witnesses before the Court, certain findings have been recorded. Thus, to the extent that "admittedly" the possession of suit land was handed over by deceased Chamaru to defendant No. 1 is not borne out from the record of the case. 14. But then, on the basis of other evidence and particularly testimonies of witnesses before the Court, certain findings have been recorded. Both the courts have relied .upon the fact that after the possession was surrendered by Chamaru and defendant No.l took over the same, oral mortgage was effected by him in favour of defendant No.2. The fact regarding oral mortgage has be deposed by the witnesses and is thus based on evidence. In my opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that by recording a finding on the basis of oral evidence on record that deceased Chamaru surrendered tenancy rights and handed over possession to defendant No.l. the Courts below-have committed an error of law. which deserves interference under Section 100 of the Code. 15. There is an additional ground also. If Chamaru or present plaintiffs continued to remain in possession even after 1973-74. he/they could have adduced evidence to prove that fact. He they could have produced receipts for payment of Galla Batai. Substantial period had gone from 1973 till the suit was filed in the year 1988 and vet no receipt whatsoever had been produced either by Chamaru or by the present plaintiffs. Production of some receipts, in my opinion possession by Chamaru or by the plaintiffs. Again, had the plaintiffs were in continuous possession, they would have objected against mortgage by defendant No.l in favour of defendant No.2. No doubt, the case of Chamaru was that everything was done behind his back and since he continued to remain in possession all throughout till interference was sought to be caused by defendant No.l in 1988. 16. In this connection, strong reliance was placed by Ms. Abhilasha Kumari on a document, in the. form of revenue records Ex.P-3. The said document is of the year 1974-75. It recites the name of defendant No.l as owner and Chamaru as tenant of the suit land. It further states that defendant No.l mortgaged the suit land in favour of defendant No.2 on 3rd March. 1974. According to the counsel, thus. in the year 1974-75. Chamaru was tenant of the suit land and he had paid Galla Batai. That fact is also reflected in the document. It further states that defendant No.l mortgaged the suit land in favour of defendant No.2 on 3rd March. 1974. According to the counsel, thus. in the year 1974-75. Chamaru was tenant of the suit land and he had paid Galla Batai. That fact is also reflected in the document. It was therefore, submitted that Chamaru was the tenant and on the appointed day on 21st February. 1974. Chamaru became the owner, his right could never have been defeated and on that basis also, both the Courts below were wrong in dismissing the suit. 17. The trial Court, no doubt, failed to consider document Ex.P-3. At the same time, however, it cannot be overlooked that at the most from that document it could be said that Chamaru was in possession of the suit land. After the death of Chamaru. plaintiffs were claiming ownership rights under the will executed by Chamaru. Obviously, therefore, both the Courts were right in relying upon the fact that it was incumbent upon them to show that they had become owners, were in actual physical possession of suit land and as to how the came in possession of the land. Both the Courts were also right in observing that to show physical possession, it was for the plaintiff to adduce evidence and one of the relevant factors which could have been proved was payment of Galla Batai and receipts thereof which would be material in asserting that they continued to remain in possession. Unfortunately, however, neither Chamaru nor the plaintiffs had placed an\thing on record in the nature of payment of Galla Batai. 18. It is true that the will executed by Chamaru is a registered Will. The factum of registration of Will is. therefore, not open to question, but the lower Appellate Court is right in observing that execution of the Will and registration are different from capacity of a person to execute a Will. The case of the plaintiffs was that when the Will was executed by Chamaru. he was in a sound state of mind and hale and heart}. To that effect evidence was led by the plaintiffs by examining PW-1. as well as two witnesses, who were present at the time of the execution of Will and also an Advocate. All of them have stated that Chamaru was physically fit and in a sound state of mind to execute the Will. To that effect evidence was led by the plaintiffs by examining PW-1. as well as two witnesses, who were present at the time of the execution of Will and also an Advocate. All of them have stated that Chamaru was physically fit and in a sound state of mind to execute the Will. But it cannot be overlooked that PW-1 himself, in cross- examination, had admitted that at the time of executing the Will.Chamaru was not Hilly fit. That is clear from the following sentence in cross-examination: "CHAMRU RAM AKHIR MAFN BOHUT BUDHA HO CHUKA THA KION KAI OOS KAI HOSH HA WAS THIK BHI NAA THAI" 19. It. therefore, appears that the witness had admitted that Chamaru had become very old and he was not fully sound and in a fit state of consciousness It is also in evidence that after the execution of the Will. Chamaru died within a period of about one month. Viewed in the light of the above facts, if both the Courts below have reached a conclusion that the deceased was not in a sound state of mind ad hence the will cannot be said to have been executed by him properly and in a sound and disposing state of mental faculty, it cannot be said that no reasonable man would have recorded such a finding and it is perverse. I so as to enable the High Court to interfere under Section 100 of the Code. 20. Ms. Abhilasha Kumari invited the attention of this court to some of the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court as well as other Courts on ambit and scope of interference by the High Court under Section 100 of the code in second appeal. 21. In D.S. Tlummappa v. Siddaramakka. 1996 (8) SCC 365. the apex Court held that where the first Appellate court failed to draw proper inference from proved facts and also failed to apply law in its proper perspective, the High Court was justified in drawing proper inference from such proved facts. In such cases, according to the Supreme Court, substantial question of law arises and the High Court can exercise jurisdiction. 22. There cannot be two opinions about the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court. In such cases, according to the Supreme Court, substantial question of law arises and the High Court can exercise jurisdiction. 22. There cannot be two opinions about the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court. On the bass of proved or admitted facts, if proper inference of law has not been drawn by a court subordinate to the High Court, it is open to the High Court to interfere with such decision. In the instant case, however, on the bass of the facts asserted by one part and controverted by the other, findings of fact have been recorded and such findings are binding on this Court. 23. In Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through L.Rs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by L.Rs. 2000 (1) SCC 434. the Court observed that were vital evidence, which could have led to a different conclusion was altogether omitted by a Court or inadmissible evidence had been relied, which if omitted would have led to a contrary finding, the High Court can interfere under Section 100 of the Code. The submission of Ms. Abhilasha Kumari. on the basis of Ishwar Dass Jain is that in the case on hand, the vital documentary evidence in the nature of Ex.P-3 which could have led to a different conclusion, was not considered at all. Hence, a substantial question of law can be said to have been involved ad on that ground, the orders passed by both the Courts below are liable to be quashed and set aside. 24. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, in my view, keeping in mind other circumstances as well as relevant facts, which have been considered by both the Courts below, no different conclusion could have been arrived at by the lower Courts. It is because of the fact tat both the Courts have relied upon the circumstance that looking to the evidence in its entirety. Chamaru relinquished tenancy rights and handed over possession of suit land to defendant No.l in 1973. Defendant No.l. in turn, executed oral mortgage in favour of defendant No.2. There was nothing, on record to show that in any case after 1974-75. Chamaru relinquished tenancy rights and handed over possession of suit land to defendant No.l in 1973. Defendant No.l. in turn, executed oral mortgage in favour of defendant No.2. There was nothing, on record to show that in any case after 1974-75. Chamaru remained in possession nor there is anything to show that plaintiffs were put in possession by Chamaru.Necessary documents, which could have supported the case of Chamaru or of plaintiffs in the nature of receipt of payment of Galla Batai were not produced as according to them, they were with third-party. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it could not be said that the ratio laid down in Ishwar Dass Jain would apply to the case. 25. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel in Daulat Ram etc. v. State of Himachal Pradesh etc.. ILR 1978 HP 742. and it was urged that once a person is recorded as a tenant in the revenue record, he becomes owner of the land under Section 104 of the Act. No fetters can be placed on his rights as owner of the said land. Thereafter it was for the other side to prove that such a person did not become owner of the property. The attempt on the part of the appellants is that once it is established that on the appointed day. Chamaru was in possession of the suit land ad such possession was in. possession of the suit land and such possession was as a tenant by operation of law. Chamaru became owner of the property. Therefore, even if it is assumed that thereafter his possession was disturbed, the provisions of law already operated and his rights could not be affected by such interference of possession. 26. In the instant case, however, in the light of oral evidence, both the Courts held that chamaru relinquished his tenancy rights and handed over possession to defendant No.l. In the light of evidence on | record, it cannot be said that by recording a finding against Chamaru or the present plaintiffs any error of law was committed by the Courts below. To the same effect is the decision of this court in Jethu through Km. Guddi and others v. Gobind Singh. 1995 (2) Sim LC 296. wherein it was stated that once right has been established, such right could be determined and/or terminated only in accordance with law. 27. To the same effect is the decision of this court in Jethu through Km. Guddi and others v. Gobind Singh. 1995 (2) Sim LC 296. wherein it was stated that once right has been established, such right could be determined and/or terminated only in accordance with law. 27. It was also submitted that when in the revenue record an entry appears, a presumption arises as to correctness of such entry. Then, it was for the other side to rebut such presumption. (Vide Durga (deceased and others v. Milkhi Ram and others. 1969 PLJ 105 (SC). 28. Reference was also made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Major Singh v. Rattan Singh dead) by LRs. and others. 1997(3) SCC 546 for the proposition that a question whether a Will was or was not validly executed, if the execution of Will is not in dispute, the Court would not presume that the High Court would be justified in interfering with the concurrent findings and to come to the conclusion that such findings were not sustainable at law. 29. I am afraid that ratio laid down in Major Singh would not help the appellants inasmuch as apart from the fact that Chamaru was not keeping good health at the time of execution of Will and died within a period of about a month or so after the execution of Will, it was even admitted by PW-1 himself in his cross- examination that Chamaru was not totally fit when the Will was executed. If taking into account these circumstances both the Courts have arrived at a conclusion that Chamaru was not in a sound and disposing state of mind, it cannot be said that no such finding could have been arrived at and the finding is perverse. 30. The decision in Gun Parkash and another v. Bhola Xath. AIR 1997 HP 27. will be of no assistance to the appellants as in that case the Court observed that the testator should be proved to be in sound and disposing state of mind. Obviously, once there is a finding that the person executing Will was in sound state of mind, the Will could not be discarded. But the condition precedent of proper mental state of the executant of the Will must be established, which is of a doubtful nature in the instant case, as observed by the Courts below. 31. Obviously, once there is a finding that the person executing Will was in sound state of mind, the Will could not be discarded. But the condition precedent of proper mental state of the executant of the Will must be established, which is of a doubtful nature in the instant case, as observed by the Courts below. 31. In Shakuntala Devi v. Savitri Devi and others. AIR 1997 HP 43. it has been held by this Court that certain circumstances cannot be described as suspicious circumstances, such as attesting witnesses not knowing the contents of the Will: contradictions in statement of witnesses regarding the date of death of testatonminute details regarding facts stated in the Will: production of Will after long time of the death of testator for getting mutation on that basis: minor omissions in the deposition of the witnesses at the time of trial: exclusion of natural heirs from giving properties, etc. Obviously, if the circumstances are not held to be such as to create suspicion about sound and disposing state of mind of the testator, on the basis of above circumstances, the Will cannot be excluded from consideration and on the basis of such will parties can not be denied benefits. 32. The decision in Surendrq Pal & Ors. v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora & Anr.. AIR 1974 SC 1999 will not help the appellants. In Sitrendra Pal. what was observed by the Supreme Court was that when a allegation is made or plea is put forward by a person that he Will was executed by the testator under undue influence, burden of proving that allegation is on the person making such allegation. If such allegation is not proved, the presumption would be that the will was executed by the testator in accordance with law and with full understanding. But in the instant case, on the basis of the evidence, the Courts below have held that deceased Chamaru was not in sound and disposing state of mind. Such a finding could have been arrived at on the basis of evidence on record and no interference is. therefore, called for. 3i. Mr. Khidtta also placed reliance on some of the decisions of the Supreme Court and contended that this Court is not a Court of first appeal and after the amendment in the Code in 1976. it is not only a question of law but substantial question of law. therefore, called for. 3i. Mr. Khidtta also placed reliance on some of the decisions of the Supreme Court and contended that this Court is not a Court of first appeal and after the amendment in the Code in 1976. it is not only a question of law but substantial question of law. which would confer jurisdiction on this Court while deciding a second appeal. He submitted that even if findings have been recorded by the first Appellate Court, this Court will not interfere. But when concurrent findings have been recorded by both the Courts below, it is much more, so that High Court will proceed on the basis of those findings unless it comes to the conclusion that they were perverse and no reasonable man would have recorded such findings. 34. In this connection, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions: 1. Ishwar Das.s Jain (dead) through LRs v. Sohati Lal (dead) by LRs.. AIR 2000 SC 426: 2. Rohini Prasad & Ors. v. Kasturchand & Anr., AIR 2000 SC 1283. 35. Reliance was also placed on decisions of the Supreme Court in V. Ramchandra Ayyar & Anr. v. Ramalingam Cheiiiar & Anr.. AIR 1963 SC 302 and Ladi Parshad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillen-Co.. Ltd.. Karnal & Ors.. AIR 1963 SC 1279. It was also submitted that from the evidence on record both the Courts have held that defendant No.l mortgaged the suit land to defendant No.2 and since defendant No.2 was closely related to plaintiffs, even if it is assumed that the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession, such possession was through defendant No.2. According to the counsel, such an inference, in the facts and circumstances, could have been draw and it does not require interference under Section 100 of the Code. Since there is no infirmity in appreciation of evidence by the Courts below, findings, which have been recorded, do not call for interference. Virtually, an attempt on the part of the appellants, submitted the learned counsel for respondent No.l. is to re-appreciate and reappraise evidence, which is not permissible. 36. In my opinion, on the basis of the findings recorded as well as for the reasons aforesaid, it cannot be said that the courts below have committed an error of law which requires interference in exercise of limited jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of the Code. 36. In my opinion, on the basis of the findings recorded as well as for the reasons aforesaid, it cannot be said that the courts below have committed an error of law which requires interference in exercise of limited jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of the Code. The Appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. 37. Interim order is vacated.