O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) THE dispute relates to premises No. 107/268 Brahma Nagar, Kanpur. Rudra Sen bajpai-respondent No. 2 had purchased the said house in the year 1977 from one Smt. Rani devi. The house consisted of two Kotharies and a Khaprall, One of the Kotharies was under the tenancy of Smt. Siromani Devi and the other was under the tenancy of late Dev Singh and the tiled (Khaprall) accommodation was in occupation of Doodh Nath Singh as tenant. Rudra Sen bajpai. who happens to be a practising Advocate on the criminal side filed a petition for release of the accommodations, aforesaid, under the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1)of Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Rent. Eviction and Letting) Act, 1972 (Act No. XIII of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the purposes of construction of a garage and office, registered as P. A. case No. 820 of 1980. The release petition was dismissed by the learned Prescribed Authority by order dated 27. 3. 1982. The respondent No. 2 landlord preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Act (Rent Appeal No. 156 of 1982) which was partly allowed by order dated 11. 4. 1983, inasmuch as, Khaprail in occupation of Doodh Nath Singh, tenant was released and in respect of the two other tenants, the appeal was dismissed. The appellate court appeared to be of the view that the landlord may conveniently have his office constructed over the roof of the garage. The landlord filed a Writ Petition No. 9078 of 1983. which has been allowed by this Court by order dated 21. 1. 2000 whereby the order dated 11. 4. 1983 passed in appeal was quashed and the XIIIth Additional District Judge was directed to consider the appeal afresh keeping in view the observations made in the body of the decision. The landlord filed a Writ Petition No. 9078 of 1983. which has been allowed by this Court by order dated 21. 1. 2000 whereby the order dated 11. 4. 1983 passed in appeal was quashed and the XIIIth Additional District Judge was directed to consider the appeal afresh keeping in view the observations made in the body of the decision. Two specific observations were made by this Court in the body of the judgment, firstly, that the appellate authority did not examine the opinion of the Engineer and the report of the Advocate commissioner, in relation to two other accommodation is respect of which, the release petition was dismissed even though these two accommodations were adjoining to the third one about which release petition was allowed though they were of the same age and secondly, the question whether an Advocate of long standing can suitably and conveniently have his office on the roof of the garage. ( 2 ) THE learned XIIIth Additional District Judge. Kanpur Nagar decided the appeal No. 156 of 1982 afresh by the impugned order dated 9-1. 2001. He has found that the need of the landlord to get all the three tenanted accommodations in premises No. 107/268 Brahma Nagar Kanpur was bona fide and that the balance of hardship tilled in his favour and accordingly allowed the release petition. It appears that the tenant Doodh Nath Singh had handed over possession of the tenanted accommodation in respect of which the release application was allowed by the appellate court on 11. 4. 1983. Smt. Siromani Devi has also not challenged the release order passed in appeal. ( 3 ) THE petitioner is the son of Late Dev Singh, tenant In Kothari at a monthly rent of Rs. 15. After the death of Dev Singh, his legal heirs were impleaded as respondent Nos. 4 to 11 in appeal. Some of the substituted respondents as legal heirs of Dev Singh also died and one of them was married outside the family. Babu Singh. the present petitioner was respondent No. 4 in appeal. He has challenged the order dated 9. 1. 2001 by filing the present writ, petition. ( 4 ) COUNTER and rejoinder-affidavit have been exchanged- Heard Sri Vinod Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R. K. Saxena appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2. at considerable length. Babu Singh. the present petitioner was respondent No. 4 in appeal. He has challenged the order dated 9. 1. 2001 by filing the present writ, petition. ( 4 ) COUNTER and rejoinder-affidavit have been exchanged- Heard Sri Vinod Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R. K. Saxena appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2. at considerable length. ( 5 ) TO begin with, it may be mentioned that the order of release passed against Smt. Siromani devi and Doodh Nath Singh has become final. Babu Singh son of Late Dev Singh tenant has challenged the order of release passed in appeal primarily on the ground that the learned appellate court has misdirected itself as it has observed that it would confine its findings and limit the decisions only to the two aspects covered by the observations made by this Court in order dated 21. 1. 2000 in Civil Misc. Writ No. 9078 of 1983 and shall not look Into the bona fide need of the landlord as it has already been determined by this Court Sri Vinod Misra. learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since the order dated 11. 4. 1983 passed in appeal No. 156 of 1982 had been quashed, it was expected and required of the lower appellate court to decide the case afresh taking into consideration all the grounds which have been taken by the Dev Singh, tenant to oppose the release petition. Sri R. K. Saxena, Advocate for the landlord took me through the decision of the lower appellate court dated 9. 1. 2001 and pointed out that the lower appellate court has considered all the material on record placed by the parties and after taking into consideration the entire evidence has independently come to the conclusion that the need of the landlord for his office and garage is bona fide. genuine and pressing. It was maintained on behalf of the landlord that the lower appellate authority has not restricted his decision to any particular point or was not, in any manner, swayed away to confine his findings in the light of the observations made by this Court. ( 6 ) I have given thoughtful consideration to the matter and have waded through the entire judgment delivered by the IIIrd Additional District Judge. Kanpur Nagar on 9. 1. ( 6 ) I have given thoughtful consideration to the matter and have waded through the entire judgment delivered by the IIIrd Additional District Judge. Kanpur Nagar on 9. 1. 2001 in Rent appeal No. 156 of 1982 and find that the submissions made by Sri Vinod Misra are wide off the mark. This Court by order dated 21. 1. 2000 passed in writ petition No. 9078 of 1983 has quashed the order dated 11. 4,1983 meaning thereby the order passed earlier [n appeal became non existent and since learned Prescribed Authority has dismissed the release petition, it was to be decided in appeal whether the need of the landlord to get the disputed accommodation released for constructing garage and an office was bona fide or not and if the need was found to be genuine, what was the balance sheet of the hardship. A reading of the impugned judgment dated 9. 1. 2001 undoubtedly indicates, that the lower appellate authority found itself shackled with the observations made by this Court In order dated 21. 1. 2000 passed in Civil Misc. Writ No. 9078 of 1983 and initially seem to have taken the view that since the bona fide need of the landlord has already been accepted by this Court, it is not required to be gone into. As one proceeds to read the judgment as a whole, it would become apparent and clear that the lower appellate court did not confine its decision to the observations made by this Court and instead threadbare dealt with the bona fide need of the landlord and its genuineness and has also dealt with the question of hardship. The case has been approached by the lower appellate court in its true perspective uninfluenced by the observations made by this Court. The moot points for consideration before the lower appellate court were : (i) Whether in view of the opinion of the Engineer/ Advocate Commissioner, was it appropriate and justified to allow the landlords application in respect of one particular portion and to reject the same in respect of the other portions in spite of the fact that the age of all the portions as one unit was one and the same ; (ii) Whether the need of the landlord to have a garage and separate office is bona fide and genuine. (iii) Whether the need of the landlord could be satisfied by constructing the office on the roof of the garage on the released portion which was earlier in the tenancy of Doodh Nath Singh, and (iv) Balance sheet of hardship. The lower appellate court has addressed itself and adverted to all the above questions independently and uninfluenced by the observations made by this Court. On all the above points, the lower appellate court has recorded the findings in favour of the landlord. ( 7 ) LEST there be any confusion about the decision of the lower appellate court. I have myself appraised the matter in my quest to reach the truth. It is an indubitable fact that the landlord has been in active criminal practice for the last about one quarter of the century. He has been paying income tax since the year 1964. He is having his residence in a house in Nehru Nagar, Kanpur nagar. He. as a practising Advocate wants to maintain his separate office and to construct a garage for his own car. His requirement to have a separate office after such a long standing practice cannot be said to be fanciful or imaginary. The suggestion that the family of the landlord presently comprised of only three members, i. e. . himself, wife and a daughter and. therefore, he can continue to run the office from his residential house does not appear to be acceptable. It is true that presently the landlord, his wife and unmarried daughter are sharing the residential house at Nehru Nagar but the fact remains that some of the members of the landlord who are living outside the city cannot be treated to have abandoned their claim to live with the family in the residential house. Here, it is not the question whether the landlord has sufficient accommodation at his disposal in the residential house to maintain office as an Advocate but the point germane for determination is whether a practising Advocate is entitled to have his office apart from his residence in the tenanted house which he has purchased for the specific purpose (i. e. , for constructing the garage and the office ). An Advocate undoubtedly is required to have a separate office which may have enough space to house a library, record room, to accommodate his juniors and clerks besides place for consultation with clients and waiting room for the clients. Maintenance of office in residential premises. undoubtedly inundates privacy. For a comfortable and peaceful living of the family members, it is necessary to maintain the professional office at some distance. Imbued with this feeling, the landlord had purchased the property in question, being premises No. 107/268 Brahma Nagar. It is the innate desire of every owner/landlord to utilise the property purchased by him keeping in view the standard of life which he has attained and the convenience of all other family members. The suggestion made on behalf of the petitioner that the landlord may have his office on the roof of the garage is not acceptable. No tenant can compel or force the landlord to live in a particular manner and to utilize his property by dictating or suggesting certain alternatives. It is for the landlord to decide whether he wants to have his office on the roof of the garage or separately. The dimensions of the garage have certainly to be small than the accommodation required for office. A spacious office with its appendages cannot be constructed over the small roof of the garage. Moreover, it may not be as convenient to have an office on the first floor. If it is located on the ground floor, it may be easily accessible from the road side. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there can be no quarrel with the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the need of the landlord to have a separate garage and an office is bona fide and genuine and that it would be highly inconvenient for a lawyer of the standing of the present landlord to have a small office on the roof of the garage. In a number of decisions of this Court, the need of a practising Advocate to have a separate office has been held to be bona fide. A reference may be made to the decision in sarian Singh v. IXth Additional District Judge. Kanpur and others, 1995 (1) ARC 200 and Abdul hafeej Khan and another v. IIIrd Additional District Judge and others, 1998 (1) ARC 96. A reference may be made to the decision in sarian Singh v. IXth Additional District Judge. Kanpur and others, 1995 (1) ARC 200 and Abdul hafeej Khan and another v. IIIrd Additional District Judge and others, 1998 (1) ARC 96. A lawyer cannot set up his practice unless he has a chamber with office and the people in general know place of his availability. In any case, as said above, the tenant cannot dictate that the landlord may have his office on the roof of the garage. ( 8 ) THE landlord is the master of his convenience. It is for him to decide where he wants to maintain his office. Conjectural alternatives as suggested by the tenant are of no consequence. It would be appropriate to make a reference to the decision of the Apex Court in Mrs. Meenal eknath Kshirshagar v. M/s. Traders and Agencies and another. JT 1996 (6) SC 468. in which it has been held that landlord is the best Judge of his residential requirement and it is for him to decide how and in what manner he would live. In Harnam Singh v. Raksha Rani and others. 1997 All CJ 1493, the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord was contested on the ground that he was having other houses which were found to be not fit for habitation. It was found by the Apex Court that it could hardly be said that the landlord does not bona fide require the premises for personal occupation because he owns houses not fit for habitation. An inspiration may be drawn from the said decision that if the residential house with the landlord is not fit for maintaining office for the variety of reasons indicated by the lower appellate court, it cannot be said that the need of the landlord to have the tenanted accommodations vacated for the purposes of constructing garage and separate office is not bona fide. ( 9 ) THOUGH in every case of eviction some sort of hardship is to be faced by the tenant, in the instant case, balance of hardship tilts much more in favour of the landlord rather than the petitioner for one simple reason that the petitioner-tenant is residing in House No. 104/a/46 rambagh, Kanpur. ( 9 ) THOUGH in every case of eviction some sort of hardship is to be faced by the tenant, in the instant case, balance of hardship tilts much more in favour of the landlord rather than the petitioner for one simple reason that the petitioner-tenant is residing in House No. 104/a/46 rambagh, Kanpur. He is using the disputed accommodation for his Baithaka and for running a tea shop on the Chobutra in front of it which Is said to be the only source of his livelihood. The litigation between the parties is going on for the last more than two decades. During this long period, the petitioner does not appear to have taken any concrete steps for finding out an alternative accommodation. To mitigate the hardship, the petitioner may put up the tea shop in or in front of the premises where he resides in Rambagh, Kanpur. He has certainly no right to stick to the tenanted accommodation to the serious detriment of the landlord. ( 10 ) SO far as the release application under clause (b) of subsection (i) of Section 21 of the Act is concerned, the lower appellate court has appraised the opinion of the Engineer and the report of the Advocate Commissioner and has recorded a finding of fact that the accommodation in occupation of the petitioner as well as other two tenants is in dilapidated condition and is required to be demolished for reconstruction. The landlord has fulfilled all the conditions required for release of the accommodation under clause (b ). The finding recorded by the lower appellate court cannot be faulted on any ground. ( 11 ) IN the conspectus of the above facts, the petition turns out to be without any merits and substance. The order of release passed by the lower appellate court suffers from no legal infirmity and. therefore, It has to be upheld. ( 12 ) LASTLY, it was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the lower appellate court has not awarded any amount of compensation to the petitioner for vacating the released accommodation. In para 14 of the counter-affidavit, the landlord has expressed his willingness to pay the requisite amount of compensation to the petitioner. I feel that a sum of Rs. 5. In para 14 of the counter-affidavit, the landlord has expressed his willingness to pay the requisite amount of compensation to the petitioner. I feel that a sum of Rs. 5. 000 (Rupees five thousand only) should be appropriate amount of compensation which the landlord is required to pay to the petitioner-tenant for vacating the released accommodation. ( 13 ) THE writ petition Is dismissed without any order as to costs. It is however, made clear that the order of release passed by the lower appellate court on 9. 1. 2001 In rent appeal No. 156 of 1982 arising out of P. A. case No. 820 of 1980 shall become executable soon after the landlord pays a sum of Rs. 5. 000 (Rupees Five thousand only) as compensation to the petitioner and if he refuses to accept, deposits the same, with the Prescribed Authority. .