JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.—The controversy raised in the above said two writ petitions relates to the constitutional validity and legality of subsection (4) Section 4 of the H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (for short Act No. 19 of 1973) whereby the adult daughter has been discriminated on the basis of gender by not providing her independent unit at par with an adult son as amended by Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to Act No. 1 of 1974) and also laying challenge to the Constitution (34th Amendment Act), 1974 whereby Act No. 19 of 1973 has been included in 9th Schedule of the Constitution of India. In view of the common question involved in these cases they were heard together with the consent of learned Counsel for the parties, and they are being disposed of by way of this common judgment. 2. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to the relevant facts with reference to writ petition No. 351 of 2002 filed by Smt. Sukarma Bhardwaj, Smt. Sangita Sharma and Smt. Krishna Tandon against the State of Himachal Pradesh represented by Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Revenue) and Union of India through Secretary Ministry of Agriculture. In the petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners sought the following reliefs : "(i) That sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 as amended by Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1973, whereby words "or daughter of a land owner" has been substituted by the words "of a person" in the principal Act may be declared ultra vires the Constitution and struck down after applying the principle of severability; (ii) That the Constitution with (34th Amendment) Act, 1974, whereby the Act has been included at Sr. No. 73 of the Ninth Schedule may be declared ultra vires the Constitution and be struck down: Alternatively : It is prayed that sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 may be read down to include "daughter" at part with "son" permitting her to have a separate independent unit to save the clause from unconstitutionality; (iii) Any other relief as may be deemed just and proper keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted in favour of the petitioners. 3. 3. Petitioner No. 1 has retired as Headmistress from Government High School, Kehlog, Tehsil Kandaghat and presently she claims to be the President of Shakti Mahila Mandal, Gram Panchayat Sirinagar, Tehsil Kandaghat, District Solan. Petitioner No. 2 Smt. Sangita Sharma is the President of Pratibha Mahila Mandal. According to the petitioners the Mahila Mandals are non-Governmental Organizations constituted to espouse the cause of women for their social and economic upliftment for achieving social justice. Petitioner No. 3 Smt. Krishna Tandon is a social worker and has been vigorously espousing the causes of women and had been a Member of the H.P. State Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission. Petitioners stated that the main task of the National Commission for Women is to study and monitor all matters relating to the constitutional and legal safeguards provided for women, to review the existing legislations and suggest amendments, wherever necessary. It will also look into the complaints and take suo motu notice of the cases involving deprivation of the rights of women in order to provide support, legal or otherwise to helpless women. The commission shall monitor the proper implementation of all the legislations made to protect the rights of women so as to enable them to achieve equality in all spheres of life and equal participation in the development of the nation etc. etc. They stated that all form of discrimination on grounds of gender is violative of international freedoms and human rights Conventions for Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (for short CEDAW), which was ratified by the United Nations Organization on 18th December, 1979 and the Government of India had ratified the same as an active participant on 19th June, 1993. It was further stated that the petitioners had been legitimately expecting that on the basis of the various social legislations enacted by the Parliament and the State Legislatures, more particularly, the National Commission for Women Act, 1990 and the Protection of Human Rights Commission Act, 1993 along with adoption and ratification of the CEDAW in the year 1973 read with right to equality, the necessary amendments would be carried out for the removal of discrimination on the basis of gender but the respondents have failed to do the needful, which has necessitated the filing of the present writ petition pro bono publico to safeguard, protect and enforce the constitutional and legal rights of women. The petitioners further contended that as per United Nations Report 1980, "women constituted half the world population, perform nearly two-thirds of work hours, receive one-tenth of the worlds income and own less than one-hundredth percent of the Worlds property. Half of the Indian population too are women, and they have always been discriminated against and have suffered and are suffering discrimination in silence. They further stated that Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India and other related Articles prohibit discrimination on the ground of sex. Thus the State should create conditions and facilities conducive for women to realize the right to economic development including social and cultural rights. The petitioners have challenged the vires of the Act, inter alia, on the following grounds : "(A) that sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 is ultra vires the Constitution creating invidious discrimination on the basis of gender alone, thus violative of Articles 13, 14, 15(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India and is also affront to the Preamble of the Constitution of India. (B) that sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, whereby the "daughter" has been deprived the right to property at par with "son" by way of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1973, is wholly unconstitutional, violating the basic essential features of the Constitution of India. The right to equality is a basic feature of the Constitution. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 completely extinguishes and destroys the rights of "adult daughter" to have independent separate unit in the property while protecting the rights of "adult son" by permitting him to retain separate unit. (C) that it is evident from the perusal of unamended sub-section (4) of Section 4 that initially the words "every adult son or daughter of a landowner" were mentioned but subsequently the same were substituted by words "by a person", whereby the word "daughter", which existed in the unamended provision of sub-section (4) of Section 4 was deleted in unconstitutional manner. This action of the legislature of substituting the words "or daughter of landowner" by the words "by a person" by Section 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Act No. 1 of 1974 gave birth to discrimination on the basis of gender. This action of the legislature of substituting the words "or daughter of landowner" by the words "by a person" by Section 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Act No. 1 of 1974 gave birth to discrimination on the basis of gender. The deletion of word "daughter" is violative of the preamble as well as equality clause of the Constitution of India. Besides this, it provides for discrimination on the basis of sex. It is stipulated in Section 2 of the Act that the Act has been enacted for giving effect to the policy of a State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India but in principle and practice it runs contrary to this Article since 50% of the women population has been deprived of the status at par with men, which enables them to have a separate unit as per sub-section (4) of Section 4. (D) The Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 was brought in the Ninth Schedule by way of 34th amendment commencing w.e.f. 7th September, 1974. Thus, it is evident that the principal Act and the Constitution (34th Amendment) Act, 1974 are based on Keshva Nand Bhartis case i.e. 24th April, 1973 and the Act and the 34th Amendment Act can be challenged on the ground that sub-section (4) of Section 4 destroys the basic and essential features of the Constitution of India. (E) It is settled law that the right to equality and dignity of a person enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution, fundamental rights and directive principles are like a trinity initiated to remove discrimination or disability on the ground only social status or gender. (F) The petitioners stated that sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 being violative of the basic structure of the Constitution based on equality before the law as well as Articles 13,14,15 and 21 read with other enabling provisions and the denial of right to the "daughter" to have a separate unit of property at par with "son" is violative of basic structure of the Constitution of India and the discrimination on the basis of gender has no intelligible differentia so as to distinguish the "daughter" vis-a-vis "son" everything being equal. It is further submitted that there is no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved on the basis of this artificial classification, which is neither supported by reason nor by logic". On these premises, the petitioners have sought the above mentioned reliefs in this writ petition. 4. In opposition to the writ petition an affidavit filed on behalf of the State by Sh. Som Nishpakshi, Under Secretary (Revenue) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, the following preliminary submissions were raised : "1. That after the independence, the main endeavour of the Government of the Independent India was to provide social, economic and political freedom and justice to all citizens of Indian in real sense. The march of the Indian nation to the Promised Land of Social Justice is conditioned by the pace of the process of agrarian reform. This central fact of our countrys progress hias made land distribution and its inalienable ally, the ceiling on land holding the cynosure of legislative attention. Enactment of Agrarian Reforms was one of steps in the direction of fulfilling this commitment. This was done to uplift the landless the last poor person of the State and to bring the downtrodden have not at par with the haves. 2. The State had applied its mind seriously to all relevant questions such as adoption of family as a unit instead of individual for applying ceiling on land holdings, size of the family, adoption of artificial definition of the family, necessity of double standards one for the primary unit of the family and another in respect of a separate unit considering other member living with the family and type of land to be clubbed in different cases. All these questions were considered having regard to the social and economic realities of our rural life and with a view to nullify the transfers effected in favour of close relations for the purpose of avoiding the effect of ceiling legislation. All these questions were considered having regard to the social and economic realities of our rural life and with a view to nullify the transfers effected in favour of close relations for the purpose of avoiding the effect of ceiling legislation. The Ceiling Acts were enacted in most of the States on the basis of Report of the Committee on Panel of, Land Reform under Planning Commissioner (January 1956), Land Reform Division of Planning Commissioner (1960), Chapter 9 of Agrarian Land Reorganization in 2nd Five years plan, Report of the Committee on Ceiling on Land Holdings Planning Commissioner (April 1961, Summary Record of Chief Ministers Conference on Land Reforms (September 26-27, 1970), Summary Record of Chief Ministers Conference on Land Reform and guidelines drawn up on the basis of the conclusions of the Chief Ministers Conference (July 23, 1972) and Ceiling on Agriculture Holdings by P.S. Appu published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India 1972. 3. That in the facts and circumstances stated above the H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Act No. 19 of 1978) (hereinafter referred as the H.P. Act) was passed by HP Assembly on 21.12.1972. It received assent of the President of India on 10.7.1973 and published in Rajpatra Extra-ordinary on 28.7.1973. Amendment was made in it in Section 4(4) vide HP Ordinance No. 4 of 1973 published in Rajpatra on 3.10.1973. This amendment came into force with effect from the commencement of the Act. The Ordinance was replaced by HP Act No. 1 of 1974 passed by HP Assembly on 18.10.1973 assented by the President of India on 1.1.1974 which was published in Rajpatra Extra-ordinary on 22.1.1974 (hereinafter referred as The H.P Amendment Act). 4. That the above said Act No. 19 of 1973 was added at serial No. 73 (the HP Act) in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution of India, vide Constitution (34th Amendment) Act, 1974. 5. That in Section 2 of the HP Act it has been declared that this Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) and (c) of Article 39 of Constitution of India. 5. That in Section 2 of the HP Act it has been declared that this Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) and (c) of Article 39 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the H.P. Act is protected by the Article 31-C of the Constitution (as it was prior to the 42nd amendment) and the amendment under challenge was carried, vide Act No. 1 of 1974 was also made prior to the 42nd amendment. It was stated that in Waman Rao and others v. Union of India, reported in 1980 (3) SCC 587 and 1981 (2) SCC 362, that Article 31-C, as it stood prior to its amendment by 42nd amendment does not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution and is valid. It was also held that if any Act or regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a Constitutional amendment made after April 24, 1973, was save by Article 31-C, as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant constitutional amendment by which that Act or regulation is put in the 9th Schedule, on the ground that the amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14,19 or 31 will become otiose and as such the present writ petition was not maintainable. 6. The H.P. Act is an Agrarian Reform Act and it has been enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) and (c) of Article 39 of Constitution of India. The enactment of this Act does not destroy or damage the basic structure of Constitution and it is a valid piece of legislation rather they strengthen and fortify the same. It is further stated that Constitutionality and validity of a similar provision in the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holding Act, 1972 was challenged before the Supreme Court in Seth Nand Lal and others v. State of Haryana, 1988 Supp. SCC 574, and the Haryana Act was alongwith its amendment added in the 9th Schedule was under the protective umbrella of Article 31-B of the Constitution of India. The provisions of the HP Act and Haryana Act are para materia regarding the family unit and method of determination of permissible area. 7. SCC 574, and the Haryana Act was alongwith its amendment added in the 9th Schedule was under the protective umbrella of Article 31-B of the Constitution of India. The provisions of the HP Act and Haryana Act are para materia regarding the family unit and method of determination of permissible area. 7. The H.P. Act of 1972 as amended subsequently is a piece of agrarian reform legislation squarely falling with the Articles 31-A and 31-C of the Constitution and therefore the Act and the concerned provisions would be immune from attack based on Articles 13, 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. The Courts have upheld the validity and constitutionality of the provisions of the ceiling enactment of the various States. Support to uphold the validity and constitutionality of the Ceiling Act has been sought from the decisions of the Full Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh v. Union of India, ILR 1976 (5) HP Series 453, and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sonapur Tea Co. v. Deputy Commissioner, AIR 1962 SC 137; Rajeev v. State, AIR 1965 SC 632; Seth Nand Lal. v. State of Haryana, 1980 (Supp.) SCC 574; Ambika Prasad v. State of U.P., 1980 (3) SCC 719; Waman Rao v. Union of India, . 1980 (3) SCC 587 and 1981 (2) SCC 362 and Copal Singh v. State of U.P., 1988 (2) SCC 532. 5. On merits it was stated that Section 4 of the Act is concerned with the determination of permissible area and it defines its purpose and sets the limits within which the scope has to be determined. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 constitutes a single scheme, each of the sub-section forming a constituent component of the scheme. It is the land holding of such person or family alone which forms the subject matter of Section 4 and the several sub-sections lay down the principles for the mathematical computation of the permissible area in respect of land holding to him. No right to share is created thereby in favour of the son in the land holding of the land owner, therefore, no question of any discrimination between a son and daughter on the basis of gender bias would arise. No right to share is created thereby in favour of the son in the land holding of the land owner, therefore, no question of any discrimination between a son and daughter on the basis of gender bias would arise. It was also stated that in the average family in India, a daughter is usually married of and has left, the family by the time she attains adulthood and it was reiterated that the presence of an adult son is relevant only for the purpose of determining the extent of the permissible area available to the land holder and it does not, affect the rights of the son and daughter on succession. Further it was stated that adopting "family" as a unit as against an individual was considered necessary as that would reduce the scope for evasion of law by affecting mala fide partitions and transfer since such transactions are usually made in favour of family members, that normally in rural agricultural set up in our country the family is the operative unit and all the lands of a family constitute a single operational holding and therefore, ceiling should be related to the capacity of a family to cultivate the land personally. Keeping all these aspects in view the concept of the family was artificially defined and double standard for fixing ceiling, one for primary unit and other for the adult son living with the family was adopted. So far as an adult son living separately from the family is concerned, he is rightly regarded as a separate unit who will have to file a separate declaration in respect of his holdings under the Act. The case of an unmarried daughter or daughters living with the family was probably considered to be a rare case and it was presumed that daughters would in normal course get married and would become members of their husbands units. That is why no separate provision was made for giving additional land for unmarried major daughters living with the family. It was also stated that the H.P. Act is not in anyway contrary to the spirit of International Conventions or Covenants. That is why no separate provision was made for giving additional land for unmarried major daughters living with the family. It was also stated that the H.P. Act is not in anyway contrary to the spirit of International Conventions or Covenants. The H.P. Act has no bearing on the provisions of Succession Act as the son or daughter or both are entitled to inherit the share in the property of their father or mother, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of Succession Act or any other law in force. It was further stated that the Act was implemented to whole population of the State for over 30 years from its enactment and if the same question is allowed to be reopened, then the action of the State which have brought about a near socio-economic revolution in the agrarian sector might be exposed to jeopardy and might be put anti clock back by setting a naught all changes that have been brought about in agrarian relationships during these years and create chaos in the lives of lakhs of people who have been benefited by these laws. It was stated lastly that in the H.P. Act there was no violation of any social legislation enacted by the Parliament and the State Legislature including National Commission for Women Act, 1990 and Protection of Human Rights Commission Act, 1993 alongwith "CEDAW". Facts in CWP No. 381 of 2002 6. The relevant facts of this writ petition are briefly set out in what follows : 7. The petitioner is the daughter of Shri Virbhadur Singh proforma respondent herein. The Collector, Sub Division Rampur Bushaher, District Shimla by order dated 7.10.1994 marked Annexure PA to the writ petition has accepted the return filed by proforma respondent No. 4 claiming one unit for himself of the landed property inherited by him from his late mother Rajmata Shanti Devi under Section 4 of Act No. 19 of 1973 and one unit was claimed for his unmarried daughter Kumari Anuradha. The description and extent of the lands and the names of the villages where the lands are situated reserved for Kumari Anuradha have been mentioned in paragraph-2 of the writ petition. Necessary entries of the mutation were also made in the revenue record in favour of Kumari Anuradha who was enjoying the rights over the said property peacefully. The description and extent of the lands and the names of the villages where the lands are situated reserved for Kumari Anuradha have been mentioned in paragraph-2 of the writ petition. Necessary entries of the mutation were also made in the revenue record in favour of Kumari Anuradha who was enjoying the rights over the said property peacefully. Kumari Anuradha executed a will on 6.3.1995 in favour of her sister the petitioner qua khasra Nos. 993, 1029,1047,1068,1069 and 1070 kita-6 measuring 1-92-86 hectares in revenue estate Tayawal. The will was duly registered and a copy thereof was placed on record marked Annexure PB and translated copy was Annexure PB/1. Km. Anuradha died on 3.5.1999 and thereafter the necessary corrections in the revenue record of the landed property bequeathed by her in favour of the petitioner were made by the revenue authority. The petitioner has been enjoying the rights of the property as an absolute owner. The petitioner stated that the Collector District Shimla after a period of about 18 years had laid the information before the Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Appeals) respondent No. 3 to exercise suo motu revisional powers under Section 20(3) of the Act alleging that late Kumari Anuradha was not entitled to a separate unit of the land and therefore, the order of the Sub-Divisional Collector, Rampur Busher was not sustainable. Respondent No. 3 respondent has issued notice to the proforma respondent in Revision Petition No. 166 of 2001 titled "State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sh. Virbhadra Singh", for March 22, 2002. The proforma respondent has also filed revision petition No. 165 of 2001 under Section 20(3) of the Act against the order of the Sub Divisional Collector before respondent No. 3. The petitioner submitted that she has absolute right to protect her property and the same cannot be defeated by the State and proforma respondent in the Revision Petition filed by them before respondent No. 3. The petitioner has extracted the relevant provisions of the National Commission for Women Act, 1990 in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the writ petition. A challenge to the vires of sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Act No. 19 of 1973 whereby the daughter has been discriminated against by not providing her separate independent unit at par with adult son is made on the basis of gender discrimination. A challenge to the vires of sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Act No. 19 of 1973 whereby the daughter has been discriminated against by not providing her separate independent unit at par with adult son is made on the basis of gender discrimination. Rest of the contents of the writ petitions are the same and similar stated by the petitioners in CWP No. 351/2002. The petitioner sought the following reliefs: It is, therefore, respectfully prayed : "(i) That the proceedings pending before the respondent No. 3 by way of Revision Petition No. 166 of 2001 titled "State of H.P. v. Shri Virbhadra Singh", may be quashed and set aside; (ii) That a writ in the nature of Prohibition be issued prohibiting respondent No. 3 from proceeding with the Revision Petition No. 165 of 2001 titled "Virbhadra Singh v. State of H.P." and Revision Petition No. 166 of 2001 titled "State of H.P. v. Shri Virbhadra Singh"; (iii) That a writ in the nature of certiorari may be issued to quash the proceedings pending before the respondent No. 3 arising in Revision Petition No. 166 of 2001 titled "State of H.P v. Shri Virbhadra Singh, after summoning the record; (iv) That sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 as amended by Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1973, whereby words "or daughter of a land owner" has been substituted by the words "of a person" in the principal Act may be declared ultra vires the Constitution and struck down after applying the principle of severability; (v) That the Constitution (34th Amendment) Act, 1974, whereby the Act has been included at Sr. No. 73 of the Ninth Schedule may be declared ultra vires the Constitution and be struck down; Alternatively : It is prayed that sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 may be read down to include "daughter" at par with "son" permitting her to have a separate independent unit to save the clause from unconstitutionally; (vi) Any other relief as may be deemed just and proper keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted in favour of the petitioner." 8. Counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents-State of Himachal Pradesh and Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Appeals) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh was filed by Sh. Counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents-State of Himachal Pradesh and Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Appeals) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh was filed by Sh. Som Nishpakshi. Under Secretary (Revenue) in which preliminary submissions contained in the said affidavit are the same and similar as noticed above in reply to the averments made in Civil Writ Petition No. 351 of 2002. On merits, it was stated that under the Himachal Pradesh Act the permissible area of proforma respondent No. 4 was to be calculated and not of Kumari Anuradha as she was not entitled for any separate unit on 7.10.1994 when order marked Annexure R-l was passed by Collector Sub-Division, Rampur Busher. It was stated that under the Scheme of the Act, additional second unit, even if wrongly granted, was to be mutated in favour of late Km. Anuradha as she could have inherited the property held by proforma respondent No. 4 after him in case she was entitled for the property. It was stated that respondent No. 4 has himself filed a Revision Petition No. 165 of 2001 before respondent No. 3 admitting the illegality committed in the order of the Collector dated 7.10.1994 and therefore, the claim of legitimate expectation of the petitioner is not sustainable. Late Kumari Anuradha was not entitled to separate independent unit of the land which was bequeathed by her to the petitioner. If the order of the Collector was illegal granting one separate unit to late Kr. Anuradha out of the land inherited by proforma respondent No. 4 from his late mother, Kr. Anuradha was neither the owner of the landed property nor she could make will in favour of the petitioner of the said land. It was further stated that the petitioner has not acquired vested right in the land which was given to her by illegal and void order of Collector concerned and the said land was to vest in the State by virtue of the Act as it was excess of the permissible are which could be retained by proforma respondent No. 4. It was further reiterated and reasserted that an adult son who is the member of the family has not been given right to independent separate unit and it is the land owner whose permissible area is determined on the basis of the scheme of the Act. It was further reiterated and reasserted that an adult son who is the member of the family has not been given right to independent separate unit and it is the land owner whose permissible area is determined on the basis of the scheme of the Act. Section 4(4) of the Act does not destroy the basic and essential feature of the Constitution of India nor the Act is in violation of any international convention, declaration or covenant. There is no necessity and legal proprietary to include the daughter in Section 4(4) of the HP Act as the right of the women are intact and they are entitled to inherit the property at par with the man. 9. No affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the other respondents to both the writ petitions. The petitioners have also not filed any rejoinder to the affidavit-in-reply of the State. 10. We have heard Mr. B. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner Ms. Meenakshi Kumari, Mr. Rajiv Sharma, Advocate for petitioner-Smt. Sukarma Bhardwaj and others and the learned Advocate General for the State, Mr. B. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Rajiv Sharma learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that sub-section (4) of Section 4 of Act No. 19 of 1973 shall be held invalid being violative of basic structure of the Constitution of India as well as Articles 14, 15 and 21 read with other enabling provisions as the denial of right to the daughter to have separate unit of property at par with son is discriminatory on the basis of gender and equality before law. They submitted that Constitution (34th Amendment Act) 1974 whereby the Act has been included at serial No. 73 of the 9th Schedule may also be declared ultra vires the Constitution. Alternatively, the learned Counsel contended that sub-section (4) of Section 4 of Act No. 19 of 1973 may be read down to include "daughter" at par with "son" as per existing provisions of Act No. 19 of 1973 before the amendment has been carried out by way of Act No. 1 of 1974. 11. Alternatively, the learned Counsel contended that sub-section (4) of Section 4 of Act No. 19 of 1973 may be read down to include "daughter" at par with "son" as per existing provisions of Act No. 19 of 1973 before the amendment has been carried out by way of Act No. 1 of 1974. 11. Per contra, the learned Advocate General contended that Act No. 19 of 1973 with all amendments up to date is an act of agrarian reforms having protection of Articles 31(A), 31(B) and 31(C) of the Constitution of India and therefore the vires of the provisions of the Act cannot be challenged as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He next contended that since Act No. 19 of 1973 was added in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution and thus has the protective umbrella of Article 31-C of the Constitution as the Act with all amendments has been enacted to give effect to the provisions of Articles 39(b) and 39(c) of the Constitution of India. He further contended that Act No. 19 of 1973 with all amendments carried out by Act No. 1 of 1974 neither confers nor takes away any right or status of an adult son or daughter as the provisions of the Act prescribes the method of calculation , of extent of permissible area to be retained by the land owner alone and the provision neither prescribes nor determines the status, right or share of the adult son or daughter much less a right in any property. He then contended that the Act in question is neither way confronts with human rights, women rights undertaking and commitments of the Government for implementation of international treaties, conventions or covenants nor it is contrary to declaration made in CEDAW and BEIJING conventions. The learned Counsel for the parties cited and relied upon a series of judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in support of their submissions which shall be dealt with and considered in the later part of the judgment. 12. Before considering the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners it will be convenient to refer to the statutory provisions relevant for the purpose. Act No. 19 of 1973 came into force on 24th day of January, 1971 i.e. appointed day as defined in clause (b) of Section 3. 12. Before considering the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners it will be convenient to refer to the statutory provisions relevant for the purpose. Act No. 19 of 1973 came into force on 24th day of January, 1971 i.e. appointed day as defined in clause (b) of Section 3. Section 2 deals with declaration as to giving effect to certain directive principle of State Policy towards securing the principle specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. Section 3(e) defines "family" to mean husband, wife and their minor children or anyone or more of them. 13. Section 3(m) defines "permissible area" to mean the extent of land specified in Section 4 of the Act. Clause (q) of Section 3 defines "separate unit" to mean an adult son or in case of his death, his widow and children, if any, and an adult daughter. "Surplus area" as per clause (r) means the area in excess of the permissible area. Chapter II of the Act contains Ceiling on Land Holdings, Acquisition and Disposal of Surplus Area. Section 4 deals with permissible area of land owner or a tenant or a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in another of a person or a family consisting of husband, wife and upto three minor children which can be retained by the said person. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 which is relevant and material for the purpose of deciding the present petitions is quoted hereunder:— "(4) Every adult son or daughter of a landowner shall be treated as a separate unit and he shall be entitled to the land upto the extent permissible to a family under sub-sections (1) and (2) subject to the condition that the aggregate land of the family and that of the separate units put together shall not exceed twice the area permissible under the said sub-section : Provided that where the separate unit owns any land, the same shall be taken into account for calculating the permissible area for that unit." 14. Section 8 deals with selection of permissible area. Section 8 deals with selection of permissible area. The said section reads as under:— "(1) Every person, who on the appointed day or at any time thereafter holds the land exceeding the permissible area shall furnish to the Collector particulars of all his lands and that of the separate unit within a prescribed period and in the prescribed form and manner and stating therein the selection of land not exceeding in the aggregate the permissible area which he desires to retain: Provided that such person shall stated in the return any transfer or other disposition of land made by him after the appointed day. (2) If the whole or a part of the land selected under sub-section (1) is under tenants, the landowner shall not be entitled to eject the tenants therefrom except on the grounds given in the tenancy laws for the time being in force in the State of Himachal Pradesh. Explanation I.—Where the person is a member of the family, he shall include in his declaration particulars of land held by him and also of land, if any, held by other members of the family. Explanation II.—In calculating the extent of land owned or held by a person, the share of such person in undivided family, registered framing co-operative society or a company shall be taken into account. (3) In making a selection of his permissible area under sub-section (1), the landowner may also select land for a separate unit: Provided that the land selected for the separate unit, after adding the land owned on qr after the appointed day by such unit, shall not exceed the permissible area." 15. The Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Ordinance, 1973 to amend the Himachal Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Act No. 19 of 1973), was promulgated by the Governor of Himachal Pradesh on the Twenty-fourth year of the Republic of India. The Ordinance came into force from the date of commencement of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Principal Act). 16. The Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh later on passed the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1973 (for short Act No. 1 of 1974). The Ordinance came into force from the date of commencement of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Principal Act). 16. The Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh later on passed the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1973 (for short Act No. 1 of 1974). By Act No. 1 of 1974 certain amendments in Section 3 of the Principal Act were carried out in clause (k), clause (i), clause (n), clause (q), sub-clause (i) of clause (t) in sub-clause (ii) of clause (t). In sub-section (4), sub-section (5) of Section 4, clause (c) of Section 5, Clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 14, sub-section (2) of Section 15 and sub-section (iii) of Section 17 of the Principal Act. In clause (q) of the Principal Act "and an adult daughter" was omitted in the definition of "separate unit". In sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act for the words "daughter of the land owner", the words "of a person" were substituted. Therefore, the exclusion of an "adult daughter" from the definition of separate unit under clause (q) of Section 3 of the Principal Act has been excluded by the Amendment Act No. 1 of 1974 and in place of the words "an adult daughter" included in sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act, the words "of a person" were substituted meaning thereby that the daughter was not held entitled to separate unit of the land owned by the land owner who was entitled to retain permissible area of the land as prescribed under Section 4 of the Principal Act. The amendment of sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act carried out by Act No. 1 of 1974 has given cause to the petitioner to challenge the vires of subsection (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act on the basis of discrimination of equality under Article 14, gender under Article 15 and also Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 17. On reading the aforementioned statutory provisions, it is clear that every adult son of a land owner is treated as a separate unit and he shall be entitled to the land upto the extent of permissible area. 17. On reading the aforementioned statutory provisions, it is clear that every adult son of a land owner is treated as a separate unit and he shall be entitled to the land upto the extent of permissible area. Under subsections 1 and 2 of Section 4 subject to the conditions contained in sub- section (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act, "an adult daughter" has been excluded from the definition of separate unit contained in sub-clause (q) of Section 3 of the Principal Act from getting the land of the land owner as a separate unit and in place of "an adult daughter" of a landowner, the words "of a person" have been substituted. The purpose of enacting such provisions as substituted in sub-section (4) of Section 4 of Principal Act by Act No. 1 of 1974 is to give right to the land owner as defined in clause (g) or a person as defined in clause (n) of Section 3 of the Principal Act to select one unit of the land for himself and his family consisting of husband, wife and upto three minor children to retain the permissible area of the land to the extent mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 4 and one unit to his adult son who is not living separately from the land owner or a person. On plain reading of the provisions of Section 4 of the Principal Act, the right is given to the land owner or a person and not to an adult son or a adult daughter. In this section, the permissible area of the land owner or a person is determined. An adult son can be independent owner of the land. An adult son or a adult daughter could be owner of the land in his or her independent right and he or she could also be subjected to the provisions of the Principal Act. Section 6 of the Principal Act prescribes that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or agreement, no person shall be entitled to hold whether as a landowner or a tenant or a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity and partly in another the land within the State of Himachal Pradesh exceeding the permissible area on or after the appointed day. Section 8(1) lays down that every person, who on the appointed day or at any time thereafter holds the land exceeding the permissible area shall furnish to the Collector particulars of all his lands and that of the separate unit within a prescribed period and in the prescribed form and manner and stating therein the selection of land not exceeding in the aggregate the permissible area which he desired to retain. In making the selection of permissible area under sub-section (1) the landowner may also select the land for separate unit under sub-section (3) of Section 8. 18. Proviso says that the land selected for the separate unit, after adding the land owned on or after the appointed day by such unit, shall not exceed the permissible area. 19. On combined reading of the provisions of Section 6 and Section 8 of the Principal Act, it becomes clear that it is the land owner who has the right to choose the permissible area of the land for his family and one separate unit for his adult son of the land not exceeding in the aggregate the permissible area and the rest of the land has to be declared by him as surplus area, as defined in clause (r) of Section 3 of the Principal Act. Section 6 entitles a person to hold whether as a land owner or a tenant or a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity and partly in another, the land within the State of Himachal Pradesh not exceeding the permissible area on or after the appointed day notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or agreement. 20. The entire basis of the claim of the petitioners is based on legal interpretation of sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act. The question whether sub-section (4) of Section 4 of Act No. 1 of 1974 is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of the law and whether it also violates Article 15 of the Constitution on the basis of sex is no longer res Integra. The question whether sub-section (4) of Section 4 of Act No. 1 of 1974 is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of the law and whether it also violates Article 15 of the Constitution on the basis of sex is no longer res Integra. In Rajkumar Rajindra Singh v. The Union of India and others, 1977 SLC 132 (ILR 1976 (5) H.R 453) Full Bench of this Court while deciding the constitutional validity of the very provisions of the principal Act and Amendment Act No. 1 of 1974 held as under:— "8. At the outset, it will be seen that Section 4 (SLC Pages 136, 137, 138 and 141) is concerned with the determination of the permissible area. That defines its purpose, and sets the limits within which its scope has to be determined. The different sub-sections of Section 4 constitute a single scheme, each of the sub-sections forming a constituent component of the scheme, the entire object of which is the determination of the permissible area. It is the permissible area in the case of person or a family. And it is the permissible area in respect of the landholding of such person or family It is the landholding of such person or family alone which forms the subject-matter of Section 4, and the several sub-sections lay down the principles for the mathematical computation of the permissible area in respect of such landholding. Section 4 is not concerned with the landholding of any other person or family nor with the transfer of the rights of one landholder in favour of another. The only transferee from the landholder is the State Government. With this as the scope of Section 4, the true construction of its sub-sections can be easily reached, and accordingly the validity of the contentions advanced before us can be readily evaluated. 9. It has urged that sub-section (4) of Section 4 provides that an adult son of a person shall be treated as a separate unit entitled to a share in the landholding while an adult daughter has not been granted such a right. That, it is said, constitutes discrimination on the ground of sex alone, and therefore sub-section (4) violates Article 15(1) of the Constitution. 10. That, it is said, constitutes discrimination on the ground of sex alone, and therefore sub-section (4) violates Article 15(1) of the Constitution. 10. If we bear in mind what has been said above of the object and scope of Section 4, it will be apparent that when sub-section (4) speaks of treating an adult son as a separate unit, it intends that in the process of determining the permissible area available to the landholder out of the landholding belonging to such landholder, the extent to the permissible area will be the area prescribed for the landholder under sub-sections (1) and (2) enlarged by an equally extensive area by reason of the existence of each adult son. The entire permissible area represents the land which the landholder can retain out of the related landholding. The additional area is added on the fiction that so much more land out of the landholding is required as a provision in the hands of the landholder in respect of an adult son or sons. 11. When sub-section (4) recites that the adult son shall be entitled to the land that is merely in aid of the fiction mentioned above. The object remains the mathematical computation of the permissible area in the case of the landholder out of his landholding. To what extent will the permissible area of such landholder be enlarged by virtue of this principle? For every adult son add the area specified in sub-sections (1) and (2), so however that the aggregate land worked out on the basis of sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) does not exceed twice the permissible area specified under sub-sections (1) and (2). There is one proviso, and that is that when you compute the area to be added by reason of the existence of an adult son you must, for the purpose of such computation, take into account the land actually belonging to such son. The extent of his land is involved as a factor in the determination of the land which the landholder is entitled to retain out of his own landholding it in no way affects the extent and continuity of rights of the son in his own land. 12. The extent of his land is involved as a factor in the determination of the land which the landholder is entitled to retain out of his own landholding it in no way affects the extent and continuity of rights of the son in his own land. 12. On the aforesaid construction of sub-section (4) of Section 4, when it is clear that no right to a share is created thereby in favour of the son in the landholding of the landholder, no question can arise of any discrimination between a son and a daughter. It is possible that a landholder with an adult son becomes entitled, by virtue of sub-section (4), to a larger permissible area than a landholder with no adult son but with an adult daughter. But even there, it cannot be said that the landholder suffers discrimination on the ground of the landowners sex. Further, if an adult son alone is mentioned in sub-section (4) as a factor determining the permissible area of the landholder, it is explained by the circumstance that in the average Indian family a daughter is usually married off and has left the family by the time she attains adulthood. It is reiterated that the presence of an adult son is relevant only for the purpose of determining the extent of the permissible area available to the landholder it does not affect the rights of the son and daughter on succession. It may be noted that in Sucha Singh v. State, AIR-1974 Punjab and Haryana 162 at p. 171 (FB), a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court repelled a similar contention as the one before us. 25. To my mind the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners that their fundamental rights have been impaired or abrogated by the impugned Act have no substance and must fail. 26. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the respondents can invoke Article 31-B and Article 31-C in protection of the impugned Act. 21. 25. To my mind the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners that their fundamental rights have been impaired or abrogated by the impugned Act have no substance and must fail. 26. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the respondents can invoke Article 31-B and Article 31-C in protection of the impugned Act. 21. In Sucha Singh Bajwa v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1974 Punjab and Haryana 162, the Full Bench considering the constitutional validity of Punjab Land Reforms Act (10 of 1973) has held that the object of Article 31-C is to make a legislation giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 immune from attack under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. If the Act and its provisions fall either under Article 31-A or under Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution, their constitutional validity cannot be challenged on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Articles 14,19 and 31 of the Constitution. The judgment proceeded to hold that the Act is clearly a measure of agricultural reform and its provisions fall under Article 31-A of the Constitution as they relate to the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights as provided in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 31-A. In Dattatraya Govind Mahajan and others v. State of Maharashtra and another; State of lifter Pradesh and others v. Rajesh Pachauri and another; State of Punjab v. Sucha Singh and others and Nagaorao Marotrao Ingole and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, (1977) 2 Supreme Court Cases 548, vires of Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1971 as amended by Maharashtra Acts 21 of 1975, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976, the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (U.P. Act 1 of 1971) as amended by U.P. Acts 18 of 1973 and 2 of 1975 and the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, were challenged and their Lordships held that the object and purpose of introducing Articles 31-A and 31-B was to protect agrarian reform legislation from invalidation. Article 31-B saves from invalidation an enactment specified in the Ninth Schedule even if it happens to be "inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the right conferred by, any provisions of Part IE". It is immaterial whether such enactment is inconsistent with any provisions of Part III or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any such provisions, for both infirmities are cured by Article 31-B. Now it would not be right to introduce an artificial dichotomy in Article 31-B by co-relating the first part of the expression, namely, "is inconsistent with any provisions of this part" and confining its applicability to post-constitution legislation and co-relating and confining the applicability of the other part of the expression, namely, "takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this part" to post-constitution legislation. That would be a highly unnatural construction unjustified by the language of Article 31-B. Both the parts of the expression, on a plain natural construction of the language of Article 31-B, apply equally to post-Constitution legislation as well as pre-Constitution legislation. The Court must place an expansive interpretation on the language of Article 31-B so as to carry out the object and purpose of enacting that article. The Maharashtra Act as amended was not held to be in conflict with the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31-A. Similarly the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act as amended by U.P. Acts 18 of 1973 and 2 of 1975 and the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 were held constitutionally valid. 22. In Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. and others, (1980) 3 Supreme Court Cases 719, while upholding the constitutional validity of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (1 of 1961), the Supreme Court held as under : (SCC: Page 728, paras 23, 24, 25, 26 and 29) : "23. The anti-female kink is patent in that the very definition of family discloses prejudice against the weaker sex by excluding adult daughters without providing for any addition to the ceiling on their account. In the case of an adult son, Section 5(3)(a) of the Act provides for the addition of two hectares of irrigated land for each of his (tenure holders) sons where the family has a strength of less than five. In the case of an adult son, Section 5(3)(a) of the Act provides for the addition of two hectares of irrigated land for each of his (tenure holders) sons where the family has a strength of less than five. Section 5(3)(b) similarly provides for two additional hectares of irrigated land for each of his (tenure holders) adult sons where the strength of the family is more than five. It must be remembered that this addition is on account of the fact that there are adult sons, even though they are not tenure holders or hold less than two hectares or none. This privilege of adding to the total extent that the family of a tenure holder may keep is denied to an adult daughter, even though unmarried, and, therefore, dependent on the family for that a married son stands on a different footing from a married daughter, what justice is there in barring a dependent unmarried daughter in the cold? Assuming, without admitting, Shri Veda Vyas further urges that having regard to the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 and the increasing prevalence of unmarried adult daughters in families these days, the discrimination is not theoretical but real because no minor girl can now marry. 24. Another similar invidious provision is the definition of tenure holder. Ceiling on holdings is fixed with reference to tenure holders. 25. We wonder whether the commission on the status of women or the Central Government or the State Governments have considered this aspect of sex discrimination in most land reforms laws, but undoubtedly the State should be fair especially to the weaker sex. Adult damsels should not be left in distress by progressive legislations geared to land reforms. This criticism may have bearing on the ethos of the community and the attitude of the legislators, but we are concerned with the constitutionality of the provision. May be, in this age of nuclear families and sex equal human rights it is illiberal and contrary to the Zeitgeist to hark back to historys dark pages nostalgically and disguise it as the Indian way of life with a view to deprive women of their undeniable half. Articles 14 and 15 and the humane spirit of the preamble rebel against the de facto denial of proprietary person-hood of womanhood. Articles 14 and 15 and the humane spirit of the preamble rebel against the de facto denial of proprietary person-hood of womanhood. But this legal sentiment and jural value must not run riot and destroy provisions which do not discriminate between man and woman qua man and woman but merely organize a scheme where lifes realism is legislatively pragmatised. Such a scheme may marginally affect gender justice but does not abridge, even a wee-bit, the rights of women. If land holding and ceiling thereon are organised with the paramount purpose of maximizing surpluses without maiming womens ownership no submission to destroy this measure can be permitted using sex discrimination as a means to sabotage what is socially desirable. No womans property is taken away any more than a mans property. 26. Section 5(3) reduces daughters or wives to the status of stooges. It forbids excessive holdings having regard to rural realities of agricultural life. Family is defined because it is taken as the unit for holding land a fact of extant societal life which cannot be wished away. This is only a tool of social engineering in working out the scheme of setting limits to ownership. Section 5(3) does not confer any property on an adult son nor withdraw any property from an adult daughter. That provision shows a concession to a tenure holder who has propertyless adult sons by allowing him to keep two more hectares per such son. The propertyless son gets no right to a cent of land on this score but the father is permitted to keep some more of his own for feeding this extra mouth. If an unmarried daughter has her own land, this legislation does not deprive her any more than a similarly situated unmarried son. Both are regarded as tenure holders. The singular grievance of a chronic spinster vis-a-vis a similar bachelor may be that the father is allowed by Section 5(3) to hold an extra two hecatres only if the unmarried major is a son. Neither the daughter nor the son gets any land in consequence and a normal parent will look after an unmarried daughter with an equal eye. Legal injury can arise only if the daughters property is taken away while the sons is retained or the daughter gets no share while the son gets one. The legislation has not done either. Neither the daughter nor the son gets any land in consequence and a normal parent will look after an unmarried daughter with an equal eye. Legal injury can arise only if the daughters property is taken away while the sons is retained or the daughter gets no share while the son gets one. The legislation has not done either. So, no tangible discrimination can be spun out. May be, the legislature could have allowed the tenure holder to keep another two hectares of his on the basis of the existence of an unmarried adult daughter. It may have grounds rooted in rural realities to do so. The Court may sympathize but cannot dictate that the landholder may keep more land because he has adult unmarried daughters. That would be judicial legislation beyond permissible process. 29. In the view we have taken, we need not discuss the soundness of the reasoning in the ruling in Sucha Singh v. State. The High Court was right, if we may say so with respect, in its justification of the section when it observe: ......The subject of legislation is the person owning or holding land and not his or her children..... Section 5 provides for the measure of permissible area that a person with one or more adult sons will be allowed to select out of the area owned or held by him and his children, whether male or female, have not been given any right to make a selection for himself or herself. It cannot, therefore, be said that this section makes a discrimination between a son and a daughter in respect of his or her permissible area on the ground of sex alone. The legislature is the best judge to decide how much area should be left as permissible area with each owner or holder of land. Insofar as no distinction between a male and a female holder or owner of the land has been made in respect of the permissible area in any given circumstances, there is no violation of Article 15 of the Constitution. Insofar as no distinction between a male and a female holder or owner of the land has been made in respect of the permissible area in any given circumstances, there is no violation of Article 15 of the Constitution. This section does not provide for any succession to the land; it, only provides for the measure of the permissible area to be retained by every holder or owner of the land out of the area held or owned by him or her on the appointed day on the basis of the number of adult sons he or she has. It is for the legislature to prescribe the measure of permissible area and no exception can be taken because only adult sons have been taken into consideration." 23. In Waman Rao and others v.-Union of India and others, (1981) 2 Supreme Court Cases 362, the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act 27 of 1961 and its subsequent amendments by Acts 21 of 1975, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976 was under challenge before the apex Court against the judgment of Bombay High Court and it is held:— "However, there are following four reasons for not invoking the rule of stare decisis for deciding upon the constitutionality of Article 31-A: (i) Article 31-A draws its sustenance from the basic tenets of our Constitution. Its unstated premise is an integral part of the very making of the Constitution and it holds, as it were, a mirror to the ideals which inspired the framing of the Constitution. (ii) In none of the earlier decisions, viz. Sankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458; Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845; Golak Nath v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1643 and Kesawananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, was the validity of Article 31-A put in issue. Nor indeed was that question considered and decided in any of those cases. A deliberate judicial decision made after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent; and the precedent by long recognition may mature into stare decisis. But these cases cannot be considered as having decided, reasons apart, that the First Amendment which introduced Article 31-A into the Constitution is valid. But these cases cannot be considered as having decided, reasons apart, that the First Amendment which introduced Article 31-A into the Constitution is valid. What can be said is that the constitutional validity of Article 31-A was recognised in these four decisions sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly and sometimes incidentally. (iii) The principle of stare decisis is merely a wise rule of action and is not a universal, inexorable command. It has a limited application only. It is a wise policy to restrict the principle of stare decisis to those areas of the law where correction can be had by legislation. The relevant demands of stare decisis do not preclude consideration of an interpretation which started as an unexamined assumption. (iv) The principle of stare decisis permits the saving of laws the validity of which has been accepted or recognised over the years. It does not require or sanction that, in future too, laws may be passed even though they are invalid or unconstitutional. Thus on principle, rules like stare decisis should not be invoked for upholding constitutional devices like Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C which are designed to protect not only past laws but future laws also. The principle of stare decisis can apply, if at all, to laws protected by these articles, if those laws have enjoyed the protection of these articles for a long time, but the principle cannot apply to the articles themselves. It was further held that however, since Article 31-A has been held to be constitutionally valid independently on its own merits, non-applicability of the rule of stare decisis for saving Article 31-A does not really matter." 24. The apex Court passed the following order dated May 9, 1980: (SCC P. 407, para 68) . "68. (1) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 31-A into the Constitution with retrospective effect, and Section 3 of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which substituted a new clause (1), sub-clauses (a) to (e), for the original clause (1) with retrospective effect, do not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure and are valid and constitutional, being within the constituent power of the Parliament. (2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 introduced Article 31-B into the Constitution which reads thus : 31-B. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force. In Kesawananda Bharatis case decided on April 24, 1973 it was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure. We hold that all amendments to the Constitution which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are valid and constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24,1973 by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent constitutional amendments except to say that if any Act or Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a constitutional amendment made after April 24,1973 is saved by Article 31-A, or by Article 31-C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the 9th Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose. (3) Article 31-C of the Constitution, as it stood prior to its amendment by Section 4 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati. Article 31-C, as it stood prior to the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. (4) All the writ petitions and review petitions relating to the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling Acts are dismissed with costs. The stay orders granted in these matters will stand vacated. We quantify the costs at rupees twenty thousand which will be borne equally by the petitioners in writ petitions Nos. 656-660 of 1977; 512-533 of 1977 and 505 to 511 of 1977. The costs will be payable to the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra in equal measure." 25. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 (Supp) SCC 1, their Lordships in para-330 of the judgment held : "The majority in Bharatis case (supra) did not hold that Article 14 pertains to the structure of the Constitution. The majority upheld the validity of the first part of Article 31-C; this would show that a constitutional amendment which takes away or abridges the right to challenge the validity of an ordinary law for violating the fundamental right under that article would not destroy or damage the basic structure. The only logical basis for supporting the validity of Articles 31-A, 31-B and the first part of 31-C is that Article 14 is not a basic structure." 26. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that subsection (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 1 of 1974 whereby the words "or daughter of land owner" has been substituted by words "of a person" be declared ultra vires the Constitution on the basis of equality before law as well as gender discrimination cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Rajkumar Rajindra Singhs case (supra), the Full Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sucha Singhs case (supra), and the ratio of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ambika Prasad and Waman Raos case (supra). 27. 27. The learned Counsel for the petitioners urged that the impugned Act was not protected under Article 31-A of the Constitution in support of this submission reliance in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 723 and A.P. Krishnaswami Naidu v. State of Madras, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1515, was placed. The Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act (58 of 1961) was challenged by a writ petition in the Supreme Court in A.P. Krishnaswamis case (supra) on the ground that it violates Articles 14, 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution. The first attack was on Section 5 of the Act which lays down the ceiling area and the second was at Section 50 of the Act read with Schedule III thereof, which provides for compensation. The Supreme Court held that family in Section 3(14) has been given an artificial definition and the provision of Section 5(1) resulted in discrimination between persons equally circumstance and was thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The court also held that the provisions contained in Section 50 read with Schedule III of the Act with respect to compensation were discriminatory and Sections 5 and 50 were the pivotal provisions of the Act and the whole Act was struck down as unconstitutional. Similar view was taken by the Apex Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman s case (supra). 28. Again in L. Jagannath etc. v. The Authorised Officer, land Reforms Madurai and another etc., AIR 1972 Supreme Court 425, their Lordships while dealing with constitutional validity of Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) 58 of 1961) which Was the subject matter of A.P. Krishnaswami Naidus case (supra), have held that Article 31-B of the 9th Schedule have cured the defect, if any in the various Acts mentioned in the said Schedule as regards any unconstitutionally alleged on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights, and by the express words of Article 31-B such curing of the defect took place with retrospective operation from the dates on which the Acts were put on the statute book. These Acts even if void or inoperative at the time when they were enacted by reason of infringement of Article 13 (2) of the Constitution, assumed full force and vigour from the respective dates of their enactment after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule read with Article 31-B of the Constitution. These Acts even if void or inoperative at the time when they were enacted by reason of infringement of Article 13 (2) of the Constitution, assumed full force and vigour from the respective dates of their enactment after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule read with Article 31-B of the Constitution. The States cannot, at any time, cure any defect arising from the violation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and therefore the objection that the Madras Ceilings Act should have been re-enacted by the Madras Legislature after the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment came into force was meaningless. Further it was said that similar attack had been made not only to the above Madras Act but to several Acts of other States imposing ceilings on the holding of land and attempting to effect similar agrarian reforms. To shield these Acts against such attacks, Parliament passed the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act on the 20th June, 1964. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Act shows inasmuch as: Several State Acts relating to land reforms were struck down on the ground that the provisions of those Acts were violative of Articles 14,19 and 31 of the Constitution and that the protection of Article 31-A was not available to them." 29. In Ranjit Singh and others v. The State of Punjab and others, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 632, the provision of East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act (50 of 1948) (as amended by Act 27 of 1960), Sections 18 and 23-A of Punjab Gram Panchayat Act (4 of 1953), Section 19 of Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act (1 of 1954), the validity of such transfer and conferment of proprietary rights on non-proprietors in respect of lands in abadi deh was challenged in violation of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. The apex Court held that the transfer of Shamilat deh-owned by the proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purposes of management and the conferral of proprietary rights on non-proprietors in respect of lands in abadi deh is legal and the several provisions of law allowing this to be done are intra vires Article 31 of the Constitution of India and the law and the action taken are protected by Article 31-A as it stood before its amendment by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. The Court proceeded to hold that the decision in case K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080, was a special case and it cannot be applied to cases where the general scheme of legislation was definitely agrarian reform and under its provisions something ancillary thereto in the interests of rural economy, had to be undertaken to give full effect to the reforms. 30. In Seth Nand Lal and another v. State of Haryana and others, 1980 (Supp.) Supreme Court Cases 574, the validity of Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Haryana Act 26 of 1972 was challenged on the touch stone of Article 14 and Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. Their Lordship held that the impugned Act together with all the amendments made therein, which essentially was meant for imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings and acquisition and distribution of the surplus area to landless and weaker sections of the society, was in substance and reality an enactment dealing with agrarian reform and squarely would fall within Article 31-A of the Constitution and as such will enjoy the immunity from challenge on ground of violation of fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31. 31. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of 1976) was challenged before the Supreme Court in Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 Supreme Court Cases 166. It was held that the entire Act was valid save and except Section 27(1) insofar as it imposed a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or of a portion of such building, which was within the ceiling area. But it was further held that the Act was intended to and by its scheme, in fact implement or achieve the purpose of clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. The vice from which a few provisions of the Act may be shown to suffer will not justify a contrary conclusion. Honble Justice Mr. Krishna Iyer, as his Lordship then was) recorded finding that the act was obviously a measure for inhibiting concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons and for equitable distribution of such land to subserve the common good and Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution were directly attracted. Honble Justice Mr. Krishna Iyer, as his Lordship then was) recorded finding that the act was obviously a measure for inhibiting concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons and for equitable distribution of such land to subserve the common good and Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution were directly attracted. It was further said that "family" as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act accorded that the concurrent life style in urban condition was neither artificial nor arbitrary and nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In view of this judgment, the contention of Mr. Rajiv Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioners that the definition of "family" in the impugned Act was artificial as such in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be accepted. In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and another, (1983) 1 Supreme Court Cases 147, constitutional validity of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 (36 of 1972) was challenged before the Supreme Court in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the impugned Act was a legislation for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Article 39(b) of the Constitution and was therefore, immune, under Article 31-C, from attack on the ground that it offended the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14. 32. The ratio of the judgments in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 and Kesavananda Bharatis case were also considered while holding the constitutional validity of Act No. 36 of 1972. In Gopal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, (1988) 2 Supreme Court Cases 532, the vires of Section 3(7) of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 whereby major daughter of tenure-holder was excluded from the definition of "family" was held to be not in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was further held that Section 5(6) of the Act was protected under Article 31-B and the Act having been included in the 9th Schedule not open to challenge on ground of being violative of second proviso to Article 31-A (1) of the Constitution. It was further held that Section 5(6) of the Act was protected under Article 31-B and the Act having been included in the 9th Schedule not open to challenge on ground of being violative of second proviso to Article 31-A (1) of the Constitution. While deciding the case of Gopal Singhs case (supra), their Lordships followed the ratio of the decisions in the case of Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. and others, (1980) 3 Supreme Court Cases 719; AIR 1980 SC 1672. In I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of T.N., (1999) 7 Supreme Court Cases 580, The Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 (the Janam Act), insofar as it vested forest lands in the Janmam Estates in the State of Tamil Nadu was struck down by the Supreme Court in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of T.N., (1972) 2 SCC 133, because this was not found to be a measure of agrarian reform protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. Section 2(c) of the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act, 1979 was struck down by the Calcutta High Court as being arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional and the special leave petition filed against the judgment by the State of West Bengal was dismissed. By the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, the Janmam Act, in its entirety, was inserted in the Ninth Schedule. By the Constitution (Sixty-sixth Amendment) Act, the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act, 1979, in its entirety, was inserted in the Ninth Schedule. These insertions were the subject-matter of challenge by way of appeals and writ petitions in the Supreme Court on the ground that these Acts, inclusive of the portions thereof which had been struck down, could not have been validly inserted in the Ninth Schedule. Their Lordships considering the ratio of the judgments in Waman Rao v. Union of India (supra) Bhim Singhji v. Union of India and others (supra) Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (supra) and Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of Indias case (supra) referred the writ petitions and appeals for decision of the larger Bench preferably by nine learned Judges. The learned Counsel for the parties had brought to our notice that the matter is still pending for decision by the apex Court. 33. The learned Counsel for the parties had brought to our notice that the matter is still pending for decision by the apex Court. 33. The judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Waman Rao and others v. Union of India and others, (1981) 2 Supreme Court Cases 362, dealt with Article 31-B. It referred to the case of Kesavananda Bharati decided on 24.4.1973 wherein it was held by the majority that the Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure. The judgment in Waman Raos case was that all amendments to the Constitution which were made before 24.4.1973 by which the 9th Schedule was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations thereon were valid and constitutional. The Principal Act as amended by Act No. l of 1974 in the present case has been included at item No. 73 of the 9th Schedule by the Constitution (34th Amendment) Act, 1974 and the case of Rajkumar Rajinder Singh v. Union of India (surpa) was decided on 23.6.1976 after the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati case. 34. The contention of Mr. Rajiv Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioners that since the judgment of Kesavananda Bharatis case was not brought to the notice of the Full Bench in Raj Kumar Rajinder Singhs case nor it was considered by the Bench, hence, the present writ petitions shall be referred to the larger Bench for reconsideration of the earlier judgment of the Full Bench of this Court cannot be accepted in view of the various judgments of the Apex Court referred to and considered hereinabove. The principal Act and the subsequent amendment thereto by Act No. 1 of 1974 is an Act of agrarian reforms having protection of Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the Constitution of India. The principal Act and the subsequent amendment thereto by Act No. 1 of 1974 is an Act of agrarian reforms having protection of Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the Constitution of India. By Section 2 of the Principal Act it is declared that this Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principle specified in Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India and thus has the protective umbrella of Article 31-C. The Principal Act and the amendment thereto by Act No. 1 of 1974 has been added at entry No. 73 in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution, thus having protective umbrella of Article 31-B. The purpose of enactment of the Principal Act with all amendments is to consolidate and amend the laws relating to Ceiling on Land Holdings in the State of Himachal Pradesh and it is not only to prescribe the extent of permissible area by a land owner but also to utilize the surplus land amongst the landless persons. The provisions of Section 3(e), (m), (q), (r) and Sections 4 and 8 of the Principal Act read together with all amendments upto date prescribe the method of calculation to the extent of permissible area to be retained by the land owner alone and the said provisions do not take away any right or status of an adult son or daughter much less a right in any property. The right of selection of a separate unit is conferred upon the land owner alone and not upon the son, minor children or daughter prior to the amendment of the Principal Act by Act No. 1 of 1974. In this view of the matter, the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 1 of 1974 as well as its inclusion in entry No. 73 of the 9th Schedule by the Constitution (34th Amendment) Act, 1974 cannot be held in violation of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Principal Act amended by Act No. 1 of 1974 in our view in no way confronts with women rights undertaking and commitments of the Government for implementation of international treaties, conventions and covenants nor it is contrary to declaration made in CEDAW and BEIJING conventions. The Principal Act amended by Act No. 1 of 1974 in our view in no way confronts with women rights undertaking and commitments of the Government for implementation of international treaties, conventions and covenants nor it is contrary to declaration made in CEDAW and BEIJING conventions. The International Laws, Covenants and Treaties are to be taken into consideration only in the absence of any domestic legislation, therefore, the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 1 of 1974 excluding the "daughter" from the definition of "separate unit" and the insertion of the words "any person" thereto cannot be held in violation of Articles 51 and 51 (a), (e) and (f) of the Constitution of India. 35. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Property Owners Association and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2001) 4 Supreme Court 455, to contend that the judgment of Supreme Court in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing and another, (1983) 1 SCC 147, cannot be relied upon by this Court as the view expressed in the said case on the interpretation of Article 39 (b) of the Constitution has been referred to a larger Bench in the case of Property Owners Association. As it stood today, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sanjeev Cokes case, Ambika Prasads case and Ranjeet Singhs case is binding upon this Court and we are deciding the present writ petition on the basis of law settled by the Apex Court in those cases. Mr. Rajiv Sharma, learned Counsel contended that under Articles 141 and 145(3) of the Constitution of India the judgment of larger Bench or the Constitutional Bench is binding on the smaller bench and, therefore this Court should not place any reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court which are referred to the larger Bench by the Supreme Court, in our humble view cannot be accepted by us for the reasons that as of today the decisions of the Supreme Court irrespective of the constitution of the larger bench is binding on this Court unless the final decision is taken by the Supreme Court in those cases. 36. Mr. 36. Mr. Rajiv Sharma, learned Counsel lastly contended that the impugned Act is not inconformity with human rights, women rights undertaking and commitments of the State Government for implementation of international treaties, conventions and covenants as well as contrary to declaration made in CEDAW and BEIJING conventions. In support of this submission reliance was placed on Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 Supreme Court Cases 759. In that case their Lordships dealt with sexual harassment of working women at the work place based upon constitution protection under Articles 16(2), 14, 21, 42, 51 and 51-A (e) and (f). It was observed that sexual harassment of working women at the working places is a form of sex discrimination projected through unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favours or such other verbal or physical conduct and rejection/submission of which affects her employment or work performance or has the effect of creating an intimidating or hostile environment for working women. Such incidents violate their fundamental rights to gender equality and right to life and liberty. Further, it is observed that India obliged under international conventions to gender-sensitise its laws and courts in India obliged to respect such international conventions and norms and ILO Seminar at Manila (1993)— convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)—Beijing Declaration on Women International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 37. In C. Masilamani Mudaliar and others v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil and others, (1996) 8 Supreme Court Cases 525, their Lordships while considering the rights of women under Articles 15(3), 14, 21, 51-A (h) and (j) and 13 of the Constitution of India and also the proviso of Sections 14(1) and (2) and 30 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as also the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. Sections 2(b) and 12-Devel-opment of the Right to Development (Declaration as adopted by General Assembly of UNO on 18.12.1979 and by Government of India on 19.6.1993 and acceded to on 8.8.1993), Articles 1, 2 (b), 3, 13, 14, 15(2) have held in paras 15, 18, 20, 21 and 23 as under : "After the Constitution came into force, the right to equality and dignity of person enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution, Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles which are a trinity intended to remove discrimination or disability on grounds only of social status or gender, removed the pre-existing impediments that stood in the way of female or weaker segments of the society. The Preamble is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Handicaps should be removed only under rule of law to enliven the trinity of justice, equality and liberty with dignity of person. The basic structure permeates equality of status and opportunity. The personal laws conferring inferior status in women is anathema to equality. Personal laws are derived not from the Constitution but from the religious scriptures. The laws thus derived must be consistent with the Constitution lest they become void under Article 13 if they violate fundamental rights. Right to equality is a fundamental right. Parliament, therefore, has enacted Section 14 to remove pre-existing disabilities fastened on the Hindu female limiting her right to property without full ownership thereof. The discrimination is sought to be remedied by Section 14(1) enlarging the scope of acquisition of the property by a Hindu female appending an explanation with it." 38. Article 21 of the Constitution of India reinforces "right to life". Equality, dignity of person and ight to development are inherent rights in every human being. Life in its expanded horizon includes all that give meaning to a persons life including culture, heritage and tradition with dignity of person. The fulfillment of that heritage in full measure would encompass the right to life. For its meaningfulness and purpose every woman is entitled to elimination of obstacles and discrimination based on gender for human development. Women are entitled to enjoy economic, social, cultural and political rights without discrimination and on a footing of equality. The fulfillment of that heritage in full measure would encompass the right to life. For its meaningfulness and purpose every woman is entitled to elimination of obstacles and discrimination based on gender for human development. Women are entitled to enjoy economic, social, cultural and political rights without discrimination and on a footing of equality. Equally in order to effectuate fundamental duty to develop scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of enquiry and to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activities as enjoined in Articles 51-A(b) and (j) of the Constitution of India, facilities and opportunities not only are to be provided for, but also all forms of gender-based discrimination should be eliminated. It is a mandate to the State to do these acts. Property is one of the important endowments or natural assets to accord opportunity, source to develop personality, to be independent, right to equal status and dignity of person. Therefore, the State should create conditions and facilities conducive for women to realize the right to economic development including social and cultural rights. Human rights are derived from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person. Human rights and fundamental freedom have been reiterated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and have mutual reinforcement. The human rights for women, including girl child are, therefore, inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full development of personality and fundamental freedoms and equal participation by women in political, social economic and cultural life are concomitants for national development, social and family stability and growth, culturally, socially and economically. All forms of discrimination on grounds of gender is violative of fundamental freedoms and human rights. By virtue of the Protection of Human Rights Act the principles embodied in CEDAW and the concomitant right to development became integral parts of the Indian Constitution and the Human Rights Act and became enforceable. Article 5(a) of CEDAW to which the Government of India expressed reservation, does not stand in its way and in fact Article 2(f) denudes its effect and enjoins to implement Article 2(f) read with its obligation undertaken under Articles 3, 14 and 15 of the Convention vis-a-vis Articles 1, 3, 6 and 8 of the Convention of Right to Development. Article 5(a) of CEDAW to which the Government of India expressed reservation, does not stand in its way and in fact Article 2(f) denudes its effect and enjoins to implement Article 2(f) read with its obligation undertaken under Articles 3, 14 and 15 of the Convention vis-a-vis Articles 1, 3, 6 and 8 of the Convention of Right to Development. The directive principles and fundamental rights, though provided the matrix for development of human personality and elimination of discrimination, these conventions add urgency and teeth for immediate implementation. It is, therefore, imperative of the State to eliminate obstacles, prohibit all gender-based discriminations as mandated by Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. By operation of Article 2(f) and other related articles of CEDAW, the State should take all appropriate measures including legislation to modify or abolish gender-based discrimination in the existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women. Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India positively protects such Acts or actions. Covenants of the United Nation add impetus and urgency to eliminate gender-based obstacles and discrimination. Legislative action should be devised suitably to constellate economic empowerment of women in socio-economic restructure for establishing egalitrarian social order. Law is an instrument of social change as well as the defender for social change. Article 2(e) of CEDAW enjoins the Supreme Court to breathe life into the dry bones of the Constitution, international conventions and the Protection of Human Rights Act and the Hindu Succession Act to prevent gender-based discrimination and to effectuate right to life including empowerment of economic social and cultural rights to women." Further it was held that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be construed harmoniously consistent with the constitutional goal of removing gender-based discrimination and effectuating economic empowerment of Hindu females." 39. In Githa Hariharan (Ms.) and another v. Reserve Bank of India and another, (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 228, Constitutionality of Section 6(a) of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (for short HMG Act) was challenged on the touch stone of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution inasmuch as the mother of a minor is relegated to an inferior position on ground of sex alone and since her right as a natural guardian is made cognizable after the father in the said provision. Their Lordships have held that the definition of Guardian in Section 4(b) and natural guardian in Section 4(c) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act do not make any discrimination against the mother and she being one of the guardians mentioned in Section 6 would undoubtedly be a natural guardian as defined in Section 4(c). The expression "the father and after him, the mother" in Section 6(a) does give an impression that the mother can be considered to be the natural guardian of the minor only after the lifetime of the father. But it is not disputed and otherwise well settled also that the welfare of the minor in the widest sense is the paramount consideration and even during the lifetime of the father, if necessary he can be replaced by the mother or any other suitable person by an order of the court, where to do so would be in the interest of the welfare of the minor. Question however arises when the mother acts as the guardian of the minor during the lifetime of the father, without the matter going to the court, and the validity of such an action is questioned on the ground that she is not the legal guardian of the minor in view of Section 6(a). It is then maintained that she could function as a guardian only after the lifetime of the father and not during his lifetime despite his concurrence. However such an interpretation violates gender equality, one of the basic principles of our Constitution. It is further observed that where two interpretations are possible the Court will lean in favour of constitutionality of the provision since legislature is presumed to have acted in accordance with the Constitution. Further it is observed that now Section 6(a) is capable of such construction as would retain it within the constitutional limits. The word "after" need not necessarily mean "after the lifetime". In the context in which it appears in Section 6(a), it means "in the absence of", the word "absence" therein referring to the fathers absence from the care of the minors property or person for any reason whatever. The word "after" need not necessarily mean "after the lifetime". In the context in which it appears in Section 6(a), it means "in the absence of", the word "absence" therein referring to the fathers absence from the care of the minors property or person for any reason whatever. If the father is wholly indifferent to the matters of the minor even if he is living with the mother or if by virtue of mutual understanding between the father and the mother, the latter is put exclusively in charge of the minor, or if the father is physically unable to take care of the minor either because of his staying away from the place where the mother and the minor are living or because of his physical or mental incapacity, in all such like situations, the father can be considered to be absent and the mother being a recognized natural guardian, can act validly on behalf of the minor as the guardian. Such an interpretation will be the natural outcome of a harmonious construction of Section 4 and Section 6 of the HMG Act, without causing any violence to the language of Section 6(a). Moreover the above interpretation gives effect to the principles contained in CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration which directs all State parties to take appropriate measures to prevent discrimination of all forms against women. The domestic courts are under an obligation to give due regard to international conventions and norms for construing domestic laws when there is no inconsistency between them. In this view of the matter, the apex Court found no inconsistency between the impugned Act and international conventions and norms in CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration and other women rights and commitments relatable to Arts. 51 and 51 (A), (e) and (f) of the Constitution of India. 40. What follows from the above discussions is that we do not find any constitutional infirmity or invalidity in the provisions under challenge before us. There is no ground to declare the Act which has been upheld in Rajkumar Rajinder Singhs (supra) by the Full Bench of this Court as unconstitutional now after about 26 years and to unsettle all the settled transactions. There is no ground to declare the Act which has been upheld in Rajkumar Rajinder Singhs (supra) by the Full Bench of this Court as unconstitutional now after about 26 years and to unsettle all the settled transactions. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 1 of 1974 must be read as obliging the land owner to retain one unit to himself and one unit to his adult son and the exclusion of an adult daughter from allotting one separate unit to her by the land owner under sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 1 of 1974, in our view, cannot be held discriminatory on the basis of gender or equality to status or opportunity nor the provision violates the equal rights of the women enshrined in the Constitution or provided in any other laws. The contentions raised by the learned Counsel fox the petitioners that sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Principal Act as amended by Act No. 1 of 1974 is ultra vires to the Constitution of India on the ground stated herein-in-above are not sustainable and tenable. 41. No other point was urged before us by the learned Counsel for the parties. 42. For the above-said reasons, these writ petitions being devoid of merit are dismissed. However, there Will be no order as to costs. Stay order dated 21.3.2002 recorded in CMP No; 392 of 2002 and modified by order dated 21.5.2002 in CMP No. 852 of 2002 in CWP No. 381 of 2002 shall stand vacated. Any other miscellaneous applications pending for disposal shall also stand disposed of. 43. Before parting with the judgment, we make it clear that we have decided both the writ petitions mainly on constitutional validity and legality of the provisions of Act in question and any observation made in this judgment shall not be construed an expression of opinion upon the rights and entitlement of late Ms. Anuradha Kumari over and in the lands given to her by the Collector, Rampur Bushahr by order dated 7.10.1994 which is the subject matter of Revision Petition No. 165 of 2001 titled Shri Virbhadra Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Revision Petition No. 166 of 2001 titled State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shri Virbhadra Singh, pending before respondent No. 3. The Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Appeals) which shall be decided by the said authority on its own merits in accordance with law. We do not express any opinion on the rights and entitlement of the petitioner Ms. Meenakshi Kumari over and in the lands bequeathed in her favour by late Ms. Anuradha Kumari by instrument of registered Will as there was no such issue directly involved in her writ petition for our consideration and decision. Writ petition dismissed.