JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—This application is filed by the applicant-accused on December 11, 2000 under Section 311 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") for production of additional evidence and examination of witnesses. 2. The petitioner-applicant was the original accused in Sessions Case No. 61-N/7 of 1995. The allegation against him was that he had committed rape on Nasreen, aged about 19 years. It was also the case of the prosecution that since Nasreen was raped, she consumed poison and committed suicide. Accordingly, the petitioner was asked to face trial for offences punishable under Section 376 read with Section 306 of Indian Penal Code. 3. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmur District Nahan held that the prosecution was successful in proving the charge against the accused for committing an offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. It, however, could not prove that the accused had committed an offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, the petitioner-accused was acquitted under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code but was convicted under Section 376 and was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. In default of payment of fine, accused was ordered to further undergo imprisonment for a period of two months. 4. The said order of conviction was challenged by the petitioner-accused. 5. The appeal was admitted on July 7, 1997. He was also ordered to be released on bail on July 30, 1997 on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs, 5,000 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Sessions Judge. Since then, this appeal is pending and the applicant-accused is on bail. 6. On July 27, 2000, the appeal was called out for hearing. Ms. Rama Mehta, Advocate was appearing on behalf of the applicant-accused. A statement was made by her that the appellant had taken away papers and she would not be appearing in the matter. The accused was also not present. Bailable warrant was, therefore, issued against him in the sum of Rs. 5,000 by making it returnable on August 18, 2000. On the returnable date, i.e. August 18, 2000, Mr. A statement was made by her that the appellant had taken away papers and she would not be appearing in the matter. The accused was also not present. Bailable warrant was, therefore, issued against him in the sum of Rs. 5,000 by making it returnable on August 18, 2000. On the returnable date, i.e. August 18, 2000, Mr. Ramakant Sharma, Advocate, appeared and made a statement that he would be filing his power of attorney on behalf of the accused. He, therefore, prayed for time. Time of four weeks was granted. On September 28, 2000 again, time was sought by the learned Counsel for the accused, which was granted. On November 17, 2000, when the matter was called out for hearing, the learned Counsel for the accused stated that an application under Section 311 of the Code has been filed. The Registry was therefore, directed to place the matter alongwith the application on Board. 7. In the application, it has been stated by the learned Counsel for the accused that some of the witnesses, who ought to have been examined by the prosecution, were not examined, and, therefore, it is in the interest of justice to grant the application and permit the accused to examine them as defence witnesses. It was also stated that on the dying declaration of Kumari Nasreen, thumb impression was obtained. The accused has come to know that Nasreen was educated and hence no thumb impression could have been taken on the so-called dying declaration. It was also stated that it was doubtful whether Nasreen was in a fit state of mind in making statement when her so-called dying declaration was recorded. A prayer was, therefore, made to exercise power under Section 311 of the Code by granting the application. 8. The application was opposed by the learned Assistant Advocate General. He contended that the application is mis-conceived and has been filed only with a view to delay disposal of the appeal so that the accused who had been released on bail, may continue to remain out of Jail. But, even otherwise, according to him, the application does not deserve any merit and on that ground, it is liable to be dismissed. There is nothing on record so far as this Court is concerned, whether the victim was educated. But, even otherwise, according to him, the application does not deserve any merit and on that ground, it is liable to be dismissed. There is nothing on record so far as this Court is concerned, whether the victim was educated. Moreover, there is no provision which prohibits taking of thumb impression by the prosecuting agency on dying declaration. Thus, there is nothing to show that the action was contrary to law. Whether or not, she was in a fit state of mind to make any statement and whether or not dying declaration could be relied upon, are questions which can be decided at the time of hearing of the appeal and it has nothing to do with the miscellaneous application filed under Section 311 read with Section 482 of the Code. Regarding examination of the witnesses, it was submitted that on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial Court decided the matter and this court after appreciating the evidence, will dispose of the appeal. It was also submitted that the defence could have examined witnesses if the accused was of the opinion that such examination was necessary for the purpose of his defence. In fact, at one time, the accused had also approached this court by filing Criminal Revision Petition No. 98 of 1996, and even at that stage, no such prayer was made for examination of witnesses. It was, therefore, submitted that the petition deserves to be rejected. 9. In my opinion, there is no substance in the application filed by the applicant and it is liable to be dismissed. So far as dying declaration is concerned, the learned trial Court has applied its mind and has recorded a finding. The matter is very much before this Court and the Court will exercise its power and will pass an appropriate order. Prima facie, the learned Assistant Advocate General is right in submitting that it is with a view to prolong the matter that such an application is made. He is right in submitting that even at an earlier occasion, the applicant-accused had approached this Court by filing Criminal Revision No. 98 of 1996. But no such prayer was made at that time. He is right in submitting that even at an earlier occasion, the applicant-accused had approached this Court by filing Criminal Revision No. 98 of 1996. But no such prayer was made at that time. Moreover, in a serious case of rape, even after conviction, he has been enlarged on bail and though the appeal was filed in July, 1977, the present application has been filed as late as on December 14, 2000. Thus, after three years, and that too, when the matter had already been placed for final hearing and some adjournments were sought on behalf of the accused, this application has been filed which deserves to be dismissed. 10. For the foregoing reasons, in my opinion, the present petition deserves to be dismissed and the same dismissed. Criminal Appeal No. 259 of 1997 Let the main appeal come on Board after two weeks. Petition dismissed.