PRASADA RAO, J. ( 1 ) FIRST defendant is the appellant in both these appeals. Both these appeals are filed by the 1st defendant against the common Judgment and decree dated 5. 2. 1988 passed by the Court of the Principal district Judge, Hassan, in RANos. 15/1994 and 16/1994 setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Court of Civil Judge, arasikere, in O. S. No. 54/1987 dated 24. 9. 1988 and granting a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff for partition and separate possession of her 1/4th share in the suit schedule properties and for recovery of possession of the said 1/4th share and also for allotment of 1/8th share in favour of the 2nd defendant. RS. A. No. 404/ 1998 is filed against the judgment and decree passed in R,a. No. 16/ 1994 challenging the allotment of 1/8th share granted in favour of the 2nd defendant by the impugned judgment. R. S. A. No. 441/1998 is filed against the judgment and decree passed in R. A. No. 15/1994 challenging the preliminary decree for partition passed in favour of the plaintiff for 1/4th share in the suit schedule property and for recovery of possession of the said share. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-Gowramma, who is the 1st respondent in R. S. 4no. 441/1998 and 5th respondent in R. S. A. No. 440/1998 filed o. S. No. 54/1987, on the file of the Court of Civil Judge, Arasikere, seeking for relief of partition of the plaint schedule properties for recovery of possession of her 1/4th share in the suit properties alleging that her father late Shivananjappa, who was also the father of her sister - defendant No. 5 Basamma and father of defendants 1 to 4 late Eerappa, who were brothers and sons of late Rudraiah and were members of the joint family late Rudraiah was a native of heggatte village owning agricultural land. Later he disposed of all those agricultural lands and shifted to Jeekahanahalli village and purchased 6 acres of land situated in Sy. Later he disposed of all those agricultural lands and shifted to Jeekahanahalli village and purchased 6 acres of land situated in Sy. No. 77 in that village with the sale proceeds realised by the sale of his lands in Heggatte late rudraiah and his sons late Eerappa and late Shivananjappa were members of the joint family and after the death of Rudraiah in the year 1990 late Eerappa became the Manager of the Joint "family and he was managing the affairs of the joint family. The suit schedule properties are the ancestral joint family properties and also properties acquired by the aid of the nucleus of the ancestral properties. Apart from agriculture, the members of the joint family did net possess any income during the year 1968. Shivananjappa died leaving behind him, the plaintiff and defendant No. 5 as his daughters and legal heirs. During the year 1980, Eerappa died leaving behind defendants 1 to 4 as his legal heirs. Defendant No. 1 is the first son of late eerappa and defendants-2 to 4 are his daughters by his second wife. Thus, plaintiff and defendants 1 to 5 are in joint possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule joint family properties and defendant No. 1 is Managing the joint family properties by the date of filing the suit. Since the 1st defendant refused to give the 1/4th share in the plaint schedule properties, plaintiff filed the suit ( 3 ) DEFENDANT No. 2 filed the written statement admitting all theplaint averments and seeking for partition and separate possession of her 1/8th share in the suit schedule properties. Defendants-1, 3 and 4 have filed a common written statement admitting the relationship between the parties and contending that late Eerappa and late Shivananjappa were not members of the joint family Late shivananjappa was living separately from Eerappa and he was carrying on the business of Coconut and Copra, They denied that the plaintiff's father Shivananjappa had any interest in the joint family property. They further contended that the plaintiff after marriage during the year 1953, has been residing in her husband's house and she is not a member of the joint family of defendants-1, 3 and 4. Defendants-1, 3 and 4 have enjoyed the suit schedule properties exclusively to the knowledge of the plaintiff for over a period of 20 years prior to the date of filing the suit. Defendants-1, 3 and 4 have enjoyed the suit schedule properties exclusively to the knowledge of the plaintiff for over a period of 20 years prior to the date of filing the suit. Thus, the plaintiff has been ousted from the enjoyment of the suit schedule, properties for a period of 20 years prior to the institution of the suit. Thus, the suit of the plaintiff is barred by time and the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the suit schedule property. They denied that the suit schedule properties are the ancestral joint family properties and that they were acquired with the aid of the nucleus of the joint family properties. They have stated that late Eerappa died during the year 1978. Defendants-1, 3 and 4, therefore prayed for dismissal of the suit. ( 4 ) AFTER defendant filed her written statement, 1st defendant filedan additional written statement contending that defendant No. 2 has no right, title or interest in the suit schedule properties. Defendant no. 1 has been in exclusive possession of the suit schedule properties and defendant No. 2 has been ousted from the enjoyment of the suit schedule properties for about 20 years prior to the date of filing of the suit. So, her claim is also barred by limitation. He further contended, that after the death of his father, a panchayat was held in the presence of defendants-2 to 4 and in that panchayat defendants-2 to 4 relinquished their rights by taking the gold jewels, belonging to the family to their shares. She, therefore, contended that defendant No. 2 is not entitled to any share in the suit schedule properties. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the above pleadings between the parties, thetrial Court framed the issues and on appreciation of the evidence adduced by both parties, the trial Court recorded its finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the plaint schedule properties are the joint and ancestral family properties belonging to all of them and that her father Shivananjappa and late Eerappa were members of the joint family. The trial Court, therefore, held that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the suit schedule properties. The trial Court, therefore, held that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the suit schedule properties. However, the trial Court held that defendant No. 2 is entitled to 1/4th share in the suit schedule properties which exclusively belonged to defendants-1 to 4 and granted a decree for recovery of 1/4th share in the suit schedule properties in favour of the 2nd defendant, while dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff challenged the said judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by filing the Regular Appeal -R. A. 15/1994 and defendant No. 1 challenged the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, in so far as it relates to the decree granted in favour of 2nd defendant for recovery of her 1/4th share in the suit schedule property by filing R. A. No. 16/1994, on the file of the Court of the Principal District Judge, Hassan. ( 6 ) THE first appellate Court, on reappreciation of the evidence adduced by both parties, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has established her case that the plaint schedule properties are the ancestral joint family properties belonging to all the parties to the suit and that she is entitled to 1/4th share in the said properties. The first appellate Court further found that 2nd defendant is entitled to 1/8th share in the suit schedule properties and allowed the Appeal r. A. No. 15/94 filed by the plaintiff and partly allowed the Appeal No. 1 r. A. 16/94 filed by the 1st defendant and granted a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of her 174th share in the suit schedule properties and modified the judgment and decree of the trial Court by granting 1/8th share in the plaint schedule properties in favour of the 2nd defendant. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the 1st-Appellate Court, defendant No. 1 filed these two appeals. ( 7 ) AT the time of admission of these appeals, the following substantial questions of law have been formulated on 7-8. 1998:- in R. S. A. No. 441/1998: "1) Whether in law is it permissibie for the lower appellate court to come to the conclusion that the suit schedule properties comprising 17 items are ancestral properties, only on the basis of an entry in the revenue records in respect of one item as ancestral ? 1998:- in R. S. A. No. 441/1998: "1) Whether in law is it permissibie for the lower appellate court to come to the conclusion that the suit schedule properties comprising 17 items are ancestral properties, only on the basis of an entry in the revenue records in respect of one item as ancestral ? 2) Whether in the absence of a plea or evidence or finding as to the sufficiency or adequacy of the joint family nucleus for the acquisition of other properties, a presumption could be drawn to the effect that all other properties even if standing in the names of the individual coparceners are HUF properties having been acquired from nucleus of the HUF property merely because no other source of income has been shown out of which they could have been acquired? 3) Whether an application for amendment of the written statement can be refused on the ground that such a plea could have been raised in the trial Court, or that it is contrary to the findings of fact of the appellate Court ? 4} Whether Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act bars a female heir from suing for partition of a dwelling house where it is occupied by a single male member of the coparcenary ? in R. S. A. No. 440/1998 even assuming that all its findings were proper, whether the appellate Court was correct in law in awarding 1/8th share to the 2nd defendant when the interest of her father in the coparcenary itself was 1/4th in view of the fact that his son, the 1st defendant was also a co-parcener? ( 8 ) I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel appearing on both sides. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/1 st defendant has vehemently contended that there is no evidence on record to prove that the grand father of the parties late Rudraiah had any ancestral properties and that he purchased 6 acres of land bearing sy. No. 77 in Jeekanahalli vi (lage, which is item No. 6 of the plaint schedule properties after he shifted to that village, with the sale proceeds of the lands, disposed of by him in Heggatte village, ft is further contended that the plaintiff has not produced the documents of title in respect of the above said land to prove that it was acquired by late Rudraiah. Alternatively, he contended that even if it were to be held that the said 6 acres of land belonged to Rudraiah, there is no other evidence to show that the said land was acquired by disposing of the ancestral properties belonging to Rudraiah of heggatte Village and that in the absence of the said evidence, it must be presumed that the said 6 acres of land in Sy. No. 77 of jeekanahalli village is the self-acquired property of late Rudraiah and that after his death his 2 sons Shivananjappa, the father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 5 and Eerappa father of defendants 1 to 4 inherited the said land as tenants in common or as co-heirs, but not as joint tenants with a right of survivorship and therefore the said property would not constitute joint family property in their hands or in the hands of plaintiff and defendant No. 5, on one hand, and defendants-1 to 4, on the other. He further contended that even assuming that Eerappa father of the 1st defendant purchased several other properties from out of the income of the said 6 acres offend, those properties acquired, would not be impressed with the character of joint family properties. It is also his alternative contention that even assuming that the first appellate Court was correct in law in coming to the conclusion that the property owned by Rudraiah which devolved upon Eerappa and Shivananappa constituted joint family properties in their hands in the absence of evidence that the said property yielded sufficient income with which the other properties would not have been acquired the first appellate Court erred in drawing a presumption that all other properties purchased by the 1st defendant impressed with the character of joint family prpperties. According to him, there is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that there was sufficient nucleus from the sole joint family of dry land of 6 acres, with which the other properties could have been purchased from time to time. According to him, there is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that there was sufficient nucleus from the sole joint family of dry land of 6 acres, with which the other properties could have been purchased from time to time. It is also his alternative contention that at least from the date of death of Shivananjappa, the father of defendants-1 to 4, who died in the year 1968, the share of the plaintiff to which she is entitled as legal heir or her father Shivananjappa gets crystallized by virtue of notional partition under the provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and so the subsequent acquisitions of properties - items 4, 9, 11 and 12 of the plaint A schedule by the father of 1st defendant - Eerappa, cannot be impressed with the character of joint family properties liable lor partition amongst the plaintiff and defendants. It is finally contended by him that the plaintiff and 2nd defendant have been residing separately after their respective marriages with their respective husband and they were not in joint possession and enjoyment bf the plaint schedule properties and 1st defendant perfected his rights by adverse possession i. e. , by ouster of plaintiff and defendart No. 2 in respect of their share of the joint family properties. It is also pointed out by him that the first Appellate Court erred in holding that 2nd defendant is entitled to 1/8th share though she is entitled to only 1/16th share in the items of properties referred by the 1st appellate court. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the Contesting respondents-1, 3, 4 and 5 argued that in the absence of any evidence relating to separate earnings or income of deceased Eerappa and his son first defendant, the first appellate Court was justified in drawing a presumption that all the other items of properties which were acquired from time to time were purchased from out of the income of the ancestral land of 6 acres (Item No. 6) belonging to rudraiah. it is further submitted by him that in the absence of a specific plead,ng by the 1st defendant in his written statement, he cannot be permitted to contend that item No. 6 of the plaint a schedule was not the ancestral land belonging to Rudraiah and that it was his self-acquired property and that after his death, it was inherited by his 2 sons Shivananjappa and Eerappa as tenants in common. He further contended that till plaintiff made a demand for partition and separate possession of her share by filing the present suit, it must be taken that she continued as member of the joint family along with all defendants and that all the properties acquired till the date of. filing the suit, either by 1st defendant or by his father, who was managing the affairs of the joint family, must be treated as the joint family properties liable for partition amongst the parties. He further contended that this Court is not entitled to interfere with the findings recorded by the first appellate Court by going into the question as to the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence to support the said findings. He, therefore, contended that the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that all the other items of plaint schedule properties 1 to 5, 7 to 9a and items Nos. 10 to 17 were acquired from out of the nucleus of the ancestral land item No. 6 of plaint A schedule, is a finding on a question of fact based on appreciation of the evidence placed on record and the said finding cannot be interfered with by this Count. He also contended that for the same reason the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that the 1st defendant has not perfected his rights by adverse possession in respect of the share of the plaintiff in plaint schedule properties and that there is no ouster of the plaintiff from possession and enjoyment of the said properties for more than 12 years prior to the date of filing the suit, is also a finding recorded on question of fact and the same cannot be interfered with in the present appeal. He finally contended that the first appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiff is entitled to claim her share in the house properties in the present suit for partition and that there is no bar to seek for partition of a dwelling house under the provisions of Section 23 of the Hindu succession Act, 1956 as defendant No. 1 is not a Class-1 heir of late Shivananjappa. ( 10 ) POINTS 1 to 3 in R. S. A. No. 441/1998 in order to appreciate the rival contentions urged by the learned counsel appearing on both sides, I shall now proceed to consider the evidence placed on record and the law applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 11 ) IN the plaint, there is a specific pleading in Para-6 that all the plaint schedule properties are the ancestral property as well as the properties acquired from out of the nucleus of the ancestral properties and that except the income from the agriculture, the members of the joint family have no other source of income or earnings. In support of this pleading, the plaintiff has adduced evidence to the effect that the original propositus Rudraiah, who was the grand father of herself and all the defendants had the ancestral land in Heggatte village and by disposing of the said properties, he purchased 6 acres of land situated in Sy. No. 77 of jeekanahalli village after he shifted to the said village and from. out of the income of the said ancestral land, the other plaint schedufe properties were acquired during his life time and after his death the joint family properties were being managed by Eerappa, fattier of the 1st defendant who was the eldest son of Rudraiah. It is in the evidence of the plaintiff, that her grand-father Rudraiah had ancestral land in Heggatte village and after disposing of those properties, he shifted to Jeekanahally village to settle-down permanently in that village and thereafter he purchased some of the properties in jeekanahally village. It is also in her evidence that after he shifted to Jeekanahally village he was alive for a period of 12 years and the ancestral properties in Heggatte village were disposed of by him from time to time one after the other. It is also in her evidence that after he shifted to Jeekanahally village he was alive for a period of 12 years and the ancestral properties in Heggatte village were disposed of by him from time to time one after the other. The above evidence given by the plaintiff that Rudraiah had ancestral lands in Heggatte village has not been seriously challenged in her cross-examination and the said portion of her evidence remained unchallenged. Similarly, her evidence that Rudraiah was residing with his two sons Eerappa and shivananjappa and that all of them were members of the joint family and that Eerappa was managing the joint family affairs, after the death of Rudraiah, also remained unchallenged. Apart from the above evidence given by the plaintiff, P. W. 2 Srinivasaiah, who was shanbhogue of Heggatte village and who was aged about 82 years at the time of giving his evidence, has also given evidence stating that late Rudraiah had garden and wet lands in Heggatte village and after he shifted to Jeekanahally village, he sold away his properties in Heggatte village for the purpose of purchasing the properties in Jeekanahally village. It is also in his evidence that late rudraiah was working as poojari in Samthamathrika Devi Temple. Even plaintiff stated in Samthamathrika Devi Temple. Even plaintiff stated in her evidence that her grand father Rudraiah was working as a priest. It is also in the evidence of P. W. 2 that after the death of rudraiah, the joint family properties were being managed by his eldest son Eerappa, and Shivananjappa and Eerappa were residing as member of the joint family in Jeekanahalli village. P. W. 3 Basappa, who is a resident of Jeekanahaily village, and who was aged about 55 years by the date of his giving evidence, has a!so given evidence stating Shivananjappa and Eerappa were residing as Members of the joint family and they had the ancestral land of 6 acres 06 guntas in Jeekanahally village which is a dry land and that Eerappa was managing the affairs of the joint family during his life time. In addition to the said oral evidence, the plaintiff has produced documentary evidence by way of revenue records to prove her contention that rudraiah purchased item No. 6 of plaint A schedule which is 6 acres of dryland in Jeekanahalli village by the sale of ancestral lands belonging to him in Heggatte village. He produced the certified copy of the preliminary record marked as Ex. P10 which contains the entry showing that the Land bearing Sy. No. 77 of Jeekahanahally village, measuring 6 acres was acquired by Rudraiah and that after his death, the katha of the said land was transferred in the name of Eerappa, who was the eldest son of Rudraiah. The nature of the acquisition is shown as "ancestral" at the said entry. These entries are also found in the certified copy of Kethwar extract marked as Ex. P9 and record of rights marked as Ex. P12. Thus, from the above documentary evidence, it is proved that late Rudraiah had acquired the suit Item No. 6, which is the land bearing Sy. No. 77 measuring 6 acres situated at Jeekanahally and it is further established from the above referred oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the said land was acquired by the sale of the ancestral lands belonging to rudraiah situated in Jeekanahally village. It must be for this reason, it is specifically mentioned at the entry in Ex. P10-Preliminary Record that the said item of land is the "ancestral land" of Rudraiah. , It is also found that there is no specific denial of the fact in the written statement filed by 1st defendant that Item No 6 of Plaint A schedule in the ancestral land of Rudraiah. In view of the above material placed on record, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/1 st defendant that Item No. 6 is the self acquired property of Rudraiah and that it is not ancestral property. His further contention that the lands of Rudraiah in Heggatte village cannot be presumed to be his ancestral lands in the absence of documentary evidence in this regard also cannot be accepted, as pleading in this regard available in the plaint and the evidence adduced by the plaintiff in support of the said pleading remained unchallenged. His further contention that the lands of Rudraiah in Heggatte village cannot be presumed to be his ancestral lands in the absence of documentary evidence in this regard also cannot be accepted, as pleading in this regard available in the plaint and the evidence adduced by the plaintiff in support of the said pleading remained unchallenged. It is no doubt contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the entry in the revenue records cannot be relied upon as a document of title. In support of his contention, he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in GURU AMARJITSINGH vs. RATTAN CHAND wherein it was held that "the entries in Jama bandhi are not proof of title parties have to establish the relationship or title to property unless there is unequivocal admission. " But, in the instant case, first defendant himself never claimed in his evidence that Item No. 6 of the plaint schedule is not the ancestral property and that it has not been acquired from out of the sale of proceeds of sale of ancestral properties of Rudraiah in Heggatte village. There is also no denial of the said pleading in the plaint in the written statement filed by the 1st defendant. In fact, admitted in his cross- examination that his grand-father Rudraiah had properties in Heggatte village. But he never claimed that the said properties in Heggatte village were the self-acquired properties of his grand father Rudraiah. He did not also dispute the fact that item No. 6 was purchased from out of the sale proceeds of the lands in Heggatte village by late rudraiah. When it was suggested to him that item No. 6 of the plaint a Schedule is the ancestral property acquired by his grand father, he did not deny the said suggestion, but claimed that he does not know about it. So, there is no reason to disbelieve the entry in Exp10 preliminary Record that the said land is the land acquired by rudraiah. In the circumstances, in my view, the first appellate Court, was justified in concluding that item No. 6 of plaint A schedule is the ancestral land acquired by Rudraiah. Further, it is clarified by the supreme Court in the decision reported in NAVALSHANKAR ishwarlal DAVE vs STATE OF GUJARAT. In the circumstances, in my view, the first appellate Court, was justified in concluding that item No. 6 of plaint A schedule is the ancestral land acquired by Rudraiah. Further, it is clarified by the supreme Court in the decision reported in NAVALSHANKAR ishwarlal DAVE vs STATE OF GUJARAT. At page 1501 in paragraph-4 that 'the entries in the revenue records are not evidence of title, though may be relevant for other purposes. " In another decision of the Supreme Court reported in SMT. CHANDRAQKANTABEN vs VADILAL BAPALAL MODI at Page 1271 in Paragraph-6, it is clarified that "though title could not be based upon the revenue records entry, possession could be proved by the said entry," Thus, it is clear that the entries in the revenue records can be relied upon for other purposes such as the nature of the land whether it is ancestral property or not. So, the plaintiff is entitled to rely upon the entries found in the revenue records-Ex. P10 preliminary Record Ex. P11, certified copy of Kethawar Patrike and ex. P12 certified copy of the record of rights to prove her contention that item No. 6 of plaint A schedule is the ancestral land acquired by her grand father Rudraiah. Thus, the plaintiff has established that the joint family of late Rudraiah and his sons late Eeraiah and late shivananjappa possessed the ancestral joint family property which is suit Item No. 6 measuring 6 acres of dry land. It is further found from the evidence placed on record that late Eerappa the eldest son of Rudraiah and father of 1st defendant had no other source of income other than the income from the above land when item No. 9 of the plaint A schedule was purchased in the year 1928 under the sale deed Ex. D1 for Rs. 28/-, which is the next item of the plaint schedule purchased by him. Further, it is in the evidence of P. W. 2 srinivasaiah of Heggatte village that Eerappa was aged about 18 years at the time when Rudraiah shifted to Jeekanahally village by disposing of his ancestral lands in Heggatte village. Even the first defendant never contended in his written statement that his father eerappa had any other source of income at the time when the other items of plaint schedule properties were acquired. Even the first defendant never contended in his written statement that his father eerappa had any other source of income at the time when the other items of plaint schedule properties were acquired. Thus, it is found that except the income from the ancestral land of 6 acres in item no. 6, the joint family had no other source of income at the time of purchase of item No. 9 of plaint A schedule under the sale deed ex. D1 dated 6. 1. 1928 for Rs. 28/ -. Though the plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to show what income the ancestral land Item no. 6 measuring 6 acres was yielding, since item No. 9 was purchased in the year 1928 for Rs. 28/- and since Eerappa had no other source of income, it can be presumed that only from out of the income of the said ancestral land, item No. 9 of the plaint sehedule measuring 1 acre 10 guntas must have been purchased for Rs. 28, it is further significant to note that in the same year 1928, the father of 1st defendant late Eerappa has disposed of the land under the sale deed Ex. P5 dated 9. 1. 1925, measuring 20 guntas in Sy. No. 34 of Jeekanahally village for Rs. 25/- in favour of Basava Shetty and the sale deed is attested by Shivananjappa the father of the plaintiff. In this document, it is not recited that this property was acquired and exclusively held by late Eerappa. Attestation of this document by late Shivananjappa would lend support to the case of the plaintiff that late Eerappa and late Shivananjappa were members of the joint family and that late Eerappa was in management of the joint family properties and that the properties were being dealt jointly by both of them. It cannot, therefore, be said that item No. 9 of plaint A schedule acquired on 6. 1. 1928, was not with the nucleus or income of the ancestral land item No. 6. As rightly, pointed out by the 1st appellate court that if late Shivananjappa had no subsisting interest in the property and if late Shivananjappa was living separately from eerappa, there was no reason for Shivananjappa to attest the sale deed Ex. P. 5 or the other sale deed Ex. P4 dated 24. 6. 1955 or the sale deed Ex. P6 dated 21. 12. P. 5 or the other sale deed Ex. P4 dated 24. 6. 1955 or the sale deed Ex. P6 dated 21. 12. 1961, It is also pointed out by the first appellate Court that the contents of sale deed Ex. P. 6 dated 21. 12. 1961 would disclose that late Eerappa and late Shivananjappa and defendant No. 1 have sold 1 acre 22 guntas of land bearing sy. No. 59 of Jeekanahally village to one Basappa for a consideration of Rs. 1,5007- and this circumstance shows that late Eerappa and shivananjappa and the present defendant No. 1 constituted a joint family and that they were enjoying the suit schedule properties as joint family properties. The other properties purchased were item no. 5 of the plaint schedule measuring 2 acres 30 guntas for Rs. 1,5007= in the year 1953 under the sale Deed Ex. D4 about 26 years subsequent to the purchase of item No,9. One acre 34 guntas which is item No,8 of the plaint schedule was purchased for Rs. 150/- under the sale deed Ex. D2 in the year 1949 about 21 years subsequent to the date of purchase of plaint schedule item No 9. Item No. 3 measuring 1 acre was purchased in the year 1953 for Rs. 300/- under the sale-deed Ex. D4 about 26 years subsequent to the date of purchase of item No. 9. Item No 3 measuring 1 acre was purchased for Rs. 300/ under the sale deed Ex. D4 about 26 years subsequent to the date of purchase of item No. 9. Item No. 2a was purchased for rs. 600/- in the year 1953 under the sale deed Ex. D5 about 26 years subsequent to the purchase of Item No. 9. Item No. 1 A was purchased in the year 1954 for Rs. 200/ under the sale deed Ex. D6 after a period of 27 years from the date of purchase of item No. 9. Three hundred yards of vacant site was purchased in auction in the year 1949 about 21 years after the purchase of Item No. 9. Thus, it is clear from these facts that all the above other items were purchased from time to time from out of the income of the joint family properties purchased earlier to each sale transaction. Three hundred yards of vacant site was purchased in auction in the year 1949 about 21 years after the purchase of Item No. 9. Thus, it is clear from these facts that all the above other items were purchased from time to time from out of the income of the joint family properties purchased earlier to each sale transaction. Having regard to these facts, the first appellate Court came to the conclusion that it can be safely presumed that all the plaint schedule items-1 to 9a were purchased and Items 10 to 17 were acquired from out of the nucleus of the ancestral land and other joint family lands, particularly when eerappa, who was managing the affairs of the joint family or his son 1st defendant, had no other source of income other than the income from the ancestral joint family lands at the time of acquisition of the said property. The law on this question is summarised as follows in wayne's Hindu Law and Usage, 12th Edition, Page 559 in Para-311: "the burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property, is in the first instance upon the person who claims. it as a coparcenary property. Where the possession of nucleus of joint family property is either admitted or proved, an acquisition made by a member of the family is presumed to be joint family property," subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid, the property in question could have been acquired. Until and unless adequate nucleus is shown the onus is not on the acquirer to prove that the property standing in his name was purchased from joint family funds. " in Srinivasa Krishna Kango vs Narayana Devji Kango 1954 s. C. S. C. 379 it was held that "it is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition, affirmatively to make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate. The sufficiency of the evidence to be adduced to shift the onus that initially rests upon plaintiff of showing adequate nucleus from which acquisitions could have been made is essentially a question of fact that depends upon the nature and extent of the nucleus. The sufficiency of the evidence to be adduced to shift the onus that initially rests upon plaintiff of showing adequate nucleus from which acquisitions could have been made is essentially a question of fact that depends upon the nature and extent of the nucleus. " at Page 311 in Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage, 12th Edition, it is observed as follows:- "where there is an acquisition by the Manager in his own name and there is no independent source of income the presumption arises that the new acquisition was joint family property. (See AIR 1954 S. C. 379 ). " in the instant case, since it is found that except the income from the ancestral land, which is Item No. 6 of Plaint A Schedule measuring 6 acres, there was no other source of income for the purchase of item No. 9 in the year 1928 for Rs. 25/ and deceased Eerappa had no earnings of his own at that time, it must be presumed that the said property must have been acquired from out of the income of the ancestral land measuring 6 acres. Similarly, it must be presumed that the other properties were acquired from time to time from out of the income of the joint family lands purchased earlier to each sale transaction and the same proceeds realised by the sale of the joint family lands from time to time under the sale deeds Exs. P4 to P6 produced. So, in my view, the first appellate Court was justified in drawing a presumption that all the above said plaint schedule lands are the joint family lands acquired from out of the nucleus of ancestral joint family lands. The first defendant has failed to discharge the burden of proof which is on him to prove that any other above; referred items of plaint schedule were purchased without the aid of nucleus of the ancestral joint family land and with any separate earnings of his father or himself. The first defendant has failed to discharge the burden of proof which is on him to prove that any other above; referred items of plaint schedule were purchased without the aid of nucleus of the ancestral joint family land and with any separate earnings of his father or himself. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent has drawn my attention to the decision of the supreme Court reported in RAMAPPA vs BOJJAPPA, wherein it was held that:- "the admissibility of evidence is no doubt a point of law, but once it is shown that the evidence on which Courts of fact have acted was admissible and relevant, it is not open to a party feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the Courts of fact to content before the High Court in second appeal that the said evidence is not sufficient to justify the findings of fact in question. It has been always recognised that the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter for decision of the Court of facts and cannot be agitated in a second appeal. " so, the finding recorded by the first appellate Court on the above question of fact, is on proper application of the question of law regarding onus of proof, I find that this Court is not entitled to interfere with the said finding and this Court cannot go in to the question whether there is sufficient and adequate evidence to base the above finding. In fact, it is found that there is sufficient and adequate evidence in support of the above finding recorded by the first appellate Court. It may also be mentioned here itself at this stage, that there is evidence of P. W. 2 Srinivasaiah to the effect that Eerappa father of the 1st defendant was 10 years old and Shivananjappa, the father of the plaintiff was aged about 6 years when Rudraiah shifted to Jeekanahally in the year 1900. In fact, it is not disclosed in the written statement filed by the 1st defendant that Eeraiah had earnings of his own other than the income from the agriculture at the time when the other lands were purchased during his life time. So, for the above reasons, I find that all the above said plaint schedule properties are the joint family properties belonging to both parties. So, for the above reasons, I find that all the above said plaint schedule properties are the joint family properties belonging to both parties. ( 12 ) IT is vehemently contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in the absence of any evidence to show that Rudraiah had ancestral land in Heggatte village, it cannot be presumed that item No. 6 purchased by him in Jeekanahally is the ancestral land of the parties and it must be taken that it is his self-acquired property of Rudraiah. He further contended that after the death of Rudraiah, his two sons Eerappa and Shivananjappa inherited the said property as tenants in common and the other properties purchased by eerappa subsequently cannot be considered as the joint family properties. In support of this contention, he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in P. PERIASAMI vs p. PERIATHAMBI, wherein it was held that:- "where the last eldej died leaving the self acquired property on his death, his sons in the absence of grandsons, would inherit the property as tenants-in-common-property in the hands of the sons would be joint property and not joint Hindu family property when out of income of the property some more properties purchased, the same must be accounted for as joint properties partition has to be made accordingly. " but the above decision is not applicable to the facts if the instant case, since it is found that the grand-father of the parties Rudralah had ancestral lands in Hegatte Village and by the sale of the said properties, he purchased Item No. 6 in Jeekanahally village after he shifted to the said village in the year 1900 and this fact is evidenced by the entries in the revenue records Exs. P11 and P13. So, the above said property inherited after the death of Rudraiah by his sons Eerappa and Shivananjappa became the ancestral joint family property and the other properties acquired from out of the income of the same from time to time in the name of Eerappa, 1st defendant have become the joint family properties belonging to all the parties. So, the above said property inherited after the death of Rudraiah by his sons Eerappa and Shivananjappa became the ancestral joint family property and the other properties acquired from out of the income of the same from time to time in the name of Eerappa, 1st defendant have become the joint family properties belonging to all the parties. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that after the death of Shivananjappa in the year 1968, the share to which the plaintiff is entitled to, is crystallized as 1/4th share by virtue of the notional partition envisaged under the provisions of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and so the properties acquired after 1968, items 4, 9, 11 and 12 of the plaint A Schedule cannot be considered as the joint family properties and the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the said properties and even if the said properties have been purchased by utilising the income from 1/ 4th share of the plaintiff in the other properties, first defendant is only liable to account for the said income, !n support of this contention, he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in M. N, ARYAMURTHl vs M. L SUBBARAYA SETTY , wherein it was held that:- "if one of the members remains in possession of the entire properties of the family even after severance in status, there is no presumption that the property, which is acquired by him after severance of the status, must be regarded as acquired for the family. Where rents and profits are received by the member in possession, he would be liable to account for the same. But the funds in the hands of that member do not become impressed with any trust in favour of the other members. Therefore, if such a member acquired some property with the funds in his possession, the other members could claim no share in that property. But the funds in the hands of that member do not become impressed with any trust in favour of the other members. Therefore, if such a member acquired some property with the funds in his possession, the other members could claim no share in that property. " placing reliance on the above decision, the learned Counsel for the respondents contended that after the death of Shivananjappa, the father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 5, by virtue of the provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, a severance in status has resulted on the premise of the notional partition and it must be presumed that the plaintiff and defendant No. 5 became divided in status with effect from the date of death of Shivananjappa and both of them can no longer be considered as members of the joint family of defendants-1 to 4 and the properties acquired after 1968 by defendant No. 1 in his name, cannot be considered as the joint family properties. To appreciate this contention, I find it necessary to refer to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act which is as under:- "devolution of interest in coparcenary property.- When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devclve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act; provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation 1.- For the purposes of this Section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, inespective of whether he was entitled to claim or not. Explanation 1.- For the purposes of this Section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, inespective of whether he was entitled to claim or not. Explanation 2.- Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. " it is clear from the above explanation 1 to Section 6 of the Hindu succession Act, 1956 that it must be presumed that a notional partition has taken place at the time of the death of the deceased coparcener only for the limited purpose of ascertairting the share to which the deceased coparcener would be entitled in the joint family properties, which will be inherited by his Class-l heirs or which will devolve by testamantory succession as the case may be. But, the actual severance in status and disruption of the joint family takes place only on a demand being made by any of the said legal heirs for partition and separate possession of their snare in the Joint family properties and whatever properties acquired Ml the date of partition from out of the income of the joint family properties, are to be treated as joint family properties in which the legal heirs of the deceased coparcener will be entitled to share. Since in the instant case, the demand for actual partition was made by the plaintiff, only just before filing the present suit and by filing the suit lor partition, it must be taken that she continued as a member of the joint family along with the other defendants till the date of suit and all properties acquired by the 1st defendant, even after the date of death of her father i. e. after 1968 till the actual date on which a demand was made for partition, from out of the income of the ancestral and joint family properties, become the joint family properties liable for partition amongst all the members of the two families ii is settled law that so long as a family remains an undivided family -all properties acquired with the aid of nucleus of the joint family properties will become the joint family properties. The disruption of the joint family and severance in status takes place only on a demand being made by a member of the joint family for partition and separate possession of his share. In the instant case, admittedly such a demand for partition has not been made by the plaintiff, at any time, subsequent to the date of death of her father Shivananjappa till a few days before filing this suit and till the date of filing the suit. So, it must e presumed that she continued as a member of the joint family till the date of filing the suit, when she made a demand for partition and separate possession of her 1/4th share in the plaint schedule properties. In the above referred decision of the Supreme Ccurt reported in AIR 1972 SC 1279 , on facts it was found that severance in status has taken place on 30th of March 1940 when sons referred their dispute to the Arbitrators for partition of their properties and it is in that context it was held that after the said date 30th March 1940, the subsequent acquisitions made by a member even with joint funds belong to him alone and other members cannot claim a share therein. In the instant case, the share to which plaintiff and defendant No. 5 are entitled in the joint family properties stood crystallized by the date of death of their father Shivananjappa in the year 1968. In the instant case, the share to which plaintiff and defendant No. 5 are entitled in the joint family properties stood crystallized by the date of death of their father Shivananjappa in the year 1968. But in which of the joint family properties they are entitled to the said share is to be determined as on the date of filing the present suit, on which a demand was made for partition and when the plaintiff made clear her intention to become separate and divided in status. In this view of the matter, I find that even the items-4, 9, 11 and 12 acquired by the 1st defendant after 1968, with the help of income of other joint family properties are impressed with the character of joint family properties and the plaintiff and defendant No 5 became entitled to claim their respective 1/4th shares in the said properties also. I am of the opinion that actual severance in status and disruption of the joint family takes place only when a member of the joint family makes his intention clear to separate himself from others by making a demand for partition and separate possession of his share. in the joint family properties and not from the date of death of deceased coparcener by virtue of notional partition as provided under explanation-1 of proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 for the purpose of ascertaining in which properties the parties are entitled to their shares. ( 13 ) FOR the above reasons, I answer Point Nos,1 and 2 in the affirmative, ( 14 ) THE first appellate Court has rejected the application for amendment filed by the 1st defendant under Order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C mainly on the ground that by the proposed amendment, first defendant wanted to introduce new contentions and new lines of defence to the effect that his father acquired the properties without the aid of any nucleus of the ancestral or the joint family lands that items 4,9,11 and 12 are his self-acquired properties, that plaintiff and defendant No. 2 are not entitled to claim shares in their dwelling house etc,. The proposed amendment, in my view, introduces a new line of defence, which cannot be permitted and it also relates to pure questions of law for which no pleadings need be there and the pleadings already available in the written statement filed by the 1st defendant, are sufficient to cover the said questions. In my view, the first appellate Court was therefore, justified in rejecting the said application. I accordingly, answer Point No. 3. ( 15 ) POINT No. 4: The first appellate Court rightly found that the first defendant not being a member of the same branch of the family of the plaintiff and not a Class-1 heir along with the plaintiff and defendant No. 5, the bar under Section 23 of the Hindu Succession act is not applicable in the present case, tor the plaintiff seeking relief of partition in respect of the family dwelling house. A close reading of the Section 23 would make it clear that the Section applies when:- 1) A male or a female dies intestate. 2) The heirs consist of female heirs specified in Class-1 of the schedule. 3) The deceased leaves a dwelling house wholly occupied by members of his or her family where a female heir specified in Class I of the Schedule to the act inherits along with other male heirs, the share in the dwelling house devolves on her absolutely, though the section postpones her right to claim partition of her share until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein. In the instant case, the 1st defendant is only a cousin brother of the plaintiff and is not a Class-l heir along with her. So the bar under Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to claim for partition of the dwelling house by the plaintiff is not attracted. Further, the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that the 1st defendant has not acquired rights by adverse possession in respect of the plaint schedule properties and that there is no ouster of the plaintiff and 2nd defendant from possession and enjoyment of the suit properties, is a finding recorded essentially as a question of fact and this Court is not entitled to interfere with the said finding. ( 16 ) POINT in R. S. A. No. 440 of 1998 Since the father of the 1st defendant Eerappa died in the year 1980 leaving behind him, defendants-1 to 4 as Class-l heirs, (i. e,) his undivided interest in the joint family properties his 1/4th share is to be divided amongst defendants-1 to 4 equally. Thus, each of them became entitled to 1/ 16th share in all the properties. By virtue of right by birth, 1st defendant became entitled to 1/4th share plus 1/16th share in his father's 1/4th share (i. e.) 5/16th share, i, therefore, find that the first appellate Court erred in quantifying the share of the 2nd defendant as 1/8th share instead of 1/16th share in the plaint schedule properties. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court has to be modified accordingly. I, therefore, answer the point in the negative and I find that the 2nd defendant is entitled to 1/16th share in the items-1 to 9a and 10 to 17 of the plaint A schedule properties. ( 17 ) IN the result, R. S. A. No. 441/1998 is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court for partition and separate possession of 1/4th share of the plaintiff in plaint A schedule items 1 to 9a and items 10 to 17, for recovery of mesne profits from the date of suit til! the date of recovery of possession. ( 18 ) R. S. A. NO. 440/1998 is allowed in-part and in modification of the judgment and decree passed by the first appel'ate Court, it is ordered that the second defendant is entitled to 1/16th share in the plaint schedule properties and a preliminary decree is accordingly passed for partition and separate possession of her 1/16th share. --- *** --- .