Research › Search › Judgment

J&K High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 314 (JK)

Raj Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

2001-12-03

S.K.GUPTA, SYED BASHIR-UD-DIN

body2001
Per Syed Bashir-ud-Din,J: 1. In the three claim petitions 14/1997, 15/1997 and 564/1997, Motor Accident Claim™s Tribunal Jammu awarded Rs.89,560/-; 46,500/- and 1,12,800/- to Davinder Kumar, Sita Ram and Joginder Kumar respectively for the injuries which each of them sustained in a road accident involving Motor Vehicle (Matador) with Registration mark and No. JK02F 1281 at or near Makhanpur, when the vehicle was being driven by its driver Ghari Singh Charak. The above awarded compensation was ordered to be met by the National Insurance Company, the respondent. Against the award of August 28, 1998 which governs all three claims, three first statutory appeals (CIMA 244/98, CIMA 245/97 and CIMA 246/97) were filed. The appellate forum of the learned Single Judge of this court while maintaining quantum of the award modified it to hold that the National Insurance Company appellant is not liable and the award money is to be born and met by the owner. The appeals were accordingly allowed by judgment dated 12-11-1999 by the first appellate court. 2. Against this judgment of the appellate court one Raj Singh s/o Buti Singh moved an application accompanied by a memo of LPA on 18-10-2000 for condonation of delay. The appeal is beyond time by 276 days. This delay is prayed to be-condoned on grounds taken up in the application. Objections have been filed by the respondents on behalf of contesting respondents. 3. It is alleged that when the MACT Jammu initiated recovery proceedings, the claimants filed application naming and placing on record the legal representatives of respondent owner of the vehicle viz, Buti Singh. The Tribunal issued notice to legal representatives including the appellant/applicant on 18-09-2000. It was only thereafter when he appeared before the Tribunal with his counsel that he came to know that the High Court had disposed of the Appeal finally on 12-11-1999, though on this date Buti Singh was alive and died only in the month of December, 1999. The applicant got knowledge only on 18-09-2000 after receiving notice. 4. In answer, contesting respondents have questioned sufficiency and bonafide reasons for delay. It is stated that the reasons given are neither cogent nor sustainable. The delay caused is deliberate. Applicants father Buti Singh, owner of the vehicle, party to claim petition and the appeal before MACT and the High Court was very much alive and even he failed to contest the case despite the notice. 5. It is stated that the reasons given are neither cogent nor sustainable. The delay caused is deliberate. Applicants father Buti Singh, owner of the vehicle, party to claim petition and the appeal before MACT and the High Court was very much alive and even he failed to contest the case despite the notice. 5. It would be seen that no cogent and adequate reasons to warrant condonation of delay is forthcoming on record. No sufficient cause is shown to warrant indulgence at this stage to extend the period. In the background that the owner applicants father was very much alive till the award was given by the MACT Jammu and Appeal was finally disposed of by the High Court and that till his death he took no steps to file further appeal to seek remedies available to him, the in-ordinate delay of 276 days taken to file the appeal with condonation application remains thoroughly unexplained. The plea of late knowledge on the part of applicant of final disposal of appeal and judgment by the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be construed as ˜sufficient cause™. We have also perused the judgment common to all three appeal matters given by Hon™ble Single Bench. We do not find that even on merits, period of limitation in this case can be extended. Faced with this situation, in our view, we do not find that sufficient cause is made out for our indulgence in this case to extend the time/condone the delay. 6. During the course of the arguments, we noticed that there is a divergence of judicial opinion as to whether LPA would lie against the decision of a Single Bench of High Court, arising out of appeal against award of MACT under provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. While as in (i) Shrimant Rajmate Vijayaraje Scindia Vs. Shrimant Maharaja Madhorao Scindia (1988 MPLJ 78), (ii) Uttam Singh Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. (AIR 1988 MP, 1999), (iii) Jaswant Rao V Kumloabai (AIR 1990 MP 354), (iv) Fazilka Dabwali Transport Coy. Vs. Madanlal (1968 ACJ 43 P&H), The view taken is that section 173 (old section 110-D) of MVA provides one appeal. Once the appeal is heard, the appellate power is exhausted and the corpus of right of appeal envisaged by the section cannot be enlarged to provide for 2nd appeal being filed in the high court. Vs. Madanlal (1968 ACJ 43 P&H), The view taken is that section 173 (old section 110-D) of MVA provides one appeal. Once the appeal is heard, the appellate power is exhausted and the corpus of right of appeal envisaged by the section cannot be enlarged to provide for 2nd appeal being filed in the high court. However, in the following cases, an opposite view is taken:- i) Shanti Dev vs. General Manager Haryana, Roadways, (1971 ACJ 247) (P&H). ii) Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Kuldeep Bhandari (1969 ACJ 276), iii) Crissa Road Transport Coy. Ltd. Vs., SibbaNandaPatnaik, (1979 ACJ-45) (Ori), iv) General Manager (H) Hazuribagh ARea of Central Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Anjan Banerjee, (1990 ACT, 550) (Pat). These are some of the cases where the courts have held that the decision in appeal may be against an award of MACT, but all the same it is a decision of a Single Judge of the High Court and it amounts to a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the LPA (para materia with clause 12 of Letters Patent J&K). 7. Since we have come to the conclusion as indicated above that no sufficient and reasonable cause is made out to warrant extension of time or condonation of delay, and consequently the LPA cannot be entertained on that count, therefore, we need not devolve deep to consider which of the two views is acceptable to this count. We leave this question to be gone into and answered appropriately in some other case. The condonation application is dismissed. As fortiorari, the LPAs received in Registry shall also go.