ORDER S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge whereunder the sentence of dismissal from service awarded to the respondent by the General Security Force Court for having committed a miscellaneous offence envisaged under section 41(e) of the Border Security Force Act 1968, had been quashed with a direction for his re-instatement in service and payment to him all the service benefits, the appellants have now come up in appeal seeking redress praying for the setting aside of the aforesaid order passed by the learned Single Judge. 2. We have heard Shri D.K. Katare, the learned counsel for the appellants as well as Shri J.P. Gupta the learned Senior Advocate, representing the respondent and have carefully perused the record. 3. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. The respondent was employed as a sub-Inspector/Stenographer in the Border Security Force, Tekanpur, and his service conditions were regulated by the provisions contained in Border Security Force Act, 1968. He was served with a charge-sheet containing two charges. The first charge was in regard to accepting for himself the gratification as motive for procuring the enrolment of a person in the service. The second charge was in regard to abatement within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code of an offence specified in section 41(e) of the Border Security Force Act in consequence of which abatement such offence was not committed. Both the charges in fact were in regard to the miscellaneous offences as envisaged under section 41(e) of the aforesaid Act. 4. The first charge was based on the allegation that the respondent had on 9-9-1991 accepted Rs. 3900/- from Sitabsingh for procuring his enrolment in the Border Security Force. The second charge was based on the allegation that on 10-9-1991 at Tekanpur, the respondent had offered to Dr. Vinay Bharti, Medical Officer, Grade I, as a motive for procuring enrolment of Sitabsingh and thereby abetted within the meaning of Indian Penal Code an offence punishable under section 41(e) of the Border Security Force Act, that offence was not committed by the said Dr. Vinay Bharti in consequence of such abetment. 5. The case of the appellants obviously was that the contesting respondent on 9th September 1991 while at Tekanpur had accepted the sum of Rs. Vinay Bharti in consequence of such abetment. 5. The case of the appellants obviously was that the contesting respondent on 9th September 1991 while at Tekanpur had accepted the sum of Rs. 3900/- from Shri Sitabsingh of village Johri Pura, District Bhind for procuring his enrolment in the Border Security Force and on 10th September 1991 while at Tekanpur the respondent had offered to Dr. Vinay Bharti, Medical Officer, Grade-I, a gratification of Rs. 5000/- as a motive for procuring enrolment of aforesaid Sitabsingh thereby abetted within the meaning of Indian Penal Code an offence under section 41(e) of the Border Security Force Act, though the said gratification was not accepted by Dr. Vinay Bharti in consequence of such abetment. 6. It may be noticed at this stage that the provisions contained in section 80 of the Border Security Force Act stipulate that in case criminal Court and the Security Force Court have each jurisdiction in respect of an offence the specified authority will have the discretion or the choice between criminal Court and the Security Force Court. Section 80 of the aforesaid Act to the following effect:-- 80. Choice between criminal Court and Security Force Court.-- When a criminal Court and a Security Force Court have each jurisdiction in respect of an offence, it shall be in the discretion of the Director-General, or the Inspector-General or the Deputy Inspector General within whose command the accused person is serving or such other officer as may be prescribed, to decide before which Court the proceedings shall be instituted, and, if the officer decides that they shall be instituted before a Security Force Court, to direct that the accused person shall be detained in Force Custody. 7. The aforesaid charges which were leveled against the respondent were denied by him and were tried by a General Security Force Court, constituted under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. Before the General Security Force Court the appellants examined eight witnesses. Dr. Vinay Bharti, MO Grade I, referred to in the second charge framed against the respondent, had admitted that he was a member of the Recruitment Board which had two members and one Presiding Officer. The respondent was the SI/Steno deputed to the aforesaid Board for performing the ministerial duties of the Board. Dr. Vinay Bharti, MO Grade I, referred to in the second charge framed against the respondent, had admitted that he was a member of the Recruitment Board which had two members and one Presiding Officer. The respondent was the SI/Steno deputed to the aforesaid Board for performing the ministerial duties of the Board. He had further deposed that on 10th September 1991 the respondent had called upon him while he was at his residence and had told him that one candidate having suspected bow legs was to be cleared in medical examination for recruitment in BSF and that he had brought some money for him for clearing the candidate for enrolment in the medical examination. The respondent then had put his right hand in the right pocket of his pant to take out some money and while the accused was in the process of taking out the money from his pocket he was stopped by the Doctor. Later on, at the residence of the accused in the presence of Shri Bhupinder Singh, Commandant Basic Training Center and two other persons the respondent had confessed about his guilt. The doctor had further admitted that he had not tried to see the money being offered to him as a gratification nor had made any effort to see whether he was carrying money in his pocket or not. It was also admitted that respondent had not told him that he was offering him Rs. 5000/- for the enrolment of a candidate. 8. The persons in whose presence the confessional statement was claimed to have been made by the respondent had also been examined as a prosecution witness. This witness had deposed that the accused-respondent had initially denied knowledge or involvement in the incident but due to long pursuation of Shri Bhupinder Singh, Commandant for about 20-25 minutes he confessed his guilt by making a voluntary verbal confessional statement in the presence of four witnesses. P.W.6, Shri A.K. Sharma the Deputy Commandant, had stated that at the residence of the accused he was motivated by all the officers to come out with the truth. 9. Bhupinder Singh had also been examined as prosecution witness No. 7 who had admitted that all of them had sat in one of the rooms and he started asking the accused repeatedly as to whether he had gone to the residence of Dr. 9. Bhupinder Singh had also been examined as prosecution witness No. 7 who had admitted that all of them had sat in one of the rooms and he started asking the accused repeatedly as to whether he had gone to the residence of Dr. Vinay Bharti, MO Grade I to offer Rs. 5000/- to bribe him for clearing the candidate namely Shri Sitab Singh or not. The respondent had denied having done so but after 5 or 6 minutes of his enquiry the accused had confessed his guilt and made a verbal confessional statement. 10. It may be noticed that it is at the instance of Bhupinder Singh that the respondent is claimed to have given a confessional statement in writing also. Bhupinder Singh had also admitted that he had given the holy book of Geeta in the hands of accused and asked him to maintain his written confessional statement by swearing in the name of Geeta that the facts narrated in the statement were true. The respondent was told to say by swearing in the name of Geeta that he had nothing more to reveal than what he had already stated in his written confessional statement. The accused was claimed to have sworn in the name of Geeta that whatever he had stated in his written confessional statement was the truth and there was nothing more to reveal or add. 11. The General Security Force Court after putting the questions to the accused and affording him opportunity of hearing returned a finding negativing the first charge levelled against the respondent but on the second charge the verdict given was holding him guilty. So far as the second charge was concerned, it may be noticed that before the Court the respondent had totally denied having given verbal confessional statement. He had further stated that so far as the written confessional statement was concerned it had been obtained by high ranking officers under undue influence and duress. After returning the findings holding the respondent guilty of second charge the Court imposed the punishment of dismissal from service as envisaged under section 48 of the Act. 12. He had further stated that so far as the written confessional statement was concerned it had been obtained by high ranking officers under undue influence and duress. After returning the findings holding the respondent guilty of second charge the Court imposed the punishment of dismissal from service as envisaged under section 48 of the Act. 12. The General Security Force Court had announced the finding on each charge in the open Court on 3-8-1992 as provided under Rule 99 (9) of the Rules framed under the Act and had awarded the sentence in question for the second charge and the offence for which the respondent had been found guilty. The provisions contained in Rule 167 of the Rules entitle a person subject to the Act who has been tried by the General Security Force Court to put in one petition before confirmation of the sentence to the Confirming Authority and one petition after confirmation to any officer mentioned in section 117 of the Act. The petition before confirmation has to be submitted within one week of the conclusion of the trial and a petition after confirmation had to be submitted within three months of the date on which the sentence promulgated. 13. The respondent in whose presence the findings had been announced and the sentence awarded on 3-8-1992 submitted his petition challenging the findings of the General Security Force Court and the conviction recorded against him, contemplated under section 117(1) of the Act before the Confirming Authority on various grounds. The Confirming Authority rejected the petition in one line cryptic order dated 12-9-1992 and confirmed the finding announced against the respondent and sentence awarded to him vide his order dated 12-9-1992. 14. As has already been indicated above the aforesaid order passed by the General Security Force Court was challenged by the respondent in the proceedings under section 117(1) of the Act before the empowered confirming authority which in the present case, it is not disputed, was the Director, BSF Academy, Tekanpur. The Confirming Authority vide its cryptic order dated 12th September, 1992 rejected the petition of the respondent indicating that the same had been considered by him in detail and was rejected being devoid of merit. 15. It may be noticed that the order passed by the Confirming Authority was not in detail as it was shown to be. It was a single line order to the following effect. 15. It may be noticed that the order passed by the Confirming Authority was not in detail as it was shown to be. It was a single line order to the following effect. Your petition No. Nil dated 05 August 1992 has been considered by me in detail and rejected being devoid of any merit. 16. Challenging the aforesaid order the respondent filed a petition as envisaged under section 117(2) of the Act which was also dismissed vide the order dated 9th March, 1993 holding the same to be devoid of merit. 17. It was thereafter that the writ petition giving rise to this appeal, had been filed. The learned Single Judge after carefully considering the facts and circumstances as brought on record came to the conclusion that the charge No. 2 to the effect that the respondent had offered Dr. Bharti an amount of Rs. 5000/- as a motive for procuring enrolment of Sitabsingh was not made out from the record, and the said finding of the General Security Force was perverse. The learned Single Judge was of the view that in the absence of any evidence no such finding could be recorded and since the finding itself was perverse, the sentence of dismissal from service could not be imposed upon the petitioner. It was also observed that in the present case no evidence whatsoever was led before the General Security Force Court to prove the charge that in fact an amount of Rs. 5000/- was offered by the present respondent. 18.The aforesaid observations appears to have been made on the basis of the deposition of Dr. Bharti recorded before the General Security Force Court. 19. The learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously challenged the observation/findings of the learned Single Judge asserting that in fact the evidence as brought on record by the department/ prosecution was more than sufficient to support the findings returned against the respondent. What has been urged is that sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence could not be taken into account by the learned Single Judge. In this connection it has further been urged that irrespective of the State of Evidence of Dr. What has been urged is that sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence could not be taken into account by the learned Single Judge. In this connection it has further been urged that irrespective of the State of Evidence of Dr. Bharti the evidence of Bhupinder Singh, the Commandant, Shri A.K. Sharma, Deputy Commandant, J.B. Sagwan (another Deputy Commandant) was more than sufficient to sustain the finding returned by the General Security Force Court and it was not a case where any interference was called for by the learned Single Judge in the disciplinary matter against an employee of an Armed Force like the Border Security Force. 20. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent has, however, urged that in the present case the learned Single Judge had rightly found that the evidence of Dr. Bharti could not lead to an inference that the offence envisaged under section 41(e) of the BSF Act was committed by the respondent. It has further been urged that so far as the other three witnesses were concerned on whom reliance was sought to be placed by the appellants, they had only tried to prove the alleged confessional statement which had been made the sole basis for returning the finding and since the alleged confessional statement was wholly irrelevant and was liable to be discarded in view of section 24 of the Evidence Act which was attracted to the proceedings giving rise to this appeal in view of the provisions contained in section 87 of the Act, that statement was liable to be ignored altogether and in that view of the matter the findings of the learned Single Judge that there was absolutely no evidence in support of the second charge levelled against the petitioner-respondent was not liable to be disturbed. 21. The confession of the accused should be in unequivocal terms admitting the confession of the crime. Such a confession cannot be used against an accused unless the Court was satisfied that it was voluntarily made and while the Court is considering this question the question whether it is true or false does not arise as indicated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its decision in the case of A her Raja Khima vz. State of Saurashtra, reported in AIR 1956 SC 217 . State of Saurashtra, reported in AIR 1956 SC 217 . It is, therefore, obvious that a confession before it can be acted upon and can be made a basis of the conviction must be proved to have been voluntarily made and true. For the purpose of establishing its truth it is necessary to examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the prosecution evidence and the probabilities of the case. A confession made under pressure is inadmissible. Where the confession is not voluntary and free the fact that it is true cannot make it admissible. A confession cannot be taken to have been voluntarily made where it is made under some threat, inducement or promise by a person in authority. In case there are circumstances which afford a well grounded conjecture that the confession was not voluntary it is more than sufficient to exclude a confession under section 24 of the Evidence Act. It should not be lost sight of that the provisions contained in section 24 of the Evidence Act do not require a positive proof of the fact that there was any inducement. The word "appears" indicating a lesser degree of probability that would be necessary if proof had been required. 22. Moreover, it may be noticed that the provisions contained in section 24 do not require that the accused should be able to prove that he made the confession under any inducement, threat or promise. If there are circumstances from which it appears that the confession was not made voluntarily, the Court would be justified in rejecting that confession. It is, therefore, permissible to reject a confession if there are grounds to base a sound conjecture that it was not voluntary; although a mere possibility that the confession was not voluntary is insufficient to warrant its rejection. However a probability would suffice. Any attempt by person in authority to bully a person into making a confession or any threat or coercion would at once invalidate such a confession if the fear was operating on the mind of the accused at the time when he claimed to have made the confession, and if it would appear to him to be reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. 23. 23. In the present case the charge levelled against the petitioner-respondent was as contemplated under section 41(e) of the Act. Section 41 of the Act is to the following effect:-- 41. Miscellaneous offences -- Any person subject to this Act who commits any of the following offences, that is to say:-- (a) being in command at any post or on the march, and receiving a complaint that any one under his command has beaten or otherwise maltreated or oppressed any person, or has disturbed any fair or market, or committed any riot or trespass, fails to have due reparation made to the injured person or to report the case to the proper authority; or (b) by defiling any place of worship, or otherwise, intentionally insults the religion, or wounds the religious feelings of, any person; or (c) attempts to commit suicide, and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of such offence; or (d) being below the ranks of subordinate officer, when off duty, appears without proper authority, in or about camp, or in or about, or when going to, or returning from, any town or bazaar, carrying a rifle, sword or other offensive weapon; or (e) directly or indirectly accepts or obtains or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any gratification as a motive or reward for procuring the enrollment of any person, or leave of absence, promotion or any other advantage or indulgence for any person in the service; or (f) commits any offence against the property or person of any inhabitant of, or resident in, the country in which he is deriving; shall, on conviction by a Security Force Court, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or such less punishment as in this Act mentioned. 24. A perusal of the provisions contained in section 41 of the BSF Act makes it clear that for establishing a case under that provision it has to be proved that directly or indirectly the accused accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain, for himself or for any other person any gratification as a motive or reward for procuring the enrolment of any person, or leave of absence, promotion or any other advantage or indulgence for any person in the service. 25. 25. In the aforesaid view of the matter the question as to whether evidence of the person, who had tried to prove the confessional statement of the respondent was admissible or not or as to whether it was liable to be ignored altogether as being irrelevant had to be taken into consideration. Further, the effect of the exoneration of the respondent so far as the first charge was concerned which, it is clear, was the basis for the second charge had also to be taken into account. 26. The provisions contained in section 117 of the Act require that when a petition is filed challenging the order passed by the Security Force Court before the Confirming Authority, the said authority has to take such steps as may be considered necessary to satisfy as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed or as to the regularity of any proceedings to which the order relates. 27. It may be noticed that the General Security Force Court in view of the provisions contained in Rule 99 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969, is not required to give reasons for the finding on each charge and has to record the finding on each charge and has to record the finding of "guilty" or of "not guilty" only. In the aforesaid view of the matter once jurisdiction of the Confirming Authority envisaged under section 117(1) of the aforesaid Act is invoked the duty cast under that provision on the Confirming Authority to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed or as to the regularity of any proceedings to which the order relates assumes great importance. 'Satisfaction' as envisaged under section 117(1) of the Act is not the personal whim, wish or opinion or the ipse-dixit- de-hors the material but a legitimate inference drawn from the material placed before the Confirming Authority which is relevant for the purpose. 28. In the above circumstances it must be emphasised that when the Statute requires recording of satisfaction of the Concerned Authority the order passed by it must demonstrate that in fact a satisfaction had been reached in regard to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order under challenge. In the present case, however, the order passed by the Confirming Authority is very cryptic and contains only a conclusion without followed by any reasoning whatsoever. 29. In the present case, however, the order passed by the Confirming Authority is very cryptic and contains only a conclusion without followed by any reasoning whatsoever. 29. The law is well settled that in cases where the exercise of statutory power is subject to the fulfillment of a condition then the recital about the said condition having been fulfilled in the order raises a presumption about the fulfillment of that condition and the burden is on the person who challenges the validity of the order to show that the said condition was not fulfilled. 30. In cases where the order does not contain a recital about the condition being fulfilled, the burden to prove that the condition was fulfilled would be of the authority passing the order if the validity of the order is challenged on the ground that the said condition is not fulfilled. 31. The presumption as to the regularity of the public act would apply in such a case but as soon as the order is challenged and it is said that it was passed without fulfilling the condition then the burden would be on the authority to satisfy by other means (in the absence of recital in the order itself) that the condition precedent had been complied with. 32. It may further be noticed that the jurisdiction contemplated under section 117(2) of the Border Security Force Act, vests the concerned authority with the jurisdiction to pass such order thereon as it thinks fit. This provision cannot by any stretch of imagination be deemed to vest the concerned authority with any appellate power and the jurisdiction contemplated in the aforesaid provision must fall short of the appellate Court's power of interference with a finding of fact where the finding of fact depends on the credibility of the witnesses there being conflict of oral evidence of the parties. This jurisdiction, therefore, must remain confined to a jurisdiction akin to revisional jurisdiction or the superintending jurisdiction. But the jurisdiction of the confirming authority as envisaged under section 117(1) of the Act is of a much wider scope. It has to be satisfied as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of the order passed or as to the regularity of the proceedings to which the order relates. He thus exercises virtually the appellate jurisdiction. But the jurisdiction of the confirming authority as envisaged under section 117(1) of the Act is of a much wider scope. It has to be satisfied as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of the order passed or as to the regularity of the proceedings to which the order relates. He thus exercises virtually the appellate jurisdiction. Being vested with such a jurisdiction of wide import which was subject to revision the mere recording of the conclusions without disclosing the reasons on which the conclusions were based cannot be taken to be in accordance with law. The confirming Authority taking into consideration the exigencies of the situation ought to have passed an order so as to at least indicate that it had applied its mind to the case and the controversy raised giving out briefly the facts of the case and the reasons in support of its conclusions. 33. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its decision in the case of Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India v. The Union of India and another, reported in 1976 (2) SCC 981 : AIR 1976 SC 1785 , had indicated that the rule requiring the reasons to be given in support of an order is like the principle of audi alterm partem, the basic principle of natural justice which must be followed in every quasi-judicial proceedings and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. The Government of India in that case had failed to give any reason in support of its order rejecting the revision application. It was observed by the Apex Court that we may presume that in rejecting the revision application, the State Government had adopted the same reasoning which prevailed with the notification. Such a situation may arise in cases falling under section 117(2) of the Act but even so far as such cases are concerned as has been noticed hereinabove, the Hon'ble Apex Court had indicated that it is desirable to give reasons. 34. The reasons introduce clarity and exclude or at any rate minimise the arbitrariness. It gives satisfaction to the person against whom the order is made affording an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which had weighed with the authority to reject his case were erroneous. 35. 34. The reasons introduce clarity and exclude or at any rate minimise the arbitrariness. It gives satisfaction to the person against whom the order is made affording an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which had weighed with the authority to reject his case were erroneous. 35. As has already been indicated hereinabove it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decisions in Civil or Criminal Court. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the concerned authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. 36. It is the settled law that the reasons are harbinger between mind of the maker and the order to the controversy in question and the decision or the conclusion arrived at. Further, it should not be lost sight of that the reasons are links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. 37. While it is true that the Legislature in its own wisdom while conferring jurisdiction on an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions may feel that it would not be in a large possible public interest that the reasons for the order be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party. It may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect and such exclusion may also flow by necessary implications from the nature and the subject matter, the scheme of the provisions and the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would naturally out-way the purpose sought to be secured by the requirement to record the reasons. In such a situation the requirement cannot be insisted upon. 38. The public interest underlying such a provision would naturally out-way the purpose sought to be secured by the requirement to record the reasons. In such a situation the requirement cannot be insisted upon. 38. However, in the present case taking into consideration the nature of the charges, the choice of the discretion exercised as contemplated under section 80 of the Act and the nature of the punishment which was dismissal from service and the further fact that the statutory obligation was cast upon the Confirming Authority to consider submissions made in the petition by the accused/delinquent challenging the order of the General Security Force Court and record its satisfaction in regard to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the General Security Force Court, it is not possible to hold that the order recording satisfaction contemplated under section 117 (1) of the Act contemplated a decision which did not embrace within its ambit the reasons. 39. It cannot be disputed that this Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction vesting in it under Article 226 of the Constitution can grant appropriate relief if the proceedings such as in question are found to have resulted in denial of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution or if the proceedings suffer from a jurisdictional error or any error of law apparent from the face of the record but since the provisions contained in section 117(1) of the Act are much wider in scope and vests the Confirming Authority with a jurisdiction akin to an appellate jurisdiction and further a petition had already been filed by the respondent raising various pleas which required to be gone into on merits on the assessment of the evidence brought on record we are of the opinion that it would not have been appropriate to undertake that exercise in the present proceedings. 40. In its decision in the case of Union of India and others. vs. Rai Sudin Saha, in Civil Appeal No. 11409 of 1995, decided on 17th November, 1995, the Apex Court while considering the implications arising under section 117 of the Act observed that it is desirable to give reasons and in any case the Director General is not precluded from doing so. vs. Rai Sudin Saha, in Civil Appeal No. 11409 of 1995, decided on 17th November, 1995, the Apex Court while considering the implications arising under section 117 of the Act observed that it is desirable to give reasons and in any case the Director General is not precluded from doing so. It was further pointed out that it is not necessary that on such a technical ground the order should be set at naught when the material is very much available and the facts speak for themselves. 41. In its another decision in the case of Travencore Rayons vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1971 SC 862 , the Apex Court had pointed out when judicial power is exercised by an authority normally performing executive or administrative functions, the Supreme Court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two grounds; one, that the party aggrieved in a proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous, the other, that the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power. It was also observed that where the order of the Central Government rejecting a revision under section 36 merely carefully considered the points made by the applicant, saw no reason to interfere with the order, the order being laconic is vitiated and should be set aside. 42. The learned counsel for the appellants has urged that in fact in the proceedings under section 117 of the BSF Act the statutes does not require assigning any reason for the conclusion. In support of this submission the learned counsel referred to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. Ex. Constable Amrik Singh, in Civil Appeal No. 3201 of 1989, decided on 29th January, 1991. A perusal of the aforesaid decision, however, indicates that it was confined to the proceedings under section 117(2) of the Act. The stage contemplated under section 117(2) of the Act comes after the passing of the order of the Confirming Authority. Constable Amrik Singh, in Civil Appeal No. 3201 of 1989, decided on 29th January, 1991. A perusal of the aforesaid decision, however, indicates that it was confined to the proceedings under section 117(2) of the Act. The stage contemplated under section 117(2) of the Act comes after the passing of the order of the Confirming Authority. While the provisions contained in section 117(1) of the Act requires that the Confirming Authority has to satisfy itself of the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the General Security Force Court or as to the regularity of any proceedings to which the order relates, the provisions contained in section 117(2) of the Act provide that when there is a challenge to the order passed by the Confirming Authority the concerned superior authority may pass such order as it thinks fit. There is vast difference in the exercise of the powers envisaged under section 117(1) and 117(2) of the Act and their scope are also different. Before the Authority exercising the jurisdiction envisaged under section 117(2) of the Act it is expected that an order as indicated herein before recording the satisfaction as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of the order passed by the General Security Force Court is available. In that view of the matter it may not be necessary to pass another detailed order especially in those cases where the material is very much available and the facts speak for themselves. 43. In the present case taking into consideration the nature of the offence envisaged under section 41(e) of the Act and further the implications arising under the exoneration of the respondent so far as the first charge levelled against him was concerned and further the nature of the evidence led in support of the alleged confession which has been utilised as a confessional statement which appears to have been made the sole basis for the conviction, the Confirming Authority ought to have adverted itself to the aspects referred to herein before going to the root of the matter while exercising its jurisdiction in regard to the recording of satisfaction regarding correctness, legality, propriety of the order passed by the General Security Force Court. 44. 44. In vain we have searched through the cryptic order passed by the Confirming Authority, the reasons which prevailed with it, we are satisfied that it is a fit case which should be remitted to the Confirming Authority for disposal afresh in accordance with law. 45. In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the considered opinion that instead of assessing the evidence in the manner done by the learned Single Judge the matter should have been remitted to the Confirming Authority for being dealt with by it in accordance with law as such an exercise could appropriately and effectively be done, with the nature and scope of the jurisdiction vesting in the Confirming Authority, by the said authority alone. 46. We, therefore, consider it proper that after setting aside the orders passed by the Confirming Authority and the Revising Authority which is also cryptic as that of Confirming Authority the case be remitted to the Confirming Authority for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 47. In the result, this appeal succeed in part. The impugned order dated 9th March, 1993 passed by the Chief Law Officer (D & L) for and on behalf of Director General, BSF as well as the order dated 12th September 1992 passed by the Director, BSF Academy, Tekanpur (Confirming Authority) are quashed with a direction to the Confirming Authority the Director, BSF Academy, Tekanpur to decide afresh the matter in regard to the confirmation of the order passed by the General Security Force Court exercising the jurisdiction under section 117(1) of the Act in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. Since, the matter has become old, the Director shall pass the final orders within a period not later than two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before it. 48. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.