ORDER Dipak Misra, J. To have democracy, a Government, "by the people, for the people and of the people", at the grass root level the concept of Panchayat Raj was introduced. If the origin of Panchayat system is to be found out one may turn to ancient history of India which would show that the essence of decentralization was scrupulously and religiously followed in various regions. Introduction of Local Self Government the Panchayat Raj System did acquire immense and notable significance which reached its zenith when the Parliament inserted Articles 243 to 243-O by the (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 in the Constitution. The said provisions while dealing with Gram Sabha, Constitution of Panchayats, Composition of Panchayats, Reservation of Seats of Panchayats has also given certain powers to the Legislature of a State to endow the Panchayats with such power and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of Self Government. The State Legislature has been conferred with powers to make law authorising a Panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes. Article 243K deals with elections to the Panchayats and Article 243O stipulates bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters. After the constitutional amendment M.P.Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was brought into existence by Act No. 1/1994 with object and purpose to consolidate and amend law relating to establishment of Panchayats with a view to ensure effective involvement of the Panchayat Raj institution in the local administration and development activities. By virtue of the enactment of the aforesaid Act a new era ushered in, in the sphere of Panchayat Raj system, and the people of the locality became more aware of their rights and their role or participation in the local self governance. With the awakening of awareness, unwarranted zealousness also entered into the system. The case at hand exposits the over zealousness on the part of Respondent No. 4 and exposes catastrophic consequences that has erupted from the order passed by the specified officer, who has been authorised to deal with allegations, disputes arising out of elections relating to Gram Panchayats. The obtaining factual matrix has a different story to tell. The Petitioner was elected as a Member of Zila Panchayat, Damoh. The Respondent No. 4 Shri Rao Khetsingh, a septuagenarian, was also elected as a Member. The obtaining factual matrix has a different story to tell. The Petitioner was elected as a Member of Zila Panchayat, Damoh. The Respondent No. 4 Shri Rao Khetsingh, a septuagenarian, was also elected as a Member. When the question of election of President arose there was a contest between the Petitioner and the Respondent No. 4. The election took place on 1-3-2000 and all the members of the electoral college cast their votes on that day. The counting took place on the same day and the Petitioner was declared elected and was granted a certificate to that effect. At this stage the Respondent No. 4 knocked at the doors of Respondent No. 2, the specified officer, and prayed for his intervention and grant of stay of notification as enshrined under the provisions of M. P. Panchayat (Upsarpanch, President, Vice President) Nirvachan Niyam, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as 'Nirvachan Niyam 1995'). The Respondent No. 2 in quite promptitude entertained the application and directed stay of notification. Eventually, the matter was adjudicated and he set aside the election of the Petitioner on certain grounds. It is noteworthy to state here the Election Tribunal discussed about the ballot papers polled in favour of the Petitioner and came to hold the identity of the voters was disclosed. He further came to hold certain votes cast in favour of the Petitioner was liable to be rejected. Being of this view he set aside the election of the Petitioner. The specified officer further directed that the declaration of result of the Petitioner was untenable and the election Petitioner Rao Khetsingh was to be declared elected for the post of President of Zila Panchayat, Damoh inasmuch as he had secured 7 valid votes whereas Chandra Bhan Singh had secured 5 valid votes. Feeling aggrieved the present writ petition was filed. When this matter was taken up for hearing Mr. N. S. Kale and Mr. L. S. Baghel, learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner, raised a preliminary objection that the Respondent No. 4 could not have filed an application u/s 122 of the Act as no notification had come into existence. To substantiate the aforesaid submission the learned Counsel had placed reliance on Section 122 of the Act and Rules 2, 6 and 21 of the M. P. Panchayat Election Petition (Corrupt Practices and disqualification of Membership) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1995 Rules'). To substantiate the aforesaid submission the learned Counsel had placed reliance on Section 122 of the Act and Rules 2, 6 and 21 of the M. P. Panchayat Election Petition (Corrupt Practices and disqualification of Membership) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1995 Rules'). They had also referred to Section 33 of the Act. The aforesaid preliminary objection was seriously objected to by Mr. Rajendra Tiwari, learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No. 4. A Division Bench judgment rendered in the case of Tikaram v. Darshanlal, 1988 (1) MPWN 192 and another decision rendered in the case of Anantram v. Badri and others, 1996 (2) VB 296 were placed reliance upon. Considering the totality of circumstances this Court thought it apposite to recommend the matter for reference to a larger Bench. The question which was recommended for reference to a larger Bench read as under:? Whether an election dispute can be raised before the Election Tribunal on the basis of the certificate granted under Rule 17 of the 1995 Rules or one is required to file a dispute before the Tribunal after the notification has been published under Rule 22 of the 1995 Rules? On the basis of the recommendation the matter was placed before the Full Bench and the Hon'ble Chief Justice speaking for the Full Bench expressed the opinion in the following terms:? In the two decisions in Tikaram (supra) and Anantram (supra), the learned Judges were not apprised of various statutory provisions dealing clearly, explicitly and exhaustively with the manner and method of holding the elections and post election disputes. First case has been decided on one side submissions and by that time factual matrix of the case had taken different turn. In the latter case, learned Judges have not advanced any reasons in support of the conclusion. Having examined the matter, we proceed to answer the reference as follows:? Election dispute cannot be raised before the Election Tribunal on the basis of the certificate granted under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1995. Election Petition can be filed before the Election Tribunal after the notification has been published under Rule 22 of the Rules of 1995. After the decision of the Full Bench the matter has been again listed for decision on merits. I have heard Mr. N. S. Kale, and Mr. L. S. Baghel, learned senior counsel, along with Mr. Rajendra Mishra and Mr. After the decision of the Full Bench the matter has been again listed for decision on merits. I have heard Mr. N. S. Kale, and Mr. L. S. Baghel, learned senior counsel, along with Mr. Rajendra Mishra and Mr. Madan Singh for the Petitioner, and Mr. Rajendra Tiwari, learned senior counsel, along with Mr. R. K. Shrivastava for the Respondents. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner that as the application u/s 122 was not maintainable the findings recorded thereupon are unsustainable and hence, the whole proceeding before the specified officer has to be quashed. It is urged by the learned Counsel that a proceeding assailing an election has to be strictly construed as per the mandate of the statute and any deviation thereof cannot be countenanced and the findings recorded by the authority concerned has to be washed off and a direction should be given for notification of the result of the Petitioner. It is also studiedly canvassed by Mr. Kale that the specified officer could not have granted stay of notification as such a power does not vest with him and by such an order the Petitioner was deprived to function as the President of Zila Panchayat and it is an uncalled for exercise of power and exposes the abuse of the process of law. Resisting the aforesaid submissions it is canvassed by Mr. Tiwari, learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No. 4, that the specified officer has passed a reasoned order and that having been based on proper appreciation of material on record this Court should not, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction interfere with the same. It is also putforth by him that the ballot papers have been scrutinized and reasonings have been given for rejecting the votes cast in favour of the writ Petitioner and on the basis of the order passed by the Election Tribunal the Respondent No. 4 has been functioning as President of Zila Panchayat and, therefore, this Court should not put the clock back. The learned senior counsel has also argued that as justice has been done a prerogative writ need not be issued as that would amount to restoration of a situation which is not warrantable. The learned senior counsel has also argued that as justice has been done a prerogative writ need not be issued as that would amount to restoration of a situation which is not warrantable. It is his further submission that the quashment of the order would not lead to any effective consequence inasmuch as the similar result is bound to follow in view of the invalid acceptance of votes in favour of the writ Petitioner and in absence of any change in the ultimate result issuance of writ by this Court would be a futile one and Courts are loath to issue futile writs. Supporting the order granting stay by the Election Tribunal it has been vehemently contended by Mr. Tiwari that the specified officer has inherent powers to grant stay or pass an order of injunction on the principle that any authority who can pass a final order can also pass any interlocutory order in the interest of justice. The learned Counsel has also referred to Rule 11(2) of the 1995 Rules to draw inspiration that the Code of CPC having been made application to the proceedings before the specified officer the said authority has the power to pass such interlocutory orders. To buttress his submissions he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of P. L. Lakhanpal v. Ajit Nath Ray, AIR 1975 Del 66 , Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. Ladha Ram and Co., , Shri Mahender Singh Vs. Shri Hukam Singh and others, and K. Venkatachalam Vs. A Swamickan and Another, . Before I advert to the rival contentions raised at the Bar it is essential to state that in a democratic setup right to contest an election is very essential, fundamental to the concept of democracy but the right to elect or to be elected is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is well settled in law that it is a statutory right and nothing beyond that. A voter may say "my vote, my life" and the person intend to contest an election may proclaim 'my right to contest is indefeasible and immutable' but both are restricted by the statute. In this context I may profitably refer to Article 2430 of the Constitution which reads as under:? 243-O. Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters. ? Notwithstanding anything in this constitution ? In this context I may profitably refer to Article 2430 of the Constitution which reads as under:? 243-O. Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters. ? Notwithstanding anything in this constitution ? (a) the validity of any law relating to the determination of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purporting to be made under Article 243K, shall not be called in question in any Court; (b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. On a reading of the aforesaid provision there remains no iota of doubt that an election can be called in question in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by Legislature of a State. Section 122 of the Act provides for filing of an election petition. The said provision stipulates that an election can be called in question only when the petition is presented in a prescribed manner. The manner has been prescribed under 1995 Rules. In this context I may profitably refer to the decision rendered by the Full Bench in this case. "Hon'ble the Chief Justice has expressed thus:? Sub-section (2) of Section 122 of the Act categorically envisages that election petition shall not be admitted unless it is presented within thirty days from the date on which the election in question was notified which means, the election petition is to be presented within thirty days from the date on which the election is notified under Rule 22 of the Rules 1995 read with Section 33 of the Act. This provision fixes the starting point and the ending point for filing the election petition. That being so, election petition filed before the issuance of notification is incompetent. It can neither be filed nor admitted for consideration since it has to be presented after issuance of notification. Some decisions interpretating the word 'entertained' and 'admitted' were placed for our consideration two of which are Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works Ltd. Vs. Asstt. Commr. Sales Tax, Kanpur and Another, , and Lala Ram Vs. Hari Ram, . In the first case the word 'entertained' means 'admitted for consideration' unless the requirement subject to which it is to be filed is complied. Asstt. Commr. Sales Tax, Kanpur and Another, , and Lala Ram Vs. Hari Ram, . In the first case the word 'entertained' means 'admitted for consideration' unless the requirement subject to which it is to be filed is complied. In the latter decision, the word 'entertained' means 'filed or received by the Court'. However, true meaning can be assigned in the context of the procedure envisaged in the statutory provision. That being so, an election petition cannot be taken for consideration unless it is presented within thirty days from the date on which election in question was notified. Therefore, applying the principle laid down in Taylar v. Taylar (supra) and approved by the Apex Court in decisions mentioned in the preceding part of the judgment and well known principles of statutory interpretation that where statute is clear and explicit, no other meaning can be given, election petition filed before issuance of notification would be incompetent and cannot be taken up for consideration. In view of the aforesaid the application before the specified officer was incompetent and could not have been taken up for consideration. Submission of Mr. Tiwari is that as findings have been recorded on proper scrutiny of the material on record this Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. As has been indicated hereinbefore he has referred to certain decisions. In the case of P. L. Lakhanpal (supra) the Full Bench of Delhi High Court was concerned with the concept of futile writ. The Full Bench held that as the senior Judges had resigned Justice A. N. Ray had become the senior most puisne Judge and not only he can be reappointed but would be entitled to be reappointed as the Chief Justice of India. In view of this backdrop their Lordships dealt with the concept of futile writ. In the case at hand the said principle cannot be made applicable as the Respondent cannot say the same result would flow after the matter is re-adjudicated. In any case the facts being totally dissimilar the concept of issuance of futile writ does not arise in the present case. In the case of Sukhad Raj Singh (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with the recounting of disputed votes on the basis of concession given by the parties that the result of election as per the recount would be final. In the case of Sukhad Raj Singh (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with the recounting of disputed votes on the basis of concession given by the parties that the result of election as per the recount would be final. Such a situation is not in existence in the present case. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case is totally distinguishable. In the case of Mahendar Singh (supra) an order of recounting was passed on the basis of agreement by the parties. On that ground the learned Judge came to hold the parties cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate. The factual matrix in the instant case is totally different and hence, the ratio of the aforesaid case is not attracted. In the case of K. Venkatachalam (supra) the Apex Court came to hold that High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and declare that election was illegal inasmuch as elector did not possess the basic constitutional and statutory qualification. Their Lordships in the said case took note of the fact that the Appellant therein was not an elector in electoral roll for Assembly constituency for general election and he filed his nomination on affidavit impersonating himself for another person of the same name in the electoral roll and hence, lacked the basic qualification under Clause (c) of the Article 173 of the Constitution read with Section 5 of the Representation of People Act, 1951. There cannot be any analogy between the case at hand and the aforesaid decision and, therefore, the ratio laid down therein is not at all applicable. As the decisions cited by Mr. Tiwari are not of any assistance to the Respondent No. 4 the core question that arises for consideration whether the findings recorded by the specified officer should be given the stamp of approval by this Court. As has been held by the Full Bench the presentation before the specified officer was incompetent. He had no jurisdiction at that juncture to entertain the application. If findings are recorded in a proceeding which is not entertainable. I am of the considered view the said findings cannot be approved by the higher forum as that would tantamount to perpetuation of illegality. Hence, the order passed by the specified officer is liable to be quashed and accordingly I so direct. If findings are recorded in a proceeding which is not entertainable. I am of the considered view the said findings cannot be approved by the higher forum as that would tantamount to perpetuation of illegality. Hence, the order passed by the specified officer is liable to be quashed and accordingly I so direct. Another facet of this case which is quite disquieting deserves to be dealt with. The Respondent No. 4, before notification of the result rushed to the specified officer who in quick despatch passed an order of stay. Mr. Tiwari has endeavoured hard to support the aforesaid action of the specified officer by contending that if a specified officer can declare an election to be invalid he can pass an order of stay staying the publication of the notification. The learned Counsel has contended that such powers do inhere with a Court or Tribunal. At this juncture, I am not inclined to address to the aforesaid larger question. Suffice it to say that the specified officer has not been conferred any power to pass an order of stay or injunction. Mr. Tiwari has drawn the attention of this Court to Rule 11(2) of 1995 Rules to show that certain provisions of the CPC are attracted. On a perusal of the said Rule it appears that certain procedural aspects have been made applicable to the proceedings before the specified officer but there is no conferment of power to pass an order of injunction. A specified officer under the Act cannot travel beyond the statutory provisions. He is a creature of the statute and has to function within the parameters of the statute and the Rules framed thereunder and cannot transgress the same and pass orders as it pleases him. The learned Counsel for Respondent No. 4 impressed upon this Court that as the specified officer is authorised in law to declare an election as bad in law he has the jurisdiction to pass such ancillary orders for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Such a broad proposition may have acceptance in respect of certain other spheres but as far as election jurisprudence is concerned the same has no applicability. It was also vehemently urged by Mr. Tiwari that specified officer can exercise such a discretion when the facts and circumstances so warrant and when the backbone of democracy is likely to be crushed. Such a broad proposition may have acceptance in respect of certain other spheres but as far as election jurisprudence is concerned the same has no applicability. It was also vehemently urged by Mr. Tiwari that specified officer can exercise such a discretion when the facts and circumstances so warrant and when the backbone of democracy is likely to be crushed. The aforesaid submission though may look attractive has an inherent fallacy in it. As has been stated earlier in a democratic setup right to elect or right to be elected are basically and fundamentally statutory rights. If an authority has not been conferred jurisdiction the question of exercise of discretion does not arise. It is to be remembered by every adjudicating authority that while exercising judicial or quasi-judicial duty one has to lock one's personal and private views of the law and be strictly guided by the mandate of the statute. Exercise of any discretion without authority of law is nothing but plain and simple arbitrariness. In all circumstances Rule of Law has to prevail and arbitrariness has to be ostracised. Thus in my considered opinion the specified officer committed a Himalayan blunder by directing stay of publication of notification. In view of my preceding analysis the writ petition is allowed and the competent authority under the Rules is directed to notify the result of the election of the Petitioner. Needless to emphasize the election of the Petitioner can be assailed by a person who is allowed in law to challenge the same in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 2,500/-. Final Result : Allowed