O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) THE dispute relates with regard to an accommodation in the form of a Kotha situate in mohalla farash Tola. lahsil Sadar district Azamgarh. It was under the tenancy of late Ram Charan initially at a monthly rent of Rs. 25. Ram Charan died in the month of September. 1981. The tenancy rights were inherited by defendant No. 1-Bacchi Devi, widow and two daughters of the deceased-tenant. A S. C. C. Suit No. 10 of 1992 was instituted by Smt. Khairulnnisan. present respondent No. 3 against Smt. Bacchi Devi widow of the deceased tenant and his two daughters, who were arrayed as defendant Nos. 1. 2 and 3. The ejectment of the legal heirs of the deceased tenant was sought on the ground that they have sub-let the tenanted accommodation in favour of servajeet son of Jag Mohan who was impleaded as defendant No. 4 in the suit. The suit was contested by the defendants resisting the allegations made by the plaintiff-respondent No. 3-Khairulnisan. It was maintained that Servajeet who is now petitioner No. 2, was not the sub-tenant in the tenanted accommodation but was. in fact, joint tenant and in occupation of the disputed accommodation right from the life-time of Ram Charan. The suit was decreed by the munsif City. Azamgarh on 27. 5. 1992 recording a categorical finding that the legal heirs of deceased-tenant Ram Charan have, in fact, sub-let the tenanted accommodation in favour of servajeet, The widow of the deceased tenant died and consequently a revision application No. 198 of 1992 under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act (hereafter referred to as the Act) was preferred by Smt. Prabhawati Devi. daughter of the deceased Ram Charan and others. The landlady Smt. Khairulnnisan also filed a Civil Revision No. 215 of 1992 under section 25 of the Act challenging the findings of the court below on certain other points which are not germane to be recited for the purposes of decision in the present writ petition. Both the revision applications were dismissed by the 1st Additional District Judge. Azamgarh by order dated 5. 1. 1993. Smt. Prabhawati who died during the pendency of the present petition and servajeet came up before this Court under Article 236 of the Constitution of India to challenge the orders passed by the trial court as well as revlsional court. Both the revision applications were dismissed by the 1st Additional District Judge. Azamgarh by order dated 5. 1. 1993. Smt. Prabhawati who died during the pendency of the present petition and servajeet came up before this Court under Article 236 of the Constitution of India to challenge the orders passed by the trial court as well as revlsional court. ( 2 ) HEARD Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Sri R. C. Gupta. appearing on behalf of the landlady-respondent No. 3. ( 3 ) SRI S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that Servajeet-petitioner No. 2 was never a sub-tenant of the disputed accommodation but, in fact, was a Joint tenant in his own right with Ram Charan and was in joint possession of the disputed accommodation with him and continued to enjoy the said position with the legal heirs of the deceased Ram Charan and. therefore, he cannot be labelled as a sub-tenant and. therefore, the order of eviction passed against the petitioners is wholly illegal and is based on misreading of the evidence. It was also urged that the respondent No. 3.-Smt. Khairulnnisan was never the owner of the disputed accommodation and relationship of landlady and tenant did not subsist between her and the petitioners. All these submissions have been emphatically repelled by Sri R. C. Gupta appearing on behalf of the landlady. ( 4 ) AFTER having heard learned counsel for the parties, the moot points which arise for determination by this Court are (1) whether the petitioner No. 2 is occupying the tenanted accommodation as a subtenant or he was a joint tenant along with late Ram Cnaran who admittedly was the tenant in the disputed shop. and (2) whether the suit at the instance of Smt. Khairulnnisan for ejectment of the petitioners is maintainable. ( 5 ) TO begin with, it may be mentioned that the two courts below have recorded very elaborate and reasoned concurrent finding of fact that Servajeet was let into possession and inducted as sub-tenant in the tenanted accommodation after the death of late Ram Charan. The concurrent finding of fact normally is not capable of being disturbed in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The revlsional court has also dealt with the circumstances in which smt. Khairulnnisan became the owner and landlady of the tenanted accommodation. The concurrent finding of fact normally is not capable of being disturbed in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The revlsional court has also dealt with the circumstances in which smt. Khairulnnisan became the owner and landlady of the tenanted accommodation. ( 6 ) IN view of the concurrent finding of the two courts below with regard to the fact of sub-tenancy, it is uphill task for the petitioners to assail it : nevertheless, since the question of sub-letting is not a pure question of fact but mixed question of fact and law, I would do better in my quest to reach the truth to enter into the controversy. If a finding recorded by the two courts below is perverse or is based on misconstruction of relevant documents and materials, the writ court can interfere. See Shama Prasant Raje v. Ganpat Rao and others. AIR 2000 SC 3094 . I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have waded through the entire evidence on record. ( 7 ) BEFORE embarking upon the question of sub-letting, it would be proper to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of Indict, AIR 1998 sc 1240 , in which the circumstances from which sub-letting may be inferred and the nature of the evidence required to be taken into consideration have come to be laid down. The law on the point is that to prove sub-letting, production of affirmative evidence showing payment of monetary consideration by the subtenant to the tenant is not necessary. Inference to sub-letting can be drawn from proof of delivery of exclusive possession of the premises by the tenant to sub-tenant. Such-tenancy or sub-letting comes into existence when the tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement or understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. Rather, the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord, concealing the overt acts and transferring possession clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord, in the sense that the landlord had not let out the premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering into possession over the demised property. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence. the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the sub-tenant. It would also be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sub-let had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent. undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or promised to be paid. It may have been paid in lump-sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is let out or sub-let or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the Court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises were sub-let. In the backdrop of above observations of the Apex Court, the question of exclusive possession becomes highly relevant. Where a person is not found to be in exclusive possession, it would be difficult to infer that he is a sub-tenant, vis-a-vis. the principal tenant. In Shana Prasant Rajes case (supra), it was held that parting with possession has to be established in making out a case of sub-letting. Such possession must be backed by some consideration. Where a person was found to be In exclusive possession and Is paying rent as consideration money for parting with the premises. sub-tenancy is inferable. According to Sri S. U. Khan, the essential element of exclusive possession is missing in this case and, therefore, Servajeet cannot be branded as a sub-tenant. Such possession must be backed by some consideration. Where a person was found to be In exclusive possession and Is paying rent as consideration money for parting with the premises. sub-tenancy is inferable. According to Sri S. U. Khan, the essential element of exclusive possession is missing in this case and, therefore, Servajeet cannot be branded as a sub-tenant. He also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Resham Singh v. Kaghbir Singh and another, AIR 1999 SC 3087 . I find that the observations made in the said decision are not applicable squarely to the facts of the case in hand. In Resham Singhs case (supra), the principal tenant was involved in criminal proceedings and was. therefore, absconding. His real brother was looking after the shop premises. It was in these circumstances that it was held that there was no evidence to show that the possession of the premises was parted by the tenant exclusively in favour of his brother and consequently, the relationship of lessor and lessee between the tenant and his brother was not established. The case of sub-letting in the above circumstances was not held to have been made out. Resham Singhs case (supra) is hardly of any help to the petitioners. ( 8 ) FROM the evidence on record, it is well established that Bechan Munim who admittedly was the owner-landlord of the disputed accommodation let Ram Charan alone into possession as a tenant. Ram Charan had executed a rent note in favour of the landlord. He was carrying on the pipe business from the tenanted accommodation. It was Ram Charan alone, who was paying rent to the landlord. At the initial stage when Ram Charan was inducted as tenant, Servajeet did not figure at all. It was suggested that Servajeet was also inducted as a tenant by Bechan Munim along with Ram Charan. Servajeet carries on the work of tailoring. It is not established when and by whom he was inducted as tenant. It is not understandable why Servajeet would be inducted as tenant along with Ram Charan. The tenanted accommodation which is in the form of a shop, could not have been utilised for the purposes of tailoring and stitching as well as the carrying on the pipe business. There is nothing in common between the original tenant Ram Charan and servajeet. It is not understandable why Servajeet would be inducted as tenant along with Ram Charan. The tenanted accommodation which is in the form of a shop, could not have been utilised for the purposes of tailoring and stitching as well as the carrying on the pipe business. There is nothing in common between the original tenant Ram Charan and servajeet. They are not related to each other in any manner. They belong to the different castes. There is firm and convincing evidence on record to indicate that Servajeet was carrying on tailoring work from another place and that he never sat on the tenanted shop along with Ram charan. The case of Servajeet himself is destructive of the plea that he was Inducted as a Joint tenant along with Ram Charan. According to him. he came to be Inducted in the disputed shop soon after the death of Ram Charan. This assertion of Servajeet is clearly in conflict with his stand that he was also inducted with Ram Charan as a joint tenant by Bechan Munim. ( 9 ) LATE Ram Charan left no male member in his family. He was survived by his widow and two daughters. The daughters were married in other families. It was after the death of Ram Charan that Servajeet was let into exclusive possession of the tenanted shop. The respondent No. 3-landlady or, for that matter, any other landlord, did not acknowledge Servajeet as the tenant along with the legal heirs of the deceased Ram Charan. There is no evidence of the fact that servajeet had directly paid rent in his own right to the landlady. ( 10 ) SOME documents have been brought on record to indicate that somehow the name of servajeet came to be mentioned. It was a result of fabrication and manipulation on the part of servajeet that his name came to be shown along with late Ram Charan. This fact was noticed by the courts below. On the other hand, after the death of Ram Charan, landlady refused to receive the rent from Servajeet. If Servajeet was really a joint tenant along with late Ram Charan, there was hardly any occasion for the landlady to refuse to receive the rent. Without dilating the matter any further. This fact was noticed by the courts below. On the other hand, after the death of Ram Charan, landlady refused to receive the rent from Servajeet. If Servajeet was really a joint tenant along with late Ram Charan, there was hardly any occasion for the landlady to refuse to receive the rent. Without dilating the matter any further. I find that the trial court has come to a reasonable and logical conclusion that servajeet was inducted as a sub-tenant in the tenanted accommodation after the death of principal tenant-late Ram Charan. This finding, which has been affirmed by the revisional court, cannot be said to be perverse or, in any manner, based on misreading or misconstruction of the relevant documents and materials. There is no warrant to deviate with the finding recorded by the two courts below on the point. The case of ejectment on the ground of sub-tenancy is clearly made out. ( 11 ) NOW It is the time to consider the second limb of the submission made by Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners that Smt. Khairulnnisan-respondent No. 3 could not maintain the suit as she was neither the owner nor landlady of the tenanled accommodation, and therefore, the decree of ejectment of the petitioners passed in her favour stands vitiated. Sri R. C. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 urged that it is a new plea which is being taken before this Court and in any case, the relationship of landlady and tenant is not in dispute. It was urged on behalf of the respondent No. 3-landlady that the petitioners have acknowledged her as their landlady and now they cannot be permitted to wriggle out of the admitted position. The submission made by Sri R. C. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 appears to have substantial force. In para 4 of the written statement, the petitioners have admitted that the rent had been paid to the landlady even after the death of Ram Charan. Being an illiterate lady, she did not issue receipts ; that she had issued the receipts by putting her thumb mark on the receipts scribed by her servants or children. In para 5 of the written statement. It is stated that the respondent No. 3-landlady was told to accept the rent and to issue the receipts. Not only this. Being an illiterate lady, she did not issue receipts ; that she had issued the receipts by putting her thumb mark on the receipts scribed by her servants or children. In para 5 of the written statement. It is stated that the respondent No. 3-landlady was told to accept the rent and to issue the receipts. Not only this. In para 3 of the writ petition, it has been mentioned that Servajeet, petitioner No. 2 was joint tenant with late Ram Charan for a long period within the knowledge and express consent of the landlady. The expression landlady obviously has reference to the respondent No. 3. From the above averments, it is well-established that the petitioners have acknowledged the respondent no. 3 as their landlady. In a suit for ejectment, relationship of landlady and tenant only is to be seen. The question of title is not required to be gone into. There are cases where a person, though may not be owner, acts as a landlord. ( 12 ) EVEN otherwise, certain facts have come on record to indicate that the respondent No. 3-the plaintiff is also owner of the tenanted accommodation. One Mattar who was the owner of the property was having two sons, namely, Ali Hassan alias Bechan Munim and Kamaruddln alias chamru who pre-deceased Mattar. Smt. Khairulnnisan-respondent No. 3 was the wife of kamaruddin and after the death of her husband, she married Ali Hasan alias Bechan Munim brother of her husband. The first wife of Ali Hasan alias Bechan Munim had developed insanity. Out of the wedlock of Ali Hasan alias Bechan Munim and Smt. Khairutnnisan-respondent No. 3, two children took birth. Smt. Khairulnnisan had undoubtedly a share in the property owned by her father-in-law Mattar. being widow of his pre-deceased son in her own rights. AH Hasan alias bechan Munim had also made a gift in her favour. Sri S. U. Khan learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the oral gift (Hiba) by a husband in favour of his wife in lieu of dower is void as immovable property worth more than Rs. 100 can be transferred by a duly registered instrument. In support of his submission he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in samsuddin v. Smt. Ameer Zahan Begum. 1995 All CJ 108. 100 can be transferred by a duly registered instrument. In support of his submission he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in samsuddin v. Smt. Ameer Zahan Begum. 1995 All CJ 108. ( 13 ) SRI R. C. Gupta learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 pointed out that a suit for partition was filed and the litigation between the sons of Ali Hasan alias Bechan Munim from his first wife and respondent No. 3 took place which culminated in Second Appeal No. 1929 of 1990, decided by this Court on 6. 9. 1994, The respondent No. 3, therefore, was the owner of the property in dispute. In view of the fact that the relationship between the landlady and tenant stood established between the parties, the suit could be filed by the respondent No. 3 for the ejectment of the petitioners. ( 14 ) IN the conspectus of above facts, the writ petition turns out to be devoid of any force or substance. It is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. .