JUDGMENT Aloke Chakrabarti, J. This application was filed challenging Award dated September 21, 1998 passed under the Arbitration Act, 1940. On an offer by the respondent Greaves Limited to the petitioner Braithwaite Burn & Jessop Construction Company Ltd., for getting design, erection and commissioning of gantries for Second Hooghly Bridge, purchase order was placed by the petitioner dated August 19/ September 11, 1985. Work order dated September 17, 1985 was placed by the petitioner on the respondent for erection and commissioning of the two gantries. The first gantry was delivered by the respondent in two separate consignments dated November 24, 1987 and November 28, 1987. Second gantry was delivered on May 31, 1988. Bills were raised by the respondent claiming escalation of wages and steel price incorporating also a claim for central sales tax at the rate of 4 per cent. In June 1988, the respondent raised bills claiming escalation of wages and steel price with similar claim of central sales tax at the rate of 4 per cent. Further bill was raised by the respondent on February 13, 1990 for balance erection and commissioning charges. When Declaration Forms were refused to be supplied, claim for balance sales tax was also made. 2. The respondent filed its first application on June 24, 1990 under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking filing of agreement and reference to arbitration of disputes relating to wage escalation and steel prices escalation in respect of two gantries. Second application under section 20 of the said Act was filed on February 27, 1992 seeking reference to arbitration of disputes relating to central sales tax and erection and commissioning charges in respect of two gantries. Disputes were referred to Arbitrator on April 3, C 1992 on disposal of the first application under section 20. There was a change of Arbitrator by a further order dated April 2, 1993. The second application under section 20 was decided on August 6, 1996 referring the disputes to arbitration. Award was passed in respect of the first proceeding and the amount held payable thereunder, has since been realised on execution. Award was passed on September 21, 1998 in respect of the second proceeding which has been challenged in the present petition. Heard Mr. Debal Banerjee, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned counsel for the respondent. 3. Broadly two questions have been raised herein. Award was passed on September 21, 1998 in respect of the second proceeding which has been challenged in the present petition. Heard Mr. Debal Banerjee, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned counsel for the respondent. 3. Broadly two questions have been raised herein. The first one is that two arbitration proceedings were not permissible as the entire cause of action arose out of one contract and principles as contained in Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, bars the second proceeding. Resulting consequence is that the award in the second arbitration is bad. The second aspect is, cause of action relating to claim for sales tax arose much before the first application under section 20 was filed as the claim for sales tax was at the rate of 10 per cent according to the prevailing rates and there was no occasion of supply of declaration forms on refusal whereof, no cause of action arose extending period to lodge a claim. 4. It has been strongly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was only one offer and one acceptance leading to only one contract and by mere issuance of two work orders relating to two parts of the job under the agreement, no separate cause of action arose entitling the respondent to initiate two separate proceedings for arbitration. For the contention that the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code applies in arbitration proceeding, law has been relied on as decided in the case of K.V. George vs. Secretary to Government, Water and Power Department, Tribandam, reported in AIR 1990 SC 53 and Jiwnani Engineering Works Private Limited vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1978 Cal. 228 . Relying on the aforesaid law, it has been contended strongly that the cause of action in respect of the second application also arose earlier and, therefore, the respondent was not entitled to split the same in two proceedings as bar under Order 2 Rule 2 becomes applicable. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no reason has been given in the impugned award as to why the contention relating to Order 2 Rule 2 as advanced by the respondent was accepted in the award. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no reason has been given in the impugned award as to why the contention relating to Order 2 Rule 2 as advanced by the respondent was accepted in the award. It is stated that the work order specifically refers to terms and conditions separate form the terms and conditions contained in the purchase order. But the same will not result in two different causes of action. Moreover, such contention relying on the separate terms and conditions, was not raised in course of Arbitration and, therefore, the respondent is not entitled to make such contention in the present proceeding particularly when the same has not been even mentioned in the Affidavit-in-Opposition. 5. The application under section 20 in the second proceeding has been referred to for showing that the respondent mentioned only the purchase order, wherein arbitration agreement has been contained and this shows that even at that stage work order was not relied on for the purpose of showing cause of action. Law, in this respect, relied on as formulated at page 1056 of Code of Civil Procedure by Mullah in its 15th Edition as also laid down in the cases of K.E.A.K. Ahmed Sahib & Co. vs. M.K. Pakir Mahomed Rawther, reported in AIR 1924 Rangoon 145, Duncan Brother & Co. vs. Jeetmull Greedhari Lall, reported in (1872) LL.R.(19) Calcutta 372, Hazari Ram vs. Firm Umrao Singh, reported in AIR 1946 All.h.512, Union of India vs. Firm Baijnath Gobind Das, reported in 1956 A.L.J. 918 and Lloyd Bitumen Products Ltd. vs. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation, reported in 1990(2) Cal. L.T. 245. On the question of condonation of delay, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that notice under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 had been served on the petitioner by the Court only on February 1, 1999 and, therefore, there is a delay of 17 days in filing the present application. In such circumstances, it is stated that such delay may be condoned and the application be decided on merit. 6. Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned counsel for the respondent contended that in terms of the provisions contained in Article 119(b) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation is 30 days from the date of service of the notice of filing of award. 6. Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned counsel for the respondent contended that in terms of the provisions contained in Article 119(b) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation is 30 days from the date of service of the notice of filing of award. Relying on some documents, being copies of certain correspondences, the learned counsel for the respondent stated that the petitioner was served with notice of filing of the award, though not by the court and, therefore, the application suffers from limitation for a long period much larger than the period of 17 days as pleaded in th application. It is stated by the learned counsel for the respondent that the notice issued by the court but any notice intimating filing of the award and any support of such contention relying on to the law as laid down in the case of State of West Bengal vs. L. M. Das, reported in AIR 1976 Cal 406 , Ch. Ramalinga Reddy vs. Superintending Engineer, reported in 1999(9) SCC 610 , Food Corporation of India vs. E. Kuitappan, reported in 1993 (3) SCC 445 and State of Bihar vs. Rameshwar Prasad, reported in AIR 1994 SC 50l. Relying on the aforesaid fact and law, it is contended that the present application is badly time barred having been filed after a long delay and, therefore, should not be entertained. 7. On merit, it has been contended that the causes of action in the two applications under section 20 are totally different. In the first application, the subject matter of claim related to wages escalation and steel price escalation. The claim relating to sales tax was only towards the additional six per cent which fell due only on non supply of sales tax declaration forms. Therefore, cause of action relating to the same arose only on November 19, 1990 and, therefore, the same could not be included in the first application under section 20 filed on June 24, 1990. 8. With regard to existence of separate cause of action in view of different terms and conditions contained in the work order specifically referred to in the work order also refers to the purchase order which is the original agreement. On the question as to what is cause of action, the law explained in the case of Md. 8. With regard to existence of separate cause of action in view of different terms and conditions contained in the work order specifically referred to in the work order also refers to the purchase order which is the original agreement. On the question as to what is cause of action, the law explained in the case of Md. Khalil Khan vs. Mehaboob Ali Mia, reported in AIR 1949 P.C. 78 and law stated at page 1042 in the Code of Civil Procedure by Mullah (15th Edition) was strongly relied on. It is stated that difference in the terms and conditions as contained in the work order and the purchase order was argued before the Arbitrator and for the said purpose, minute of the seventh sitting of arbitration was referred to. With regard to the second application under section 20, it has been stated by the respondent that in the second application itself prayer was made for consolidated hearing of the two applications and, therefore, objection of not raising the said contentions in the first application, cannot stand. With regard to the contention as regards one contract and one termination, it is stated that in this regard two-views were possible and the learned Arbitrator has adopted one and such finding cannot be altered by the court as in such cases, court is not to interfere. In support of such contention, reference was made in the cases of Hind Builders vs. Union of India, reported in 1990(3) SCC 338 and Jagdish Ch. Bhatia vs. Lachman Das Bhatia, reported in 1993(1) SCC 548 . 9. After considering the aforesaid, I find that on the question of limitation and condonation of delay, the contention of the respondent about the knowledge of the petitioner earlier than service of notice of filing of the award, does not stand. Law in this connection, is settled that for the said purpose requirement is filing of the award in the Court and intimation thereof by the Registry of the Court to the parties concerned. Beyond this no other technicality is required to be complied under the statutory provision. Law in this regard as decided in the case of Indian Rayon Corporation Limited vs. Raunaq & Company Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 1988 SC 2054 , is relavant. Beyond this no other technicality is required to be complied under the statutory provision. Law in this regard as decided in the case of Indian Rayon Corporation Limited vs. Raunaq & Company Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 1988 SC 2054 , is relavant. Therefore, in the present facts when only contention raised by the respondent is that the petitioner was served with notice of filing of the award though not by the court and therefore, the application is barred by the law of limitation for a longer period much larger than the period of seventeen days, the said contention does not stand the test regarding such question as indicated in the case of Indian Rayon Corporation Limited (supra). With regard to the delay of seventeen days, in view of the facts available, r find in the interest of justice in such facts the delay of seventeen days should be condoned. 10. With regard to the contention regarding bar of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I find the cause of action in respect of the first application was regarding claim for escalation of wages and steel price and for the same, entitlement occured on delivery of the gantries. In fact bills for the said purpose were also raised in June 1988 by the respondent. But the second application was relating to commissioning charges and the claim regarding balance amount towards sales tax dues which arose on non furnishing of sales tax declaration forms by the petitioner. Apparently the causes of action in the two proceedings are not same. Law in this regard as decided in the case of K.V. George (supra) and Jiwnani Engineering Works Private Limited (supra) were decided in different factual circumstances and, therefore, does not apply in the present facts when claims in the second application arose subsequently. Claim for balance sales tax could be made only on refusal by the petitioner to furnish sales tax declaration form and before that the claim was only for furnishing sales tax declaration form. In such circumstances, causes of action in the two proceedings are not same. Moreover, law in this regard as decided in the case of Lloyd Bitumen Products Limited (supra) does not help the petitioner. In such circumstances, causes of action in the two proceedings are not same. Moreover, law in this regard as decided in the case of Lloyd Bitumen Products Limited (supra) does not help the petitioner. The correct test for this purpose is whether the claim in the new suit is infact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation in the former suit. In the present case, I have already held that the causes of action in the two proceedings were different and, therefore, applying the above test, it does not appear that the second petition was barred under the principles contained in Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the aforesaid findings, there is no question of interference with the impugned award. No other point having been argued by the petitioner, petition is dismissed. Stay prayed for and the same is refused. All parties are to act on a xeroxed signed copy of this judgment on the usual undertaking. Writ petition dismissed. Stay order refused.