T. R. Gupta Contractors v. National Hydroelectric Power Corp. Ltd.
2001-12-12
A.M.MIR
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
1. The sole question arising out of this petition filed under section 20 of the Arbitration Act is as to whether or not an arbitrable dispute exists between the parties, who are admittedly governed by an arbitration agreement dated: 20-01-1983. To the disputes raised by the petitioner in his application, the objection by the respondent-Corporation is that the amount of money received by the claimants was released as full and final satisfaction of the entire claim, which was acknowledged and accorded by the claimant-petitioner and after acknowledging such position, he is stopped from turning back and raising the plea of an arbitrable dispute. BRIEF FACTS: 2. The parties entered into an agreement in writing on20-01-1983. The existence and terms of the agreement are not deemed by either of the parties. On 17-07-1992 the parties entered into a compromise in respect of payment of cement variations and standards of material. I feel it necessary to reproduce the undertaking in verbatim. It reads as under: - UNDERTAKING: We, M/s T.R. Gupta Contractors, for the work of construction of Performed Plunge Pool at Salal Project Stage-I, have gone through the decision of competent authority in respect of the case for cement variation payment for different grades of concrete used in the construction of Plungs Pool for use of additional cement in between specified quantity and actual quantity used which is as under:- a) M-150 P.C.C. should be compared with 80 mm size aggregate (221 kg. cement) Vs. actuals. b) M-150 RCC should be compared with 40 mm size aggregate (245 kg) Vs. actuals, c) All M-200 concrete should be compared with 40 mm size aggregate (265 kg) Vs. actuals. We have studied the case thoroughly and the decision and payments being released thereof are acceptable to us as full and final settlement of the case. No further claims with reference to cement/aggregate in the subject matter shall be raised by us in future nor shall we go for arbitration on the issue.� 3. It becomes clear that the petitioner-company agreed to the release of the amount in terms of the agreement as full and final settlement of the claim. The negative clause towards the end of the concluding para of the undertaking makes it clear that any further claim of cement/aggregate was waived. However, the matter does not end here. 4.
It becomes clear that the petitioner-company agreed to the release of the amount in terms of the agreement as full and final settlement of the claim. The negative clause towards the end of the concluding para of the undertaking makes it clear that any further claim of cement/aggregate was waived. However, the matter does not end here. 4. It has been pleaded in the application that this undertaking was not entered upon by dint of free will of the petitioner-company On the other hand it is pleaded that this was the outcome of pressure/coercion. In this behalf a communication, which is said to have been sent to the respondent-corporation, prior to the date of undertaking i.e. 14-07-1992, and two such other communications reflecting the reservation, subsequent to the date of undertaking, dated: 18-07-1992 and 29-07-1992, have been relied upon. Mr. Thakur, appearing for the petitioner, has taken me through these communications. The whole case of the petitioner is that he lodged a protest against the undertaking before and after the same was executed. That, according to him, is sufficient to prove that the undertaking was not executed by his client out of his free will. 5. Mr. J.P. Singh, appearing for the respondent-corporation, has impressed upon the text of section 20 of the Arb. Act. According to him the court under this provision of law acts only as an umpire. It does not normally decides issues. It refers a matter to the arbitrator only, when it finds a dispute existing, which is capable of being referred to him. It is bound by the agreement between the parties and the court cannot go into legality or otherwise of the agreement, including one arrived at by the parties subsequently. 6. Before adverting to the position of law on the subject, I would like to place on record that in terms of the agreement dated: 20-01-1983, the date of termination of the contract by way of completion of the work was agreed to be 30-06-1985. The anomaly with regard to termination of contract is clinched by annexure PC-3, dated: 12-04-1988, a communication issued by the petitioner-company through its Executive Director, in which it has been stated that the work had been successfully tested and the project commissioned long back and to the delight of all. For purposes of adjudication of the related issues reference to the date of termination is necessary. 7.
For purposes of adjudication of the related issues reference to the date of termination is necessary. 7. It will be worthwhile to mention here that Mr. J.P. Singh has also resisted the petition for omission of the petitioner, to issue a notice as envisaged in terms of clause 55.5 of the agreement. In terms of this clause thirty days prior notice in writing was required to be issued. The clause reads as under:- 55.5 A notice of the existence in question, dispute or difference in connection with the contract, unless served by either party within 30 days of the expiry of the Defects Liability period, failing which all rights and claim under this contract shall be deemed to have been waived and thus forfeited and absolutely barred.� Mr. Thakur, however, has argued that a communication issued by his client on 06-02-1992, was a notice and it satisfies the contemplations of the clause. 8. I propose to deal with the second point relating to notice first. In terms of clause 55.5, a notice was required to be issued after the expiry of the defects/liability period. The omission to serve such a notice results in waiver and forfeiture of all rights. The communication dated: 06-02-1992 in substance makes a request for release of the outstanding payment amounting to Rs. 3,77,15,215/- within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of notice and in case the payment was not arranged within the given time, then the matter would be taken up for arbitration. This cannot be held to be a notice conforming to clause 55.5. This is so because the communication was addressed years after the expiry of defects/liability period and not within 30 days. Secondly the communication seeks the release of payment which in terms of undertaking was made on 27-07-1992. Therefore, after such release, the claim of release of money seems to have been satisfied. In my opinion the stipulations contained in para 55.5 also have a bearing on the case for determination as to whether an arbitrable dispute exists. This is so because in absence of notice, waiver and forfeiture clause will come into operation. The undertaking by itself does not leave us in any doubt with respect to the intention of the petitioner-company. It prima facie seems to convey the accord and satisfaction of the full and final settlement of the claim. 9. Mr.
This is so because in absence of notice, waiver and forfeiture clause will come into operation. The undertaking by itself does not leave us in any doubt with respect to the intention of the petitioner-company. It prima facie seems to convey the accord and satisfaction of the full and final settlement of the claim. 9. Mr. Thakur, as already observed, has tried to challenge this undertaking on the sole ground that the same was the outcome to undue influence and coercion. While dwelling upon his argument he has relied upon a case titled Wild Life Institution of India vs. Vijay Kumar Garg, reported in 1997 (10 SCC) 528. I do not understand as to how this judgment helps him in this case. The facts of this case are that the claimant received payment as full and final settlement and then issued a receipt thereof and thereafter filed an arbitration petition. It was allowed by the civil court. When an appeal from civil court judgment had been dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court, the Apex Court reversed both the findings and allowed the appeal against the order of the High Court. The lordships have held as under:- 5. Looking to the facts in the present case and the circumstances which are apparent from the correspondence exchanged between the parties in connection with the signing of the receipt of 23-10-1993, it is clear that the final payment was accepted by the respondent in full satisfaction of all his claims under the contract and that there was no dispute outstanding.� 10. Mr. Thakur has, however, tried to avail of the concluding sentence of para 5 of this judgment, which reads as under: - After the receipt of the said amount also, the respondent has not lodged any protest nor has he alleged any pressure being put upon him for signing the receipt.� Mr. Thakurs argument is that in his case a protest was duly lodged therefore, an arbitrable dispute existed. In my opinion this connection is misconceived. The law laid down by their lordships is the same as laid down earlier in two cases, which I am going to refer to.
Thakurs argument is that in his case a protest was duly lodged therefore, an arbitrable dispute existed. In my opinion this connection is misconceived. The law laid down by their lordships is the same as laid down earlier in two cases, which I am going to refer to. In this case also in para 4 their lordships, while referring to a letter, observed that the letter did not make reference to the receipt nor did the letter contain allegation that the amount was received under protest or respondent No.1 had, in any manner, been pressurized in giving that receipt. In the present case also I find that in both the annexures, which are said to have been addressed to the corporation, no such reference to the undertaking, its text or it having been executed under pressure or duress, has been made. Therefore, the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject require a mention. 11. The point came up for consideration in a case titled M/s P.K. Ramaiah and company Vs. Chairman and Managing Director National Thermal Power Corpn. reported in 1994 Supp(3) Supreme Court Cases 126. In this case written acceptance of payment was made as full and final settlement of the claims. A subsequent claim for further amount in respect of the same work was held not to be a dispute arbitrable. Their lordships held as under:- 8. On those facts, this court held that although there was alleged payment as final satisfaction of the contract, yet as the respondent did not give any receipt accepting the settlement of the claim, the payment was unilateral, so the dispute still subsisted and therefore it was arbitrable dispute and the reference was valid. In Bhan Parkash case also there was no full and final settlement and payment was not received under a receipt. In L.K. Ahuja and Co. case this court while laying the general law held that if the bill was prepared by the department, the claim gets weakened. That was not a case of accord and satisfaction but one of pleading bar of limitation without prior rejection of the claim. Therefore, the ratio therein is of little assistance. The Calcutta High Court merely followed the statement of law laid in Ahuja & Co, case.
That was not a case of accord and satisfaction but one of pleading bar of limitation without prior rejection of the claim. Therefore, the ratio therein is of little assistance. The Calcutta High Court merely followed the statement of law laid in Ahuja & Co, case. It is not shown to us that the Chief Construction Manager was competent to acknowledge the liability or an authority to refer the dispute for arbitration. So neither his letter binds the respondent nor operates as estoppel. Admittedly the full and final satisfaction was acknowledged by a receipt in writing and the amount was received unconditionally. Thus there is accord and satisfaction by final settlement of the claims. The subsequent allegation of coercion is an afterthought and a devise to get over the settlement of the dispute, acceptance of the payment and receipt voluntarily given. In Russel on Arbitration, 19th Edn. p. 396 it is-stated that an accord and satisfaction may be pleaded in an action on award and will constitute a good defence. Accordingly we held that the appellant having acknowledged the settlement and also accepted measurements and having received the amount in full and final settlement of the claim, there is accord and satisfaction.� 12. Same view was expressed by another Bench of the Court, in a case titled State of W.B. Vs. Gopal Chander Paul, reported in 1995 (3) SCC 324. Their lordships while laying stress on final settlement agreement held that such an agreement has to be acted upon and cannot be found fault with unless that agreement is set aside in independent proceedings. It was held as under- Even otherwise we feel that once the parties have arrived at a settlement in respect of any dispute or difference arising under a contract and that dispute or the difference is amicably settled by way of a final settlement by and between the parties, unless that settlement is set aside in proper proceedings, it cannot lie in the mouth of one of the parties to the settlement to spurn it on the ground that it was a mistake and proceed to invoke the Arbitration clause.
If this is permitted the sanctity of contract, the settlement also being a contract, would be wholly lost and it would be open to one party to take the benefit under the settlement and then to question the same on the ground of mistake without having the settlement set aside. In the circumstances, we think that in the instant case since the dispute or difference was finally settled and payments were made as per the settlement, it was not open to the respondent unilaterally to treat the settlement as non-est and proceed to invoke the Arbitration clause. We are therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in the view that it took.� 13. Keeping in view that facts of the case and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the finding of this Court is as under:- Where a receipt of the amount towards full and final settlement of the claim has been executed by the claimant, the inference is that the contracting party has discharged its liability. In absence of there being any express provision in the receipt that the amount is accepted by way of protest, this presumption gets strengthened. However, where the claimant executed an undertaking that the amount was received by way of full and final settlement and the other claims were surrendered and forfeited, this undertaking assumes the shape of an agreement between the parties. The Courts while deciding the existence or otherwise of a dispute will have to be take that agreement into consideration. The Court in terms of section 20 Arb. Act has only to see as to whether a dispute between the parties has arisen and the same is covered by the agreement. The Court while proceeding in terms of section 20 does not seem to have any power of adjudging the legality and correctness of the subsequent agreement. I think it has to treat the undertaking to be a part of the agreement, unless the same is declared to be null and void. It is true that if the undertaking is brought into existence by coercion, undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation, then the same may not conform to the standard of a valid contract in terms of the Contract Act.
It is true that if the undertaking is brought into existence by coercion, undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation, then the same may not conform to the standard of a valid contract in terms of the Contract Act. But unless the undertaking, like any other agreement, is challenged by way of an independent proceedings before a Civil Court and declared to be null and void, same cannot be brushed aside, while dealing with proceedings under section 20 Arb. Act. This is infact what was hinted at by their lordships of the Supreme Court, though not in so many words, in Nathani Steels Ltd. (1995 (3) SCC 324) supra. On the analogy of the above reasonings, no arbitrable dispute exists between the parties. That being the position, I dismiss this petition, without any order as to costs.