S. B. SINHA, C. J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners herein are aggrieved by an interim order dated 13-12-2000 passed in OA No. 3427 of 2000 granted in favour of the 1st respondent herein by the A. P. Administrative tribunal which is to the following effect:"pending further consideration of the OA, the 2nd respondent is directed to reinstate the applicant into duty forthwith and continue to pay his pay and allowances which he was drawing as on the date of his retirement on 30-6-2000. However, the applicant is not entitled to make any claim for wages for the period from the date of his retirement on 30-6-2000 till his actual date of reinstatement, and this issue will be agitated at the time of final disposal of the OA. " ( 2 ) THE question which arose for consideration in the Original Application filed by the 1st respondent herein is as to whether having regard to the provisions of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Public employment (Regulation of Age of superannuation) Act, 1984 (for short the act ), his age of superannuation will be 58 years or 60 years. If he is a workman, his age of superannuation would be 60 years whereas if he is a supervisor the same would be 58 years. ( 3 ) THE learned Tribunal purported to have arrived at a prima facie finding that having regard to the fact that even a foreman employed by the petitioners herein had been held to be a workman and as the category of Work Inspector was included in the superior category along with the categories of Foreman and Assistant foreman, there is discrimination against the 1st respondent in not allowing him to continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years and accordingly passed by the above interim order. ( 4 ) BEFORE adverting to the question involved in this application, the basic fact of the matter may be noticed: the petitioners informed the 1st respondent by letter-dated 11-2-2000 that his date of superannuation is 30-6-2000. 1 st respondent filed an Original Application there against before the Tribunal which was marked as OS No. 2790 of 2000. By an order dated 9-6-2000, he was directed to approach the petitioners at the first instance. 1 st respondent filed an Original Application there against before the Tribunal which was marked as OS No. 2790 of 2000. By an order dated 9-6-2000, he was directed to approach the petitioners at the first instance. By reason of an order dated 30-6-2000, the additional Commissioner (Admn.), MCH rejected the representation of the 1st respondent holding:"in the reference 1st cited Sri Ibrahim khan, Vehicle Inspector has been informed that he is retiring from service on 30-6-2000 on attaining the age of superannuation age of (58) years. Aggrieved with the above orders sri Ibrahim Khan, Vehicle Inspector filed a case in Hon ble A. P. Administrative tribunal in OA No. 2790 of 2000. The hon ble A. P. Administrative Tribunal directed the applicant to make a representation to the Commissioner, mch requesting for continuing him in service till he attains the age of (60) years, within two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order and on receipt of such representation, the 2nd respondent is directed to consider the same and pass appropriate orders within a month thereafter. Till such time the orders are passed on the representation, the impugned proceedings No. 111. HG/ health/mch/2000, dated 11/15-2-2000 are kept in abeyance. Accordingly Sri Ibrahim Khan, Vehicle inspector has submitted a representation vide reference 3rd cited for continuing him in service till he attains the age of (60) years. In order to examine this issue, a committee has been constituted with the additional Commissioner (Hands), additional Commissioner (Finance), additional Commissioner (Pandw), examiner of Accounts, Financial Advisor of MCH. The Committee after examining this issue observed that since the work and duties of Vehicle Inspector are supervisory in nature, and he was also promoted from the category of Driver whose age of retirement on superannuation is (58) years, his request to continue him in service till he attains the age of (60) years cannot be considered. Accordingly, Sri Ibrahim Khan, vehicle Inspector, MCH is hereby retired on 30-6-2000 (AN) on attaining the age of (58) years. " ( 5 ) IT is not in dispute that the 1 st respondent was relieved of his duties on 30-6-2000. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner filed OA No. 3427 of 2000 questioning the above order. Accordingly, Sri Ibrahim Khan, vehicle Inspector, MCH is hereby retired on 30-6-2000 (AN) on attaining the age of (58) years. " ( 5 ) IT is not in dispute that the 1 st respondent was relieved of his duties on 30-6-2000. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner filed OA No. 3427 of 2000 questioning the above order. First respondent herein filed an application for a direction that he should be allowed to continue as vehicle Inspector till he attains the age of 60 years. It appears that the OA was disposed of by the Tribunal as covered by the order passed in OA No. 345 of 1999. The 1st respondent disputes that he never claimed before the Tribunal that his case is covered by the order in OA No. 345 of 1999. Be that as it may, he filed a writ petition before this Court, which was marked as wp No. 12923 of 2000 and a Division Bench of this Court disposed of the said writ application directing:"we are persuaded to say that the matter requires a detailed hearing by the Administrative Tribunal. As in our considered view the relief sought by the petitioner is not similar to the relief sought in OA No. 345 of 1999 and Batch decided by the Tribunal on 27-6-2000, we, therefore, set aside the order impugned and remit the matter back to the Tribunal. We desire the Tribunal shall take up OA No. 3427 of 2000 and decides the matter according to law on merits as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the order. The writ petition is accordingly disposed. "despite the same, the impugned order has been passed. ( 6 ) MR. Balakrishnamurthy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, inter alia, submitted that the learned Tribunal committed an error insofar as it failed to take into consideration that having regard to the admitted fact that the 1st respondent had been released from service, no interim relief could be granted and particularly in view of the direction of this Court in the aforementioned writ application. ( 7 ) MR. ( 7 ) MR. Nuty Ramamohana Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behaff of the 1st respondent, on the other hand, submitted that passing a mandatory order directing reinstatement of the employee into service cannot be said to be unjustified in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Counsel would submit that having regard to the fact a vehicle inspector employed in APSRTC had been held to be a workman, there is absolutely no reason why the 1st respondent herein should not held to be so. The learned Counsel would submit that Municipal Corporation being an industry within the meaning of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was obligatory on the part of the petitioners herein to continue the 1st respondent in service till he attains the age of 60 years. According to the learned Counsel even the balance of convenience lies in favour of the 1st respondent inasmuch as by reason of the impugned order, the petitioners herein would be entitled to take work from the 1 st respondent. Strong reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex court in Arkal Goviad Raj Rao v. Ciba geigy of India Limited Bombay, AIR 1985 sc 985 . ( 8 ) IN the instant case, a Division bench of this Court had directed the learned Tribunal to dispose of the matter on merits. The question as to whether the 1st respondent herein is a workman or not is essentially a question of fact. A finding to that effect has to be arrived at by an appropriate Court or Tribunal having regard to the materials which may be placed before it. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the determining factor for arriving at a conclusion as to whether an employee is a workman or not depends upon the principal duties he has to perform. Nomenclature, it will be a repetition to state, is not decisive. ( 9 ) AS a finding of fact is yet to be arrived at, in our considered opinion, the tribunal was not justified in passing the impugned order. From the order dated 30-6-2000 passed by the petitioners herein, it would appear that the issue had been gone into by a Committee constituted by the MCH and the Committee had arrived at a finding that the work and duties of vehicle Inspector are of supervisory in nature. From the order dated 30-6-2000 passed by the petitioners herein, it would appear that the issue had been gone into by a Committee constituted by the MCH and the Committee had arrived at a finding that the work and duties of vehicle Inspector are of supervisory in nature. ( 10 ) IN our view, unless the finding arrived at by the petitioners herein that the duties performed by the 1st respondent are supervisory in nature is set aside, the impugned order could not have been passed by the Tribunal. ( 11 ) EVEN assuming that the 1 st respondent has a prima facie case, in our opinion, it would not be correct to say that the balance of convenience lies in his favour inasmuch as in the event of his success, he will be paid the entire salary. The 1st respondent also do not suffer any irreparable injury in the event interim relief is not granted. It is also a well settled principle of law that if interim relief is granted in matters of this nature, it would amount to allowing the Original Application itself. Further, it is for the employer to take work from the employee or not and unless the situation so warrants, ordinarily, the Court would not thrust an employee on an unwilling employer. ( 12 ) FOR the views, we have taken; it is not necessary to consider the other aspects of the matter. ( 13 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the learned Tribunal is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.