A. V. SRINIVASA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the concurrent findings of the courts below dismissing the eviction petition filed by the petitioner-landlord, since deceased, under Section 21-b (l) (a) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (the act' for short ). ( 2 ) THE petitioner-landlord filed the eviction petition seeking eviction of the petition premises bearing No. 31/2869a situated at shivajinagar, nipani. The petitioner was a member of the armed forces. He retired from service on 16-7-1976. On retirement the petitioner also procured a certificate from the commanding officer from his regiment to the effect that he retired from service as on 1-12-1976 and that he requires a suitable accommodation for himself and his family for residence. The said certificate is marked as ex. P. 2. On coming over to his home-town the petitioner filed the petition claiming that his family consists of himself, his wife, one major son, two minor sons and one minor daughter and the petition premises are required by him for the residence of himself and the family members and also for opening a kirana business. It was also stated by him in the petition that his family had no other income and that the pension he would receive would not be sufficient to make both ends meet. It was adverted to in the petition that one more eviction petition was filed against the tenant residing in the southern portion, the possession of which was yet to be obtained. A specific case was made out that even if possession of the southern portion is obtained, he would still be in need of the portion in the possession of the respondent herein. ( 3 ) THE respondent-tenant opposed the grant of eviction order by stating that the certificate produced by the petitioner is defective and, therefore, inadmissible as proof of the requirement under Section 21-b (1) of the act. The landlord is in possession of another premises owned by his wife and is presently residing there. That he does not require the premises for the bona fide use of himself and his family members. The landlord is in possession of another premises owned by his wife and is presently residing there. That he does not require the premises for the bona fide use of himself and his family members. It was also contended by the respondent-tenant that the southern portion of the petition premises also belonged to the landlord and he has filed an eviction petition in respect of the southern portion also and that if an eviction is obtained in that case, it would more than meet the requirements of the landlord. On these grounds the tenant sought the dismissal of the eviction petition. ( 4 ) THE learned munsiff framed the following three issues for his consideration: (i) whether petition is maintainable under Section 21-b of the Karnataka Rent Control Act? (ii) does the petitioner prove that he requires the petition premises for his reasonable and bona fide purpose of personal use and occupation for himself and his family members and also for running a kirana shop? (iii) whether the petitioner proves that hardship would be caused to him if eviction order is refused? The learned munsiff answered all the three points in the negative and dismissed the eviction petition. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-landlord filed the revision petition before the district judge, belgaum. The learned district judge concurred with the findings recorded by the munsiff and dismissed the revision petition filed under Section 50 of the act. Hence, the present revision petition, under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is filed by the l. rs. Of the landlord against the concurrent findings of the courts below. ( 5 ) I have heard the learned counsel Sri Basavaraj V. Sabarad for the petitioner and Sri g. b. shastry for respondent. ( 6 ) THE certificate produced by the petitioner-landlord to stake his claim under Section 21-b is produced at ex. P. 2 and it reads:"in continuation of the certificate issued to ex-gunner ramu mangale No. 1167590x on 19-7-1983 this is to certify that No. 1167590x gunner ramu mangale of nipani, retired from service from 1-12-1976, he is now an ex-serviceman of the Indian army and that he requires suitable accommodation for himself and his family members for residence". P. 2 and it reads:"in continuation of the certificate issued to ex-gunner ramu mangale No. 1167590x on 19-7-1983 this is to certify that No. 1167590x gunner ramu mangale of nipani, retired from service from 1-12-1976, he is now an ex-serviceman of the Indian army and that he requires suitable accommodation for himself and his family members for residence". Section 21-b (l) (a) of the act is the special provision governing recovery of possession of premises by members of armed forces of the union and it inter alia reads:" (1) notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, (a) a landlord, who is a member of the armed forces of the union or who was such a member and is duly retired which term shall include premature retirement shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises on the ground that the premises is bona fide required by him for occupation by himself or any member of his family and the court shall pass a decree for eviction on such ground if the landlord, at the hearing of the suit, produces a certificate given by the head of his service or his commanding officer, to the effect, (i) he is presently a member of the armed forces of the union or he was such a member and is now retired; and (ii) he does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area where he or the members of his family can reside". ( 7 ) BOTH the courts below have found fault with the certificate produced by the landlord on the ground that it answers to the first of the requirements touching the certification of the petitioner as an ex-serviceman but does not satisfy the second condition i. e. , that the petitioner does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area where he or the members of his family can reside. ( 8 ) SO far as the first of the requirements is concerned both the courts below have held in favour of the petitioner-landlord that the certificate is sufficient proof of the fact that the petitioner is an ex-serviceman. However, in regard to the condition No. 2 to be satisfied the courts below have held against the petitioner-landlord on the ground that it does not in clear terms state that the petitioner-landlord does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area. However, in regard to the condition No. 2 to be satisfied the courts below have held against the petitioner-landlord on the ground that it does not in clear terms state that the petitioner-landlord does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area. Reverting back to the exact words used in the certificate in relation to the second requirement, it reads:". . . . . . AND that he requires suitable accommodation for himself and his family members for residence". the question is, whether this part of the certificate would tantamount to the requirement as envisaged by Section 21-b (l) (a) (ii) of the act which is extracted hereinabove. Reverting back to the wordings employed in sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21-b, the latter part of the condition to be satisfied by the certificate is that, 'he does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area where he or the members of his family can reside'. The condition as framed by the legislature is coined in negative form requiring the certificate to indicate that the ex-serviceman or the member of the armed forces does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area where he or the members of his family can reside. The exact wordings used in the certificate are, '. . . . . that he requires suitable accommodation for himself and his family members for residence'. The certificate conveys the very same meaning as required by the provision but it is coined in the positive form by stating that the petitioner requires suitable accommodation for himself and his family members for his residence. The only meaning that can be gauged by a simple reading of the later part of the certificate is that the petitioner does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area where he or other members of his family can reside. Both the courts have missed the substance and gone for the style. ( 9 ) WHAT the courts below should examine is the exact meaning that is conveyed by the certificate. It is not a requirement of law that where a certificate is essential for the purposes of establishing a fact, that it should find expression in the same form adhering to the very same words as contained in the provision. ( 9 ) WHAT the courts below should examine is the exact meaning that is conveyed by the certificate. It is not a requirement of law that where a certificate is essential for the purposes of establishing a fact, that it should find expression in the same form adhering to the very same words as contained in the provision. What is of importance is the meaning that is implicit and not the manner in which it is conveyed. Hence, insofar as the findings recorded by the courts below on the question whether the certificate ex. P. 2 answers to the requirement of Section 21-b (a) (ii) it has to be held that they have misinterpreted the meaning conveyed by the certificate ex. P. 2 by attaching too much importance to the wordings employed overlooking the meaning that the certificate conveys. That the courts below have recorded concurrent findings on this question need not detain this court in arriving at a different conclusion as what is involved is interpretation of a question of law. The munsif is no doubt right in observing that the provision being a special provision must be interpreted stringently. But the need for a stringent interpretation does not mean that the courts should insist upon a certificate which is a literal replica of the condition contained in the clause. That is not the requirement of law. This being purely a question of law I have no hesitation in holding that the courts below erred in concluding that the certificate does not answer to the requirements of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21-b. ( 10 ) THAT takes me to the next question whether the landlord has proved that the premises is required for the bona fide use and occupation of himself and his family members. Both the courts below have held against the petitioner-landlord on this question of fact. The question is whether interference is called for in this petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. That this court has ample jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact and law, in appropriate cases, and record its own conclusions on the basis of material available on record, is no longer res integra. ( 11 ) THE evidence adduced in the case by the petitioner touching his requirement is as below:"i was serving in army from 1961 to 1966. ( 11 ) THE evidence adduced in the case by the petitioner touching his requirement is as below:"i was serving in army from 1961 to 1966. Now I am retired. I am getting pension per month. I have no other income except the pension. I have 2 sons and a daughter. My eldest son is aged about 20 years, studied upto 12th standard. He has left the education since 2 years. I want to start a grocery shop in the suit property. He has taken training in shop of samabugade of nipani. I require the petition premises for residence purpose and business purpose. Except petition premises and another apartment of same building I have no other property". the petitioner has denied the suggestion put to him in the cross- examination that the house in which he is presently staying belongs to him. It is also elicited in the cross-examination of the petitioner that he is presently residing in a premises belonging to one torskar, as tenant. The petitioner has also got examined on joti tukaram who has given evidence stating that he owns property bearing No. 2499 at shivajinagar which has three rooms and that he resides in one of the rooms and the petitioner and his family reside in the other two rooms as tenants by paying a monthly rent of Rs. 60/- per month. ( 12 ) BOTH the courts below have placed heavy reliance on the alleged fact that the petitioner and his family are staying in premises No. 2753/d which belongs to the petitioner's wife to come to the conclusion that the petitioner does not require the petition premises for his own bona fide use and occupation. Even if on the strength of the documentary material produced in the case it could be safely held that the petitioner is staying in the premises belonging to his wife, it would not, by itself, defeat the claim of the petitioner for self-occupation of the petition premises. The courts below erred in coming to this conclusion based solely on the documentary evidence produced in the case in the form of voters list and the property extract ex. D. 3. No advertance is made to the nature of accommodation available in the said property bearing No. 2753/d and whether it would sufficiently meet the requirement of the petitioner and his family. D. 3. No advertance is made to the nature of accommodation available in the said property bearing No. 2753/d and whether it would sufficiently meet the requirement of the petitioner and his family. Even if it were to be held that the petitioner is not residing in a rented premises as urged by him, and is in fact residing in the premises owned by his wife, it would not provide the legal ground to throw out his eviction petition. ( 13 ) THE specific case of the petitioner is that he requires the petition premises and the portion to the south of the petition premises for his own use and occupation and also for starting a grocery business. Unless it is established by the tenant that the premises presently in the occupation of the petitioner is sufficient for the twin requirements of the convenient stay of the petitioner and his family and also to start a grocery business, the courts below could not have recorded a finding against the petitioner merely on the basis of the establishment of the fact that the petitioner is residing in a premises owned by his wife. The fact that the petitioner is staying in his wife's house would become irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the bona fide requirement of the petition premises by the petitioner-landlord, if it was further not shown by the tenant with reference to the accommodation available in the said house owned by the petitioner's wife, that the same is sufficient for the need of the landlord petitioner, to meet which the petition has been filed. ( 14 ) SUB-CLAUSE (ii) of clause (a) makes reference to 'suitable accommodation' and not to accommodation or alternative accommodation. Therefore, in cases where alternate accommodation or other accommodation is available to the landlord, the cases brought under Section 21-b cannot be rejected merely on that ground. The object sought to be achieved by enacting Section 21-b is to provide the men from the armed forces accommodation which is suitable to them. While subjecting the contents of ex. P. 2 to stringent interpretation, the courts below have overlooked this vital aspect of the matter. Therefore, the fact that ex. The object sought to be achieved by enacting Section 21-b is to provide the men from the armed forces accommodation which is suitable to them. While subjecting the contents of ex. P. 2 to stringent interpretation, the courts below have overlooked this vital aspect of the matter. Therefore, the fact that ex. P. 2 is not a literal replica of the conditions mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) and the fact that the petitioner's wife owns the house in which the petitioner is residing with his family, are all extraneous matters for deciding the issue whether the petitioner requires the premises for his own bona fide use and occupation if it is shown by him that he is not in possession of a suitable premises. The object and reason for introducing this provision was to ensure that the service personnel or their widows are not made to suffer for want of suitable accommodation and to help them to regain possession of the premises owned by them and leased to others, in a more simplified and effective manner. The availability of any other accommodation or the fact that the landlord is residing in a premises owned by him or any of the family members would be, at best, a circumstance that would weigh against the petitioner-landlord when it is considered for examining the question of comparative hardship. But this petition having been filed under Section 21-b (1) of the Act, it is not necessary for the courts to examine the question of hardship. Under Section 21-b the requirement of the landlord to prove that greater hardship would be caused to him if eviction order is not passed, is done away with and it is enough if it is established by the landlord that the petition premises is bona fide required by him. On a re-assessment of the evidence, i find that the findings recorded by the courts below are a direct result of improper exercise of jurisdiction which has led to miscarriage of justice. ( 15 ) MR. On a re-assessment of the evidence, i find that the findings recorded by the courts below are a direct result of improper exercise of jurisdiction which has led to miscarriage of justice. ( 15 ) MR. G. Balakrishna shastry, learned counsel for the respondent, relied on the decision in M/s. D. l. f. housing and construction company (private) limited, New Delhi v sarup singh and others , wherein the apex court considering the point as to whether the high court can interfere against the findings of the court below under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, held:" (I) the position is firmly established that while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not competent to the high court to correct errors of facts however gross or even errors of law unless the errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. The words 'illegally' and 'with material irregularity' as used in this clause do not cover their errors of fact or law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this clause may relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors of either fact or of law, after the prescribed procedure has been complied with". the position in law has undergone a subtle change as could be gauged from a later decision of the apex court. In Ajantha Transports (Private) Limited, coimbatore v M/s. T. V. K. Transports, Pulampatti, while considering the question whether the grant or refusal of the permit by the tribunal can be interfered with under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code the apex court, held:"relevancy or otherwise of one or more grounds of grant or refusal of a stage carriage permit could be a jurisdictional matter. A grant or its refusal on totally irrelevant grounds would be ultra vires or a case of excess of power. If a ground which is irrelevant is taken into account with others which are relevant, or, a relevant ground, which exists, is unjustifiably ignored, it could be said to be a case of exercise of power under Section 47 of the Act, which is quasi-judicial, in a manner which suffers from a material irregularity. If a ground which is irrelevant is taken into account with others which are relevant, or, a relevant ground, which exists, is unjustifiably ignored, it could be said to be a case of exercise of power under Section 47 of the Act, which is quasi-judicial, in a manner which suffers from a material irregularity. Both will be covered by Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code". in the case on hand also the courts below have refused to grant order of eviction on the erroneous ground that the certificate does not answer to the requirements of Section 21-b of the act. The certificate has been rejected on a totally irrelevant ground that it does not in terms read as required by Section 21-b (l) (axii) of the act and mixing this ground with the relevant ground of bona fide requirement, which though has been sufficiently established by the petitioner but has been unjustifiably ignored by the courts below, the courts below have exercised their jurisdiction improperly in passing the orders impugned herein which procedure adopted by them suffers from material irregularity calling for interference by this court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, this is a fit case in which this court could interfere under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 16 ) I do not want to overburden this order by referring to other case-laws viz. , ramchandra keshav adke (dead) by l. rs v govind joti chavare and mrs. Meenal eknath kshirsagar v M/s. Traders and agencies and another , cited by the learned counsel on either side, which have little or no application to the facts of the case on hand. ( 17 ) THE petitioner is no more. The petitioner's family now consists of the wife and three children. It has come in evidence that possession of the southern portion has been obtained. It has only three rooms. The three rooms would not be enough to accomodate the family of the petitioner as also to establish the grocery shop. The petition cannot, therefore, be rejected on that ground also. ( 18 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, the revision petition is allowed under Section 21-b of the act and the respondent-tenant is directed to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises in question on or before 31st March, 2002. --- *** --- .