JUDGMENT - VAZIFDAR S.J., J.:---Rule. Respondents waive service. By consent rule made returnable forthwith. 2. This case in the words of the Supreme Court "illustrates an unfortunate trend which has now become too common these days in the governance of the country." (Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar and others)1, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 322. We should have thought it unnecessary for a judicial pronouncement to tell people that if they are aggrieved by the orders of statutory functionaries their remedy lies in adopting appropriate legal proceedings challenging the same and not by approaching Ministers and high ranking Government officials seeking their interference with the working of such statutory functionaries. We should have thought it even less necessary to remind Ministers and Government officials that they ought not to respond to such approaches. 3. Respondent No. 1 is the Chairman of the Central Railway Employees Education Society. The society was registered for the purpose of running a school for the children of the employees of Central Railway working at the Parel Loco Shed Workshop. Respondent No. 2 is the Incharge Head Master of the Central Railway Employees High School and Junior College (hereinafter referred to as the said school). Respondent No. 3 is the Education Inspector. Respondent No. 4 is the Deputy Director of Education. Respondent No. 5 was at the relevant time the Minister of State for Education and presently the Minister of State for Excise, Food and Drug Administration in the Government of Maharashtra. Respondent No. 6 is the Secretary of Human Research and Development in the Government of Maharashtra. 4. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari to quash and set-aside an oral order dated 7th February, 2001 issued by respondent No. 5, an order dated 7th March, 2001 issued by respondent No. 3 and an order dated 8th March, 2001 issued by respondent No. 1 pursuant to the order dated 7th March, 2001. The petitioner has also prayed for a direction, permitting him to resume his duties as Head Master and for payment of his dues. 5. The facts are as under:--- The petitioner was employed by the said school as an Assistant Teacher in 1978. He was promoted as Head Master in 1995. 6. The petitioners case is that till the year 2000 i.e. for a period of 22 years he neither faced any difficulty nor received any adverse remarks relating to his employment. 5. The facts are as under:--- The petitioner was employed by the said school as an Assistant Teacher in 1978. He was promoted as Head Master in 1995. 6. The petitioners case is that till the year 2000 i.e. for a period of 22 years he neither faced any difficulty nor received any adverse remarks relating to his employment. However, in July, 2000, respondent No. 1 started developing animosity towards the petitioners, as he did not oblige him by not terminating the services of respondent No. 1s wife one Mrs. Lata Dixit, who was appointed during the academic year 1999-2000 on the temporary basis on a reserved post. Thereafter the petitioner was continuously harassed by the office bearers of the society/school as stated hereafter. 7. The said society issued a show cause notice dated 5th July, 2000 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the various acts of misconduct alleged therein. The petitioner addressed a detailed reply dated 15th July, 2000 to the show cause notice. After dealing with each of the allegations in details, the petitioner pointed out his contribution to the school over the years. He also stated that his was the first time in 23 years of service that such allegations had been made against him. Respondent No. 1 did not submit either the show cause notice or the petitioners reply thereto to the Managing Committee/trustees of respondent No. 1. However respondent No. 1 addressed a letter dated 17th August, 2000 to respondent No. 4 (Deputy Director of Education) seeking prior permission to suspend the petitioner on the basis of the allegations contained therein. Respondent No. 1 did not submit either the show cause notice or the petitioners reply thereto to the Managing Committee/trustees of respondent No. 1. However respondent No. 1 addressed a letter dated 17th August, 2000 to respondent No. 4 (Deputy Director of Education) seeking prior permission to suspend the petitioner on the basis of the allegations contained therein. Prior permission of the Education Inspector to suspend an employee pending an enquiry is required to be taken under Rule 33(1) of the M.E.P.S. Rules, 1981 which reads as follow:--- "Rule 33: Procedure for inflicting major penalties.(1) If an employee is alleged to be guilty of (any of the grounds specified in sub-rule (5) of Rule 28) and if there is reason to believe that in the event of the guilt being proved against him, he is likely to be reduced in rank or removed from service, the management shall first decide whether to hold an inquiry and also to place the employee under suspension and if it decides to suspend the employee, it shall authorise the Chief Executive Officer to do so after obtaining the permission of the Education Officer or, in the case of the Junior College of Education and Technical High Schools, of the Deputy Director. Suspension shall not be ordered unless there is a prima facie case for his removal or there is reason to believe that his continuance in active service is likely to cause embarrassment or to hamper the investigation of the case. If the management decides to suspend the employee, such employee shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (5) stand suspended with effect from the date of such order." Rule 2(e)(i) defines Education Officer to mean the Education Inspector in relation to private secondary or higher secondary school or Junior College of Education in Greater Bombay. The said statement of allegations against the petitioner was also forwarded directly to respondent No. 3 (Education Inspector) by respondent No. 1 without forwarding the same to the petitioner. The statement of allegations was shown by the Education Inspector to the petitioner on 14th September, 2000 when an enquiry in the matter commenced. The petitioner replied to the same in detail by his letter dated 14th September, 2000. By a further letter dated 21st November, 2000, the petitioner forwarded to the Education Inspector written submissions in respect of a hearing held before him on 13th November, 2000. 8. The petitioner replied to the same in detail by his letter dated 14th September, 2000. By a further letter dated 21st November, 2000, the petitioner forwarded to the Education Inspector written submissions in respect of a hearing held before him on 13th November, 2000. 8. This brings us to the first important stage and event in the matter. The Education Inspector after holding a preliminary enquiry declined to grant respondent Nos. 1 and 2 prior permission to suspend the petitioner. 9. In the meantime and over a month after the petitioner was issued the show cause notice dated 5th July, 2000 respondent No. 1 by its letter dated 28th August, 2000 communicated adverse remarks against the petitioner who was asked to submit his reply if he desired to have the remarks removed. The petitioner by his letter dated 25th October, 2000 replied to the same. 10. The petitioner has also alleged that respondent No. 2 began harassing him increasingly in various ways. It is also stated that the petitioner was further harassed, as he refused to endorse adverse remarks in respect of ten teachers in their confidential report. The petitioner by his Advocates letter dated 9th October, 2000 stated the above facts after which he states that the harassment was temporarily stopped. 11. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not challenge the decision of respondent No. 3 refusing to grant prior permission to suspend the petitioner pending the hearing. Instead respondent No. 1 again made a complaint to respondent No. 4 against the petitioner on the basis of the same allegations. Respondent No. 4 by a letter dated 21st October, 2000 directed respondent No. 3 to re-hear the matter and submit a report by 31st October, 2000. Respondent No. 3 made a report in respect of this hearing. This report was forwarded to the petitioner only subsequently to which we will revert shortly. Suffice it to say at this stage that the report of respondent No. 3 completely exonerated the petitioner in respect of all charges levelled against him by respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 3 therefore once again refused to grant prior approval for suspension of the petitioner. This is the second important event in the matter. 12. Suffice it to say at this stage that the report of respondent No. 3 completely exonerated the petitioner in respect of all charges levelled against him by respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 3 therefore once again refused to grant prior approval for suspension of the petitioner. This is the second important event in the matter. 12. Respondent No. 1 being upset at not having obtained prior approval to suspend the petitioner, served the petitioner under section 36(1) of the M.E.P.S. Rules, 1981, the same statement of allegation with the some additional charges on 17th January, 2001. On 22nd January, 2001, the petitioner filed his reply to the statement of allegations in detail. 13. What followed is the third important development in the matter. It is also the first of three factors which vitiated the impugned orders. At this stage, the respondents adopted a course which must be viewed seriously, deprecated strongly and halted immediately. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were aggrieved by the 3rd respondents refusal to grant them prior permission to suspend the petitioner pending the enquiry. It requires no elaborate judicial pronouncement to hold that their remedy was to take recourse to the due process of law which they did not do. They did not take any steps in accordance with law that is to challenge this refusal. Unfortunately the first respondent instead of following the procedure prescribed by law admittedly sought the intervention of respondent No. 5 obviously to exert pressure on the authorities exercising statutory powers under the M.E.P.S. Act viz. respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Respondent No. 5, was at that time the Minister of State for Education in the Government of Maharashtra. The following averment in the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 makes interesting reading:--- "I say that in view thereof a representation was made to the Honble Minister so that appropriate and proper enquiry can be conducted by the Education Department and all the parties are heard. I say that the matter was, therefore, again heard by the Education Department and thereafter the Education Department has passed an order permitting petitioners suspension from the job." 14. What is even more unfortunate is that respondent No. 5 as the Minister of State for education admittedly intervened at the behest of respondent No. 1. This is the fourth important development in this matter. What is even more unfortunate is that respondent No. 5 as the Minister of State for education admittedly intervened at the behest of respondent No. 1. This is the fourth important development in this matter. It also the second factor that has vitiated the impugned orders. What followed thereafter was a result of this thoroughly improper approach by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the unfortunate intervention of respondent No. 5 by issuing directions to respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 regarding discharge of their statutory judicial duties. The respondents have been unable to point out any owner/authority entitling respondent No. 5 to issue directions to respondent No. 3/4 to rehear the matter. The respondents have not even been able to show any material on the basis whereof respondent No. 5 thought it fit or proper to issue such directions. 15. The events that transpired thereafter were a direct result of the Ministers intervention. The petitioner was called by respondent No. 3 to remain present in the office of respondent No. 6 (Secretary, School Education, Minister for Human Research and Development in Government of Maharashtra) on 7th February, 2001. When the petitioner presented himself respondent No. 1 was already present in the office of respondent No. 6. The Minister called respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in his chamber, but did not call the petitioner. From the pleading in paragraph 12 of the petition, it is not clear as to whether respondent No. 1 was called into the office by respondent No. 5 or respondent No. 6. That however need not detain us as respondent No. 6 was obviously acting under the instructions of respondent No. 5. Even if he was acting on his own the impropriety remains. Respondent No. 5 admittedly directed respondent No. 3 to grant a rehearing to respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 3 by his letter dated 3rd March, 2001 asked the petitioner to remain present on 5th March, 2001 specifically stating that, the Minister had orally ordered a re-hearing. This is fourth important stage in the matter involving respondent Nos. 3 and 4 complying with the illegal and unauthorized order of respondent No. 5. It is also the third factor that vitiated the impugned orders. The petitioner also addressed a letter dated 5th March, 2001 to the Minister, setting out his side of story, but with that we are not concerned. 3 and 4 complying with the illegal and unauthorized order of respondent No. 5. It is also the third factor that vitiated the impugned orders. The petitioner also addressed a letter dated 5th March, 2001 to the Minister, setting out his side of story, but with that we are not concerned. On 5th March, 2001, no statement of allegation was given to the petitioner. The petitioner however referred to the earlier proceedings and also replied to the fresh allegations. The petitioner also forwarded a written explanation in detail on 7th March, 2001. 16. In these circumstances it is not surprising that respondent No. 3 felt compelled and pressurised to grant prior approval for suspending the petitioner which he did by a letter dated 7th March, 2001. Respondent No. 1 promptly on 8th March, 2001 served the order on the petitioner, placing him "under suspension with immediate effect from 8th March, 2001". The petitioner was directed to hand over complete charge to the Assistant Head Master. Naturally the order dated 8th March, 2001 referred to respondent No. 3s prior sanction for suspension. 17. The manner in which the order dated 7th March, 2001 was passed established the mala fides of the respondents and the three impugned orders viz. the oral orders of respondent No. 5 and the orders dated 7th March, 2001 and 8th March, 2001. Pursuant to the intervention of respondent No. 5, respondent No. 3 purportedly held a meeting on 5th March, 2001, which was a Monday. This hearing was at 4.30 p.m. At the hearing the petitioner was asked to tender written submissions. The petitioner under cover of his letter dated 7th March, 2001 in fact tendered detailed written submissions. Not very surprisingly, respondent No. 3 with expected haste passed the impugned order dated 7th March, 2001. What is important is that 6th March, 2001 was a holiday on account of Id-Uz-Zuha. What is worse is that respondent No. 3 has falsely stated in the said order that the petitioner had not submitted the written submissions in time. What was the time stipulated? Surely it could not have been the same day i.e. 5th March, 2001 when the hearing was held at 4.30 p.m. Surely again it could not have been 6th March, 2001 as that day was a holiday. The earliest the petitioner could have filed his written submissions was therefore 7th March, 2001. What was the time stipulated? Surely it could not have been the same day i.e. 5th March, 2001 when the hearing was held at 4.30 p.m. Surely again it could not have been 6th March, 2001 as that day was a holiday. The earliest the petitioner could have filed his written submissions was therefore 7th March, 2001. In his haste respondent No. 3 lost sights of all these facts and falsely stated that the petitioner had not tendered the written submissions in time. There was not even a whisper of an explanation by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 3 and 6 in this regard. There was no reason for this other than the fact that respondent No. 3 was acting under pressure of the directions from respondent No. 5. 18. Considering the view that we have taken we did not hear Mr. Dighe, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, on merits in detail though there was considerable force in his submissions. Suffice it to say that respondent No. 3 himself who passed the impugned order dated 7th March, 2001, did not find any substance in the allegations on two earlier occasions when he refused to grant permission to suspend the petitioner pending the enquiry. 19. The facts in Chandrika Jhas case (supra) are that on the bifurcation of the district of Muzaffarpur and creation of the new districts of Muzaffarpur and Hajipur, a separate Central Co-operative Bank called the Vaishalli District Central Co-operative Bank for the District of Hajipur was registered with its registered bye-laws. Bye-law No. 29 provides that the Management of the Bank shall vest in a Board of Directors which would consist seventeen persons. Under the proviso to the bye-law the first Board of Directors of the bank were to be nominated by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar for a period not exceeding one year at a time and not exceeding three co-operative years in the aggregate and that the Registrar, co-operative societies may modify the nomination if and when required. The Registrar, nominated the Committee which included the appellant, to be the first Board of Directors of the Co-operative Bank for a period of six months or till further orders, whichever was earlier. The Committee was specifically directed to hold the elections of the Board of Directors within six months of the date of nomination. The Registrar, nominated the Committee which included the appellant, to be the first Board of Directors of the Co-operative Bank for a period of six months or till further orders, whichever was earlier. The Committee was specifically directed to hold the elections of the Board of Directors within six months of the date of nomination. The Registrar reserved his discretion to make changes in the nomination of the Board. The appellant by using a direct approach to the then Chief Minister Dr. Jagannath Mishra ensured that the Board of Directors constituted by the Registrar kept on flouting with impunity, the repeated directions of the Registrar by getting the term of the first Board of Directors extended from time to time and postponing the election of the new Board of Directors without any lawful justification. With the resignation of Dr. Jagannath Mishra as Chief Minister, L.P. Shahi, Minister for Industries for the State of Bihar issued a direction to the Commissioner of Co-operative Department marked as unofficial, that the Committee shall consist of seven members only. For this purpose he sent seven names. He further directed that when the Committee is superseded under another provision, it may consist of fifteen members. For this purpose he sent another list of eight names. In compliance with these directions, the Registrar in supersession of his earlier orders re-constituted the first Board of Directors with immediate effect and directed that the tenure of the reconstituted Board shall be for the remainder of the term or till further orders, whichever was earlier. In this background the Supreme Court made the following observations :--- "Para No. 7:---The short question that falls for determination is whether the then Chief Minister was entitled to usurp the functions of the Registrar Co-operative Societies under bye-law 29. Further, the question is whether the Minister was entitled to issue a direction to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to reconstitute the nominated Board of Directors under bye-law 29, and if so, whether he could go further and assume the functions of the Registrar and forward to him a list of names to be nominated, on the reconstituted Board. Under bye-law 29, it is the function of the Registrar to constitute the first Board of Directors which necessarily carries with it the incidental or ancillary power to reconstitute such Board when he is satisfied that the circumstances attendant so require. Under bye-law 29, it is the function of the Registrar to constitute the first Board of Directors which necessarily carries with it the incidental or ancillary power to reconstitute such Board when he is satisfied that the circumstances attendant so require. Para No. 11:---We fail to appreciate the propriety of the Chief Minister passing orders for extending the term of the first Board of Directors. Under the cabinet system of Government, the Chief Minister occupies a position of pro-eminence and he virtually carries on the governance of the State. The Chief Minister may call for any information which is available to the Minister-in-charge of any department and may issue necessary directions for carrying on the general administration of the State Government. Presumably, the Chief Minister dealt with the question as if it were an executive function of the State Government and thereby clearly exceeded his powers in usurping the statutory functions of the Registrar under bye-law 29 in extending the terms of the first Board of Directors from time to time. The executive power of the State vested in the Governor under Article 154(1) connotes the residual or governmental functions that remain after the legislative and judicial functions are taken away. The executive power includes acts necessary for the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State including both a decision as to action and the carrying out of the decision. Some of the functions exercised under "executive powers" may include powers such as the supervisory jurisdiction of the State Government under section 65-A of the Act. The executive cannot, however, go against the provisions of the Constitution or of any law. Para No. 13:---Neither the Chief Minister nor the Minister for co-operation or industries had the power to arrogate to himself the statutory functions of the Registrar under bye-law 29. The act of the then Chief Minister in extending the term of the Committee of Management from time to time was not within his power. Such action was violative of the provisions of the Rules and the bye-laws framed thereunder. The act of the then Chief Minister in extending the term of the Committee of Management from time to time was not within his power. Such action was violative of the provisions of the Rules and the bye-laws framed thereunder. Para No. 15:---In the instant case, however, the impugned order issued by the Registrar to reconstitute the first Board of Directors was not made by him at his own discretion in the exercise of his powers under bye-law 29 but was made at the behest of the Minister for industries and it must accordingly be held to be invalid." (Emphasis supplied) Though the facts in Chandrika Jhas case are not identical to the facts of the present case, they certainly are similar. Respondent No. 5 was not entitled in law to call upon respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to grant a re-hearing. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were not bound by the said orders. Despite the same, respondent No. 5 admittedly issued the directions to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 who complied with the same. The ratio in Chandrika Jhas case squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 20. In these circumstances, we have grave reservations as to whether the enquiry will at all be fair and unbiased. We propose to protect the petitioner by providing that the order which may be passed in the enquiry in so far as it is adverse to the interest of the petitioner, shall not be implemented for a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of the same to the petitioner. We do the so as such an order will obviously fall for a greater degree of scrutiny than regular orders in such proceedings. 21. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the impugned orders are illegal, null and void. The approach of respondent No. 1 to respondent No. 5 was improper. The intervention of respondent No. 5 was unconstitutional and contrary to the statutory provisions. The order dated 7th March, 2001 passed by respondent No. 3 was a direct result of the improper intervention of respondent No. 5. We have no hesitation therefore in coming to the conclusion that the impugned order of suspension of the petitioner was mala fide. In the circumstances, we pass the following order:--- ORDER Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a). We have no hesitation therefore in coming to the conclusion that the impugned order of suspension of the petitioner was mala fide. In the circumstances, we pass the following order:--- ORDER Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a). The respondents shall not give the effect to any order that may be passed in the enquiry in so far as the same may be adverse to the petitioner for a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of the order to the petitioner. Respondents are directed to pay the petitioner Rs. 2500/- as costs. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order, duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court. -----