PER S.K.GUPTA.J: 1. We have heard Mr. Adarsh Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant/appellant, as well as Mr. A.V. Gupta, senior learned counsel for the respondent. 2. There is a delay of 177 days in preferring the LPA against the judgment and order dated: 11-10-1999 passed by the learned Single Judge and an application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay. Notice was issued to the respondent and Mr. A.V. Gupta appeared and filed objections. 3. The circumstances recited in the application by which the applicant/appellant prevented from preferring an appeal within time, are detailed in para 2 to 8 of the application. According to the applicant/appellant, the presence of his counsel has though been recorded in the order of the learned Single Judge, but, in fact, the counsel was not present and, thus, he was not aware of the passing of the judgment. The applicant/appellant came to know about the judgment in the last week of March 2000 and thereafter started collecting the relevant documents. That the original record file of the brother of respondent- 1 was misplaced when it was sent to the Secretariat several times by the applicant/appellant. On account of this reason that the applicant/appellant could not file objections to the writ petition. The file was, however, traced out by the applicant and sometime was consumed in collecting the Revenue Record and to relevant Government orders. That it was after examining the record thoroughly, the applicant decided to prefer an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 11-10-1999 and applied for the certified copy of the judgment. Lately, it was contended that the applicant/appellant being an autonomous body, and having collective responsibility, taken some time in deciding to prefer an appeal, due to which the delay had occasioned. 4. According to Mr. A.V. Gupta, sufficient cause as contemplated under section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been explained and, therefore, it is not a fit case to condone the delay of 177 days. It is further contended that the case was heard on, 14/9/1999 in which counsel appearing for both the parties appeared and the judgment was reserved. The judgment came to be delivered on 11-10-1999. That these facts are clearly borne out from the judicial orders recorded on the file. It is further contended that the case was heard on, 14/9/1999 in which counsel appearing for both the parties appeared and the judgment was reserved. The judgment came to be delivered on 11-10-1999. That these facts are clearly borne out from the judicial orders recorded on the file. That the application for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment was filed by the applicant/appellant on 25-04-2000 and the certified copy delivered on 03-05-2000. The appeal, however, has been filed by the applicant/appellant on 12-6-2000. Mr. Gupta further submitted that assuming that the applicant/appellant acquired the copy of the judgment in May 2000, there has been no explanation for the delay between 03-05-2000 and 12-06-2000. The applicant also could not show sufficient cause for not applying for the copy of the judgment between March 2000 to 25-04-2000. The delay has also not been explained between 03-05-2000 after securing the certified copy and the period till the application for condo nation was filed, i.e. 12-06-2000. There can hardly be said any reasonable or satisfactory or even a proper explanation seeking condo nation of delay shown by the applicant/appellant in the application. Mr. Adarsh Sharma, learned advocate appearing for the applicant/appellant, submitted that section 5 of the Limitation Act is an enabling provision that confers power to condone the delay in order to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. His further contention is that expression "sufficient cause" employed in the provision is adequately elastic to cloth the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves ends of justice. To support his contention, Mr. Adarsh Sharma, learned counsel, placed reliance on various judgments of the Apex Court in catena of cases in reiterating that "sufficient cause" be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice. These judgments pertain to the facts of those cases and the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. 5. It would be noticed from the perusal of the application that the applicant/appellant has not been able to show sufficient and satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the appeal within time. Before granting condo nation of delay, it is imperative for the court to record satisfaction that the explanation for the delay is either reasonable or satisfactory, which is essential pre-requisite to condonation of delay. Before granting condo nation of delay, it is imperative for the court to record satisfaction that the explanation for the delay is either reasonable or satisfactory, which is essential pre-requisite to condonation of delay. There was absolutely no explanation for the period between March 2000 and 25-4-2000 when certified copy was applied after becoming aware of the judgment and for the period between 3-5-2000 to 12-6-2000 when the appeal was filed after obtaining the certified copy of the judgment. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, any explanation, much less reasonable or satisfactory one, has been offered by the applicant/appellant in the application for the condo nation of the inordinate delay of 177days Period of limitation so prescribed by the statute cannot be extended by the court on equitable ground. The discretion to be exercised has to be either proper or judicious for condoning the delay. In the facts and circumstances discussed above, we are clearly of the view that the delay has been caused due to laches and negligence of the applicant/appellant. This application for condo nation of delay is accordingly rejected and the Letters Patent Appeal stands dismissed as barred by limitation as a consequence thereof.