H.K.K. Singh, J.— The petitioner while serving as a constable in the Central Industrial Security Force (hereinafter referred to as "CISF") a departmental proceedings was held and on inquiry, the charge was found proved. Accordingly, the disciplinary authority under order dated 27.12.1993 imposed the penalty of removal from service. The appeal filed by the petitioner having been rejected, the petitioner approached this High Court by filing Writ Petition which was registered as Civil Rule No. 434 of 1994 and under order dated 13.8.1998, the penalty of removal from service was set aside and the respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner in service and again to impose punishment in accordance with the Rules other than the penalty of removal from service. Against the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge, Union of India filed an appeal being Writ Appeal No. 101 of 1998 and the Division Bench under Judgment and order dated 13.8.1999 set aside the order of setting side of removal from service holding inter-alia that the charge of theft labelled against the petitioner having been proved in the disciplinary proceedings, that itself is grave enough to have his service removed. However, the Division Bench remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority to consider once again the quantum of punishment keeping in view of the long service rendered by the petitioner. Again, the writ petitioner filed a Review Petition being No. 12/2001 against the aforesaid Judgment and order dated 13.8.99 and under Judgment and Order dated 21.5.2002, the said Review Petition was rejected. It may be mentioned here that while the review petition was pending, the Group Commandant, CISF passed an order thereby modifying the punishment of removal from service to that of "Compulsory retirement from service". This present order dated 03.11.1999 imposing penalty of "compulsory retirement from service" is the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. 2. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously submitted that the penalty of compulsory retirement which is a penalty as found in Section 8(1) read with Rules 31(c) is grossly disproportionate to the charge labelled against the petitioner and as such, this writ court may exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, on the ground that the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate and it shocks the judicial conscience. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel has cited many decisions of the Apex Court starting from the case of Ranjit Thakur -Vs-Union of India reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611 and the case of B.C. Chaturvedi-Vs- Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 and others. On the other hand, Mr. P. Dhar, the learned CGSC has also relied upon many decisions of the Apex Court including the recent decision in the case of Union of India & ors. -Vs- R.K. Sharma reported in (2001) 9 SCC 592 . 3. The charge labelled against the petitioner was for a theft of a wooden saluting base. The value of the property is not much and that property was also recovered. Still, the learned Single Judge has observed that the punishment of removal from service was imposed on the ground of proved charge of theft and as such, lighter punishment in place of removal from service by this court is not warranted. Again, the learned Single Judge set aside the order of penalty of removal from service and ordered to reinstate the petitioner and directed the authorities to impose any penalty other than the penalty of removal from service. While reconsidering the writ petition by the Appellate Court which is a in house appeal of the High Court, the Division Bench while deciding the Writ Appeal has observed that committing of theft by a disciplinary force is grave enough to have him removed. Thus, the order of the learned Single Judge for setting aside the punishment of removal from service was set aside. Still, as noticed above, the Division Bench remitted the case to the disciplinary authority to consider once again the quantum of punishment keeping in view of the long service rendered by the petitioner. 4. As a principle of law, in exercise of power of judicial review, the High Court may interfere with the penalty if it shocks the judicial conscience and may direct the authority concerned to reconsider and impose appropriate punishment commensurate to the gravity of mis-conduct or the charges labelled or to shorten the matter, the High Court itself may pass appropriate penalty. In the instant case, the judgment of the learned Single Judge get merged with the judgment of the Division Bench and as such, as per the decision of the Division Bench, the penalty of removal from service was not interfered with, though the case was remitted to the authorities to consider once again the quantum of punishment keeping in view of the long service rendered by the petitioner. It is clear that the Division Bench did not come to the conclusion that the penalty of removal from service was grossly disproportionate which shocked the judicial conscience. Though, the disciplinary authority considered the matter and modified the penalty of removal from service to one of compulsory retirement from service. 5. Thus, there was no finding, far less, direction of the appellate court to the authorities to pass any penalty other than removal from service. 6. The question, now, is whether it is open to the court to again hold as to whether the penalty of compulsory retirement from service is grossly disproportionate and shocks the judicial conscience requiring judicial intervention. Even as per the finding as recorded by the Division Bench of this court which was again prayed for by the petitioner to be reviewed but rejected, I am of the considered view that it is not open for the Single Bench to re-open the matter once again to find out as to whether the punishment of compulsory retirement is grossly disproportionate requiring intervention by the court. 7. Lastly, the submission of Mr. Biswas that in the course of the departmental proceeding, the petitioner was not given a chance of exercising his statutory right to have the service of a defence assistant and this had vitiated the proceeding for violation of statutory right as well as the principles of natural justice cannot be agitated now. This matter should have been taken as a ground on earlier stages of this litigation, that is, at the time of hearing of the Civil Rule No. 434 of 1994 or the Writ Appeal No. 101 of 1998. As a principle of law, even if this plea was not taken, the same cannot be taken at this stage. Here, it may also be mentioned that while rejecting the review application in Review Petition No. 12/2001, the Division Bench categorically held that this plea regarding the service of a defence assistant cannot be taken now. As a principle of law, even if this plea was not taken, the same cannot be taken at this stage. Here, it may also be mentioned that while rejecting the review application in Review Petition No. 12/2001, the Division Bench categorically held that this plea regarding the service of a defence assistant cannot be taken now. It may not be out of place also to mention that in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents in the present case, it has been clarified that the petitioner expressed his desire to appoint one civilian as defence assistant but the same was not allowed as the Rules did not permit so. Again, under letter dated 29.7.93, the authority permitted the petitioner to present his case with the assistance of any member of the Force, but the petitioner on 1.7.93, in writing, declared that he did not want to have the service of any defence assistant. Thus, this plea cannot be taken as a ground now and also on point of law, this plea is not maintainable as the petitioner was given ample opportunity for such a defence assistant in the course of departmental inquiry. 8. It may be mentioned herein that Mr. D.K. Biswas relying upon a recent Constitution Bench decision in the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra, petitioner -Vs-Ashok Hurra and another, Respondents reported in 2002 AIR SCW 1730 submitted that considering the entire facts and nature of the case that the petitioner has been in service for 11 years and the property alleged to have been stolen which was also recovered from the room of the petitioner was for a value of Rs. 100/- thus, applying the doctrine of ex debito justitiae, this court may interfere with the modified penalty. The submission of the learned counsel has no force at all, the aforesaid doctrine of ex debito justitiae is not applicable in view of the fact that the aforesaid Constitution Bench decision was with regard to the power of the Supreme Court to be exercised in rare cases. Thus, aforesaid Constitution Bench decision is not relevant as we are now concerned with the power of the High Court and even, if it is taken that High Court has also the power to exercise such a power under the doctrine of ex debito justitiae, on facts, the present petition does not lie as observed above. 9. Thus, aforesaid Constitution Bench decision is not relevant as we are now concerned with the power of the High Court and even, if it is taken that High Court has also the power to exercise such a power under the doctrine of ex debito justitiae, on facts, the present petition does not lie as observed above. 9. In the case at hand, the disciplinary authority has reconsidered the quantum of punishment and on consideration of the entire service records of the petitioner and other relevant matters as admissible and required under the Rules, has passed the modified penalty for the proved charge of theft committed by the petitioner. Thus, it is not a fit case for this court to interfere with the penalty passed by the disciplinary authority. 10. With the above observation, direction and conclusion, this writ petition stands dismissed. H.K.K. Singh, J.— The petitioner while serving as a constable in the Central Industrial Security Force (hereinafter referred to as "CISF") a departmental proceedings was held and on inquiry, the charge was found proved. Accordingly, the disciplinary authority under order dated 27.12.1993 imposed the penalty of removal from service. The appeal filed by the petitioner having been rejected, the petitioner approached this High Court by filing Writ Petition which was registered as Civil Rule No. 434 of 1994 and under order dated 13.8.1998, the penalty of removal from service was set aside and the respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner in service and again to impose punishment in accordance with the Rules other than the penalty of removal from service. Against the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge, Union of India filed an appeal being Writ Appeal No. 101 of 1998 and the Division Bench under Judgment and order dated 13.8.1999 set aside the order of setting side of removal from service holding inter-alia that the charge of theft labelled against the petitioner having been proved in the disciplinary proceedings, that itself is grave enough to have his service removed. However, the Division Bench remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority to consider once again the quantum of punishment keeping in view of the long service rendered by the petitioner. Again, the writ petitioner filed a Review Petition being No. 12/2001 against the aforesaid Judgment and order dated 13.8.99 and under Judgment and Order dated 21.5.2002, the said Review Petition was rejected. Again, the writ petitioner filed a Review Petition being No. 12/2001 against the aforesaid Judgment and order dated 13.8.99 and under Judgment and Order dated 21.5.2002, the said Review Petition was rejected. It may be mentioned here that while the review petition was pending, the Group Commandant, CISF passed an order thereby modifying the punishment of removal from service to that of "Compulsory retirement from service". This present order dated 03.11.1999 imposing penalty of "compulsory retirement from service" is the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. 2. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously submitted that the penalty of compulsory retirement which is a penalty as found in Section 8(1) read with Rules 31(c) is grossly disproportionate to the charge labelled against the petitioner and as such, this writ court may exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, on the ground that the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate and it shocks the judicial conscience. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel has cited many decisions of the Apex Court starting from the case of Ranjit Thakur -Vs-Union of India reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611 and the case of B.C. Chaturvedi-Vs- Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 and others. On the other hand, Mr. P. Dhar, the learned CGSC has also relied upon many decisions of the Apex Court including the recent decision in the case of Union of India & ors. -Vs- R.K. Sharma reported in (2001) 9 SCC 592 . 3. The charge labelled against the petitioner was for a theft of a wooden saluting base. The value of the property is not much and that property was also recovered. Still, the learned Single Judge has observed that the punishment of removal from service was imposed on the ground of proved charge of theft and as such, lighter punishment in place of removal from service by this court is not warranted. Again, the learned Single Judge set aside the order of penalty of removal from service and ordered to reinstate the petitioner and directed the authorities to impose any penalty other than the penalty of removal from service. Again, the learned Single Judge set aside the order of penalty of removal from service and ordered to reinstate the petitioner and directed the authorities to impose any penalty other than the penalty of removal from service. While reconsidering the writ petition by the Appellate Court which is a in house appeal of the High Court, the Division Bench while deciding the Writ Appeal has observed that committing of theft by a disciplinary force is grave enough to have him removed. Thus, the order of the learned Single Judge for setting aside the punishment of removal from service was set aside. Still, as noticed above, the Division Bench remitted the case to the disciplinary authority to consider once again the quantum of punishment keeping in view of the long service rendered by the petitioner. 4. As a principle of law, in exercise of power of judicial review, the High Court may interfere with the penalty if it shocks the judicial conscience and may direct the authority concerned to reconsider and impose appropriate punishment commensurate to the gravity of mis-conduct or the charges labelled or to shorten the matter, the High Court itself may pass appropriate penalty. In the instant case, the judgment of the learned Single Judge get merged with the judgment of the Division Bench and as such, as per the decision of the Division Bench, the penalty of removal from service was not interfered with, though the case was remitted to the authorities to consider once again the quantum of punishment keeping in view of the long service rendered by the petitioner. It is clear that the Division Bench did not come to the conclusion that the penalty of removal from service was grossly disproportionate which shocked the judicial conscience. Though, the disciplinary authority considered the matter and modified the penalty of removal from service to one of compulsory retirement from service. 5. Thus, there was no finding, far less, direction of the appellate court to the authorities to pass any penalty other than removal from service. 6. The question, now, is whether it is open to the court to again hold as to whether the penalty of compulsory retirement from service is grossly disproportionate and shocks the judicial conscience requiring judicial intervention. Thus, there was no finding, far less, direction of the appellate court to the authorities to pass any penalty other than removal from service. 6. The question, now, is whether it is open to the court to again hold as to whether the penalty of compulsory retirement from service is grossly disproportionate and shocks the judicial conscience requiring judicial intervention. Even as per the finding as recorded by the Division Bench of this court which was again prayed for by the petitioner to be reviewed but rejected, I am of the considered view that it is not open for the Single Bench to re-open the matter once again to find out as to whether the punishment of compulsory retirement is grossly disproportionate requiring intervention by the court. 7. Lastly, the submission of Mr. Biswas that in the course of the departmental proceeding, the petitioner was not given a chance of exercising his statutory right to have the service of a defence assistant and this had vitiated the proceeding for violation of statutory right as well as the principles of natural justice cannot be agitated now. This matter should have been taken as a ground on earlier stages of this litigation, that is, at the time of hearing of the Civil Rule No. 434 of 1994 or the Writ Appeal No. 101 of 1998. As a principle of law, even if this plea was not taken, the same cannot be taken at this stage. Here, it may also be mentioned that while rejecting the review application in Review Petition No. 12/2001, the Division Bench categorically held that this plea regarding the service of a defence assistant cannot be taken now. It may not be out of place also to mention that in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents in the present case, it has been clarified that the petitioner expressed his desire to appoint one civilian as defence assistant but the same was not allowed as the Rules did not permit so. Again, under letter dated 29.7.93, the authority permitted the petitioner to present his case with the assistance of any member of the Force, but the petitioner on 1.7.93, in writing, declared that he did not want to have the service of any defence assistant. Again, under letter dated 29.7.93, the authority permitted the petitioner to present his case with the assistance of any member of the Force, but the petitioner on 1.7.93, in writing, declared that he did not want to have the service of any defence assistant. Thus, this plea cannot be taken as a ground now and also on point of law, this plea is not maintainable as the petitioner was given ample opportunity for such a defence assistant in the course of departmental inquiry. 8. It may be mentioned herein that Mr. D.K. Biswas relying upon a recent Constitution Bench decision in the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra, petitioner -Vs-Ashok Hurra and another, Respondents reported in 2002 AIR SCW 1730 submitted that considering the entire facts and nature of the case that the petitioner has been in service for 11 years and the property alleged to have been stolen which was also recovered from the room of the petitioner was for a value of Rs. 100/- thus, applying the doctrine of ex debito justitiae, this court may interfere with the modified penalty. The submission of the learned counsel has no force at all, the aforesaid doctrine of ex debito justitiae is not applicable in view of the fact that the aforesaid Constitution Bench decision was with regard to the power of the Supreme Court to be exercised in rare cases. Thus, aforesaid Constitution Bench decision is not relevant as we are now concerned with the power of the High Court and even, if it is taken that High Court has also the power to exercise such a power under the doctrine of ex debito justitiae, on facts, the present petition does not lie as observed above. 9. In the case at hand, the disciplinary authority has reconsidered the quantum of punishment and on consideration of the entire service records of the petitioner and other relevant matters as admissible and required under the Rules, has passed the modified penalty for the proved charge of theft committed by the petitioner. Thus, it is not a fit case for this court to interfere with the penalty passed by the disciplinary authority. 10. With the above observation, direction and conclusion, this writ petition stands dismissed.