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2001 DIGILAW 336 (HP)

KARAM CHAND v. DATTA RAM

2001-11-19

R.L.KHURANA

body2001
JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.—This order will dispose of the abovenoted two revision petitions arising out of the order dated 3.4.1998 of the learned Appellate Authority, Una affirming the order dated 20.10.1994 of the learned Rent Controller (2), Una. 2. Civil Revision No. 104 of 1998 has been filed by the tenant assailing the findings of the two courts below whereby he has been ordered to be evicted from the tenanted premises under Section 14(3)(c) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short the Act). 3. Civil Revision No. 190 of 1998 has been preferred by the landlord against the findings of the two courts below holding that the rent payable for the tenanted premises is at the rate of Rs. 500 per annum and not at the rate of Rs. 500 per month. 4. For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter being referred to as landlord and tenant respectively. 5. The tenanted premises comprise of a piece of "rented land" shown as ABCD in the site plan Ex. PW3/A forming western part of khasra No. 925 situated on Una-Nangal Road within the local limits of Municipal Committee, Una. 6. The tenanted premises were let out to the tenant for a commercial purpose, namely, for running a Saw mill about 17 years before the filing of the ejectment petition. According to the landlord the rent payable is Rs. 500 per month. The landlord sought ejectment of the tenant from the tenanted premises on the following two grounds:— (a) Non-payment of rent with effect from 1.1.1976; and (b) The tenanted premises are required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of construction of a non-residential building. 7. The tenant while resisting the petition averred that the tenanted premises were taken by him for agricultural purposes on payment of "Chakota" (annual rent) of Rs. 500. Arrears of rent as claimed by the landlord were denied and it was pleaded that rent till 1984 stood paid to Hans Raj, the brother of the landlord. Rent for the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 was paid to the landlord. Bona fide requirement of the landlord was also denied. 8. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller: 1. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent, if so how much and since when? OPP. 2. Rent for the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 was paid to the landlord. Bona fide requirement of the landlord was also denied. 8. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller: 1. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent, if so how much and since when? OPP. 2. Whether the petitioners bona fide require the demised premises/ rented land for the purpose of re-construction? OPP. 3. Relief. 9. The learned Rent Controller while deciding issue No. 1 came to the conclusion that rent payable for the tenanted premises is Rs. 500 per annum. The tenant was held to be in arrears of rent with effect from 1.1.1976 at the said rate. The learned Rent Controller also decided issue No. 2 in favour of the landlord and it was held that the tenanted premises were bona fide required by him for the purpose of raising /constructing a non-residential building therein. Consequently, an order of ejectment came to be passed against the tenant on both the grounds. It was, however, stipulated that in case the arrears of rent along with costs and interest at the rate of 9% per annum was paid/deposited by the tenant within 30 days from the date of ejectment order, he shall not be evicted from the tenanted premises on the ground of non-payment of rent. 10. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 20.10.1994 of the learned Rent Controller, both the landlord and tenant went up in appeal before the learned Appellate Authority. The landlord challenged the findings of the learned Rent Controller adjudging the rent payable for the tenanted premises as Rs. 500 per annum, the tenant assailed the eviction order passed against him by the learned Rent Controller on the two grounds of non-payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the landlord. 11. The learned Appellate Authority vide its impugned order dated 3.4.1998 dismissed both the appeals and affirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on both the issues. 12. At the very outset, it may be stated that the concurrent findings of the two courts below are purely on questions of fact, namely, rate of rent, period for which rent is due and bona fide requirement of the landlord for construction of non-residential building in the tenanted premises which consist of rented land. 13. 12. At the very outset, it may be stated that the concurrent findings of the two courts below are purely on questions of fact, namely, rate of rent, period for which rent is due and bona fide requirement of the landlord for construction of non-residential building in the tenanted premises which consist of rented land. 13. The power of the court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 24(5) of the Act is limited in seeing whether any illegality or impropriety has been committed by the two courts below in exercise of the powers under the Act. This Court in exercise of such limited revisional powers cannot reappreciate and re-assess the evidence in order to disturb the concurrent findings on a question of fact. 14. The Apex Court in M/s. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma and others, 1988 (1) SCC 70, while dealing with the extent of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the provisions of which are similar to the provisions contained in Section 24(5) of the Rent Act in the present case) has held that the questions whether there was a subtenant and whether the written consent of the landlord had been obtained, were questions of fact. Concurrent findings on such questions cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers. 15. Again in Fatima Bee (Smt.) v. Mahamood Siddiqui, (1996) 9 SCC 450, it has been held by the Apex Court that the High Courts power to interfere with concurrent findings of fact under the Rent Act would be limited and if there is no misreading of evidence by the two courts below, it is not open to the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and reverse the findings recorded by the Courts below in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 16. In Patel Valmik Himatlal and others v. Patel Mohan Lal Muljibhai, (1998) 7 SCC 383, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court had concurrently found sub-letting as proved. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, after re-appreciating the evidence, held that it was not a case of sub-letting but a case of partnership. The Honble Supreme Court observed that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence, which it could not do. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, after re-appreciating the evidence, held that it was not a case of sub-letting but a case of partnership. The Honble Supreme Court observed that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence, which it could not do. It was held that mere fact that a different view was possible on re-appreciation of evidence was no ground for the High Court to substitute its own finding in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 17. In Chaman Prakash Puri v. Ishwar Dass Rajput and another, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 445, and in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 1999 (1) RCJ 158, it has been held that it is not permissible for the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the two courts below, on the facts of the case, are so unreasonable that no Court could have reached such a finding on the material available. 18. Dealing with the similar provision contained in Section 21(5) of the H.R Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 (as then in force) which provision is pari materia to Section 24(5) of the present Rent Act, the Honble Supreme Court in Dr. Gyan Parkash v. Som Nath and others, 1996 (1) RCR 342 (SC), has held that on questions of fact, the findings recorded by the authorities below must be accepted and the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with such finding in exercise of limited scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Act. The High Court is not exercising the powers of a Court of Appeal and, as such, is not expected to re-appreciate the entire evidence coming on record and to come to a contrary finding. 19. In Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201, the Honble Supreme Court considered the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. It was held that where a statute provides for a right of appeal as well as revision, discretionary jurisdiction of revision can be invoked only when appellate order suffers from illegality, impropriety or perversity. The two jurisdictions (appellate and revisional) are different from each other in scope and content. It was held that where a statute provides for a right of appeal as well as revision, discretionary jurisdiction of revision can be invoked only when appellate order suffers from illegality, impropriety or perversity. The two jurisdictions (appellate and revisional) are different from each other in scope and content. The use of the expression "legality or propriety of such orders or proceedings" makes the revisional powers of the High Court wider than powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nonetheless it is not so wide as to embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an appeal and disturb findings of fact arrived at by the courts below without recording a finding that the conclusions arrived at were perverse or based on "no evidence" or were arrived at on a superficial or perfunctory approach. It was further observed:— "If the High Court proceeds to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact ignoring the above mentioned well recognized principles, it would amount to equating the revisional powers of the High Court as powers of a regular appeal frustrating the fine distinction between an appeal and a revision." 20. In the present case, on the basis of the evidence coming on the record, the two courts below have arrived at concurrent findings that: (i) the rent for the tenanted premises is Rs. 500 per annum; (ii) the tenant is in arrears of rent with effect from 1.1.1976; and (iii) the tenanted premises are bona fide required by the landlord for the purpose of construction of a non-residential building. 21. Such concurrent findings being purely on questions of fact, cannot be interfered with in the present revision petitions. I have gone through the evidence coming on the record and it can be safely held that there has been neither misreading nor misappreciation of evidence by the two courts below. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or impropriety. 22. Resultantly, both the revision petitions are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Revision dismissed. -