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2001 DIGILAW 34 (HP)

STATE OF H. P. v. KASHMIR SINGH

2001-03-14

K.C.SOOD, KAMLESH SHARMA

body2001
JUDGMENT Ms. Kamlesh Sharma, J.—This is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 104 days in filing appeal against the award dated 11.1.2000 passed by District Judge, Bilaspur, whereby the reference petition of the respondent-claimant was allowed and the market value of the acquired land was enhanced from Rs. 50 per biswa to Rs. 20,000 per biswa.. 2. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 3. The sufficient cause shown in the application, which is supported by the affidavit of Superintending Engineer, 10th Circle, H.P. P.W.D., Bilaspur, is that appeal could not be filed within the period of limitation, which expired on 17.4.2000, as after processing the case at different levels approval to file the appeal was granted on 26.4.2000 by the Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (PW) and thereafter Superintending Engineer took further steps to file the appeal. The respondent filed reply to the application and opposed it seriously on the ground that no sufficient cause is made out from the averments made in the application. According to the respondent, satisfactory explanation of 104 days long delay has not been given. 4. By filing rejoinder on the affidavit of Superintending Engineer of the Circle it is further stated that after the receipt of the approval to file appeal by the Executive Engineer, H.P. P.W.D. Division No. 2, Bilaspur on 24.5.2000 the case was prepared and submitted through proper channel for vetting on 31.5.200C In order to provide the funds for payment of the award amount again the case was routed through various channels and at last on 24.7.2000 a draft of Rs. 2,62,454 was prepared. After making the payment available the case . was signed by the Superintending Engineer on 25.7.2000 and filed in the court on 27.7.2000. It is stated that delay was neither wilful nor intentional. Rather it was beyond the control of the applicants. In his sur-rejoinder the respondent has taken the stand that even after receiving the approval to file appeal on 24.5.2000 and knowing well that the time for filing the appeal had expired on 17.4.2000 the Officers did not care to prepare and file the appeal within a reasonable period. 5. Rather it was beyond the control of the applicants. In his sur-rejoinder the respondent has taken the stand that even after receiving the approval to file appeal on 24.5.2000 and knowing well that the time for filing the appeal had expired on 17.4.2000 the Officers did not care to prepare and file the appeal within a reasonable period. 5. Learned Advocate General appearing for the applicants-State has referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Manx and others, AIR 1996 SC 1623 and Special Tehsildar Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma, AIR 1996 SC 2750, to urge that State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual and some sort of latitude deserves to be given to it as it is an impersonal machinery working through its Officers or servants. According to learned Advocate General, the expression "sufficient cause" should be given liberal construction and unless inaction or negligence is proved on record, which is not there in the present case, prayer for condonation of delay shall not be refused. According to the learned Advocate General, delay in the present case was caused as the matter was processed at different levels for obtaining approval to file appeal and thereafter for preparing the appeal, getting it vetted and also for making funds available for payment of award amount, which clearly proves on record the bona fide of the Government to file appeal against the impugned award whereby market value has been increased by 400 times. It is also submitted that public interest will suffer if delay is not condoned and appeal is not considered on merit. 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent by relying upon the judgments of Supreme Court in P.K Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another, AIR 1998 SC 2276, and of Patna High Court in Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna and others v. Baxi S.R.P. Sinha and another, AIR 1999 Patna 203, has urged that law of limitation is to be applied with all its rigours even in the case of the State and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. He has further submitted that moving the file from one section to another section and from one office to another office is not a sufficient or good ground to extend the period of limitation as held by their Lordships in Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd., 1989 Pat LJR 5 (SC). 7. After giving our best consideration to the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, we find that by applying the law laid down in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (supra) to the facts and circumstances of the present case, delay deserves to be condoned. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (supra) after considering catena of case law their Lordships of Supreme Court have concluded in para 10 : “.....When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, the considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally, injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of delay." Similar view was taken in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma (supra) and the learned Judges have observed in para 2: "It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day to day delay. The transaction of the business of the Government being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice, it would result in public mischief by skillful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice, it would result in public mischief by skillful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the court would be pragmatic but not pedandic.......” 8. So far the judgment in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another (supra) is concerned, their Lordships of Supreme Court were not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of that case any explanation muchless a reasonable or satisfactory one, had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days. In the application for condonation of delay the thrust in explaining the delay was that there was great rush in the office of Advocate General and also that immediately after the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the matter was examined by the District Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope for filing the appeal but later on, despite the opinion referred to above, the appeal was filed after about 2 years and three months. It was in this context that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held that law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds, discretion exercised by the High Court in condoning the delay was not held proper and judicious as it had failed to record its satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was reasonable or satisfactory. No doubt, this judgment is later in point of time but it was rendered by a Division Bench consisting of two Judges, whereas the judgment in State of Haryana v. Chandra Manx (supra) was of three Judges. 9. By now it is well settled that if there is any conflict between two decisions the opinion of the larger Bench would prevail even if it is earlier. So far the judgment in Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. (supra) is concerned, it is by the Division Bench consisting of three Judges but earlier in point of time to the judgment in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (supra), as such, it will also not prevail. So far the judgment in Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. (supra) is concerned, it is by the Division Bench consisting of three Judges but earlier in point of time to the judgment in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (supra), as such, it will also not prevail. Further, the judgment of Patna High Court in Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna and others v. Baxi S.R.P. Sinha and another (supra) is also of no assistance to us as it is based upon the judgment of Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. (supra) and Jias not taken into consideration the judgment of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (supra). 10. Therefore, from the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case for condoning the delay by giving liberal construction to the expression "sufficient cause" and taking pragmatic approach keeping in view that the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers1" or servants who may have worked at a snail pace but they cannot be held guilty of inaction or negligence. Moreover, if delay is not condoned and appeal is not considered on merits public interest would also suffer. Accordingly, the application is allowed and delay is condoned. There is no order as to costs. Application allowed.