VAMAN RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment of the Assistant Sessions Judge at Khammam dated 17-9-1997 rendered in Sessions Case No. 270 of 1994 under which the appellant herein has been convicted for the offence under Section 307 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case as brought out during the evidence may be stated briefly as follows : ( 3 ) THE de facto complainant P. W. 1 (victim) is a rickshaw puller. He was engaged by the accused to transport earthen pots for the whole day on 13-4-1994. At the end of the work, P. W. 1 took the accused to his house in his rickshaw. P. W. 1 demanded remuneration for his work from the accused. On this, the accused got enraged and abused P. W. 1 and also slapped him. When P. W. 1 protested, the accused went inside his house and brought a tin of kerosene oil and poured kerosene on P. W. 1 and lit a match and set fire to P. W. 1. When P. W. 1 raised cries, some neighbours went to the scene and one of them, P. W. 3, helped P. W. 1 in putting off fire by wrapping a blanket over him. P. W. 5 also tried to extinguish the fire by pouring sand on P. W. 1. Thereafter, P. W. 1 ran from the scene and reached the police station. He was sent to the hospital where he was treated by the Doctor, P. W. 7. At the hospital, P. W. 1 s statement was recorded by P. W. 9 the head constable at Khammam I Town P. S. who also recorded the statement of P. W. 1 in Ex. P-1. On the basis of this statement, the FIR, Ex. P-6, was registered at the said police station. P. W. 9 conducted a part of investigation. P. W. 9 went to the scene of offence and conducted a panchanama of scene of offence attested by P. W. 6, half burnt currency notes, Mos. 1 to 4, partial burnt pieces of human skin, MO5, and a chappal belonging to P. W. 1 were seized from the said scene of offence under panchanama Ex. P-4. P. W. 9 went to the scene of offence and conducted a panchanama of scene of offence attested by P. W. 6, half burnt currency notes, Mos. 1 to 4, partial burnt pieces of human skin, MO5, and a chappal belonging to P. W. 1 were seized from the said scene of offence under panchanama Ex. P-4. P. W. 2, the wife of P. W. 1, was informed about the incident in the night, P. W. 1 narrated the above incident to her. ( 4 ) IN support of the case of the prosecution, P. Ws. 1 to 9 have been examined and Exs. P-1 to P-6 and MOs. 1 to 6 have been marked. ( 5 ) WHEN examined under Section 313 of Cr. P. C. , the accused while denying the various allegations did admit the fact that he poured kerosene on P. W. 1 and set fire to him. ( 6 ) ON this evidence, the learned Assistant Judge held that prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly recorded conviction and imposed sentence as stated above. ( 7 ) THE question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the charge against the accused? ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant seeks to challenge this finding firstly pointing out that there is delay in lodging the first information report which according to the learned counsel denudes the credibility of the prosecution case completely. It is also pointed out that the evidence of P. W. 1 does not get corroborated from the other evidence on record in the most important aspect incriminating the accused. It is then contended that at any rate even if the occurrence of the incident is held to have been proved, the offence under Section 307 of IPC has not been made out. ( 9 ) IT is apparent from the evidence on record that the prosecution seeks to rely on the following pieces of evidence:i. the evidence of the victim P. W. 1 himself who narrated that the accused engaged him for transportation of earthen pots to various places throughout day and at the end of the work in the night, when after he dropped the accused at his house, he demanded the rickshaw charges on which the accused scolded him and abused him. P. W. 1 further stated that the accused even slapped on his cheeks. When P. W. 1 protested, the accused got enraged and went inside the house and brought out a kerosene can and sprinkled kerosene on his body. II. The evidence of P. Ws. 3 to 5 who seek to corroborate P. W. 1. These witnesses have stated that on hearing the cries of P. W. 1, they came out of their houses being the neighbours of the accused and tried to extinguish the fire. P. W. 3 stated that he wraped the blanket around P. W. 1 whereas P. W. 5 states that he poured sand on him to put out the fire. III. The evidence of P. W. 6, the panch witness, and P. W. 9, the Investigating Officer as to the recovery of half burnt currency notes, partially burnt human skin pieces and a chappal belonging to P. W. 1 from the scene of offence. IV. The medical evidence given by P. W. 7 showing the burnt injuriies on the person of P. W. 1. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner points out that though P. W. 1 has stated that the incident occurred at 10. 00 p. m. and he went to the police station soon thereafter but admittedly his statement was not recorded at the police station and he was merely sent to the hospital for treatment. The learned counsel for the appellant further points out that investigating agency has sought to explain this by stating that soon after P. W. 1 went to the police station, he disclosed the identity of his wife and children and immediately fell unconscious and as such his statement could not be recorded. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the evidence of the Doctor, P. W. 7 discloses that at about 11. 40 p. m. he examined the victim P. W. 1 and that at that time he was very much conscious. Even assuming that there is a lapse on the part of the police in recording the statement of P. W. 1, immediately after he went to the police station, this lapse of the investigating agency does not seem to adversely affect the case of the prosecution in this case. Even assuming that there is a lapse on the part of the police in recording the statement of P. W. 1, immediately after he went to the police station, this lapse of the investigating agency does not seem to adversely affect the case of the prosecution in this case. ( 11 ) IT may be pertinent to mention here that P. W. 1, the victim in this case is a man of a humble status being a rickshaw puller. Obviously, the concerned official at the police station did not seem to have taken seriously his complaint made orally at that time. This circumstances in itself does not seem to affect in any way the credibility of P. W. 1 himself in this case. It is pertinent to mention here that P. W. 1 is not shown to have absolutely any motive to falsely implicate the accused in such a heinous crime though a suggestion was made to P. W. 1 that because he teased his wife 25 days prior to the incident, the accused bore grudge against him and foisted this case. This suggestion, which has been denied by P. W. 1 appears far fetched and highly improbable. ( 12 ) THE next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that as far as the fact of the accused having sprinkled kerosene on P. W. 1 and his setting fire to him is concerned, there is absolutely no corroboration from any other witness. It is true that on this particular aspect of the case, there is only the solitary evidence of P. W. 1 because the neighbours who are said to have gone to the scene of offence on hearing the cries of P. W. 1, namely, P. Ws. 3 and 5 do not claim to have witnessed the accused having sprinkled kerosene on P. W. 1 and setting fire to him. Another such neighbour who has been examined as P. W. 4 has not supported the case at all. But, P. W. 2 has categorically stated that on hearing the cries when he went outside, he saw the accused burning with flames on his body. He tried to put out the fire by wraping a blanket around him. Similar is the evidence of P. W. 5 who stated that he poured sand on P. W. 1 to put out the fire. He tried to put out the fire by wraping a blanket around him. Similar is the evidence of P. W. 5 who stated that he poured sand on P. W. 1 to put out the fire. This sturdily corroborates the evidence of P. W. 1 as to the occurrence of the incident in which he was set on fire by the accused. Thus, P. Ws. 3 and 5 in material particulars corroborate P. W. 1 s evidence. The evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 5 lends assurance to the version given by P. W. 1 as to the occurrence of the incident. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant, however, points out that P. W. 4 and P. W. 5 do not corroborate each other inasmuch as they do not speak of the presence of each other at the scene at the relevant time. It is true that P. W. 3 has not spoken about the presence of P. W. 5 and similarly P. W. 5 has not referred to the presence of P. W. 3 at the scene of offence at the relevant point of time. It is somewhat improbable that P. Ws. 3 and 5 who must have reached the spot at about some time on hearing the cries of P. W. 1 should not have observed each other at the scene. But, it is pertinent to mention here that there are certain features in the case which deserved attention. Both P. Ws. 3 and 5 appear to belong to the same caste as the accused. They happened to be the neighbours of the accused also. Under the circumstances, they appear to be some what reluctant witnesses. ( 14 ) CONSIDERING this aspect, their failure to mention each other s presence at the scene of offence should not be a ground for rejecting their evidence. In fact, the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 5 is natural and probable. There are no reasons brought out in their cross-examination to discredit their testimony on the aspects they have deposed to. The evidence of P. W. 1 is further corroborated by the seizure of important corroborative piceces of material from the scene of offence, namely, half burnt currency notes, half burnt pieces of human skin, and a chappal near the house of the accused where the incident is said to have occurred. The evidence of P. W. 1 is further corroborated by the seizure of important corroborative piceces of material from the scene of offence, namely, half burnt currency notes, half burnt pieces of human skin, and a chappal near the house of the accused where the incident is said to have occurred. It is in the evidence of P. W. 1 that he had some currency notes in his pocket which were burnt. Even half burnt currency notes, Mos. 1 to 4, partial burnt pieces of human skin, MO. 5 and a chappal which P. W. 1 identified by him as his own constitute significant circumstance lending assurance to the credibility of P. W. 1 as to the place of the incident and the manner in which the incident occurred. ( 15 ) THE fact that P. W. 1 was sent from the scene of occurrence to the police station with burn injuries immediately after the incident is also a circumstance which corroborates P. W. 1 s evidence. The fact that P. W. 1 has received burn injuries is fortified by the medical evidence of the Doctor, P. W. 7. P. W. 7 has stated that P. W. 1 received partial burn injuries all over his body except back, abdomen etc. According to P. W. 7, both the hands of P. W. 1 had become defunct due to burns. It is further in the evidence of P. W. 7 that such injuries are possible when kerosene is sprinkled on the body and is on set fire. He also described the injuries as grievous in nature. The evidence of P. W. 7 is not challenged during his cross-examination at all. Thus, in the light of this evidence, the findings of the learned Assistant Judge that the prosecution has poured beyond reasonable doubt the broad spectrum of the incident, namely, the accused sprinkled kerosene on the body of P. W. 1 and set fire to him must be held to be in accordance with the evidence on record and has to be upheld. ( 16 ) THE next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that even if the incident as such is presumed to be true, the offence of attempt to commit murder under Section 307 of I. P. C. cannot be said to have been made out. ( 16 ) THE next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that even if the incident as such is presumed to be true, the offence of attempt to commit murder under Section 307 of I. P. C. cannot be said to have been made out. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that even according to P. W. 7, the burn injuries received by P. W. 1 were superficial in nature. It is further contended that obviously there was no intention on the part of the accused to commit murder of P. W. 1 inasmuch as there is absolutely no motive for the accused to do away with P. W. 1. ( 17 ) AS seen above, P. W. 7, the Doctor has stated that the burn injuries received by P. W. 1 constitute grievous injuries. It is true that the evidence on record does not disclose that the accused had any motive to kill P. W. 1 but for constituting an offence under Section 307 of IPC, intention to kill is not the only ground for constituting the offence. In such cases, it is well settled that the result of the action of the accused including the injuries sustained by the victim are relevant and constitute a basis for drawing an inference as to the intention or knowledge. There may be instances where even without any injury having resulted, the accused can very well be held to have committed the offence under Section 307 of IPC if the other circumstances on record go to show that either he had intention to kill or he had the knowledge that the act attributed to him was likely to result in the death of the victim. ( 18 ) "murder" has been defined under Section 300 of IPC, which is extracted below : "300. ( 18 ) "murder" has been defined under Section 300 of IPC, which is extracted below : "300. MURDER: Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done: firstly, with the intention of causing death, or secondly: If it is done with intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or thirdly: If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or fourthly: If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. ( 19 ) CULPABLE homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person. The act of the accused in this case may not fall under these categories inasmuch as no intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death may be attributed to the accused. However, it is pertinent to note that if the act by which death is caused is done with an intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or if the person committing the act knows that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. ( 20 ) IN this case, the acts attributed to the accused are that he brought out a can of kerosene from inside his house and sprinkled kerosene on the body of P. W. 1, lit a match stick and set fire to his body. This resulted in the body of P. W. 1 catching fire resulting in extensive burn injuries over his body. This resulted in the body of P. W. 1 catching fire resulting in extensive burn injuries over his body. Pouring kerosene over a person and setting fire to him is certainly so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Any person, who pours kerosene on another and sets fire to him must be presumed to know the dangerous nature of the act committed by him. There is nothing to show that there is any excuse for the accused to commit this act against P. W. 1. Thus, the act of the accused would clearly fall under the fourth clause of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code if death resulted by such act. Thus the acts held to have been committed by the accused were committed under such circumstances that if death resulted, it would be deemed to be a murder. In view of this, there is no escape from holding that the conviction of the accused for the offence under Section 307 of IPC is perfectly justified. ( 21 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant, however, finally submits that considering the circumstances of the case, the sentence is too severe and disproportionate. ( 22 ) IT is true that the accused had absolutely no motive to kill the victim, P. W. 1. The accused certainly has not intended to kill him. The incident apparently originated from a small scuffle or argument over payment of rickshaw charges to P. W. 1 by the accused. Considering these circumstances, I am inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the sentence is on a higher side. ( 23 ) CONSIDERING the circumstances of the case while confirming the conviction of the accused for the offence under Section 307 of IPC, the sentence of imprisonment of 10 years is reduced to rigorous imprisonment for four years. It is obvious that the sentence of imprisonment shall be worked out by adding the period of detention during the trial. Thus, the appeal is partly allowed ordering reduction of sentence as above while confirming the conviction of the accused. Appeal partly allowed.