Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 343 (MAD)

Sujatha Christiana v. C. Thomas

2001-03-16

V.BAKTHAVATSALU

body2001
Judgment :- C.M. A. No. 778 of 1996 is preferred against the order passed in I. D. O. P. No.36 of 89. C.M.A. No. 779 of 1996 is preferred against the order passed by the Learned District Judge in G.W.O.P. No. 45 of 1991. The respondent in the above O.Ps is the appellant in both the appeals. The respondent herein has filed I.D.O.P. No. 36 of 89 against the appellant herein, who is his wife. 2. The case of the petitioner is as follows :- The petitioner and respondent are CSI christians and their marriage was solemnized on 29-12-1983 in Kanyakumari District. The petitioner is employed as a Assistant Professor in the Government Arts College, Musiri, Tiruchirapalli District. After the marriage, the petitioner and respondent spent some time at the petitioner's family name and thereafter, both went to Musiri on 23-1-1984 and lived their happily till 22-4-1984. At the commencement of the summar holidays in April 1984, the petitioner and the respondent returned to the petitioner's house and lived there till 30-5-1984. On 31-5-1984, the respondent left the petitioner's house and went to her parents house at Palappalam, about five kilometers away from the petitioner's house. The respondent was pregnant at that time. The respondent did not return to the petitioner's house, though she promised to go back after spending few days with her parents. The respondent's father is a widower. The petitioner unsuspecting the real cause of the respondent continued residing with her father used to visit her and had asked her to return to the petitioner's house. On 12-6-1984, the petitioner went back to Musiri and the respondent refused to go with him. On 29-11-1984, the respondent gave birth to a male child. No intimation was given to the petitioner even at the time of baptism of the child. The respondent accepted the job of a teacher in My Lady in Agasteeswaram Taluk in the month of June 1984 and this was not disclosed to the petitioner before he went back to Musiri on 12-6-1984. the respondent expressed her desire to work being a post-graduate herself and the petitioner had disclosed to the respondent about the dis-advantage and advantage of the respondent accepting the teacher's job in a private school. the respondent expressed her desire to work being a post-graduate herself and the petitioner had disclosed to the respondent about the dis-advantage and advantage of the respondent accepting the teacher's job in a private school. The bringing up of children, the possibility of petitioner's regular transfers, the near impossibility of respondent's getting a job in a Government School, the job in a private school making it necessary for the respondent to stay at a particular place for the rest of her period of service, the additional expense in maintaining two establishments and the psychological effect on the growing children all certain problems. In spite of these difficulties, the petitioner tried to get the respondent a job in Nayarasam Matriculation School at Palliyathur near Erode and nearer to Musiri in the month of May 1984. This was not to the liking of the respondent. When the petitioner was told that the respondent had taken up a job in a school in Kanyakumari District, the petitioner did not at the outset suspect that it was the outcome of a careful plan at the instance of the father of the respondent. The respondent expressed her intention to stay in Kanyakumari District and continued her services in one of the private schools in the district and the said decision was influenced by the father of the responeent. The petitioner pleaded her through letters and also in person to come and reside with him. But the said request was not accepted by the respondent. The petitioner made efforts to persuade the respondent to reside with the petitioner and to resume cohabitation. The friends and relatives and a Professor of Christian College, Nagercoil and the brother-in-law of the petitioner talked to the respondent and her father and requested her to live with the petitioner. But all the efforts ended in failure. The respondent has no right to break the marital house and deny consortium to the petitioner. The respondent is obliged in law to live with the petitioner as a lawful wedded wife. The respondent refused to return to the petitioner and live with him is condemnable morally and legally and therefore, the petitioner has filed this application for restitution of conjugal rights. The respondent is obliged in law to live with the petitioner as a lawful wedded wife. The respondent refused to return to the petitioner and live with him is condemnable morally and legally and therefore, the petitioner has filed this application for restitution of conjugal rights. The respondent made unwarranted allegations against the petitioner and complained to the police that the petitioner has been insisting on dowry and caused a prosecution to be launched under the Dowry Prohibition Act against the petitioner and his brother. The petitioner was arrested by the police and he obtained bail from the Court. The petitioner issued notice dated 12-8-1988 to the respondent, for which a reply dated 5-9-1989 was received. The allegations in the reply notice are not true. 3. The case of the respondent is as follows :- It is true that the respondent was living with the petitioner from 23-1-1984 to 22-4-1984 at Musiri. During that period, the petitioner demanded Rs.50, 000/- as additional dowry. The respondent was helpless and pleaded her inability to bring the amount. Therefore, the petitioner beat the respondent frequently for non-bringing of the amount. The relatives and well-wishers approached the petitioner and advised to stop all type of harassments. During the time of stay at the petitioner's house from 23-4-1984 to 31-5-1984, the petitioner locked the respondent in a room for two days without giving food. The respondent has not left voluntarily from her husband's house. On 31-5-1984, at about 7.00 p.m. the respondent was taken by the petitioner in a taxi and left her near to the respondent's parents house and informed the respondent that she would be taken back only if she brings Rupees 50, 000/- from her father. From that day, the respondent is living with her father. The petitioner know the respondent's pregnancy and delivery of the child.Even after getting information, the petitioner has not turned up to see his child. Since the respondent passed P.G. Degree in Science and B.Ed. degree, she was called for P.G. Assistant according to seniority on temporary basis. This good news was informed through letters to the petitioner for his information. But the petitioner never sent any reply. Now the temporary post was made permanent and the respondent is working at CSI Higher Secondary School, James Town. The respondent sent mediators for re-union. degree, she was called for P.G. Assistant according to seniority on temporary basis. This good news was informed through letters to the petitioner for his information. But the petitioner never sent any reply. Now the temporary post was made permanent and the respondent is working at CSI Higher Secondary School, James Town. The respondent sent mediators for re-union. But the petitioner informed the mediators that the respondent would be taken back if her father pays Rs.50, 000/- as dowry. While the process of mediations were going, the petitioner issued notice for restitution of conjugal rights. On receipt of the notice, the respondent replied consenting to go back with the petitioner. But unfortunately the respondent received the unhappy news of the petitioner's demand for Rs.50, 000/-. Thereafter, the respondent complained the matter to the police. The police registered a case under S.498-A, 406 IPC and under Ss.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Thus, the petitioner continuously gave harassment to the respondent. The cruel acts of the petitioner towards the respondent are unbearable and hence, the respondent is unable to live with the petitioner. 4. The case of the petitioner in G.W.O.P. No. 45 of 91 is as follows :- The petitioner filed I.D.O.P. No. 36 of 89 for restitution of conjugal rights. The petitioner is the natural guardian for the minor boy and as such, he is entitled to custody. The respondent is unfit to be the guardian. She is not taking proper care of the minor boy and the boy has been completely neglected. The respondent is more interested in spending her time with her friends leaving the child to be taken care by her neighbours. She is spoiling his character and his future. The stay of the minor with the respondent is not at all in the interest of the minor. The petitioner made repeated request since January 1991 to return the custody of the minor to the petitioner. But the respondent is not willing and therefore, this petition is filed for directing the respondent to handover the custody of the boy to the petitioner. 5. The case of the respondent is as follows :- The delivery of the child was intimated to the petitioner. But the petitioner never cared to see the child and the mother. Then the petitioner was duly intimated the baptism ceremony of the child. But, the petitioner simply ignored the ceremony. 5. The case of the respondent is as follows :- The delivery of the child was intimated to the petitioner. But the petitioner never cared to see the child and the mother. Then the petitioner was duly intimated the baptism ceremony of the child. But, the petitioner simply ignored the ceremony. The petitioner is not having any interest on the child. After the death of the father of the respondent, she has no option, but to accept a job for running her life.The petitioner never prepared to see the child till now. If the boy is given custody to the petitioner, it will ruin the education and health of the boy. The criminal case is pending for disposal. The boy is studying 2nd standard in a English Medium School, which is at a distance of only one kilometer from her residence. The boy has completed 7 years. The boy has not even seen the face of the petitioner. The petitioner could not afford homely meals to the boy as he is residing in a lodge. For the welfare of the minor, it is proper that the custody of the minor should be with the mother i.e., respondent. 6. Both cases were jointly tried and common evidence was recorded by the learned District Judge. On the side of the petitioner, two witnesses were examined and Exs. P-1 to P-10 were marked. On the side of the respondent, two witnesses were examined and Ex.D-1 is marked.On a consideration of the entire evidence, the learned District Judge passed a decree for restitution of the conjugal rights in I.D.O.P. and in G.W.O.P. the Court has directed the respondent to hand over the custody of the minor child to the Father within one month. Aggrieved by the said orders and decrees these two appeals are preferred by the respondent in the O.P. i.e., mother of the boy. 7. The following contentions are raised by the appellant in the appeal :- The trial Court has completely erred in granting custody of the minor child to the respondent without taking into consideration the materials on record. The learned District Judge ought to have considered the fact that the boy has not seen the face of the father for the past 10 years. The petitioner's father had no real love and affection towards his son. The learned District Judge ought to have considered the fact that the boy has not seen the face of the father for the past 10 years. The petitioner's father had no real love and affection towards his son. The trial Court failed to see that the respondent has not taken any interest to visit the child after the birth. It is significant to note that even during the pendency of the proceedings, the respondent did not take any effort for the interim custody of the minor child. The trial Court failed to consider the question as to whether the respondent would be entitled to relief of restitution of conjugal rights at this distance of time. The trial Court failed to see that the answer of the appellant to the petition filed by the respondent is necessarily the ground for a suit for judicial separation and as such, the appellant should not have been made to suffer a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. As the respondent has committed acts of cruelty, he is not entitled for restitution of conjugal rights. The trial Court has not properly considered the averments in Ex. B-1. It is always open to the wife to take employment at difference place other than the place where her husband is living and the respondent cannot insist his wife to give up her employment and live with him. The trial Court has not properly appreciated the oral evidence especially the evidence of P.W.2. The comments of the trial Court that the appellant was an adamant lady and that she has no respect or regard over the genuine sentiments of her husband are unwarranted. The trial Court failed to notice that the O.P. was filed only on 10-3-1989 to prevent the criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant and not with a good intention to live with his wife. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent/husband contended that the trial Court had occasion to observe the demeanour of the witness and that the trial Court has properly considered the attitude of the appellant and her inconsistent stand and that even though the appellant expressed her desire to come and live with her husband, subsequently, she has changed her mind and that therefore, the findings of the trial Court cannot be upset in this appeal. Regarding the custody of the child, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent/husband that the respondent is the natural guardian of the child and that he is entitled to have the custody of the child and that he being a professor has got capacity to provide better education and maintain the child and as such, the order of the trial Court cannot be reversed in the appeal. 9. It is not in dispute that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 29-12-1983 at C.S.I. Church, Neyyor. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner is employed as Assistant Professor in Aringar Anna Governments Arts College, Musiri. In the counter filed by the respondent, the wife of the petitioner, it is admitted that the respondent lived with the petitioner at the petitioner's house till 31-5-1984. it is also admitted that from 31-5-1984, the respondent is living in her parents house at Palappalam, which is five kilometers away from the petitioner's residence. From 31-5-1984 till today, the petitioner and the respondent are living separately. It is not in dispute that on 29-11-1984, the respondent gave birth to a male child, who is now aged about 17 years. The petitioner has also admitted in the petition that the respondent was employed as a teacher in My Lady School at nagercoil in the month of April 1984. The petition for restitution of conjugal rights seems to have been filed on 10-3-1989 i.e., nearly five years after the respondent leaving the house of the petitioner. It is not in dispute that the respondent filed a criminal compliant alleging that the petitioner demanded dowry of Rs.50, 000/-. P.W.1 the petitioner, has admitted evidence that he was enquired by the police and that the above complaint was filed against him and his brother and that the above complaint was quashed in the High Court. It is also admitted that the brother of the petitioner filed a civil suit O.S. No. 118 of 1993 on the file of District Munsif, Padmanabhapuram for damages. The petitioner issued notice under Ex. A-9 on 12-8-1988 calling upon the respondent to come and live with him. Ex. A-10 is the reply notice issued on behalf of the respondent. It is also admitted that the brother of the petitioner filed a civil suit O.S. No. 118 of 1993 on the file of District Munsif, Padmanabhapuram for damages. The petitioner issued notice under Ex. A-9 on 12-8-1988 calling upon the respondent to come and live with him. Ex. A-10 is the reply notice issued on behalf of the respondent. It is alleged in the reply notice that the petitioner is ill-treating the respondent and that the respondent was treated as a slave and that even after repeated request of the respondent and mediators, the petitioner has not turned up to see the child and that in spite of these things, the respondent is ready and willing to live with the petitioner. R.W.1, the respondent, has admitted of having issued the above reply notice expressing her willingness to join with her husband. But during the course of the trial, R.W.1 has deviated from the stand taken in Ex. A-10. She has stated the even if the petitioner did not object to her employment, she is not willing to live with him and that she is not willing to live with the petitioner even if the petitioner expresses his desire to come and live with the respondent. In the light of the above facts and admissions and the stand taken by both the petitioner and the respondent before and after the date of the petition, the Court has to see whether it would be reasonable to direct the respondent to resume the cohabitation. 10. In this context, it would be useful to refer to the answer given by the respondent in the counter. It is alleged that the respondent was sent to her parents house by the petitioner by force and that the birth of the child was duly intimated to the petitioner and that the petitioner never cared to see the child and the mother. it is, further, alleged that the petitioner demanded Rs.50, 000/- as additional dowry and that the respondent was also locked in a room by the petitioner for two days. It is the case of the respondent that she has not voluntarily left the husband's house and that she was taken by the petitioner in a taxi and left near the house of her parents. It is the case of the respondent that she has not voluntarily left the husband's house and that she was taken by the petitioner in a taxi and left near the house of her parents. Regarding the mediation, it is alleged by the respondent that the petitioner insisted the mediators that the respondent would be taken back if her father pays Rs.50, 000/- as dowry. Regarding the stand taken in Ex.A-10, the reply notice, it is alleged that the respondent sent her relatives to re-unite with the husband and that unfortunately the respondent received unhappy news of the petitioner's demand for Rs.50, 000/-. Thus, from the above averments, the respondent wants to prove her case that she has not withdrawn from the society of her husband without reasonable cause. Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act states that the Court on being satisfied of the truth of the statement made in the petition, may decree the restitution of conjugal rights when either the husband or wife has without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the society of other. It is manifestly clear from the above Section that before ordering for restitution of conjugal rights, it must be shown that one of the spouses has withdrawn from the society without reasonable excuse. It is contended by the Appellant that the respondent is employed as a teacher in Nagercoil and that the petitioner is employed as an Assistant Professor in Musiri College and that both the husband and the wife are living separately for more than 12 years and that the petitioner has not even seen the face of his son all these years and that in the above circumstances, it would not be reasonable to direct the respondent to live with the petitioner. 11. learned counsel for the petitioner/husband cited number of decisions in support of their claim.Learned counsel for the appellant also relies upon a decision reported in Sulochana v. Selva Madhavan, 1974 TLNJ page 351. in the above decision, it is held thus :- The question that the Court is called upon to consider is whether in the circumstances or the case it can be said that the wife has without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the society of the husband. Under pristine Hindu law, a Hindu wife's first duty to her husband is to submit herself obediently and to remain under his roof and protection. Under pristine Hindu law, a Hindu wife's first duty to her husband is to submit herself obediently and to remain under his roof and protection. But then legislative enactments like the Hindu Marriage Act have made considerable inroads upon the unqualified rights that the Hindu husband generously enjoyed over the wife. The Court cannot in every case when the wife withdraws from the society of the husband pass a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against her unless she has done so without reasonable cause. In Bipinchandra Shah v. Prabhavati, it is held thus :- "The fact that the wife leaves her husband's place in shame not having the courage to face the husband after the discovery of her reprehensible conduct does not render her in the eye of the law a deserter. The Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Sulochana v. Rajagopal (1996)2 Mad LJ 625 has held thus :- A separate living by a spouse against the wish or consent of the other spouse will not amount to desertion if there is a reasonable cause. If the spouse is living separately for good reasons and at the same time wants to maintain the marital relationship, it will not amount to desertion in law. If the wife who is expecting a happy life is disappointed by the conduct of the respondent is not providing necessary protection and she is compelled to leave the matrimonial house, it will not amount to desertion but the person responsible is the husband himself." In N.R. Radhakrishnan v. N. Dhana-lakshmi, 1975 AIR(Madras) 331, this Court has held that the Court cannot in every case when the wife withdraws from the society of the husband pass a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against her unless she has done so without reasonable cause. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent relies upon a decision reported in Gaya Prasad v. Bhagwati, 1966 AIR(MP) 212. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent relies upon a decision reported in Gaya Prasad v. Bhagwati, 1966 AIR(MP) 212. In the above decision, it is held thus "wife accepting the service without husband's consent at a place different from husband's home the husband calling upon her to leave service and live with him at his place and the refusal of the wife to obey the direction of her husband would amount to withdrawal without reasonable excuse." The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decison reported in Pothuraju v. Radha, 1965 AIR(SC) 407 has held that wife is bound to live with her husband wherever he resides. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the decision reported in Surinder Kaur v. Gurdeep Singh, 1973 AIR(P&H) 134 has held that where a wife accepts employment without husband's consent at a different place from his home, it would be reasonable to infer that she has withdrawn without reasonable excuse from his society. The Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Sulochana v. K. Rajagopal (1996) Mad. LJ 625 has held that in cases concerning marital relationship precedent will be of little importance and that the question depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and that the Court can only apply the legal principles of the facts of statute. In view of the above judgment of the Division Bench, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent would not assist his case in any way. Further, in view of the direct decisions of our High Court, which are referred to above, i am unable to place any reliance upon the judgments of other High Courts. 13. It is seen from the evidence of P.W.2 and R.W.2 that efforts were made to re-unite the petitioner and the respondent and that they could not succeed. Now, the question is whether the refusal of the respondent to go and live with the petitioner is justified. It is seen that even though the respondent left her husband's house in the month of May 1984, this petition for restitution of conjugal rights is filed only in the year 1989. It is seen in the letter Ex.B-1 dated 9-1-1984 that the respondent has alleged acts of cruelty on the part of her husband. but, it is admitted that subsequent to Ex. B-1, the respondent lived with her husband for some time. It is seen in the letter Ex.B-1 dated 9-1-1984 that the respondent has alleged acts of cruelty on the part of her husband. but, it is admitted that subsequent to Ex. B-1, the respondent lived with her husband for some time. It is the case of the respondent that her husband did not like her going for a job and that the petitioner wants the respondent to leave the job. P.W.1 has admitted that he told the respondent that he would secure a job in the Government High School and that the respondent insisted that she would work only in C.S.I. School. The letters written by the respondent, which are marked as Exs. A-1 to A-3, will show that the respondent requested the petitioner to give permission for securing the job in a private school. In all the above letters, the respondent requested the petitioner to send reply. In Ex. A-2, the relevant portion reads thus :- (Vernacular matter omitted) It is not shown that the petitioner has written any reply letters to the above letters. It is, thus, seen that the respondent was keen in securing a job near to her parent's house. The tenor of the language employed in Exs. A-1 to A-3 will show that the respondent was all along trying to get permission of her husband to work as a teacher in C.S.I. School. In the above circumstances, it cannot be said that the cruelty alleged by the respondent in Ex. B-1 is not entitled to any weight. It is seen from the evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1. that the respondent is interested in continuing her employment as a teacher in Nagercoil district. It is the case of the respondent that the petitioner has not visited her house to see the child after intimation was sent about the birth of the child. P.W.1, the petitioner, has admitted in his evidence thus:- (Vernacular matter omitted) It is, thus, seen that the petitioner did not make any attempt to see the face of the child. That apart, the respondent filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner alleging dowry harassment in the year 1989. It is no doubt true that the above criminal proceedings were quashed by the High Court and a damage suit is also filed against the respondent by the brother of the petitioner. That apart, the respondent filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner alleging dowry harassment in the year 1989. It is no doubt true that the above criminal proceedings were quashed by the High Court and a damage suit is also filed against the respondent by the brother of the petitioner. The trial Court commenting upon the above facts has come to the conclusion that the respondent is a adamant lady and that she refused to live with her husband without any reasonable cause. The mere fact that the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent were quashed, cannot be a ground for holding that the respondent gave a false complaint against her husband. As already stated, both parties are living separately for more than 12 years. The subsequent events such as filing a criminal complaint and examining both the petitioner and the respondent by the police will clearly show that the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent has become strained and that they reached a point of "No return". Inasmuch as, the respondent gave a criminal complaint and harassed the petitioner in the criminal case it will show that the respondent would have entertained reasonable apprehension in her mind that she would not be properly treated by her husband, if she resumes cohabitation with the petitioner. If really the respondent left the house of the petitioner without reasonable excuse, the petitioner should have filed this petition without any delay. On the other hand, the petitioner filed this application after a lapse of nearly five years. The respondent has given reasons in the counter as to why she refused to live with her husband even though she expressed her willingness to live with her husband in the reply notice Ex. A-10.It is seen that while the respondent left the house of the petitioner, she was pregnant. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent has withdrawn from, the society of the petitioner without any reason. It is admitted that subsequently the respondent secured a job as a teacher and criminal proceedings followed thereafter. In view of the above subsequent events, it is not just and proper to direct the respondent to live with the petitioner. As already stated, the tenor of the language employed in the letters Exs. A-1 to A-3, will show that there must be some mis-understanding between the spouses regarding the employment of the respondent as a teacher. In view of the above subsequent events, it is not just and proper to direct the respondent to live with the petitioner. As already stated, the tenor of the language employed in the letters Exs. A-1 to A-3, will show that there must be some mis-understanding between the spouses regarding the employment of the respondent as a teacher. Therefore, when it has become practically impossible for the parties to live together, it will be improper to order restitution of conjugal rights. Having regard to the conduct of both the petitioner and the respondent and the events occurred subsequent to the date of Ex. A-10, it is not desirable to order restitution of conjugal rights. It is clearly established from the available materials that it is impossible for the petitioner and the respondent to live as husband and wife. In the above circumstances, I am unable to sustain the findings of the trial Court the petitioner has established the case for restitution of conjugal rights. 14. The child is in the custody of the respondent from the date of its birth. The evidence of P.W.1, in cross examination will show that he did not take any attempt to see the child. It is established that for the past 17 years, the child is living only with the mother i.e, respondent. Even though the petitioner is the natural guardian of the child, it is not desirable to pass an order directing the respondent to handover the child to the custody of the petitioner. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that it would not be in the interest of the child to direct the child to live with the father/petitioner. In this context, learned counsel relies upon the decisions reported in Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal (1974) 2 Mad LJ(SC) 34, Mary Vanitha v. Babu royan (1991) 2 Mad LJ 231) and Chanaraj v. Rajammal (1997)2 Mad LJ 427. Learned counsel for the respondent relies upon a decision reported in Kamalamma v. L. Rao, 1971 AIR(Mysore) 211. In the above decision, it is held that father is the natural guardian of the minor child and that in the appointment of guardian, it is the welfare of the child that is the paramount consideration. Learned counsel for the respondent relies upon a decision reported in Kamalamma v. L. Rao, 1971 AIR(Mysore) 211. In the above decision, it is held that father is the natural guardian of the minor child and that in the appointment of guardian, it is the welfare of the child that is the paramount consideration. As the child is living with the mother for the past 17 years, I fail to understand as to how, at this stage, the child can be directed to live with the father. As the re-union of the petitioner with the respondent has reached the stage of impossibility, the child cannot be directed to live with the father. Further, as the respondent is also employed, she is in a position to incur expenditure for the education of the child. I hold that it would not be desirable to direct the respondent to handover the child to the petitioner at this stage, since the said act would not be in the interest in welfare of the child. For the above reasons, I hold that the order of the trial Court in directing the respondent to handover the child to the custody of the petitioner cannot be sustained. However, it is open to the petitioner to visit and meet his son on a fixed day by giving notice to the petitioner (respondent) about the date of the visit and venue of the meeting. I hope that the said right of the petitioner would not be denied by the respondent. With the above observations, the G.W.O.P. is also liable to be dismissed. 16. In the result, C.M.A. No. 778 of 1996 is allowed. The order passed by the trial Court in I.D.O.P. No. 36 of 1989 is set aside. the parties are directed to bear their respective costs. 17. In the result, C.M.A. No. 779 of 1996 is allowed. The order passed by the trial Court in G.W.O.P. No. 45 of 1991 is set aside. the parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Order accordingly.