Judgment S. S. SUDHALKAR, J. 1. This writ petition is filed by the workman challenging the award of the Labour Court dated February 9, 1999. Copy Annexure P/1, vide which it was held that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. 2. The petitioner was appointed on january 1, 1984. His services were terminated on April 30, 1985 and the demand notice was issued by him on August 4, 1993. It is his case that his services were terminated illegally, without any notice, notice pay or retrenchment compensation or without any disciplinary action against him. The respondent employer had controverted the claim of the petitioner and contended that the reference was time barred. It was admitted by the employer that he was appointed on daily wage basis on January 1, 1984 to February 29, 1984 with breaks and his services were terminated for want of post and that he was not entitled to any protection of the industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ). It is further contended that he never rendered service for 240 days as alleged. It was also contended that the reference was hopelessly time- barred. 3. The Labour Court has relied on the case of Ajaib Singh V/s. The Sirhind Co-operative marketing-cum-Processing Service Society. It is a judgment of this Court reported as AIR 1999 sc 1351 : 1999 (6) SCC 82. 4. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Labour Court has relied upon the judgment, which has been over-ruled by the supreme Court. The Supreme Court vide judgment in the case of Ajaib Singh V/s. The sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-processing Service Society Limited (supra), has over-ruled the said judgment. In that case the services of the workman were terminated on july 16, 1974. He issued the notice of demand on December 8, 1981. No plea regarding delay was taken by the management before the labour Court. The Supreme Court after considering various authorities came to the conclusion that no plea of delay being taken by the management, the workman could not show the circumstances preventing him from approaching the Court at an earlier stage and had that plea been taken he would have been able to show the circumstances or even to satisfy the Court that such plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by the government. It was further held that the High court was not justified in holding that the workman had not given any explanation as to why demand notice had been issued after a long period. It further held that the Supreme Court in no case had held that Article 137 of the limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under the Act. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on two more judgments of Supreme court i, e. first in the case of Mahavir Singh V/s. UP State Electricity Board 1999 (9) SCC 178. It has been held therein that once the termination is held to be illegal, reference cannot be rejected. Though the dispute had lingered on for number of years, it has been held that, it would not mean that the dispute had ceased to exist. It has further held that the dispute was belatedly raised but that had been taken care of by the Labour Court by not awarding full back wages but only 50% of the back wages. The other judgment referred to by the learned counsel is in the case of Gurmail Singh V/s. Principal, Govt. College of Education 2000 (9) SCC 496. In this case, the Supreme court has also relied on its judgment in the case of Ajaib Singh (supra ). 6. After these judgments of the Supreme court, in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. V/s. K. P. Madhavankutty and others AIR 2000 SC 839 : 2000 (2) SCC 455 a different view has been taken. It can be seen that the judgments in the cases cited by the petitioner are earlier to this judgment which was pronounced by the Supreme Court on january 28, 2000. It has been held that the dispute in that case which was made after a lapse of 7 years could not be raised both on the ground of delay and lack of industrial dispute existing or apprehended. In that case, a bank employee was dismissed from service after an enquiry. The remedy of appeal was availed. However, he was not successful. Seven years thereafter the employee complained of discrimination on the ground that two other dismissed employees were reinstated by the bank but it was nowhere mentioned as to under what circumstances they were dismissed and were subsequently reinstated. The remedy of appeal was availed. However, he was not successful. Seven years thereafter the employee complained of discrimination on the ground that two other dismissed employees were reinstated by the bank but it was nowhere mentioned as to under what circumstances they were dismissed and were subsequently reinstated. In that case, the notice was issued to the bank on January 17, 1980 demanding the reinstatement of the workman mentioning that two other employees who were dismissed were later reinstated. The workman also filed application before the State government under Sec.10 of the Act. It was refused by the State Government on the ground that the appropriate government was the central Government in that case. On October 31, 1980 the workman moved the Assistant labour Commissioner of the Central government for relief who observed that there is no scope for formal proceedings under the act since the matter was one which arose way back in 1972. The workman filed a writ petition in the High Court complaining that the Central government has not passed any order in the matter under Sec.10 of the Act. The High court by its order directed the Assistant Labour commissioner to send his report under Section 12 (4) of the Act to the Central Government. In pursuance of the order of the High Court the assistant Labour Commissioner sent his report to the Central Government for consideration. Central Government declined to make any reference under Sec.10 of the Act. This led to the filing of the writ petition in the High court for directing the Central Government to re-examine the matter. This order was challenged in appeal. The appeal Bench observed as under in 2000-I-LLJ-561 at p.563: "the apprehension expressed by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the direction of the learned single Judge is capable of being interpreted as a command to the Central Government to make a reference under Sec.10. It was also submitted that it is likely to be understood as conveying that the Central Government should not take into consideration all that has happened before the third respondent chose to set the industrial law into motion. We are inclined to take the view that there is nojustification for this appre hension. It was also submitted that it is likely to be understood as conveying that the Central Government should not take into consideration all that has happened before the third respondent chose to set the industrial law into motion. We are inclined to take the view that there is nojustification for this appre hension. The central Government is required to examine as to whether an industrial dispute exists as on the date on which it is called upon to make the reference and as to whether, in the circumstances, it is expedient or not to make the reference. For this purpose it will be well within its right to examine the entire facts of the case, including the factthatthird respondent admitted his guilt and only pleaded for merciful treatment and accepted the amount due to him in full satisfaction on his claim. All those factors have a bearing on the question as to whether in spite of all these the industrial dispute still subsists meriting reference and also in regard to the question as to whether it cannot be said that in the circumstances, it is expedient to refer the dispute to the Tribunal. It is also well settled that the question of delay and of the claim being stale or belated are also relevant factors to be taken into consideration in the matter of making an appropriate reference. We have no doubt that the Central government will consider all these aspects objectively and take a decision on the question as to whether the dispute should be referred under Sec.10 of the Act. Making the position clear as aforesaid, this appeal stands disposed of. No costs. " 7. Therefore, the Central Government made the reference. The employer felt aggrieved and challenged the reference by filing writ petition which was allowed by the single Judge but in the appeal filed before the division Bench, the validity of the reference was upheld. 8. The Supreme Court has observed in that case that law does not prescribe a time limit for appropriate Government to exercise powers under Sec.10 of the Act. However, it was also observed that this power cannot be exercised at any point of time and to revive the matters which have since been settled and the power has to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. However, it was also observed that this power cannot be exercised at any point of time and to revive the matters which have since been settled and the power has to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. It held that there was no rational basis on which the Central Government exercised the powers in a case after a lapse of 7 years after order of dismissal from service. It further observed that at the time of reference no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to be apprehended. It is further observed that a dispute which is stale could not be subject matter of reference under Sec.10 of the Act. However, it was also observed that as to when the dispute can be said to be stale would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and when the matter has become final it appeared rather incongruous that the reference be made under Sec.10 of the Act in the circumstances as in the said case. The only ground advanced by the workman was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated but under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated was nowhere mentioned and, therefore, the demand raised by the workman was ex facie bad and incompetent. Moreover, it also observed that it was not a case of the workman that the disciplinary proceedings which resulted in his dismissal were in any way illegal. 9. It is further observed that whenever workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate government cannot in mechanical fashion make reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. It was further observed that instead of keeping industrial peace in the establishment which should be the purpose of reference, the reference in that case was destructive to industrial peace and the bank was, therefore, justified in moving the High Court seeking to quash the reference order in question. 10. It can be seen that the case of Mahavir singh (supra) was decided by Supreme Court on April 27, 1998. The case of Gurtnail Singh (supra) was decided on December 10, 1999. The case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra) was decided on January 28, 2000. In the case of gurmail Singh, the Supreme Court had relied on its own judgment in the case of Ajaib Singh (supra) case. The case of Gurtnail Singh (supra) was decided on December 10, 1999. The case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra) was decided on January 28, 2000. In the case of gurmail Singh, the Supreme Court had relied on its own judgment in the case of Ajaib Singh (supra) case. Therefore, if two views are there, the latter would prevail. Moreover, the division Bench (in which I was a Member) of this Court in the case of Surjit Singh V/s. Presiding Officer and others, (2001-1)127 p. L. R.556 (Civil Writ Petition No.9580 of 1999 decided on October 31, 2000), has discussed the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ajaib Singh and Nedungadi Bank ltd. (supra) and has come to the following conclusions: "1. No limitation is prescribed under the Act.2. If plea of delay is not taken the delay may not be considered.3. If plea of delay is taken, it should be considered.4. If a dispute has become stale, it should not be revived after a lapse of a long period if the plea regarding delay has been taken. " 11. In the present case, it is clear from paragraph 3 of the award that the respondents have taken up a dispute regarding delay by stating that the reference is hopelessly time barred. 12. In view of the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court, when the question of delay is taken it has to be considered. In the present case, as stated above, the petitioners service was terminated on April 30, 1985 while demand notice was issued on august 4, 1993. No reason is given for the delay which could be considered by the Labour court or by this Court except that he had made representations. The Labour Court has held that the representations cannot be said to have been served. There is no reason to take a different view. This being so, the petitioner has not been able to show any reason for the late filing of the demand notice. Therefore, the dispute can be held to be a stale one and it cannot be revived after a lapse of long time. The Labour Court has relied on Article 137 of the Limitation Act. However, we do not subscribe to the view that the said Article will be applicable to the raising of Industrial dispute. Therefore, the dispute can be held to be a stale one and it cannot be revived after a lapse of long time. The Labour Court has relied on Article 137 of the Limitation Act. However, we do not subscribe to the view that the said Article will be applicable to the raising of Industrial dispute. However the demand being a belated and stale one, could not have been entertained. 13. In view of this reason, we do not find it proper to interfere with the award of the Labour court. This writ petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.