JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. These two second appeals are at the instance of two sets of sub-tenants in a suit for eviction on the ground of efflux of lease of 21 years and are directed against the judgment and decree dated March 30, 1995 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 11th Court, Alipore in Title Appeal Nos. 566 of 1986 and 500 of 1986 thereby affirming those dated June 18, 1986 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 2nd Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 129 of 1979. 2. The respondent No.1 herein filed the aforesaid suit impleading the original lessee as well as the sub-lessees on the ground of expiry of the period mentioned in the deed of lease. 3. There is no dispute that the deed of lease was executed and registered on July 12, 1958 and the same was for a period of 21 years with effect from February 1,1958. Thus, the period of lease came to an end on January 31,1979. It is also undisputed that on August 12. 1962 a registered deed of rectification was executed by the original lessors and the lessee by virtue of which the rate of rent was reduced from Rs. 950/- a month to Rs. 900/- a month as a portion of the leasehold property was surrendered by the lessee in favour of the lessors. All other terms and conditions indicated in the original deed of lease were however maintained. 4. Although the lessee, i.e. the defendant No.1 did not contest the suit, the same was contested by the defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 5 by filing separate written statements claiming sub-tenancy from the defendant No.1 and contending that the tenancy of the defendant No.1 being governed by the provisions contained in West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act ("Act"), the suit, in the absence of a notice under section 13(6) of the Act and due to non-existence of any of the grounds mentioned in section 13(1) of the Act, was liable to be dismissed. The absolute ownership of the plaintiff in the suit premises was also disputed. 5. The learned trial Judge on consideration of the materials on record turned down all the contentions raised by the contending defendants and decreed the suit in full. 6. The absolute ownership of the plaintiff in the suit premises was also disputed. 5. The learned trial Judge on consideration of the materials on record turned down all the contentions raised by the contending defendants and decreed the suit in full. 6. Being dissatisfied, two different appeals being Title Appeal No. 500 of 1986 and Title Appeal No. 565 of 1986 were preferred, the former by the defendant Nos. 2 and 5 and the latter by the heir of the deceased defendant No.3. Both the aforesaid appeals were heard analogously and by a common judgment dated March 30, 1995 the learned first appellate court below dismissed both the appeals thereby affirming those passed by the learned trial Judge. 7. Being dissatisfied, the heir of the defendant No.3 has preferred SA No. 144 of 1996 while the defendant Nos. 5 and 2 have preferred the SA No.627 of 1995. 8. It appears from the record that a Division Bench of this court admitted these two appeals only on the added ground taken in S.A. No. 627 of 1995. However, at the time of hearing of these appeals neither Mr. Roychowdhury appearing for the appellants in S.A. No. 627 of 1995 nor Mr. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the appellant in S. A. No. 144 of 1996 pressed the ground on which these appeals were admitted. They however prayed for leave to take an additional ground each. 9. After hearing the learned counsel for the parities, this court in exercise of its power conferred under section 100 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure granted such leave and formulated the following two additional questions:- a) In view of the admitted fact that the lease was given effect to from a date anterior to the date of execution of the said deed whether the same should be held to be void for contravention of section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act? b) Whether the deed of rectification of the original lease can be construed as a new lease deed effective from the date of execution of such deed of rectification? 10. Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in S. A. No. 627 of 1995 has by relying upon the following decisions contended before this court that the lease deed executed and registered on July 12, 1958 having been given effect to from an anterior date viz. 10. Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in S. A. No. 627 of 1995 has by relying upon the following decisions contended before this court that the lease deed executed and registered on July 12, 1958 having been given effect to from an anterior date viz. February 1, 1958 the deed should be held to be void ab initio and thus it should be presumed that the tenancy of the defendant No.1 was governed not by the said deed but under the provision of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act:- 1) M/s. Bajaj Auto Limited vs. Behari Lal Kohli, 1989(4) SCC 39 (Para 8); 2) Budh Ram vs. Raila Ram, 1987(4) SCC 75 : AIR 1987 SC 2078 ; 3) Burmah Sheel vs. Khaja Miohatnoor and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 1470 (Paras 5 and 7); 4) Biswabani Put, Limited vs. Santosh Kumar Dutt, AIR 1980 SC 226 ; 5) Chandra Nath Mukherjee vs. Chulai Pashi and Anr., AIR 1960 Cal 40 ; 6) Pieco Electronics and Electricals Limited vs. Sm. Tribeni Debi, AIR 1990 Cal 135 ; 7) Ram Kumar Das vs. Jagdish Chandra Deo and Ors., AIR 1952 SC 23 ; 8) Satish Chandra Makhan vs. Gouardhan Das Byas, AIR 1984 SC 143 . 11. Mr. Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in S.A. No. 144 of 1996 has no the other hand submitted that the moment the deed of rectification was executed by the parties after surrendering a portion of the property leased out by virtue of the deed dated July 12, 1958 at a new rate of rent, it should be presumed that there has been an implied surrender of the original lease and a new tenancy has been created with effect from the date of execution of the said deed of rectification. 12. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 in these two appeals has however opposed the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Roychowdhury and Mr. Banerjee and has submitted that if a registered deed of lease is given effect to from a date earlier to that of execution, it should be presumed that the deed of lease has started operating from the date of execution; but for that reason the entire deed of lease cannot be held to be invalid. According to Mr. Banerjee and has submitted that if a registered deed of lease is given effect to from a date earlier to that of execution, it should be presumed that the deed of lease has started operating from the date of execution; but for that reason the entire deed of lease cannot be held to be invalid. According to Mr. Mukherjee, the deed will be valid from July 12, 1958 till January 31, 1979 and the effective period being more than 20 years, the provisions contained in West Bengal Premise Tenancy Act cannot have any application to the present case. 13. In answer to the point raised by Mr. Banerjee, Mr. Mukherjee contends that merely because a small portion of the property was surrendered by the original lessee during the subsistence of the lease dated July 12, 1958 and for surrender of such small portion the rate of monthly rent was also reduced by Rs. 50/-, such fact cannot imply surrender of the original lease dated July 12, 1958. 14. As regards the point raised by Mr. Roychowdhury, I am ofthe view that if a registered deed of lease is executed and is given effect from a date anterior to the date of execution, in view of the provision in contained in section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act the same should be treated to be valid only from the date of execution thereof. But there is no reason why the entire transaction should be held to be void merely because the law does not permit creation of a lease from a date prior to the date of transaction. In such a case, that part of the deed by which relationship is created from a date anterior to the date of execution should be ignored. But there is no impediment in giving effect to the terms of the agreement from the date of execution thereof till 21 years from February 1, 1958 i.e. till January 31, 1979. 15. I now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Roychowdhury. 16. The sum and substance of the principles laid down in the decisions cited by Mr. 15. I now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Roychowdhury. 16. The sum and substance of the principles laid down in the decisions cited by Mr. Roychowdhury except the case of Ram Kumar Das vs. Jagdish Chandra Deo (supra) and of Chandra Nath Mukherjee vs. Chulai Pashi (supra) is that a lease of the nature mentioned in the first paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act must be registered; in the absence of registration, those decisions maintained, the lease deed must be held to be inoperative as such type of lease and the terms contained in such unregistered deed cannot be looked into. 17. In the cases of Ram Chandra Das (supra) and Chandra Nath Mukherjee (supra) it was held that even a registered kabulyat only by lessee cannot create a valid lease being violative of the third paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. 18. Relying upon the principles laid down in the above decisions, Mr. Roychowdhury contended that for non-compliance of the formalities prescribed in section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act if a deed is held to be void, for the same reason, for non-compliance of the requirements of section 5 thereof, the deed in question should also be held to void. I am afraid, such contention is not tenable in view of the simple reason that the defects mentioned in the aforesaid decisions were incurable in nature resulting in absence of basic requirements of a valid lease and hence were held to be void; but in the instant case, although the creation of lease from a past date was invalid but there was no legal obstacle in upholding the transaction from the date of execution till January 31,1979 as all the statutory formalities required for maintaining that part of the transaction were complied with and the void part can be totally separated from the valid part. In other words, the rights and liabilities of the lessor and lessee for the purpose of carrying out the terms and conditions of the valid part are in no way dependent upon anything mentioned in the void part. 19. In other words, the rights and liabilities of the lessor and lessee for the purpose of carrying out the terms and conditions of the valid part are in no way dependent upon anything mentioned in the void part. 19. Therefore, the lease deed in question for all practical purposes should be held to be valid from the date of execution till January 31, 1979 although the same is void in so far as it sought to create a relationship of lessor and lessee from February 1, 1958 to July 11, 1958. As regards point No. (b) formulated above, the same is equally devoid of any substance. There is no dispute with the proposition of law that in a given fact whether there has been an implied surrender of the original lease or not is a question of conduct of the parties. The principle underlying the doctrine of implied surrender is that whenever a relationship of landlord and tenant exists between two parties in respect of subject matter and a new relationship arises as regards the identical subject matter, if two sets of relationships cannot co-exist as being inconsistent and incompatible i.e. if the latter can come into effect only on termination of the earlier, that would be deemed to have been terminated to enable the latter to operate. In the instant case, it appears from the deed of rectification that the parties intended that all other terms of the original lease would continue till January 31,1979 excepting the provision of payment of reduced rate of rent in view of surrender of a small portion. Therefore, implied surrender of the original lease cannot be inferred from the terms contained in the deed of rectification; on the contrary the said deed of rectification upheld all other terms of the tenancy including the period mentioned earlier. Therefore, the point raised by Mr. Banerjee in this appeal is of no avail to his client. Both the points raised in these appeals are thus answered against the appellants. These appeals are thus devoid of any substance and dismissed with costs which I assess at 300 Gms each. Appeals dismissed.