JUDGMENT Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J.: The petitioner decree-holder in this case has brought this application for committing the respondents for trial for contempt of court on the allegation of breach of undertaking given by them. When the application was moved affidavits were invited without issuing any Rule as prayed for, to decide the preliminary issue as to whether undertaking given by the respondents in this matter tantamount to breach of undertaking so as to warrant drawing up of contempt proceedings or not. 2. This has come for hearing after affidavits are filed. Before dilating the respondents' contentions it would be appropriate to reproduce the text of the undertaking on which this contempt proceeding is founded. 3. The undertaking contained in the Terms of Settlement in clause (2) of the compromise and agreement of the parties. The judgment debtors agree and undertake before this Hon'ble Court to pay to the decree holder a total sum of Rs.4,75,000/-(Rs.4,00,000/-as remaining interest payable under the Decree dated September 21, 1992 and Rs.75,000/- as processing fee of the plaintiff) as per the following Schedule:- i) On or before 15.12.98 Rs. 1,00,000/- ii) On or before 15.01.99 Rs. 1,00,000/- iii) On or before 15.02.99 Rs. 1,00,000/- iv) On or before 15.03.99 Rs. 1,00,000/- v) On or before 15.04. 99 Rs. 37,500/- vi) On or before 15.05.99 Rs. 37,500/- 4. Admittedly none of the instalments has been paid as mentioned in the said agreement. 5. Mr. Abhijit Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing in support of this application contends that undertaking though recorded in the agreement has been accepted by this court passing an order. The court did not proceed with the execution application because of the aforesaid undertaking being given. Therefore, according to him, the moment such agreement containing undertaking, is accepted by the court the same amounts to an undertaking given to the court itself. 6. Mr. Chatterjee is fair enough to concede that if the aforesaid undertaking is construed to be an undertaking to the parties decree-holder then of course this contempt application may not be maintainable. In support of his contention he has relied on two decisions of this Court reported in ILR 1946 499 and AIR 1976 Cal. 475 . 7. He contends that the undertaking given to a court amounts to contempt of court even in case of payment of money as well. In support of his contention he has relied on two decisions of this Court reported in ILR 1946 499 and AIR 1976 Cal. 475 . 7. He contends that the undertaking given to a court amounts to contempt of court even in case of payment of money as well. He refers to the decisions of Supreme Court on this proposition reported in AIR 1979 SC 1536 , AIR 1955 Cal. 182 and 1997 Cr.L.J 1051. 8. Mr. Chatterjee further contends that though in this case there may be alternative method to proceed against the defaulting judgment debtor, of successive failure to honour their promise or undertaking previously given to the court this court should deal with them in the contempt application itself. He has drawn my attention to the previous order of this court dated 16th September, 1998 which records another terms of settlement that too visited with non-compliance. 9. Mr. P.K.Roy, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Basak, Advocate contends that breach of all kinds of undertaking does not invite contempt proceedings. Unless it is shown that undertaking given to the court itself no contempt proceedings can be drawn up for breach thereof. He urges in this case upon careful reading of my order as well as the language of the undertaking that this undertaking was not given to court and this will appear on the face of the wordings thereof. It is an undertaking given to the party and the court has not accepted the aforesaid undertaking to be one being given to it. In support of his contention he has relied on the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1948 Cal. 294, AIR 1952 Cal. 591 and AIR 1979 SC 1528 . 10. Mr. Roy further contends that even mere failure to deposit any amount in terms of the court's order does not amount to contempt and he has drawn my attention to a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1970 Mad. 14 . 11. His next contention is that if for the argument sake there is breach of undertaking given to the court, still then contempt proceedings cannot be resorted to by the court as alternative remedy and method are provided for. In this connection he has drawn my attention to a judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported in 81 CWN 209. 12. In this connection he has drawn my attention to a judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported in 81 CWN 209. 12. Having heard the respective contention of the learned counsels the point fallen for consideration is as follows:- (i) Whether any undertaking in this case has been given to court or not; (ii) Whether there occurs any wilful breach of the undertaking or not; and (iii) Whether even if there being any breach of undertaking contempt proceedings is to be drawn up or not. 13. The Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in AIR 1948 Cal. 294 cited by Mr. Roy it has been pronounced by Harries C.J. (as His Lord ship then was) speaking for the court observed in paragraph 18 as follows: "It must be remembered that a compromise decree is nothing more than an agreement of the parties with the sanction of the court superadded. It has really no greater sanctity than the agreement itself. It certainly cannot mean anything more than the agreement itself." 14. But in paragraph 20 it has been observed by Their Lordships as follows: "...................the word 'undertake' does not mean a promise to a Court. It merely means solemn promise to some one and where the word appears in an agreement between A and B, it appears to me that if A undertakes, he obviously undertakes to B, and not to a Court. In Building and Land Trust (India) Limited vs. Sri Tilok Chand Surana, decided on 22nd May, 1946, Claugh, J. arrived at the same conclusion as that arrived at by Panckridge, J. in the case I have cited and Gentle, J. in the present case. The learned Judge appears to have thought that once the facts are borne in mind that the parties intended the agreement to be submitted to Court and that a decree was passed in terms of it, the word 'undertake' when used in a compromise must mean an agreement by one of the parties to give an undertaking to the Court. I cannot accept that reasoning. It appears to me that each case must be decided on its particular facts and upon the precise words in the compromise under discussion and cases are not very helpful unless the words are precisely similar. I cannot accept that reasoning. It appears to me that each case must be decided on its particular facts and upon the precise words in the compromise under discussion and cases are not very helpful unless the words are precisely similar. In the present case, it appears to me, on a true construction of para 6 of the compromise, that there was nothing more than a solemn promise by the defendant to the plaintiff and the nature of that promise or undertaking could never be changed by reason of the compromise being accepted by the Court and a decree passed in its terms." 15. Then again in paragraph 21 it has been held by Their Lordships amongst other as follows: "..............If one of the terms of compromise is that one of the parties should give an undertaking to the Court then the compromise should make it clear and the compromise merely states that one of the parties 'undertakes' then the ordinary construction must be given that that is a promise or solemn promise given to the other party and not to the Court." 16. In the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this court reported in AIR 1976 Cal. 475 cited by Mr. Chatterjee though without considering the aforesaid Division Bench judgment, it has been held in the same line, and in that case it was decided that undertaking must be given to the court. In the Division Bench judgment cited by Mr. Roy reported in AIR 1952 Cal. 591 it has also been held in the similar line that undertaking must be given to the court. 17. Therefore, after careful reading of the decisions as above and analysing the law I am of the view in order to maintain an application for contempt on the allegation of breach of undertaking the court has to see having regard to the language and intention of the parties and further reading of order of the court whether undertaking was given to the court. Undertaking means in its ordinary dictionary meaning is promise or promises to do certain thing or to forbear from doing certain things. So, it would be prudent for me to examine the terms of the undertaking vis-a-vis my order. 18. Undertaking means in its ordinary dictionary meaning is promise or promises to do certain thing or to forbear from doing certain things. So, it would be prudent for me to examine the terms of the undertaking vis-a-vis my order. 18. From plain reading of the undertaking contained in clause (2) recorded above it appears, without any shred of doubt, that undertaking was given to the decree-holder plaintiff, not to the court. Even this undertaking does not appear to have been accepted by my order dated 3rd April, 2000. By my order I recorded that execution of money decree had been settled by the parties by way of adjustment of the decree by the written agreement. This written agreement was kept on record. But it was not part and parcel of my order dated 3rd April, 2000 so it will be useful to quote my aforesaid order. "This is an execution of a money decree and parties have settled and adjusted this decree by written agreement. Such written agreement is kept on record. Accordingly this execution application is disposed of recording the adjustment and/or compromise contained in the written agreement. However, any decretal amount if remains unsatisfied for any reason because of the breach of the terms contained in the agreement recorded and filed today then the decree-holder will be entitled to apply in accordance with law. It is recorded that a banker's cheque bearing No. 036590 dated 1st February, 2000 amounting to Rs. 1,50,000/- purported to be the payment of instalments in terms of the agreed mode is handed over to the learned Advocate-on-record of Mr. Chatterjee. There will be no order as to costs. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking." 19. Therefore, following the ratio laid down by the aforesaid judgments of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 SC 1528 and our Court reported in AIR 1952 Cal 591 and AIR 1948 Cal. 294 I am of the view that to charge a person for breach of undertaking one has to establish without any shadow of doubt that undertaking was given to the court expressly or by necessary implication. 294 I am of the view that to charge a person for breach of undertaking one has to establish without any shadow of doubt that undertaking was given to the court expressly or by necessary implication. Moreover, I find upon careful construction on the entire agreement pursuant to which the execution application was disposed of the parties by necessary implication agreed to keep the execution application pending and this will appear from clause 5 of the said agreement itself which is as follows: "After payments are made by the judgment-debtors as aforesaid, the decree-holder undertakes to withdraw the execution proceedings and not to proceed with it any further." 20. Therefore, reading as a whole of the said agreement as well as my earlier order, I observe while repeating, undertaking was given to the decree-holder not to the court nor did the court accept as the same having been given to it. The court in this case did not act passing order on the basis of undertaking nor did it accept such undertaking to be the basis of disposal of the execution application. As such, I am of the view that this is not the undertaking for which the court should draw up a contempt proceedings. 21. However, I am unable to accept Mr. Roy's argument that in case of undertaking given to court involving payment of money no contempt proceedings can be drawn up for which execution proceedings is effective method. I accept the argument of Mr. Chatterjee that if it is proved undertaking having been given to the court in respect of any matter be it payment of money or otherwise contempt proceedings for breach thereof will lie. 22. As I have already observed the undertaking means promises to do or not to do something, if any of the litigants or any persons having made promise to the court to do or not to do something, does not stick to this promise, whether it is payment of money or not the court shall not only as a matter of policy but as a matter of rule and course to uphold majesty and dignity of the court shall keep the promissor bound within the promise otherwise a dangerous message will be sent to public in general, to encourage litigant to bring the court in odium and mockery. I am not forgetful of the established judicial principle that the contempt proceeding is not meant for vindication of the personal right and dignity of the judge concerned but to uphold the majesty and dignity of the administration of justice. 23. I find support of the above proposition from the observation of the Supreme Court in a case of Baburam Gupta vs. Sudhir Vasin reported in AIR 1979 SC 1528 . In paragraph 10 it has been observed amongst other as follows:- "In fact, the reason why a breach of clear undertaking given to the Court amounts to contempt of Court is that the contemner by making a false representation to the Court obtains a benefit for himself and if he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a serious fraud on the court itself and thereby obstructs the course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution." 24. In the said judgment the Supreme Court has made a distinction between the undertaking and the consent order or compromise decree. In case of any order or decree the Supreme Court held that breach of undertaking and promise contained in the compromise decree or order tantamounts to practising fraud on the party not on this court. Therefore, I am of the view in case of undertaking given before the court for any purpose including payment of money the contempt proceedings can be drawn up but in case of compromise decree or order containing any undertaking or promise to the party no contempt shall lie and remedy lies elsewhere. This view of mine is supported by a Division Bench judgment of Madras High Court reported in AIR 1970 Mad. 14 as cited by Mr. Roy. 25. In the Division Bench judgment of Madras High Court in paragraph 5 it has been held that non-compliance by the appellant with the order of this Court directing him to deposit the arrears of rent due to the petitioners within the time prescribed and continue to deposit the future rent, does not amount to any contempt of Court. The penal sanction under the contempt procedure should not be invoked for default of compliance with such an order. 26. The Division Bench judgment of our Court reported in 81 CWN 209 cited by Mr. Roy also laid down the theory of alternative remedy even in a clear case of contempt. The penal sanction under the contempt procedure should not be invoked for default of compliance with such an order. 26. The Division Bench judgment of our Court reported in 81 CWN 209 cited by Mr. Roy also laid down the theory of alternative remedy even in a clear case of contempt. It has been held that in case of violation of order of injunction passed under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure the remedy lies under Order 39 Rule 2(3) of the Code. The proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in this situation is not appreciated by Their Lordships when there is alternative remedy. 27. In view of the above decisions I hold that in this case no contempt shall lie. I find from clause 5 of the agreement filed in the court that after payments are made by the judgment-debtors as aforesaid, the decree-holder undertakes to withdraw the execution proceedings and not to proceed with it any further. 28. Since, admittedly no payment has been made by the judgment debtors represented by Mr. Roy and granted leave to the decree-holder by my order dated 3rd April, 2000 to proceed in accordance with law, I hold that the said execution application is deemed to have been pending and the decree-holder is not obliged to undertake to withdraw the execution proceedings. It would be open for the parties to proceed with the execution application in accordance with the law before the appropriate forum. 29. There will be no order as to costs.