JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J. :- Appellant is the plaintiff whereas respondents are the defendants and they will be referred to as such in this judgment. Plaintiff is aggrieved by the decree and judgment dated 31.8.1998 passed by the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, whereby the appeal of the defendants was allowed and the decree and judgment dated 30.3.1996 passed by the Sub Judge 1st Class (2), Palampur, district Kangra, was set-aside as a result of which the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed as not maintainable holding that remedy lies only under the Arbitration Act. The Sub Judge 1st Class had decreed the suit to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to receive a sum of Rs.56,000/- from the defendants and the defendants were directed to make payment of this amount along with interest at the rate of 12.5% per annum from 3.8.1988 till the date of realization. The plaintiff was also directed to affix and valorem court fee on the plaint at the suit amount of Rs.70,000/- within a period of two weeks, failing which the suit would be deemed to have been dismissed with costs. It was also decreed that after payment of Rs.56,000/- with interest to the plaintiff he would not have any right, title or interest whatsoever in car No.HPZ-488 and would be liable to get the registration transferred in the name of the defendants. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff had insured his Ambassador taxi-car (Model-1984) with the defendants for a sum of Rs.70,000/-. The said taxi car was stolen and theft was reported in the police by the driver on 28.7.1988 and the defendants were duly informed of the same. The plaintiff filed his claim for Rs.70,000/- with the defendants which was not finalized on one pretext or the other and the defendants firstly offered a sum of Rs.30,000/- on 10.7.1989 and thereafter a sum of Rs.45,000/- on 16.10.1989. Ultimately, the plaintiff asked the defendants to refer the matter to arbitration in terms of arbitration agreement to which they agreed. Accordingly, Capt. S.P. Dhawan was appointed arbitrator on behalf of the plaintiff and shri R.K. Sood, Advocate was appointed arbitrator on behalf of the defendants. Ultimately, the plaintiff asked the defendants to refer the matter to arbitration in terms of arbitration agreement to which they agreed. Accordingly, Capt. S.P. Dhawan was appointed arbitrator on behalf of the plaintiff and shri R.K. Sood, Advocate was appointed arbitrator on behalf of the defendants. Both the arbitrators by their communication dated 26.3.1990, Ext.P-2, wrote to the parties that keeping in view their mood to compromise, they had found a reasonable solution, without going into the arbitration proceedings, to recommended Rs.56,000/- as amicable and respectable settlement, but it was left to the parties to agree upon the settlement amount in their own interest and to cut down the arbitration proceedings and further expenses. 3. Thereafter, the plaintiff vide his letter dated 28.5.1990, Ext. D-l, wrote to the defendants to make payment of Rs.56,000/- considering the settlement Ext.P-2 as award, but his arbitrator Capt. S.P. Dhawan informed him vide letter dated 21.6.1990, Ext.D-3 that no arbitration proceedings were conducted and the settlement was made with the consent of the parties. On the other hand, the arbitrator of the defendants Shri R.K. Sood, Advocate, vide his letter dated 8.6.1990, Ext. D-4, asked the defendants whether they- wanted registration of the award which would be done with the Sub Registrar, Palampur, or decree of the Court under Section 14 of the arbitration Act. Despite the opinion of their arbitrator the defendants wrote to the Manager, Punjab National Bank (PSC Cell), Palampur with a copy to the plaintiff on 8.6.1990, Ext.D-1, that as per their earlier offer they were ready to settle the matter for Rs.45,000/-on the plaintiffs submitted the requisite documents within 15 days of the receipt of their letter, failing which the matter would be closed as no claim. It was clearly mentioned in the letter that the so called arbitration was totally ambiguous and in fact, no arbitration was ever held under the Arbitration Act. 4. On the above stated admitted facts, the stand of the defendants was that a amount of Rs.56,000/- was settled by the arbitrators and accepted by both the parties, but instead of submitting the requisite documents and showing interest to get the award registered or made rule of the court the plaintiff filed a civil suit. 4. On the above stated admitted facts, the stand of the defendants was that a amount of Rs.56,000/- was settled by the arbitrators and accepted by both the parties, but instead of submitting the requisite documents and showing interest to get the award registered or made rule of the court the plaintiff filed a civil suit. The defendants also took preliminary objections, inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable in the present form; it was not within limitation; the plaintiff was stopped by his acts and conduct to file the suit and also that after the arbitration proceedings, the suit was not competent. The trial Court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the suit amount as claimed? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for interest @ 12.5% as claimed? OPP. 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is not within limitation? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff is stopped from filing the suit? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action ?OPD. 7. Whether the award given by the arbitrator is binding between the parties ? OPD. 8. Relief. 5. Issues No. 1 and 2 were decided in favour of the plaintiff and issues No.3 to 7 against the defendants and the suit was decreed. The District Judge has set aside the decree merely on the law point that since the arbitrators were appointed with mutual consent of the parties, their authority could not be revoked without the leave of the Court and the only option remained with the parties was to get the settlement made rule of the court or to get the same registered as per the provisions of the Arbitration Act, for which no steps were taken. The District Judge has concluded that once the parties resort to domestic forum and send their dispute for arbitration, it is not open to them to get relief by filing a civil suit and the remedy lies only under the Arbitration Act and the suit has been dismissed. However, the District Judge while holding that the equity lies heavily on the side of the plaintiff, advised the defendants to make the payment as per the award as they admitted the settlement. Hence, the present regular second appeal. 6. However, the District Judge while holding that the equity lies heavily on the side of the plaintiff, advised the defendants to make the payment as per the award as they admitted the settlement. Hence, the present regular second appeal. 6. At the time of admission of this appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed:- 1. Whether an inconclusive communication of the arbitrators can be termed as an award? 2. Whether the document dated 26.3.1990 (Ext.D2) can be termed as an award within the meaning of the Arbitration Act, 1940? 3. Whether Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act prohibit the filing of the suit even though no challenge is made to the arbitration agreement or the arbitration proceedings?- 4. Whether in the facts and circumstances the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable? 7. In order to answer substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2, it is to be examined what do we mean by an Award. Admittedly, its meaning is not given in the Arbitration Act, 1940 (old Act) as well as in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (new Act). As per Blacks Law dictionary, award is the "Decision" or determination rendered by arbitrators or commissioners, or other private or extra judicial decides, upon a controversy submitted to them also the writing or document embodying such decision. Again in Blacks Law Dictionary, the word Decision means a determination arrived at after consideration of facts, and, in legal context, law. A determination of a judicial or quasi judicial nature. The findings of fact and conclusions of law which must be in writing and filed with the clerk. 8. If the award is the decision of the Arbitrator given on a reference made to him, after consideration of the facts and/or law, the document dated 26.3.1990, Ext. D-2, cannot be termed as an award. The perusal of this document and other records shows that the Arbitrators have not even entered the reference and initiated the arbitration proceedings. After considering various solutions, they had recommended payment of Rs.56,000/- by the defendants to the plaintiff as amicable and respectful settlement of the claim of plaintiff, but it was left to the parties to agree to the proposal in their own interest and to cut short the arbitration proceedings. After considering various solutions, they had recommended payment of Rs.56,000/- by the defendants to the plaintiff as amicable and respectful settlement of the claim of plaintiff, but it was left to the parties to agree to the proposal in their own interest and to cut short the arbitration proceedings. Arbitrator Shri S.P. Dhawan in his letter dated 21.6.1990, Ext.D-3 has categorically stated that no proceedings were held and the proposal for settlement was made with the consent of the parties. On the other hand, Shri S.K. Sood, Advocate, Arbitrator of the defendants had advised them vide his letter dated 8.6.1990, Ext. D-4, either to get the award registered or to get it made rule of the court under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act (old). But the defendants did not accept the advice and instead offered an amount of Rs.45,000/- against the recommendation of Rs.56,000/- contained in Ext.P-1, which shows that they did not consider and accept document Ext. P-l as an award. In this view of the matter, the stand of the defendants in the suit that Ext. PI is an award deserves to be rejected as they cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate. 9. Therefore, this court has no hesitation to hold that the document dated 26.3.1990, Ext. P-2, is not an award. Further, in view of the meaning of the word award the inconclusive communication of the Arbitrators can never be termed as an award. Accordingly, Substantial question of law No. 1 and 2 are answered in the negative. 10. Coming to substantial question of law No.3, it is to be examined whether Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, (old) prohibit the filing of the suit, even though no challenge is made to the arbitration agreement or arbitration proceedings, as in the present case section 32 is: Bar to suits contesting arbitration agreement or award- Notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground, whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act. And Section 33 is: Arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application. And Section 33 is: Arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application. - Any party to an arbitration agreement, or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of their determined shall apply to the Court and the court shall decide the question on affidavits: Provided that where the Court demands it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit." 11. From these provisions, it is clear that instead of civil suit, an application lies to assail the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award which would be decided by following the procedure laid down in Section 33. If the subject matter of the suit does not fall within the scope of these sections as in the present case, the bar to file civil suit does not exist. Since the communication dated 26.3.1993, Ext.,P2 has not been held to be an award, there was no question of obtaining decree under Section 17 or to get it set aside by moving an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act. In this view of the matter, the judgments in Nahar Dass, Chela Bawa Joti Parkash v. Tarak Singh, 1974 P.L.R. 244, Narbadabai & Ors. v. Natverlal Chunilal Bhalakia & Anr., AIR 1953 Bombay 386, Lai Singh & Anr. v. Munshi Ram, 386, 1984, S.L.J. (H.P.) 85 and The Manager, M/s. Pyarchand Kesarimal Porwal Bidi Factory v. Onkar Laxman Thenge & Ors., AIR 1970 Supreme Court 823, are not applicable in the present case. Therefore, the findings of the District Judge that in view of Sections 32 and 33 the jurisdiction of the Civil court was ousted, are set aside. Point No.3 is answered accordingly. 12. So far substantial question of law No.4 is concerned, the district Judge has held that the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable on the ground that the authority of the arbitrators was not revoked with the leave of the Court as envisaged under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Point No.3 is answered accordingly. 12. So far substantial question of law No.4 is concerned, the district Judge has held that the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable on the ground that the authority of the arbitrators was not revoked with the leave of the Court as envisaged under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 5 is as under: "Authority of appointed arbitrator or umpire irrevocable except by leave of Court - The authority of an appointed arbitrator or umpire shall not be revocable except with the leave of the court, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the arbitration agreement." 13. Admittedly, leave of the Court was not sought revoking the appointment of the arbitrators, but to examine whether there was contrary intention expressed in the arbitration agreement, this Court would refer to the Arbitration agreement contained in clause 8 of the Insurance Policy. It is: If any difference shall arise as to the quantum to be paid under this policy, (liability being otherwise admitted), such difference shall independently of all other questions be referred to the decision of an arbitrator, to be appointed in writing by the parties in difference, or if they cannot agree upon a single arbitrator to the decision of two disinterested persons as arbitrators of whom one shall be appointed in writing by each of the parties within two calendar months after having been required so to do in writing by the other party in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as amended from time to time and for the time being in force. In case either party shall refuse or fail to appoint arbitrator within two calendar months after receipt of notice in writing requiring an appointment, the other party shall be at liberty to appoint sole arbitrator, and in case of disagreement between the arbitrators, the difference shall be referred to the decision of an umpire who shall have been appointed by them in writing before entering on the reference and who shall sit with the arbitrators and preside at their meetings. It is clearly agreed and understood that no difference or dispute shall be referable to arbitration as herein before provided, if the Company has disputed or not accepted liability under or in respect of this policy. It is clearly agreed and understood that no difference or dispute shall be referable to arbitration as herein before provided, if the Company has disputed or not accepted liability under or in respect of this policy. It is hereby expressly stipulated and declared that it shall be a condition precedent to any right of action or upon this policy that the award by such arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire of the amount of the loss or damage shall be first obtained. It is also hereby further expressly agreed and declared that if the company shall disclaim liability of the insured for any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within twelve calendar months from the date of such disclaimant have made the subject matter of a suit in a Court of Law, then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have bee abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder." 14. Last para of the arbitration agreement makes it clear that if the Insurance company disclaims the liability of the insured, the insured can file civil suit within 12 calendar months from the date of such disclaim. In other words, despite the arbitration agreement, the parties had agreed that filing of civil suit is not a bar if the insurance company disclaims the liability of the insured. Disclaim may be in to or in part, as in the present case even after the recommendations of Rs.56,000/- made by the arbitrators vide communication dated 26.3.1990, Ext.P2, the insurance company offered to pay an amount of Rs.45,000/- on the paintiff s submitting the requisite documents within 15 days, failing which the matter was to be closed as no claim, which amounts to disclaim the liability of payment of Rs.56,000/- and the plaintiff-insured was entitled to file civil suit which he had filed on 3.8.1990. Otherwise also, the defendants had not taken this objection in their written statement as well as in the grounds of appeal before the District Judge. Their precise objection was that the communication dated 26.3.1990, Ext.P2, was an award and either it could be got made rule of the Court or set aside under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the civil suit was not maintainable. Having held that communication dated 26.3.1990, Ext.P2, was not an award and the arbitrators had not proceeded with the arbitration proceedings, the plaintiff was not debarred from filing the suit. 15. Having held that communication dated 26.3.1990, Ext.P2, was not an award and the arbitrators had not proceeded with the arbitration proceedings, the plaintiff was not debarred from filing the suit. 15. Now the question arises whether there can be implied revocation. If yes, whether in the facts and circumstances of this case implied revocation can be inferred. The words "unless contrary intention is expressed in the arbitration agreement" qualifying the earlier part of Section 5 make it clear that in a particular case revocation of the appointed arbitrators depends upon the arbitration agreement and if it permits, there can be implied revocation. So far the case in hand is concerned, as discussed hereinabove, arbitration clause itself permits that in the case of insurance company disclaiming the liability, the insured can file a civil suit. Therefore, revocation of appointed arbitrator with the leave of the Court is not mandatory but regulatory. After the receipt of Communication dated 26.3.1990, Ext.P2, neither further proceedings were held nor the parties took any step for extension of time as provided under clause (3) of the 1st Schedule. When suit was filed by the plaintiff the defendants did not take up this objection, rather their defence was that communication dated 26.3.1993, Ext.P.2 is an award, which means the Arbitrator had become fornicates officio, as such, where was the question of seeking leave of the court to revoke the authority of arbitrators. Instead, the arbitrator of the defendants had appeared as counsel on their behalf from which fact it can further be inferred that he never intended to arbitrate in the matter. Therefore in the peculiar facts and circumstances on record, it can be inferred that authority of the Arbitrators stood revoked impliedly. 16. For taking this view, this Court finds support from the judgment of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in H. Gul. Mohd. Bhat, v. Smt. Fata Bibi & Ors. AIR 1966 Jammu and Kashmir 122, wherein it is held that on the dismissal of application under Section 34 to stay the proceedings in the suit, the work of the arbitrator ipso facto comes to an end, which would mean revocation of his authority by the Court itself. In the present case application under Section 34 was riot filed nor any objection was taken that the authority of the arbitrators was continuing and not revoked. Therefore, implied revocation can be inferred. In the present case application under Section 34 was riot filed nor any objection was taken that the authority of the arbitrators was continuing and not revoked. Therefore, implied revocation can be inferred. Similar view was taken in Edakkavil Karimbuvalappil Abdulkhader Haji v. Thalakkal Kunhammad & ors. AIR 1986 Kerala 3, that refusal to enlarge time for making award amounts to preseding arbitration. In another case in Union of India v. Bahadur Singh, AIR 1953 Assam 195, the learned Judges have held that in the absence of particular method provided under Section 5 of making an application for revocation, it can be implied from the circumstances of each case. If after hearing the parties the court appoints another arbitrator and cancels the appointment of previous arbitrator, the order of the court constitutes permission and the conduct of the parties itself amounts to revocation of the authority of the arbitrator. Substantial question of law No.4 is answered in negative and the findings of the district Judge that suit was no maintainable without revocation of the authorities of the appointed Arbitrators as envisaged under Section 5 of the old Act are set aside. 17. The result of the above discussion is that there is merit in this appeal and it is allowed. The decree and judgment dated 31.8.1998 of the district Judge is set aside, and the decree and judgment dated 30.3.1996 of the Sub Judge is upheld, as a result of which the suit of the plaintiff stands decreed with costs. (Appeal Allowed) -