Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. This Misc. First Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred against the order dated 10-11-2000 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge XII, Patna, in Misc. Case No. 4 of 2000 (Rekha Basu and Anr. V/s. Hare Ram Belbariar), whereby the present appellants (the defendants) application under Order Q, Rule 13 read with Sec. 151 C.P.C. for setting aside the judgment and decree passed on 22-5-2000 in T.S. No. 12 of 1996, has been dismissed. 2. The respondents herein (the plaintiffs) had instituted Title Eviction Suit No. 12 of 1996 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Patna, for eviction of the appellants herein from the suit premises on the ground of expiry of the period of lease within the meaning of Sec. 11(1)(e) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the 1982 Act). The defendants-appellants entered appearance and contested the suit. The plaintiff-respondent dosed his evidence on 14-4-2000. The same was posted on 18-4-2000 for evidence of the defendants-appellants and had to be adjourned on account of complete inaction on the part of the defendants-appellants, who showed the same attitude on the next date i.e. 3.5.2000. Therefore, the case was closed, arguments were heard, and the judgment and decree dated 22-5-2000 was passed. The defendants-appellants sprang to action and preferred the aforesaid application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. before the same Court for setting aside the ex-parte decree which has been rejected by the impugned order on account of non-deposit of the amount due from him under the decree, and in terms of the proviso to Sec. 17 of the provision of the Small Causes Court Act 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the 1887 Act). 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, the learned Counsel for the appellants submits that the Court below has misinterpreted and misapplied the provisions of Sec. 17 of the 1887 Act, inasmuch as the same is applicable to money decrees only and does not apply to eviction suits. He has taken me through the provisions of the same and relies on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in 1991 (1) PLJR 25 (Smt. Darogani Devi V/s. Smt. SurtiDevi). 4. I have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants and have perused the impugned judgment. He has taken me through the provisions of the same and relies on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in 1991 (1) PLJR 25 (Smt. Darogani Devi V/s. Smt. SurtiDevi). 4. I have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants and have perused the impugned judgment. I am unable to accede to the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants. The appellants do not dispute that the summary procedure contemplated by Sub-sections (5) and (7) of Sec. 14 applies to eviction suits within the meaning of Clauses (c) and (e) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 of the Act. Sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 14 of the 1982 Act reads as follows: (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this section shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. It is thus manifest that summary procedure laid down in the 1887 Act shall be applicable to eviction suits within the meaning of Clauses (c) and (e) of Sub-section (1) of Sec. 11 of the 1982 Act, namely, the suits on the ground of personal necessity and on the ground of expiry of the period of lease; The present suit is on the later ground. Sec. 17 of the 1887 Act reads as follows: 17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.-(1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits: Provided that an application for an orde.r to set aside a decree passed ex-parte or for a review of judgment shall at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed. It is manifest on a perusal of this provision that an application for setting aside the decree passed ex-parte shall not be maintainable until and unless the applicant has deposited in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment. 5 I am supported in my view by the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court (S. Abdul Rahman V/s. Mt. Anikunnisa). In that case, the petitioner had filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. for setting aside the ex-parte decree on the last day of prescribed period of limitation. On the same day, he had filed another insufficiently stamped application along with Chalan to deposit a decretal amount as required by the proviso of Sec. 17 of the 1887Act. The Chalan was, however, passed and money was actually deposited in the Treasury only after expiry of. the period of limitation. It was, therefore, held that the petitioner had not complied with the requirements of the mandatory provisions of the proviso to Sec. 17 of the Act. When there was no compliance with the requirement of that provision either in substance or in law, the application for setting aside an ex-parte decree could not be allowed. On facts, the instant case stands on an inferior footing, namely, the amount of Rs. 5641.00 as cost of the suit due under the decree was not deposited along with the application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. The judgment of the Allahabad High Court (M.P. Mishra v. S. Lal Agarwal) is to the same effect. It is clearly laid down therein that there is nothing in Sec. 17 of the 1887 Act to show that it will be only a money decree that will stand covered by the proviso to the section. A decree for eviction and payment of arrears of rent is covered by the proviso to Sec. 17. It has, therefore, been held that an application to set aside the ex-parte decree without depositing the decree amount was not maintainable. On the other hand, the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Darogani Devi (supra) is wholly inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case which stood on a fundamentally different footing. On the other hand, the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Darogani Devi (supra) is wholly inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case which stood on a fundamentally different footing. The same did not deal with an application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C, and the issues relating to Sec. 14 (7) of the 1982 Act read with the proviso to Sec. 17 of the 1887 Act did not arise for consideration. In other words, the same was not with respect to a suit within the meaning of Clauses (c) and/or (e) of Sec. 11 of 1982 Act which has to be disposed of in accordance with the summary procedure prescribed in the 1887 Act. The Stringent provisions of the 1887 Act, has advisedly been prescribed for the eviction suits on the said two grounds. 6. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have no manner of doubt that the present appellants application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. was not maintainable because of their failure to deposit the money part of the decree in question. It is settled law that such an application is not maintainable. The learned Court below has, therefore, passed an appropriate and lawful order. The aforesaid aspect of the matter is sufficient to uphold the impugned order. However, there is yet another aspect of the matter which I incidentally mention. The provisions of the Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. is attracted only if the defendant satisfies the Court that summon was not duly served (which is not the case here), or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. It is manifest from the facts stated hereinabove that the defendants started absenting themselves as, soon as they were called upon to examine their witnesses which was obviously to delay the proceedings. Before adopting such a dilatory tactics, the defendants ought to have remained themselves that the suit in question had to be disposed of as per the summary procedure prescribed in the 1887 Act and, therefore, they should not have allowed themselves any liberty in the matter verging on abuse of the process of the Court. 7. In the result, this appeal is dismissed, and the impugned order dated 10-11-2000, passed by the learned Subordinate Judge XII, Patna, in Misc. 7. In the result, this appeal is dismissed, and the impugned order dated 10-11-2000, passed by the learned Subordinate Judge XII, Patna, in Misc. Case No. 4 of 2000 (Rekha Basu and Anr. V/s. Hare Ram Belbariar), is hereby upheld.