Judgement ORDER:- All these petitions have been filed by the Union of India through Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway, Ambala Cantt, Haryana, under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India against a common order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Shimla, on October 30, 1999. Those orders have been passed in applications filed under S. 5 of the Limitation Act in CMA Nos. 21/S/14 of 1995, 18-S/14 of 1996, 22-S/14 of 1995, 23-S/14 of 1995, 24-S/14 of 1995 and 25/S/14 of 1995. A prayer was made in the said applications for condonation of delay in presenting appeals under S. 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. To appreciate the controversy raised in the present petitions few relevant facts may not be stated. According to the petitioner-Railway Administration, the respondents were carrying on business of trading in coal, which was to be carried to Shimla in railway wagons. To facilitate stocking of coal, the petitioner licensed a plot of land to the respondents. According to the petitioner, it was for a specified purpose for stocking coal therein, which had been brought to Shimla by rail. The land was prime land located near the Bus Stand. Shimla. With the passage of time, stated the petitioner, the respondents stopped trading in coal. The practice of carriage of coal by rail was also discontinued. The licences of the respondents for the said lands, therefore, came to an end and the respondents were asked to vacate the land and handover possession to the Railway Administration. Since the respondents did not handover the possession of the land, proceedings were initiated under Ss. 4 and 7 of the Act for the eviction of the respondents from the land and also for recovery of damages from the respondents for the use and occupation of the land. The proceedings were initiated before the Estate Officer, Northern Railway, Ambala Cantt. For a number of years, the proceedings remained pending and finally by order dated October 14, 1992 and order dated March 17, 1992 passed in No. 136-W-PPEA/WMB, 26-W-PPEA/UMB, 30-W-PPEA/UMB, 31-W-PPEA/UMB and 28-W/PPEA/UMB, disposed of all the cases. At an appropriate stage, I will deal with the contentions raised on behalf of Railway Administration before the learned Additional District Judge as well as before me. 3. At an appropriate stage, I will deal with the contentions raised on behalf of Railway Administration before the learned Additional District Judge as well as before me. 3. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the Estate Officer, appeals were filed under S. 9 of the Act. There was delay on the part of the Railway Administration in institution appeals. Accordingly, applications for condonation of delay were filed under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In the applications, it was stated by the applicant that immediately after the decisions were rendered by the Estate Officer, steps were taken and the Department considered the matter. The entire case papers were then referred to Headquarters inasmuch as it involved matter of policy and it was not merely commercial matter. It had wide ramifications as the respondents were not receiving any traffic of coal through rail. It was also asserted that the Headquarters after receiving the matter, asked for numerous clarifications from various departments, had to go through old record, which was not easily and readily available. It also affected large number of persons. Finally, a decision was taken in 1995 to prefer appeals and accordingly appeals were instituted. It was, therefore, prayed that the delay, which had been caused in filing appeals was "neither deliberate nor the result of negligence but it arose because of the reasons beyond the control of the applicant". It was also stated that the question raised in the appeals was of "great importance" and the judgments appealed against were "completely illegal and without jurisdiction" and if allowed to stand, they will occasion a great failure of justice. A prayer was, therefore, made to condone the delay. 4. The applications were strongly opposed on behalf of the respondents by filing written replies. It was contended that the applications were not maintainable and no sufficient cause could be said to have been made out and they were liable to be rejected on that ground. Since almost identical applications were filed, an objection was also raised that the dates mentioned in the applications against the impugned order was also not correctly mentioned as in some of the cases dates stated to be in the applications were not correct. Since almost identical applications were filed, an objection was also raised that the dates mentioned in the applications against the impugned order was also not correctly mentioned as in some of the cases dates stated to be in the applications were not correct. Moreover, all facts and circumstances were within the knowledge of the Railway Administration and yet there was failure to take due diligence by the applicant and no appeals were filed within the period of limitation. The Railway was a huge organization and it was expected to take immediate steps. They were supposed to know the period of limitation for filing appeals and if they remained silent, it cannot be said that there was no negligence or inaction on their part and delay of three years, which had been caused, could be condoned. It was stated that the facts stated were not correct and the grounds were not genuine but concocted. The respondents also contended that no question of law much less an important question of law, was raised by the Railway Administration. On the basis of the orders, fresh agreement had been entered into and nothing requires to be done further in the matters. On merits also, the orders passed by the Estate Officer were sought to be supported contending that the orders were legal, valid and in consonance with law. It was, therefore, stated that all the applications were liable to be dismissed. 5. Before the learned Additional District Judge, a question arose for the consideration was whether there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing appeals. The learned Additional District Judge, after hearing the parties, held the point in the negative, namely, against the Railway Administration holding that delay could not be condoned. The learned Judge observed that there was more than three years delay in filing appeals by the Railway Administration and considering the circumstances in their entirety, it could not be said that sufficient cause had been made out by the Railway Administration for condoning delay. The applications, therefore, were liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, all the applications filed under S. 5 of the Limitation Act were dismissed. Resultantly, the appeals also stood disposed of without entering into the merits of the matters and treating them as time-barred. It is this order, which is challenged by the petitioners in the present petitions. 6. I have heard Mr. Accordingly, all the applications filed under S. 5 of the Limitation Act were dismissed. Resultantly, the appeals also stood disposed of without entering into the merits of the matters and treating them as time-barred. It is this order, which is challenged by the petitioners in the present petitions. 6. I have heard Mr. J. L. Kashyap, learned counsel for the petitioner-Railway Administration and Mr. Rajeev Sood, Mr. G. C. Gupta, Senior Advocate, instructed by Mr. Mohit Thakur, Advocate and Mr. K. D. Sood, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the respective petitions. 7. On behalf of the Railway Administration, it was strenuously urged that the learned Additional District Judge has committed a jurisdictional error in dismissing the applications and in refusing to condone the delay. It was alleged that considering the facts and circumstances as also the applications made before the Appellate Authority, it ought to have taken into account the fact that after the decisions by the Estate Officer, the Railway Administration considered the matter as to whether the appeals should be preferred before the Appellate Authority. For the said purpose, necessary steps were taken and the papers were sent to the Head Office. The Head Office looked into the matter and asked for certain clarifications. It had to go through old records and considering the totality of circumstances as also ramifications of the orders passed by the Estate Officer, a decision was taken to file appeals, which had resulted into delay. It was, however, submitted that looking to the entire record, it cannot be said that there was inaction, negligence or want of bona fides on the part of Railway Administration. If it is so, submitted the counsel, the delay deserves to be condoned, if necessary by imposing condition as to payment of costs to the other side. It was also submitted that again there is failure of jurisdiction on the part of the Appellate Authority in not considering merits of the matter. Had the learned Additional District Judge considered the consequences, which were likely to ensue if the orders passed by the Estate Officer were allowed to stand, he would have exercised discretion reasonably and on sound judicial principles. Had the learned Additional District Judge considered the consequences, which were likely to ensue if the orders passed by the Estate Officer were allowed to stand, he would have exercised discretion reasonably and on sound judicial principles. Reading the orders passed by the Estate Officer, it is clear that not only the Estate Officer had dismissed the cases filed by the Railway Administration against the respondents, but he had virtually exercised power as an owner of the property by issuing directions to the Railway Administration and by ordering renewal of licences after every three years on the terms and conditions specified therein. Thus, according to the learned counsel, life long licences were granted by the said Officer in the so-called exercise of statutory powers under the Act, which authorised him either to allow the applications or dismiss them. Such a power could not have been exercised by him as he could not have exercised plenary jurisdiciton. He was merely called to decide whether the respondents could or could not be said to be unauthorized occupants within the meaning of the Act by exercising powers and discharging duties. He had no power, authority or jurisdiction to order renewal of licences after every three years and he had exceeded his jurisdiction in doing so, orders passed by him were thus null and void. The said important, relevant and most material fact ought to have been considered by the learned Additional District Judge while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay. By not doing so, the learned Additional District Judge has committed jurisdictional error and the order deserves to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the orders passed by the Appellate Authority. It was submitted that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that there was no mala fide intention on the part of the Railway Administration, this was a clear case of inaction and/or negligence and once it is proved that there was either negligence or inaction, it cannot be said that there was "sufficient cause". The counsel stated that the orders were passed by the Estate Officer in presence of parties. The counsel stated that the orders were passed by the Estate Officer in presence of parties. It is not even the case of the Railway Administration that they were not aware of the orders passed by the Estate Officer. If it is so, the Railway Administration was required to take immediate steps keeping in view the provisions of the Act. The counsel stated that under sub-section (2) of Section 9, appeals are required to be filed within a period of twelve days. As the provision originally stood, such appeals could be filed within fifteen days but by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) (Amendment) Act, 1980 (Act No. 61 of 1980), the said period was reduced to twelve days. The Railways Administration was supposed to know the legal provision. Even otherwise, ignorance of law is no execuse and if appeals were to be filed within a period of twelve days and when they were filed after three years by refusing to condone delay, no jurisdiction error can be said to be committed by the Appellate Authority. Moreover, whether to condone or not to condone delay is in the discretion of the Appellate Authority and unless this Court is of the opinion that the impugned orders are perverse or that no reasonable man could have arrived at a conclusion, which has been arrived at by the Appellate Authority, this Court cannot interfere with the discretionary orders passed by the Court below. It was, therefore, submitted that no ground much less sufficient ground, has been made out by the petitioners and the petitions are liable to be dismissed. Even on merits, the orders passed by the Estate Officer could not be said to be illegal, contrary to law or unlawful. It was, therefore, submitted that all the petitioners are liable to be dismissed. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that all the petitions deserve to be allowed. In my opinion, in considering the applications for condona-tion of delay, the learned Additional District Judge ought to have taken into consideration relevant factors and submissions made on behalf of the applicant-administration that the orders passed by the Estate Officer were without of law and/or jurisdiction particularly when, the orders passed by the Estate Officer were de hors the Act and could not have been passed by him. Considering the provisions of the Act, the Court ought to have condoned delay and decided the appeals on merits. It was rightly submitted that had there been proper approach on the part of the learned Additional District Judge, he would have condoned the delay and directed the Registry to place the matter on Board by giving appeal numbers and by deciding them on merits. 10. In this connection, my attention was invited by learned counsel for both the parties to several decisions. In State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the connotation "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court observed that it should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. 11. In the instant cases, it is not even the contention of the respondents that there was want of bona fides on the Railway Administration, but the submission is that there was both negligence as well as inaction, which is a writ large from the facts stated and submissions made in the applications for condonation of delay. 12. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, the Supreme Court laid down certain principles while dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that the doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State, should be accorded similar treatment and the law must be administered in an even-handed manner. At the same time, however, it must be borne in mind that on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology, occasionally there is delay on the part of the State authorities in taking appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. The Court has to take liberal approach in the matters of condonation of delay with a view to advance substantial justice. 13. The Court then laid down the following principles (at page 1354) : "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. Every days delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5.There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigants does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 14. In State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, AIR 1996 SC 2173 : (1996 Lab IC 1843) there was delay on the part of the State authorities to the extent of 480 days in preferring Special Leave Petition under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The delay had occasioned in processing the matter through official channel. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the applicants seeking condonation of delay was duty bound to explain the reasons for delay. The Court, however, observed that as held by the Court in several cases, the very manner in which the bureaucratic process moves, if the case deserves merit the Court should consider the question of condonation from that perspective as well. 15. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani AIR 1996 SC 1623, it was indicated by the Apex Court that while dealing with application for condonation of delay by State authorities, the expression "sufficient cause" should be construed considering the fact that the Government is a impersonal machinery and decisions are taken at slow pace. Certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. 16. Certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. 16. In State of Bihar v. Subhash Singh, AIR 1997 SC 1390, it was posited by the Supreme Court that strict proof of every days delay should not be insisted upon. It was observed that in transacting Government business, none would own personal responsibility and decisions are "leisurely taken at various levels". It is also not uncommon that sometimes delay would be deliberately caused by filing appeal or revision by Government to confer undue advantage to opposite party, more so, when stakes involved are high or persons are well connected/influential or due to obvious considerations. The Court should not adopt strict approach as to standard of proof. 17. In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 2000 SC 2306, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in Mst. Katiji. It was further observed that power to condone delay has been conferred upon Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing the matters on merits. The Court referred to Chandra Mani, wherein it was observed that it is notorious and common knowledge that there was delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in the Apex Court -be it by private party or the State and the Court generally adopts liberal approach in condoning delay in filing appeals. 18. I had an occasion to deal with the point in Municipal Corporation of Ahmeda-bad v. Manish Enterprises Ltd., AIR 1993 Guj 145, Relying on various decisions on the point, I stated (at pages 149-150 : "In my opinion, the Court has to bear in mind the principle of substantial justice and if the expression sufficient cause has to receive liberal construction, in the facts and circumstances of the case, sufficient cause can be said to have been made out by the applicant. For that purpose, in my opinion, it is altogether immaterial whether the Advocate could have telephoned the officer concerned; whether the said officer could have immediately rushed to the Advocate in the High Court, or whether the appeal could have been filed little earlier. The question is whether there is inaction, negligence or want of bona fides as observed by the Supreme Court. According to me, it cannot be said that any of the above elements is present in the instant case. The question is whether there is inaction, negligence or want of bona fides as observed by the Supreme Court. According to me, it cannot be said that any of the above elements is present in the instant case. "sufficient Cause has been made out by the applicant Corporation in approaching this Court in filing the appeal and accordingly delay is required to be condoned. In my judgment, the legal position cannot be disputed that the provisions of the law of limitation must be applied to all persons equally and uniformly. Government departments and local authorities cannot claim any privilege in that regard and they must be treated on par with private individuals. However, as observed by the Suupreme Court, the realities of life also cannot altogether be ignored. Whereas a private individual takes a decision one way or the other almost instantaneously, a democreatic Government or a bureaucratic department hesitates and halts, discusses and debates, considers and consults, peeps through papers and files, speaks through notes and drafts, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion, unmindful and oblivious of urgency and emergency." 19. From the above decisions, in my judgment, the law is well settled and it is this. Though the Government or instrumen-talities of the State cannot claim any additional privilege or concession when an application is made for condonation of delay and the case must be considered like any other litigant approaching the Court and the law of limitation must be applied to all persons equally and uniformly, realities of life cannot altogether be ignored. Whereas a private individual takes a decision one way or the other almost instantaneously, a democratic Government or a bureaucratic department hesitates and halts, discusses and debates, considers and consults, peeps through papers and files, speaks through notes and drafts, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion, unmindful and oblivious of urgency and emergency. 20. No doubt, the counsel for the respondents placed strong reliance on other line of decisions and contended that if the delay would be condoned in the instant cases, which is more than three years, the provisions of law of limitation will become nugatory and otiose. 21. In this connection, attention of the Court was invited to Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361. 21. In this connection, attention of the Court was invited to Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361. In that case, the Court observed that question of diligence during the period of limitation is altogether irrelevant in considering application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act but once a proceeding becomes time-barred, it becomes relevant in exercising discretion to condone delay. It is also observed that proof of a "sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction vested with the Court. If sufficient cause is not proved, nothing further has to be done and application for condonation of delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. But even if sufficiednt cause is shown, the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone delay. It is at that stage, the diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration, but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. 22. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142 : (AIR 1988 SC 897) it was held that scope of discretion of Court in condoning delay in filing appeal when the appellant was a Government, the Court should have regard to the normal procedural delays. It was also observed whether the delay occurred due to fraud and unusual conduct of Government Pleader, in the larger interest the Court should condone delay. 23. In P. K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala AIR 1998 SC 2276, there was delay of 565 days in filing an appeal. An application for condonation of delay was filed on behalf of the State. The High Court condoned delay by granting application and observing that though there was delay of 565 days in filing appeal, "taking into consideration the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay," it was inclined to condone delay and, accordingly, the petition was allowed. The aggrieved respondent approached the Supreme Court. 24. The High Court condoned delay by granting application and observing that though there was delay of 565 days in filing appeal, "taking into consideration the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay," it was inclined to condone delay and, accordingly, the petition was allowed. The aggrieved respondent approached the Supreme Court. 24. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court, the Apex Court observed that the High Court did not appear to have examined the reply filed on behalf of the contesting respondents as "reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order". The Court also noted that it was not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of delay of 565 days. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the ground put forward by the State authorities that the Advocate Generals office "was fed up" with so many arbitration matters equally important could hardly be said to be sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, delay was not condoned. 25. In Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Lal (1999) 8 SCC 532 : (AIR 1999 SC 3101) the Court indicated that law of limitation has to be applied with all its vigour when statute so prescribes. The Court cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is appropriate to note that Lachhman Das Arora was a matter relating to Election Petition and in the light of litigation in question, the Court made the above observations. 26. In the present cases, there is delay on the part of the Railway Administration in approaching the District Court. It is also true that S. 9 mandates the aggrieved party to file an appeal within twelve days, but as observed by the Supreme Court in several cases, while considering the applications for condonation of delay and deciding them, the approach of the Court is to decide the matter on merits and to do substantial justice between the parties. Merits cannot be ignored or overlooked altogether. 27. In the cases on hand, the allegation of the Railway Administration was that the respondents were licensees, the period for which the licences were granted in their favour, was over. Merits cannot be ignored or overlooked altogether. 27. In the cases on hand, the allegation of the Railway Administration was that the respondents were licensees, the period for which the licences were granted in their favour, was over. The licences were not continued thereafter but the licensees continued to remain in possession unauthorisedly. Thus, they were unauthorized occupants and were liable to be evicted in accordance with law. One can understand that on the basis of allegations and counter-allegations and appreciating the evidence led by the parties, a decision can be arrived at by the Estate Officer one way or the other. In the instant cases, however, a curious approach had been adopted by the Estate Officer. In paragraph 4 of the order, the Estate Officer observed that the respondent on S.A. stated; "He was willing to pay the licence fee to the applicant (Railway) according to the assessment of the value of land at site determined by the revenue authorities, Shimla, on the basis of revenue record and as per the relevant railway rules at the time of alleged termination of the license of plot and revision thereafter as in force from time to time". 28. He then proceeded to observe that the applicant (Railway Administration) was directed to determine the value of the land and to work out the licence fee as per the instant rules and the Railway Administration was asked to submit the same before him. i.e. before the Estate Officer. The hearing was thereafter completed. The respondents-unauthorised occupants accepted the details of assessment of land and consented to execute fresh agreement on commercial plot basis. 29. In paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8, the Estate Officer observed : "In view of the statement of the respondent as above and record available before me the case u/S. 4 for eviction is hereby closed. As regards damages the same have been claimed by the applicant amounting to Rs 13440/- for the period from 1-3-1986 to 28-2-89 which are inconsistent with the extant (sic) rules and as per the rationalized guidelines issued by the Rly. Board in regard to the licensing of Rly. Land for common purposes. The arrears of license fee workout for the period from 1-3-86 to 31-12-91 comes to Rs. 29483.88 upon which I (sic) purpose 10% as token damages which thus comes to Rs. Board in regard to the licensing of Rly. Land for common purposes. The arrears of license fee workout for the period from 1-3-86 to 31-12-91 comes to Rs. 29483.88 upon which I (sic) purpose 10% as token damages which thus comes to Rs. 32432/27 which the respondent is liable to pay and I hold accordingly. Further in exercise of powers conferred upon me u/S. 7/2 of the Act I do hereby order that the respondent shall pay Rs. 32432/27 as arrears of license fee including 10% as token damages for the period from 1-3-86 to 31-12-91 within two months from the receipt or publication of this order and thereafter @ Rs. 5037.27 per annum as license fee. Amount already paid, if any, by the respondent as license fee shall be deducted while effecting recovery. The respondent is also hereby directed to execute a fresh agreement to this effect which is to be renewed after every three years. Failing above, action as provided in the Act shall be taken." 30. Reading the above order, there is no doubt that the said Officer did not decide the matter like a Tribunal or an Authority constituted under S. 3 of the Act. He virtually acted as the owner or licensor of the plots and ordered renewal of licences. It is also clear that practically lifetime licences were created/renewed by the Estate Officer in the sense that such renewal was to be made "after every three years". 31. In my opinion, the grievance voiced by the Railway Administration is fully justified that above action on the part of the Estate Officer was not only dehors the Act but without power, authority or jurisdiction. One could have understood had he dismissed the cases holding that the averments made and allegations levelled against the licensors by the Railway Administration were not well founded and, hence, they were liable to be dismissed. He had, however, no power either to direct the Railway Administration to determine the value of the land and work out the licence fee as per instant rules nor he could issue directions to the occupants, who according to the Railway Administration, were unauthorized occupants to pay the amount and to get the licences renewed. In any case, a direction that such licences would be renewed after every three years would be wholly uncalled for. In any case, a direction that such licences would be renewed after every three years would be wholly uncalled for. Grant of such right, if it is called right, for all time to come would be wholly without jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, who was required to decide lis between the parties, i.e., Railway Administration on the one hand and so called unauthorized occupants on the other hand. That fact, therefore, ought to have been taken into account by the learned Additional District Judge even while dealing with applications for condonation of delay. 32. It is, no doubt, contended on behalf of the respondents that the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is limited to see that the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction act within the bounds of their authorities and they should not exceed to the jurisdiction or abuse their powers and it is not open for this Court to enter into questions of fact or of law. Even if such authorities commit error of fact or of law, such errors cannot be corrected. For this reliance was placed on the following decisions. 1. Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, AIR 1984 SC 38; 2. Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte, AIR 1975 SC 1297; and 3. Khimji Vidhu v. Premier High School, (1999) 9 SCC 264 : (AIR 2000 SC 3495). 33. In my opinion, the law is clear on the point. While dealing with the cases under Art. 227 of the Constitution, this Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction. It has no power to interfere with findings recorded by the Courts or Tribunals by reappreciating the evidence on record and even if they commit errors of fact, errors of law or errors of facts and of law, they cannot be corrected under the supervisory jurisdiction. The Court cannot substitute its findings for the findings recorded by the authorities. At the same time, however, it is the power and duty of the Court to see that the Tribunals situate within the territory in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction keep themselves within the limits of their authority. The Court cannot substitute its findings for the findings recorded by the authorities. At the same time, however, it is the power and duty of the Court to see that the Tribunals situate within the territory in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction keep themselves within the limits of their authority. It is the duty of the High Court to see that they obey the law and if there is breach on the part of the Tribunals or subordinate Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction, the orders passed by them must be corrected under Art. 227 of the Constitution, (vide State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela, AIR 1968 SC 1481). 34. In the instant cases, the Estate Officer, who had to decide the cases in accordance with law, unfortunately was oblivious of his powers and duties under the Act and instead of deciding the matters on merits, either by allowing or dismissing the cases, exercised powers and jurisdiction as an owner or licensor, got willingness from the occupants to pay licence fee to the Railway Administration according to the assessment of the value of the land as determined by the revenue authorities, directed the Railway Administration to determine the value of the land and work out the licence fee as per instant rules and ordered occupants to pay the same with a further direction that fresh agreements would be arrived at and would be renewed after every three years. Such a power, with respect, to say the least, nowhere found under the provisions of the Act. This important and vital fact ought to have been taken into account by the learned Additional District Judge while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay. Since it was not done, in my opinion, the orders passed by the learned Additional District Judge deserve interference. Considering the importance of the question agitated by the Railway Administration, to me, it appears that all the cases were such which required decisions on merits after condoning delay, which had been caused in filing the appeals. Delay, therefore, deserved to be condoned and is hereby condoned. 35. At this stage, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that since there was long delay on the part of the appellant-Railway Administration, even if this Court is of the opinion that delay deserved to be condoned, the respondents may be awarded costs. Delay, therefore, deserved to be condoned and is hereby condoned. 35. At this stage, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that since there was long delay on the part of the appellant-Railway Administration, even if this Court is of the opinion that delay deserved to be condoned, the respondents may be awarded costs. According to them, it would be exemplary as observed by the Supreme Court in M. K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam, (2001) 6 SCC 176 : (AIR 2001 SC 2497). In that case, ex parte decree was passed. An application was made for setting aside ex parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The High Court dismissed the petition. When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the application was allowed and order passed by the High Court was set aside. Considering the delay on the part of the applicant, the Supreme Court ordered payment of Rs. 50,000/- as exemplary costs to be paid to the opposite side within a period of thirty days. 36. In the instant cases, however, from the record, it is clear that when the cases were filed for getting back possession alleging that respondents were unauthorised occupants, damages were also claimed and it was stated that they were liable to pay damages, which was about Rs. 5000/- per year. In one case, from 1-3-86 to 28-2-1989, the amount claimed was Rs. 13,440/-. Considering the entirety of the facts and attending circumstances, in my opinion, ends of justice would be met if the petitions are allowed and delay is ordered to be condoned by directing the Railway Administration to pay costs to the petitioners, which is quantified at Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) per petition. Such an amount would be paid within two months. 37. The petitions are accordingly disposed of. 38. Now, the learned District Judge/Additional District Judge will direct the Registry to give regular number to the appeals and will decide them in accordance with law on their own merits. 39. I may clarify before parting with the matter that it is open to the parties to raise all contentions available to them and those contentions will be decided by the Appellate Authority in accordance with law without being inhibited by the observations made by me hereinabove. 39. I may clarify before parting with the matter that it is open to the parties to raise all contentions available to them and those contentions will be decided by the Appellate Authority in accordance with law without being inhibited by the observations made by me hereinabove. Since the original cases are of 1986, the Appellate Authority will give due priority and dispose them within six months from the receipts of the record from this Court. Record be sent immediately. Order accordingly.