Commissioner of Income Tax v. Comfund Services India Ltd.
2001-04-16
M.F.SALDANHA, R.GURURAJAN
body2001
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JUDGMENT R. Gururajan, J.—The Revenue has come up by way of this petition under Section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, seeking for a reference of the following questions of law from this court : "1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is right in law in holding that the loss of Rs. 18,23,82,925 on account of write off of 1.2 crores units of the Unit Trust of India was not a double claim ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is right in law in holding that an adjustment loss of Rs. 7,55,31,164 on account of fictitious sale and interest on loan and capital loss on account of dealing with Videocon International Ltd., was not a double claim ?" 2. The brief facts of the case resulting in this petition are as under : The assessee filed a return of income on December 29, 1993, declaring loss of Rs. 50,74,40,280. The return was processed under Section 143(1)(a) determining the loss at Rs. 50,71,95,468. The case was selected for scrutiny. Notices were issued under Sections 142(1) and 143(2) of the Act and the assessee submitted all the details called for. The assessing authority passed an order adding back Rs. 18,23,82,925 being the amount written off in respect of 1.2 crores of the Unit Trust of India units on the ground that while adopting the closing stock this factum had been taken note of and the assessee claimed twice over this amount which according to the authority is a case of double deduction claim. Similarly in the matter of adjustment of a sum of Rs. 7,55,31,164 in respect of fictitious loss of interest on loan account as capital loss is again a double claim. The assessee being aggrieved by the adding back of these claims preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax. The assessee was represented before the Commissioner and he also explained the case with regard to the double claim both in respect of writing off of the loss and with regard to the interest on loan and capital loss. The Commissioner being satisfied with the explanation offered by the assessee and in the light of the records ordered deletion of these two additions.
The Commissioner being satisfied with the explanation offered by the assessee and in the light of the records ordered deletion of these two additions. The Revenue preferred an appeal before the Income Tax appellate authority, against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax. The Tribunal after examination of the facts and detailed accounting procedure confirmed the order of the Commissioner. While doing so, the cross-objections preferred by the assessee also came to be dismissed. Thereafter the Revenue filed an application seeking for a reference to this court. The Tribunal in its order rejected the request for a reference to this court on the ground that the findings of the Tribunal are findings of fact and no question of law arises on the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. Now the Revenue is before us seeking for a reference on a question of law in this petition. 3. Notice was issued pursuant to which the assessee is represented. We have heard learned counsel appearing on either side in detail. Mr. Indra kumar, learned counsel for the Revenue, vehemently contended before us that the findings of the Commissioner confirmed in appeal with regard to the double claim require our interference. Per contra, Mr. Nihaldalvi, learned counsel for the assessee, contended that both the Commissioner and the Tribunal after analysing the account books and material on record found as a matter of fact that the finding on double claim is not based on facts. According to him, no referable question of law arises for consideration in the case on hand. In reply, Sri Indra Kumar submitted that if a finding is given not based on facts, and if a finding is given contrary to the material on record that finding could also be characterised as a question of law. According to him even a perverse finding can be a question of law. 4. The scheme of the Income Tax Act provides for a three tier system. The first authority is the assessing authority against which an appeal is provided to the Commissioner of Income Tax and a further appeal is provided to the Tribunal consisting of a Judicial Member and an Accountant Member. The Act further provides for a petition being filed seeking for a reference on a question of law arising out of such order to this court.
The Act further provides for a petition being filed seeking for a reference on a question of law arising out of such order to this court. In the event of rejection of the application, the Revenue can maintain an application before this court under Section 256 of the Act. Section 256(1) of the Act provides for a request to the Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order, and subject to the other provisions contained in this section and the Appellate Tribunal shall, within one hundred and twenty days of the receipt of such application draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court. Section 256(2) provides for an application being made in the event of the Tribunal refusing to state a case on the ground that no question of law arises within six months to the High Court and the High Court may if it is not satisfied with the correctness of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, require the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and to refer it. 5. From a reading of this provision it is clear to us that in so far as findings of fact are concerned, the Tribunal has the final say in the matter but that final say if it is in contravention of any provision of law, it can certainly be a question of law arising out of that order. Let us see as to whether in the case on hand, the Revenue has made out a case for reference. 6. In the case on hand we are concerned only with regard to two items, namely, the loss on account of write off of 1.2 crores Unit Trust of India units and the dealing with Videocon International Ltd., resulting in a trading loss of Rs. 7,55,31,164. The assessee has explained the controversy with regard to the loss of Rs. 18,23,82,925 towards the Unit Trust of India units by contending that the dealer had fictitiously recorded the transactions.
7,55,31,164. The assessee has explained the controversy with regard to the loss of Rs. 18,23,82,925 towards the Unit Trust of India units by contending that the dealer had fictitiously recorded the transactions. The assessee stated that the purchase of 20 crore units from RCFT was wrongly recorded as 21.50 crore units with the same value ; purchase of 85 lakhs units from Deutsche Bank was shown as 90 lakhs units with the same value ; purchase of 15 lakhs units from the Standard Chartered Bank was fictitiously recorded which in fact represents the difference between the purchase and sale proceeds payable by the company to the SCB on a different set of deals ; sale of 50 lakhs units to Tolani Ltd., was fictitiously recorded which in fact was a clean borrowing from Videocon International Ltd. According to the assessee all these fictitious entries are nothing but an over statement of the balance units in the books to the extent of 1.20 crore units which was written off in the books with a value of Rs. 18,23,82,925. The assessing authority ruled that the loss on account of non-existing units is already taken into account. By writing off the loss of Rs. 18,23,82,925 the assessee is actually accounting the loss twice by way of debiting it to the profit and loss account and secondly by reducing the value of closing stock. The assessee explained this by contending that due to inflation of purchases in terms of quantity, the average cost price has been taken at a lesser figure while arriving at the profit arising out of some of the transactions. According to the assessing authority, the assessee has made a double claim and furnished wrong particulars. 7. In so far as the dealing with Videocon International Ltd. is concerned, the assessee claimed a trading loss of Rs. 7,55,31,164. The assessee explained the same by contending that the payment of Rs. 7,55,31,164 is in settlement of an agreement dated June 5, 1992. It is stated that the amount of Rs. 7.5 crores along with interest of Rs. 5.31 lakhs was found to be due to Videocon International Ltd., and the payment has been set off against the sum of Rs.
7,55,31,164 is in settlement of an agreement dated June 5, 1992. It is stated that the amount of Rs. 7.5 crores along with interest of Rs. 5.31 lakhs was found to be due to Videocon International Ltd., and the payment has been set off against the sum of Rs. 7,72,64,384 due to the excess from Videocon International Ltd., on sale of debentures of Videocon Appliances Ltd. It is further submitted that due to fudging of the accounts the loss has been incurred in due course of business and should be allowed as trading loss. According to the assessing authority, the loan amount which is repayable to Videocon International Ltd., can at the most be treated as capital loss and not as trading loss. With this reasoning he added back the same. 8. When the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner, the Commissioner by a detailed order set aside the adding back of these two items. According to him, the profits have been inflated due to adoption of a lower value per unit of the securities sold in working out the profit as per the trading account in securities compared to the actuals due to the manipulations and the peculiar method of reckoning of profit from transactions followed by the appellant. In so far as interest on loss of Rs. 7,55,31,164 is concerned, the Commissioner holds that a sum of Rs. 7,55,31,164 stood erroneously credited to the income side of the trading account. He further notices that there is justification for holding that the profit was overstated by the amount of Rs. 7.50 crores as sale consideration of shares which were not purchased. The appeal fifed by the assessee was allowed. 9. On a further appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal notices all these facts. According to the Tribunal, the assessee has taken recourse to a very complex system of accounting but if step by step examination of the matter is made the entire discrepancy can be found out to be reconcilable. After noticing the various facts and figures, the Tribunal holds in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal found as a matter of fact that the assessee did not claim this amount as a separate deduction.
After noticing the various facts and figures, the Tribunal holds in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal found as a matter of fact that the assessee did not claim this amount as a separate deduction. With regard to double claim in respect of fictitious sale as interest on loan account is concerned, the Tribunal again holds that there is no basis for the assertion on the part of the Assessing Officer that the loss represents capital loss. It was found as a matter of fact that this loss was not separately claimed in the income computation statement. On the facts, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. When a reference is sought for before the Tribunal, the Tribunal rejected the same by holding that the finding of the Tribunal is on factual examination of the facts and books of account of the assessee and other material. They found that there is no question of law involved in terms of Section 256(1) of the Act. In the light of this finding, we are clear in our mind that the claim of the Revenue on double claim stands negatived by the Commissioner, and confirmed by the Tribunal on the facts. The Assessing Officer on a factual question arrived at a conclusion of double claim in respect of two items which finding of fact again on reappreciation of material facts is reversed by the Commissioner which has been accepted by the Tribunal. No error of law with reference to this factual finding is shown before the Tribunal or before us. The said finding of fact arrived at by the Commissioner confirmed by the Tribunal, cannot be canvassed as a question of law. It is not a finding based on no evidence or a finding totally opposed to the material facts. The Commissioner being satisfied with the material placed before him has given a factual finding with regard to double claim which again is confirmed by the Tribunal. Learned counsel for the Revenue tried to impress upon us that the finding of the Commissioner and the Tribunal with regard to double claim is an incorrect finding. 10. The mere possibility of arriving at a different conclusion on the facts cannot be considered to be a question of law under Section 256(2).
Learned counsel for the Revenue tried to impress upon us that the finding of the Commissioner and the Tribunal with regard to double claim is an incorrect finding. 10. The mere possibility of arriving at a different conclusion on the facts cannot be considered to be a question of law under Section 256(2). The scope of Section 256(2) being limited we cannot interfere on a finding of fact unless the said finding is opposed to any provisions of law or a finding totally opposed to the material on record or a perverse finding coupled with legal error. Even readings of the questions of law framed would show that they are nothing but questions of fact and not questions of law. Hence, we refrain from interfering in the case on hand. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Thiru Arooran Sugars Ltd., Madras etc. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1997 SC 3575 had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 256(2) of the Act, and ruled that the Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority. The High Court cannot go behind the facts found by the Tribunal ; it was for the assessee to raise all questions of fact at the time of hearing of the appeal before the Tribunal. At the reference stage, no fresh investigation into facts was possible. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of K. RAVINDRANATHAN NAIR Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, (2001) 247 ITR 178 SC ruled as under (headnote) : "It is the Tribunal which is the final fact-finding authority. A decision of the Tribunal on the facts can be gone into by the High Court only if a question has been referred to it which says that the finding of the Tribunal on the facts is perverse, in the sense that it is such as could not reasonably have been arrived at on the material placed before the Tribunal. Unless and until a finding of fact reached by the Tribunal is canvassed before the High Court in the manner set out above, the High Court is obliged to proceed upon the findings of fact reached by the Tribunal and to give an answer in law to the question of law that is before it. The only jurisdiction of the High Court in a reference application is to answer the questions of law that are placed before it.
The only jurisdiction of the High Court in a reference application is to answer the questions of law that are placed before it. It is only when a finding of the Tribunal of fact is challenged as being perverse, in the sense set out above, that a question of law can be said to arise." 12. The judgments referred to above squarely apply to the facts of this case on hand. Even the questions sought for before the Tribunal and before us are not on the basis of a perverse finding by the Tribunal. M.F. Saldanha, J.—The Department unfortunately has been filing these petitions in virtually every case that is decided against it by the Tribunal irrespective of merits and legal considerations. If the view is that by doing so the Department is keeping the judges busy or perhaps occupied, we need to formally remind the Department that we expect a judicious scrutiny process to be followed before selecting the number of cases in which these CPs are filed. We have highlighted the fact that it is now more than well settled that the Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority and that consequently the Department will have to be much more vigilant and much more effective in the conduct of its side of the proceedings when the appeal comes up for hearing before the Tribunal realising that it is virtually the last round of the litigation. More often than not, the presentation of the Department's case at that stage is absolutely cavalier--if the Department is not interested in vigorously, professionally and dynamically agitating its grievance before the final forum we would like to make it very clear that the High Court is not to be used as a corrective agency or as a remanding agency. Secondly, where the law precludes interference on pure questions of fact the Department will not get away by trying to couch these issues in legal terminology and seemingly present them as though they are points of law. What we insist upon therefore is that a proper scrutiny be done at the departmental level and those of the cases where the decision is purely factual are totally weeded out and no attempt is made to use the High Court machinery as a virtual second appeal.
What we insist upon therefore is that a proper scrutiny be done at the departmental level and those of the cases where the decision is purely factual are totally weeded out and no attempt is made to use the High Court machinery as a virtual second appeal. If the guidelines are not heeded hereinafter, the High Court will be left with no option except to saddle the Department with exemplary costs in all those cases where there was no ground for filing a CP in the first instance. 14. As far as the field of tax laws is concerned almost every facet of the law has been examined and decided by one or the other judicial forums. Where the principles involved are already covered by judgments, even if it be a point of law of some importance merely because the Department is unhappy with the outcome before the Tribunal it is no ground for the filing of a CP as no other view is possible. Again, there are a large number of cases in which the conclusions arrived at are perfectly logical and are within the four corners of the law and yet, a CP is filed with the hope that another view may be possible. It is again well settled law that unless it is one of those very small category of cases where new ground is being broken, merely because some other view may remotely be possible is no justification for an approach to the High Court. Lastly, we have noticed that at the stage that the application is preferred to the Tribunal no serious effort is made to project a valid case for reference. The points for reference or the issues are summarised in the same old mundane terminology that has been prevalent for the last half a century and even in those of the cases where the High Court calls for a reference, we have seldom found the point of law being specifically, effectively and professionally drafted out and formulated. It is not a mere expectation of the High Court but it is the requirement of law that this be done and unless the Department adopts immediate corrective action in this field we will be constrained to dismiss every CP wherein the proposed points of reference do not conform to these requirements. 15.
It is not a mere expectation of the High Court but it is the requirement of law that this be done and unless the Department adopts immediate corrective action in this field we will be constrained to dismiss every CP wherein the proposed points of reference do not conform to these requirements. 15. In the light of the clear pronouncement of law with regard to the scope of Section 256(2) and in the light of our discussions no question of law arises for consideration in the case on hand. The petition stands rejected. Parties to bear their respective costs. 16. Learned standing counsel to ensure that a copy of this judgment is forwarded to every one of the concerned officers of the Department.