JUDGMENT J.G. Chitre, J. 1. By this application, a prayer has been made to this High Court to direct the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to make a reference in view of the provisions of section of 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act" for convenience), and, therefore, we are now dealing with the question which can be mentioned as under : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in cancelling the penalty of Rs. 95,000 levied by the Assessing Officer under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act ?" In view of that, now we are dealing with it in view of the submissions advanced by Shri R.L. Jain, counsel appearing for the Commissioner of Income Tax, and Shri H.C. Sarda, counsel appearing for the respondent-asses-see. 2. The facts in brief can be stated as under : The assessee-HUF, Kasturchand Surajmal Bori, Jhabua, filed the return pertaining to the assessment year 1973-74, which happens to be the subject-matter of the present reference. In the said return, the assessee mentioned the income from house property as Rs. 200, business income Rs. 22,000 and pointed out that his total income which is liable to be assessed for taxation was Rs. 22,200. When the Assessing Officer was considering it, he noticed that the assessee had filed the return in view of the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme in the context of the wealth-tax and in the said return, he pointed out that he was having the amount towards the capital which was to the tune of Rs. 94,500. The Assessing Officer was scrutinising the return filed by the assessee, he found that this amount of Rs. 94,500 was not mentioned in the return filed for the purpose of the Act and therefore, he called on the assessee for hearing and during hearing the assessee was unable to explain this income to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer, and, therefore, the Assessing Officer treated it as unexplained income and added it in "capital" of the assessee. Thus, the capital increased to the tune of Rs. 1,95,500. In view of that, the Assessing Officer issued a notice to the assessee in view of the provisions of Section 147(a) of the Act after giving him the opportunity of being heard and proposed a penalty of Rs. 95,000. 3. Thus, the capital increased to the tune of Rs. 1,95,500. In view of that, the Assessing Officer issued a notice to the assessee in view of the provisions of Section 147(a) of the Act after giving him the opportunity of being heard and proposed a penalty of Rs. 95,000. 3. That order imposing the penalty and of assessment of tax in that context was assailed by the assessee before the Commissioner of Income Tax. The Commissioner of Income Tax by his judgment and order confirmed the judgment and order passed by the Assessing Officer. 4. The said judgment and order of the Commissioner of Income Tax was assailed by the assessee before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal by its judgment and order, declared that the decision of the Assessing Officer, which was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income Tax treating the said sum of Rs. 94,500 as unexplained income was wrong. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal further held that the Assessing Officer was wrong in treating the case of the assessee in view of the provisions of Section 147(a). He held that the case would be treated in view of the provisions of Section 147(b) of the Act only. Apart from that, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that there could be a mistake in disclosing the wealth on the part of the assessee for the assessment year 1972-73 and that mistake cannot be taken as the foundation for taking that there was an accretion in the assessment year 1973-74 and cannot be explained by the assessee. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal further held that the assessment had already been completed in view of the provisions of Section 143(3) of the Act. It could not be reopened after a long lapse of nearly nine years. 5. An application was filed for making a prayer to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to refer the question for adjudication to the High Court in view of the provisions of Section 256(2) of the Act but the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal rejected the prayer. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhopal, made a prayer to this court to direct the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to make a reference in view of Section 256 of the Act. 6. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhopal, made a prayer to this court to direct the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to make a reference in view of Section 256 of the Act. 6. Shri R.L. Jain pointed out that the judgment and order of the Assessing Officer and the judgment and order of the Commissioner of Income Tax and the judgment and order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and submitted that the decision taken by the Assessing Officer in treating the said amount of Rs. 94,500 as unexplained income was correct and consistent with the facts revealed by the return filed by the assessee and the return filed by the asses-see in view of the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act. He submitted that the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax is well reasoned confirming the judgment and order passed by the Assessing Officer. There was no ground for the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to dislodge the adjudication of the Assessing Officer and resultant penalty imposed against the assessee making him liable to pay the amount of Rs. 94,500. He submitted that the assessee should have mentioned in the return filed under the provisions of the Act that he had income of Rs. 94,500 as disclosed vide return filed in view of the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act. He submitted further that as it was not done, because the assessee was not following the provisions of Section 147(a) of the Act. He submitted that the reasons given by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in dislodging this, happen to be wrong in view of the provisions of law and facts depicted by the matter. He submitted that in view of that, the reference as proposed, needs to be directed to be referred to this court by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and therefore, this application needs to be allowed. 7. Shri Sarda submitted that the case of the assessee so far as the present assessment year in question is concerned, falls under the purview of Section 147(b) of the Act. He further submitted that it was a sheer mistake and that has been rightly so described by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in its judgment. Further, he submitted that there was no need of reopening it after a lapse of nine years. He further submitted that it was a sheer mistake and that has been rightly so described by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in its judgment. Further, he submitted that there was no need of reopening it after a lapse of nine years. He submitted that the judgment and order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is well reasoned and consistent with the return and, therefore, it needs to be maintained. 8. Shri Sarda further submitted that the information which was brought in play by the Assessing Officer happens to be information which has come to the knowledge from the return which was filed in view of the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act and in view of that, the case of the assessee falls under the purview of Section 147(b) of the Act. 9. In support of his contention, Shri Sarda placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of CIT v. Lakhiram Ramdas [1962]44ITR726(SC) , wherein the Supreme Court held that (headnote): "the question to be decided was, as stated by the Tribunal and the High Court whether by reason of any omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, income had escaped assessment, and that on the facts and circumstances, the finding of the Tribunal that there was no such omission or failure was a finding of fact, and the application for reference was rightly rejected." 10. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court further held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and having particular regard to the fact that the return and the statements accompanying the return furnished by the assessee during the course of the assessment proceedings for 1945-46 did not indicate such a large transaction as Rs. 1,10,000 by a single bank draft, the Income Tax Officer was right in starting proceedings under Section 34(1)(a) on the receipt of the information about the above transaction, to make a reassessment for 1945-46. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court further held that the question which the appellant said arose out of the Tribunal's order was a question of fact and not a question of law. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court further held that the question which the appellant said arose out of the Tribunal's order was a question of fact and not a question of law. It further pointed out that (page 729) "the question suggested by the appellant was misconceived because the question before the Tribunal at the time of the hearing of the appeal was not whether the assessee had failed to disclose the transaction of Rs. 1,10,000 in the return and the statements accompanying it, but whether there was any omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the year in question." 11. Shri Sarda further placed reliance on the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of CIT v. Purushottamdas [1999]236ITR573(MP) . In the said matter, the Division Bench of this court held that an application under Section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, at the instance of the Revenue for calling for a statement of case from the Tribunal on the following question of law (page 573) : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in deleting the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) even after confirming the unexplained investment in quantum appeal ?" was not liable to be referred. 12. For the purpose of dealing with the topic involved during the submissions disclosed by counsel appearing for the parties, it is necessary to examine the words and sentences used in the provisions of Section 147 of the Act, as it was at the relevant time. It reads : "(a) the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under Section 139 for any assessment year to the Assessing Officer, or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or (b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in Clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Assessing Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year." 13. Therefore, it will have to be kept in mind that there was a significant difference between the meaning conveyed by the provisions of Section 147(a) and 147(b). The difference was mainly indicated by the words "has reason to believe that by reason of omission or failure on the part of an assessee" and "the Assessing Officer has in consequence of information in his possession". These two provisions indicate that there has to be a failure on the part of the assessee to mention truly and fully the income and there has to be an omission or failure on the part of the assessee so far as Section 147(a) is concerned. However, so far as Clause (b) is concerned, it indicates the pointer towards "Assessing Officer has in consequence of information in his possession". In view of this difference in both the clauses, the material before the Assessing Officer should unequivocally indicate these two factors for the purpose of making him able to take a decision either way. If there is omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return truly and fully, the action would be in view of the provisions of Clause (a), but if the point comes to the notice of the Assessing Officer on account of the information which is in his possession, the action would be in the context of the provisions of Clause (b). In the present case, in view of the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme a return was filed by the assessee in which he made the disclosure of the amount of Rs. 94,500 and that information was in the possession of the Assessing Officer when he scrutinised the return filed in view of the provisions of the Act pertaining to the assessment year in question. In this case, there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee in truly and fully disclosing the income. 14. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note the spirit behind bringing forth the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme. The Voluntary Disclosure Scheme was for the purpose of inviting the members of the public to go for voluntarily disclosure and in view of introduction of that Voluntary Disclosure Scheme, the assessee in the present case disclosed the said amount of Rs. 94,500 and when the Assessing Officer was scrutinising the return pertaining to the assessment year in question, this information was in his possession. 94,500 and when the Assessing Officer was scrutinising the return pertaining to the assessment year in question, this information was in his possession. Shri R.L. Jain submitted that the assessee should have put a note on the return submitted by him which is involved in the present matter that he had disclosed this amount in the return filed by him in respect of the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act in view of the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme and the failure to do so was amounting to omission or failure on his part to "disclose truly and fully" and, therefore, the judgment and order passed by the Assessing Officer was correct, lawful and was not fit to be dislodged by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. We are unable to agree with him because mainly the said return was filed by the assessee in view of the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme and with different angle. Apart from that, this point was used by the Assessing Officer for scrutinising the return in question as the source of information which was in his possession. As it was done, the provisions of Clause (b) were attracted and it has been rightly held by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal that way and that is the correct approach consistent with the provisions of law and the spirit of the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme. 15. It is pertinent to point out that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that there was a mistake in the disclosure of wealth for the assessment year 1972- 73 and that mistake could not be taken as a foundation for presuming that there was accretion in the wealth in the assessment year 1973-74 and that cannot be explained by the assessee. Here again, the spirit behind the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme was required to be kept in mind by the Assessing Officer. 16. Shri Sarda further submitted in his arguments that the notice issued to the assessee for recovery of the amount so imposed as penalty was not in context with the provisions of Sections 147(a) and 271(1)(c) and in view of that, the assessee was not liable for the liability for payment of the amount of Rs. 94,500, which was imposed as penalty on him. The record shows so. 17. 94,500, which was imposed as penalty on him. The record shows so. 17. Shri Sarda further pointed out that the application was moved making a prayer to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to make a reference in respect of the question which is sought to be referred, it has been rejected by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal with a reasoned order. It being so, this court be not pleased to direct the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to make a reference in the context with the said question to this court. 18. We uphold the submission of Shri Sarda by holding that by a reasoned order the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has dealt with the topic involved in the matter and the judgment of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is well reasoned dealing with all the matters and situation on record. The conclusion drawn by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is borne out from the record and is consistent with the provisions of law and spirit behind the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme. 19. Thus, in view of the discussion above and the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Lakhiram Ramdas [1962]44ITR726(SC) we do not find any substance in the application started with the prayer for a reference as sought. Therefore, we turn down the said prayer and dismiss this M. C. C., but with no orders as to the costs.