JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J. :- This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter referred to as the Code) read with Article 227 of the constitution of India is directed against the order dated 3.1.2001 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Kangra at Dhararnshala whereby , he had dismissed the revision petition preferred by the petitioners against the order dated 18.12.1999 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, I-Class (I), Dharamshala ho, ding that a prima facie case is made out against the petitioners, for the commission of offences punishable under Section 147 read with Section 1 149 and Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code. " 2. In brief, the amterial facts are that the Officer-in-charge, Police Station, Shahpur submitted a charge-sheet under Sections 147/149/341 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners on the allegations that on 1.3.1999 a secret information was received by the police that about 200-250 persons of Congress (I) had gathered at Relu Chowk at Shahpur under the Charmanship of petitioner No.l and the petitioners had stopped the vehicles which were to pass through that Chowk. On investigation, it was found that the petitioners had obstructed the vehiclular traffic by sitting on Dharna and were raising slogans against the State Government because of price hike. Being political leaders, they could not be arrested because such arrest would have created law and order situation and would have led to breach of peace, therefore, on the basis of their deemed arrest, the charge-sheet was prepared and sent to the Court concerned. 3. After perusa of the material placed on the record, the learned trial Magistrate found that a prima facie case was made out against the petitioners to proceed against them for the commission of offences punishable under Section 147 read with Section 149 and Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code and the charges were accordingly framed against them. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners preferred criminal revision which was heard and dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Kangra at Dharamshala by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present petition. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Assistant Advocate General for the respondent - State and have also gone through the records. 6. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners preferred criminal revision which was heard and dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Kangra at Dharamshala by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present petition. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Assistant Advocate General for the respondent - State and have also gone through the records. 6. It was contended by the for the petitioners that the allegations against the petitioners are that they were raising slogans against price rise and Government apathy in not controlling the price rise. Even if such allegations are true, these do not constitute the commission of any offence. On the contrary, their act at the most can be said exercising their rights under article 19 of the Constitution and they have been implicated falsely and as a measure of retaliation for raising their voice against the failure of the State Government to control the price of essential commodities. It was further contended that there is no material on record which may warrant putting the petitioners to trial, therefore, the impugned order and proceedings against the petitioners are liable to be quashed. 7. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Advocate General contended that the petitioners are accused of forming an unlawful assembly and stopping the vehicles/passengers on the road and the material on record prima facie discloses the commission of the offences under Sections 147/149 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code by the. Therefore, they have rightly been put to trial for the commission of the said offences and the impugned order and proceedings against them do not warrant interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, more so, when they have lost before the revisional court. 8. It may be pointed out at the very out-set that it is by now well settled that powers of superintendence and inherent powers of the High Court maybe exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure unnecessary delay in trial, protraction of proceedings and gross injustice, more so, in a case where the prosectuion has already been launched. The High Court in exercise of such powers is not to embark upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations against the accused. The High Court in exercise of such powers is not to embark upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations against the accused. However, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. It is in view of this settled position in law that the present petition has to be considered and decided. 9. Now, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners were exercising their fundamental rights, may be examined. It is true that Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India guarantees to every citizen the right to assemble peaceably and without arms and Article 19(1) (d) guarantees the right to move freely throughout the territory of India. It is from these rights that right to take out a procession flow if the processor carries placards or shouts slogans or halts from time to time and speeches are made, right of speech and expression as guaranteed by Article 19(l)(a) is also exercised. However, these rights are subject to constitutional and statutory restrictions and can be exercised subject to such restrictions only. When such rights are exercised on a public high-way, it has to be ensured that it is done peacefully and in an orderly manner without infringement of the rihs of others. Every member of the public has a right o use a high-way and such right is subject to similar rights of other members of the public. The acts of sitting in Dharna and stopping other persons and vehicles from passing through the high-way will not be a lawful exercise of the rights of the precisionists but will be violative of the rights of others and will amount to public nuisance, roiting and causing of illegal restraint to others who are stopped from passing/re-passing through the public high-way. 10. In the case on hand, the case of the prosecution is that the petitioners apart from raising slogans and carrying placards, sat on Dharna, stopped the vehicles and passengers from moving in the direction they wanted to go and thereby committed the offences complained against. 10. In the case on hand, the case of the prosecution is that the petitioners apart from raising slogans and carrying placards, sat on Dharna, stopped the vehicles and passengers from moving in the direction they wanted to go and thereby committed the offences complained against. The two Courts below have, on the basis of the material on record, already found that there are reasons to proceed against the petitioners for the commission of the offences alleged to have been committed by them. Such prima facie findings recorded by them are supportable on the basis of the material on record. 11. At this stage, there is nothing on the record to infer that the allegations against the petitioners are baseless and politically motivated. Nor can the allegations against them be sad to be absurd or inherently improbable. Therefore, the impugned order does not call for any interference by this Court either in exercise of its powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 12. As a result, this petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. 13. The parties, through, their learned counsel, are directed to appear before the trial Court on 7.1.2002.