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2001 DIGILAW 362 (MAD)

T. K. Pattabhiram v. C. S. Ramamurthy and others

2001-03-21

PRABHA SRIDEVAN

body2001
Judgment :- The dispute between the parties has a long history. On 25. 1.1971, the petitioner and two others formed a Trust called the Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Vidya Mandir Trust (VMT in short) which was a charitable trust and inspired by the visit of His Holiness Shri Jeyandra Saraswathi Swamigal, the present head of Kanchi Kama Koti Peedam (HH in short) to Coimbatore. The properties of the Trust as per the trust deed were movables beings subscriptions, donations, gifts etc. The three trustees were to hold office for life. The vacancy in the office of the Trust has to be filled up by nomination in consultation with HH obtained in his personal capacity. The petitioner was the first managing trustee. For the purpose of this civil revision petitioner were concerned with another trust called Shree Kanchi Kamakoti Mandir Trust (MT in short). This trust deed was executed on 19.3.1979, the first trustees were the same as the trustees of the VMT. The main object of MT was to provide a temple for public worship and to instal idols for public worship. The period of office of trustees was give years at the end of which it was to stand terminated. The retiring trustees can be reappointed for a further time subject to the consent of HH. The office of appointment and reappointment was at the pleasure of HH. Any vacancy in the office of the Trust has to filled up by nomination by the Board of Trustees in consultation with HH. The first Managing Trustee was the petitioner. Decisions by the Board of Trustees had to be unanimous and in case of difference of opinion it has to be referred to HH whose decision would be final. The property which was subject matter of the Trust was comprised in T.S.Nos.360, 361, 362, 364, Tiruvengadam Swami Road, Coimbatore, measuring 2,196 sq.ft. and comprised of shrines of Vinayagar, Kamatchi Amman, Navagraham, Ashtalakshmi and Perumal. The two Trust Deeds referred to above were marked as Exs.B-6 and A-1 respectively. The former is a registered Trust Deed and the latter is not. 2. The petitioner as stated above was appointed as the Managing Trustee for life in respect of VMT and out of the other two trustees one is dead and the other had migrated from Coimbatore and therefore, in effect he alone continued. The former is a registered Trust Deed and the latter is not. 2. The petitioner as stated above was appointed as the Managing Trustee for life in respect of VMT and out of the other two trustees one is dead and the other had migrated from Coimbatore and therefore, in effect he alone continued. there were certain proceedings in respect of the temple, sometime in 1993 the petitioner handed over possession of the temple to HH. The rival parties have their own version regarding the circumstances under which this was done. Before the authorities constituted under theH.R. & C.E. Act, O.A.No.45 of 1990 and O.A.No.12 of 1986 which are suo motu proceedings under Sec.63 (f) and (g) of the Act and petition under Sec.63(a) and (b) of the Act respectively. The petitioner had along with the two others filed O.A.No.12 of 1986 claiming that they were hereditary trustees and this was dismissed and as regards O.A.No.45 of 1990 which is a suo motu proceeding, it was decided and declared that the Kamatchi Amman Temple is the public religious institution. This order was passed on 11.8.1998. The Joint Commissioner has considered in detail the history of the two trusts and held that the MT trust and the secular activities were dealt with by the VMT trust. He also came to the conclusion that a perusal of Ex.A1, the MT trust deed lays down clear-cut provisions for filling up vacancies in consultation with HH and therefore, he held that the institution having been found to be a public religious institution, appointment of trustees should be made in terms of Ex.A-1, trust deed and in consonance with the statutory rules. These two proceedings themselves were disposed of pursuant to the interim order made by this Court in W.P.No.13 of 1990 filed by the petitioner herein challenging the order appointing a fit person. Originally the petitioner had not impleaded the respondents 1 to 5 in the writ proceedings but thereafter they were impleaded. Against the order in O.A.No.12 of 1986 and O.A.No.45 of 1990, an appeal petition was filed under Sec.69(1) of the Act. Originally the petitioner had not impleaded the respondents 1 to 5 in the writ proceedings but thereafter they were impleaded. Against the order in O.A.No.12 of 1986 and O.A.No.45 of 1990, an appeal petition was filed under Sec.69(1) of the Act. The Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., on a consideration of all the issues involved in the matter, came to the conclusion that there is no justification on the part of the petitioner to continue evading production of accounts and that the petitioner was directed to cooperate with the authorities of the H.R. & C.E. Department. The appeal was therefore, dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the writ petition mentioned above was filed O.A.No.8 of 1999 before the Joint Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. under amended Sec.64(1) of the Act for settling a scheme of administration with a specific provision for appointment of non-hereditary trustees. This application was filed by the respondents as “worshippers” of the temple and s “persons interested” and also on the ground that there was no legally constituted trustee functioning in the temple at present which provided room for mismanagement and misappropriation in the temple. The petitioner also filed O.S.No.943 of 1999, a statutory suit under Sec.70(1) of the Act against the dismissal of the A.P.No.28 of 1998 and for declaration that VMT is not a religious institution and that the petitioner was entitled to hold office as hereditary trustee as VMT as well as the Kamatchi Amman Temple and for permanent injunction. This suit is pending and so is the O.A. filed by the respondents 1 to 5. 3. Be that as it may after 2.4.1993 there has been a Committee which has been appointed by HH to manage the Temple. On 27.8.1995, the Mutt appointed the first defendant as a Manager for one year. At the end of one year the petitioner was asked to handover charge which he did not. According the averments made in the suit the petitioner had opened the Hundial and issued paper publications creating a wrong impression amongst the public and therefore, the matter got precipitated. It was at this juncture that the present suit came to be filed on account of the alleged misdeeds of the petitioner in respect of the temple. Pending suit the respondents 1 to 5 asked for appointment of a receiver in I.A.No.1324 of 1999 and for injunction in I.A.No.1325 of 1999. It was at this juncture that the present suit came to be filed on account of the alleged misdeeds of the petitioner in respect of the temple. Pending suit the respondents 1 to 5 asked for appointment of a receiver in I.A.No.1324 of 1999 and for injunction in I.A.No.1325 of 1999. Both these applications were dismissed. Therefore, the respondents 1 to 5 filed C.M.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2000 respectively, which were allowed. The petitioner is thus before this Court having filed two revisions. This is the background of the case. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.P.Gopalan, submitted that apart from the petitioner there is no legally appointed trustee. The trust deeds themselves would show that he has been named as the Managing Trustee and in the absence of the other he was entitled to manage the temple and the trustee. According to the petitioner, respondents 1 to 5 were strangers and had nothing to do with the temple or the trust. It is also his case that the MT does not exist at present, since it had become extinct by the resolutions of the Trust-Board at the meeting held on 19.3.1984. The trust deed had also been subsequently rectified twice. According to the petitioner, since MT had become extinct there is no vacancy to be filled up and VMT alone controls the temple. In or about 1993, the petitioner was asked by the Kama Koti Peedam on behalf of HH to handover the temple and accordingly the suit-temple was handed over by the petitioner. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that first of all the handing over of the charge that is alleged was itself illegal. When the managing trustee namely the petitioner had authority to hold office for life and even as per the Trust Deed the existing trustees may continue until he vacancy is filled up, there is no question of handing over and the petitioner was the sole trustee and could continue as such. According to the learned counsel, the MT does not exist and had got merged with VMT and therefore, the properties that had vested with MT now are under the control of VMT. He also submitted that as per the recitals of VMT, the trustees hold office for life and consequently, the petitioner continues to hold office and continues to exercise control over the suit-temple. He also submitted that as per the recitals of VMT, the trustees hold office for life and consequently, the petitioner continues to hold office and continues to exercise control over the suit-temple. He also challenged the locus standi of the respondents to file the suit. On the one hand they had claimed to be the members of the ad hoc committee appointed by the HH, but in the application to the H.R. & C.E., for settling a scheme they had described themselves as devotees of the temple. According to the learned counsel, these contradictions would go to show that the respondents have not genuine interest in the temple and only want to wrest the temple away from the petitioner. He also submitted that he had filed all the accounts that there was no case made out for mismanagement and that, in any event appointment of a receiver is one of the harshest remedy and when the suit property is in the possession of the rightful person there was no justification in appointing a receiver which is done especially when the rights of the respondent is not free from doubt. He relied on the following judgments reported in, (1) Rajeshwar Nath Gupta v. Administrator General and others Rajeshwar Nath Gupta v. Administrator General and others Rajeshwar Nath Gupta v. Administrator General and others A.I.R. 1989 Del. 179; (2) D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja and others D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja and others D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja and others (1955)1 MLJ. 287 : A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 360; (3) Dilman Rai v. Srinarayan Sharma and another Dilman Rai v. Srinarayan Sharma and another Dilman Rai v. Srinarayan Sharma and another A.I.R. 1983 Sikkim 11; (4) A.S.Sethurathnammal v. The Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (Admn.) Department, Madras-600 034 A.S.Sethurathnammal v. The Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (Admn.) Department, Madras-600 034 A.S.Sethurathnammal v. The Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (Admn.) Department, Madras-600 034 (1996)2 MLJ. 385 : (1996)2 L.W. 131 and (5) Rasi Dei v. Bikal Maharana and others Rasi Dei v. Bikal Maharana and others Rasi Dei v. Bikal Maharana and others A.I.R. 1965 Ori. 20 to support his case. 6. Mr.N.V.Naga Subramanian, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.Mohan Ram, counsel for the respondent submitted that the beginning of the history of the case started with a visit of HH to Coimbatore. 20 to support his case. 6. Mr.N.V.Naga Subramanian, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.Mohan Ram, counsel for the respondent submitted that the beginning of the history of the case started with a visit of HH to Coimbatore. All his devotees were inspired to set up trustees as already stated under Exs.B-6 and A-1. For the purpose of this case the recitals of VMT and property belonging to VMT are not relevant because VMT has not controlled the temple. Two rectification deeds were executed on 25.10.1971 and 29.2.1972 in respect of the VMT, and by these rectification the clauses relating to consulting HH for filling up vacancies in the trust was removed. Therefore, as far as VMT is concerned it may be said that HH does not have any control, but as far as MT is concerned the perusal of the deed would show that an all pervasive control has been given to HH under this deed. He also referred to the various discrepancies and contradictions in the case of the petitioner. In the affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of C.M.P.No.1919 of 2000, the petitioner had said that the original trust deed was dated 20.10.1971 and this trust established Kamatchi Amman Temple and subsequently, the deed was rectified to suit 6he changing needs and demands of the trust and the trust was also thereafter called MT, but after the rectification deed it went back to the original status and therefore, as per the original trust deed he alone is the managing trustee. The learned counsel submitted that this is ex-facie untrue because a perusal of the VMT deed would show that it has no connection with the temple since it is clearly a secular trust. The two rectification deeds were of the years 1972 and 1975 (prior to the date of MT). Therefore, there was no question of the VMT becoming MT and thereafter reverting back to VMT status by the rectification deed when Ex.A-1, the MT trust deed is only in 1979, several years after the rectification deed. Therefore, the petitioners case of a rectification deed in respect of a trust which had not yet come into existence cannot be admitted. Therefore, there was no question of the VMT becoming MT and thereafter reverting back to VMT status by the rectification deed when Ex.A-1, the MT trust deed is only in 1979, several years after the rectification deed. Therefore, the petitioners case of a rectification deed in respect of a trust which had not yet come into existence cannot be admitted. He also submitted that the stand taken by the petitioner that originally the temple was under the control of VMT also cannot be accepted because VMT is clearly a secular trust and when we look at Exs.A-1 and B-6, the temple is included in the Schedule of property to Ex.A-1 which relates to MT. Ex.B-6 does not deal with the temple at all. The learned counsel also submitted that the case of the petitioner that he alone has to be in control of the temple is also not in consonance with the specific recitals in the trust deed, Ex.A-1 where the public character of the temple had clearly been brought out in Clause 2 (a). The learned counsel also referred to the various recitals in the counter filed by the petitioner in the application wherein he had averred that the MT had emerged with the VMT on 15.2.1979 which is prior to the execution of the MT deed. He also referred to the pleadings in the statutory suit filed by the petitioner wherein it is stated that the MT merged with the parent trust by a resolution dated 15.2.1974. This is contrary to what is stated in the counter. He also submitted that unlike the recitals in Ex.B-6 relating to VMT with regard to term of the trustees recitals in Ex.A-1 are clear and it is only for 5 years. He also referred to the document dated 27.8.1995, Ex.A-11 wherein the petitioner was appointed as a who is bound to submit the accounts to Shri Madam every month and after one year depending on the satisfaction of the public, the petitioner was informed that the question of continuing him as a Manager would be considered. The learned counsel submitted that this clearly shows that the petitioner had submitted to the control of the Mutt and for him to now state that HH had nothing to do with the trust nor did HH had any authority to interfere with the administration is not permissible. The learned counsel submitted that this clearly shows that the petitioner had submitted to the control of the Mutt and for him to now state that HH had nothing to do with the trust nor did HH had any authority to interfere with the administration is not permissible. He also referred to Ex.A-18 which is a letter written by the petitioner calling himself as the Managing Trustee of VMT. This is dated 2.4.1993 and this speaks of the petitioner handing over the Kamatchi Temple to HH as a gesture of goodwill. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner was actually bound to handover the control, both because his term had expired and also because of the various complaints from the public. But nonetheless, even accepting his own case that it was a gesture of goodwill, the fact remains that the petitioner ceased to have control and possession of the temple. Ex.A-9, which was also referred to is a letter dated 5.9.1996 from HH which the Shri Madams displeasure with the conduct of the petitioner is made clear and the petitioner has been directed to cooperate in all aspects with the Administrative committee. Ex.P-10 is dated 12.9.1996 which shows the composition of the Administrative Committee. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that it is not open to the petitioner to question the locus standi of the respondents since he is fully aware from Exs.A-8 and A-9 that an Administrative Committee had been formed to take charge of the temple and with whom the petitioner was directed to cooperate. Ex.A-21 is another document which is addressed by the petitioner to the first respondent herein which also shows that the petitioner knows that the first respondent is a person interested in the temple. This letter is also addressed by the petitioner stating clearly that he is writing the letter at the behest of His Holiness. After stating so it was not open to the petitioner to question the authority of HH. As regards the allegations of mismanagement, the learned counsel submitted that no accounts were produced by the petitioner in accordance with the Act when H.R. & C.E. Act under Sec.87 directs audited statement of accounts to be produced when the petitioner has also stated that the Hundial collections are his own and that the Temple is a private temple. Nothing further need be said about mismanagement, the matter speaks for itself. Nothing further need be said about mismanagement, the matter speaks for itself. The learned counsel also pointed out to the pleadings of the petitioner in various proceedings where wild allegations are made against HH and submitted that this would show the depths to which he could descend. The learned counsel relied on the following judgments: (1) R.M.Subramaniam v. N.Sundaram Iyer R.M.Subramaniam v. N.Sundaram Iyer R.M.Subramaniam v. N.Sundaram Iyer (1963)1 MLJ. 113 (F.B.) for the purpose of showing that subsequent events can be taken note of an appropriate cases. (2) Institute Indo-Portuguese and others v. Dr.Theotnio Borges and others Institute Indo-Portuguese and others v. Dr.Theotnio Borges and others Institute Indo-Portuguese and others v. Dr.Theotnio Borges and others A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 275 and (3) D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja and others D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja and others D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja and others (1955)1 MLJ. 287 : A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 360. He submitted that after the order of the lower appellate Judge appointing the HH as the receiver, HH has taken control and also nominated one S.Kuppusamy to be in management of the temple. In view of this and also due to mismanagement of the petitioner, there was no necessity to disturb the status quo as on date by removing the nominee of HH and putting the Temple back under the control of the petitioner. 7. The heart sinks when we find that even temples do not escape the greed of man. The grievance of the petitioner has been well answered by the lower appellate Court, who has considered the questions from all the relevant points of view namely the contradiction in the petitioners stand as regards the existence of the MT, the contradictory stand taken by the petitioner with regard to the authority to HH with regard to the management of Temple and appointment of trustees; the claim made by the petitioner asserting the private right in respect of the Temple, the effect of the introduction of the petitioners own family members as trustees and also of course the question of balance of convenience with regard to grant of injunction. There can be no gainsaying the fact that appointment of a receiver is one of the harshest remedies which the Law provides. There can be no gainsaying the fact that appointment of a receiver is one of the harshest remedies which the Law provides. However, unless the facts of the matter show at least prima facie some emergent or eminent danger the Court will not normally deprive a person in de facto possession and vest the property in the hands and another. The trial Court had held that the petitioner was in de facto possession of the Temple as a Trustee. A perusal of Exs.A-1 and B-6 shows that while Ex.B-6 is secular, Ex.A-1 is for a religious performance and to establish a public temple and install idols for public version. As submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent we are not really concerned with VMT since a perusal of the trust deed. Ex.B-6 shows that the Trust does not concern deeds with the temple therefore, we are only concerned with the MT which is Ex.A-1. The clause 4 of the trust deed reads as follows: “The administration and management of the Trust shall vest in the hands of the Trustees whose number shall not exceed five and shall at no time to less than three. The first Trustees shall be (1) Sri A.S.Bhanu Panth, (2) Sri Ramji Arjun, and (3) Sri T.K.Pattabhiraman. Each of the above mentioned trustees 1 to 3 shall hold offices for a period of five from the date of this deed and their offices shall stand terminated on the date of expiry of the term mentioned above. The retiring trustees shall be subject to re-appointment for a further period of five years subject to the consent of His Holiness Sri Sankaracharya Swamigal of Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Mutt. The Trustees shall hold the office of appointment and re-appointment at the pleasure of His Holiness Sri Sankaracharya Swamigal of Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Mutt.” 8. The language is peremptory and we see therefrom that the office of the trustees stand terminated after a period of five years and the reappointment of the same trustees is not automatic. Not only that it is subject to the consent of His Holiness but also at the pleasure of His Holiness. The petitioner has signed Ex.A1 and is fully aware of the recitals contained therein. Not only that it is subject to the consent of His Holiness but also at the pleasure of His Holiness. The petitioner has signed Ex.A1 and is fully aware of the recitals contained therein. This is why in Ex.A-3, the order passed in O.A.Nos.45 of 1990 and 12 of 1986, the Joint Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., holds that the provisions in the MT deed are clear cut and vacancy can only be filled up in consultation as per the trust deed. The Joint Commissioner also comes to the conclusion that the temple is a public religious institution as per Secs.6(18) and 6(20) of the H.R. & C.E. Act and that the Kamatchi Temple and the other shrines have been constructed on the land purchased by the Trust from the donations collected from the public. He has also held that the income derived from above shrines through Hundials, Abishekam, Archanai tickets, donations etc., shall be used for their up-keeps and maintenance only. In the appeal filed against this order to the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., the Commissioner has disapproved the conduct of the petitioner to continue evading production of account and he dismissed the appeal. The reading of the two trust deeds shows that 5 years after the execution of Ex.A-1 the term of office of the petitioner as a trustee came to an end. Therefore, in 1984 his term had come to an end and there is nothing on record to show that he was continued as a trustee in consultation with his holiness. To overcome this difficulty the petitioner submits on the one hand that the MT had become merged with the appellant VMT as per the resolution dated 15.2.1979 in his counter in I.A.No.1324 of 1999 whereas in the suit filed by him under Sec.70(1) of the Tamil Nadu H.R. & C.E. Act which is marked as Ex.A-17. Where in the affidavit filed in C.M.P.No.1919 of 2000 in the civil revision petition here he has stated that the original name of Sri VMT then it was called the MT then by a rectification deed it has gone to its original status. So the case set up in the counter that by a resolution this was merged has now been given the go-by. So the case set up in the counter that by a resolution this was merged has now been given the go-by. It is evident that the petitioner somehow wants to make out a case that the identity of the MT and the VMT has become one so that he can take advantage of the clause in the VMT, Ex.B-6 that the Managing Trustee can hold office for life. The rectification deeds produced by him are prior to 1979. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that by those rectification deed the identity of the MT was affected. The alternative case of the single trust changing its name once and reverting to its original name cannot be accepted because the fact there are two trust deeds has been demonstrated not only before the Civil Court but also before the authorities of the H.R. & C.E. Department. It is stated that the trust properties and the temple was purchased by him out of his personal funds in 1983 and also that due to the pressure and inducement of His Holiness in 1983 he was pressurized to form Kamakoti Madam Trust for a period of five years. This is also proved to be false because even in 1979, the MT had come into existence. Therefore, this statement is also without basis. Looked at from any angle we see that the petitioner is not in de facto possession of the temple as a trustee. This finding is bolstered by the letter, Ex.A-9, dated 5.9.1996 in which his holiness has instructed the Sri Madam to issue the letter to the petitioner stating that His Holiness does not desire the petitioner to continue either as a Manager or as a Trustee or as a Managing Trustee. This follows the earlier letter Ex.A-11 dated 27.8.1995 where he was appointed as a Manager for one year alone commencing from 15.9.1995 that period having to an end he was asked to handover charge. We have already seen that even on his own admission he had stated that he had handed over possession of the temple though he defined it as a gesture of goodwill. As regards the conduct of the petitioner a few extracts from his own pleadings are eloquent of the petitioners intention with regard to the suit property. In W.P.No.18992 of 1990 in which he challenged the order dated 28. As regards the conduct of the petitioner a few extracts from his own pleadings are eloquent of the petitioners intention with regard to the suit property. In W.P.No.18992 of 1990 in which he challenged the order dated 28. 11.1990 wherein the department had engaged that they have the right to seal the Hundial, he had stated as follows: “I submit that the hundials are kept for the benefits of the members of the Trust and not a public hundials as contemplated under the provisions of the Act 38 of 1953. The sealing of the hundials by the Inspector, H.R. & C.E., Coimbatore at the instance of the Assistant Commissioner, Coimbatore was objected in view of the pendency of the character of the institution.” 9. The petitioner had also stated in his counter that the parent trust has been rectified due to circumstance of time and to suit the changing needs and demands of the Trust. It is his statement in the writ petition that the Hundial is for the benefit of the Trustees. Admittedly, out of the three original trustees, one died and one migrated to Gujarat and the petitioner had appointed his wife and son on the Board of the Trustees. It is needless to spell out whose changing needs and demands required the deeds to be rectified. This is why the learned I Additional Judge, Coimbatore held that it is apparent what is meant by benefit of the members of the Trust in Ex.A-19 which is the affidavit filed in the writ petition. After having issued the letter, Ex.A-21, to the first respondent herein under instructions of His Holiness and as a Manager of the Kamatchi Amman Temple on 1.2.1995, the petitioner has had the temerity to state in the counter that it must be understood that the words Kanchi Kamakoti in the Trust does not imply that the Kanchi Mutt has anything to do with the affairs of the Trust. According to the petitioner even as per the recitals in MT, His Holiness has no power to appoint Trustees. In his anxiety to retain control of the Temple in the hands of his family he has made wild allegations against the HH and he has averred in his plaint in O.S.No.943 of 1999 that the Kanchi Kamakoti Mandir Trust was constituted on 19.2.1979 due to the “instigation” of the Kamakoti Sankaracharya Swamigal. In his anxiety to retain control of the Temple in the hands of his family he has made wild allegations against the HH and he has averred in his plaint in O.S.No.943 of 1999 that the Kanchi Kamakoti Mandir Trust was constituted on 19.2.1979 due to the “instigation” of the Kamakoti Sankaracharya Swamigal. He has made similar allegation in the affidavit filed in support of C.M.P.No.1991 of 2000. On the one hand he states that His Holiness pressurized him into forming the Trust in 1983 for five years and on the other, he states that the MT did not exist from 1984 onwards. 10. If only VMT existed as per his claim then it is not a de facto trustee but de jure trustee, since he is entitled to hold office for life. But he is relying on MT, then he is not a trustee at all, because his term of office has come to an end. The very fact that he calls himself a de facto trustee shows that he is aware that he has no right to continue as trustee. The petitioner obviously is a person who has neither any respect for truth nor reverence for the sanctity of the temple or the Mutt. He is evidently under the impression that the Temple can be used for private aggrandizement and that it can dealt with as a personal fiefdom. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the respondents at one point called themselves a Managing Committee and at another point called themselves as devotees and thus questioned their locus standi. I have already referred to Ex.A-10, whereunder His Holiness has intimated to the petitioner that the respondents 1 to 5 shall constitute the administrative committee, so they can file the suit. Further they are persons interested as they describe themselves in Ex.A-15 in application before the H.R. & C.E. for setting the scheme, there are no legally appointed trustees. As on that date there are no legally appointed trustees at present in the temple and there is likelihood of malpractices, since the petitioner who alone was there at that time in the temple, who was dealing with the income of the temple without any legal authority. Therefore, I see no reason to question the locus standi of the respondents. 12. Therefore, I see no reason to question the locus standi of the respondents. 12. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner as pointed out by Mr.N.V.Naga Subramanian with regard to the appointment of receiver where the right to immovable property is in dispute and so will not be applicable. But here, the right that is in dispute is the right to hold office. A person who was appointed under a deed as for a fixed period of time cannot hold on to the office even after the expiry of the aid time and say thereafter that divesting the property from him is to take away a right to which he is entitled to. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to the decision reported in R.M.Subramaniam v. N.Sundaram Iyer R.M.Subramaniam v. N.Sundaram Iyer R.M.Subramaniam v. N.Sundaram Iyer (1963)1 MLJ. 113 which deals with the duty of Court to take note of subsequent events though normally the Court will have to deal with the case only on the basis of the facts as on date of the lis before the Court. The following passage is relevant. “Broadly and generally stated, the rule is that the rights of parties have to be determined and pronounced upon as on the date of commencement of the lis before the Court. This is not however, a stubborn or inflexible rule and it has to give way in instances where, unless the subsequent events are considered and taken into account, grave injustice would result or the decision of the Court would become a mockery. The discretion of the Court, under its inherent powers, to adjust the rights of parties on the basis of events after the starting of the action, is well recognised and accepted as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience. In some cases, it is almost the duty of the Court to advert to the subsequent events brought to its notice lest it should fail to do substantial justice between the parties.” 14. After the order of the lower appellate Court a nominee was appointed and on 25.9.2000, he has taken charge. This is pursuant to the lower appellate Court directing that His Holiness should take charge of the suit property. After the order of the lower appellate Court a nominee was appointed and on 25.9.2000, he has taken charge. This is pursuant to the lower appellate Court directing that His Holiness should take charge of the suit property. The appointment of nominee is also in conformity with the recitals of the Trust Deed, Ex.A-1, since the trust deed directs that the management of the temple should be in the hands of a person appointed by His Holiness. It is also in consonance with the order of the statutory authorities who have declared that a trust deed possessing all qualifications as per theH.R. & C.E. Act should be appointed as per the recitals of the trust deed, which means in consultation with the HH. Therefore, there can be no question that the petitioner has absolutely no right to be in possession and even if the had his conduct in treating the Hundial income as his own private property and appointing his own family members as trustees etc. disentitle him from continuing in any capacity in the management of the temple. The decision reported in Institute Indo-Portuguese v. Dr.Theotonio Borges Institute Indo-Portuguese v. Dr.Theotonio Borges Institute Indo-Portuguese v. Dr.Theotonio Borges A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 275 in which the Bombay High Court had held that, “If the Court finds that the affairs of the trust have been brought to a stand-still particularly for the reason that there has been no constituted managing committee to undertake the responsibility of discharging its duties under the constitution, then, whatever may be the reliefs claimed in the suit, and whether those reliefs could be granted to the plaintiffs or not, at the time of the final hearing of the suit, the Court, would be entitled to appoint the Receiver for the proper management of the property during the pendency of the suit before it.” 15. In this case, the Court below found that the affairs of the Trust had been mismanaged and before the properties of the temple are endangered any further, thought it fit to vest the right of management in the proper hands. The other decision referred to was D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja (1955)1 MLJ. 287 : A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 360 where the Division Bench held that in order to preserve trust property and for its proper management appointment of a receiver was quite appropriate. The other decision referred to was D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja D.K.Raja v. P.S.Kumaraswami Raja (1955)1 MLJ. 287 : A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 360 where the Division Bench held that in order to preserve trust property and for its proper management appointment of a receiver was quite appropriate. In that case, the Court held as follows: “Where trustees have been appointed for the management of an institution which is charitable or religious in its nature, then even if the document provided for a certain mode of management, still if the interests of the trust require interference Courts have ample supervising powers over the discretion of the trustee in the management of the institution.” But as I have already said the appointment of receiver is in conformity with the mode provided in the document itself. Therefore, this decision also comes to the aid of the respondent. The judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in A.I.R. 1983 Sikkim. 11 laid down some principles of appointment of a receiver and held, where it has the effect of depriving the defendant of a ‘de facto’ possession, it would cause irreparable wrong since it is a harsh, drastic and pre-emptory measure. It was also held therein that the Court will not act on possible danger but there must be a well-grounded apprehension of immediate injury and danger of suffering irreparable loss and that the charges must be specific and the appointment of receiver should always be prompt. In this case, the petitioner called himself as de facto trustee. 16. As regards immediate injury and irreparable loss, the apprehension of the respondent that the temple collections will suffer irreparable loss if the temple had to continue in the hands of the petitioner cannot be regarded as unfounded. As regards the specific charges, the charges have been clearly made and there is no vagueness or ambiguity. So the conditions laid down by the Sikkim High Court exist in this case. 17. The lower Court had rightly decided to protect the property from such a person. In fact, the lower Court owed a duty to do so since Courts are in the position of parens patria with regard to religious and charitable trusts. The order of the Court below is well-reasoned and has been passed to immediately arrest further damage to the suit property. In fact, the lower Court owed a duty to do so since Courts are in the position of parens patria with regard to religious and charitable trusts. The order of the Court below is well-reasoned and has been passed to immediately arrest further damage to the suit property. Since I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner cannot continue as a Managing Trustee, the injunction prayed for should also be granted. Therefore, I confirm the findings of the Court below. The civil revision petitions are dismissed with costs of Rs.3,000 to be paid to the temple in question.