Anjani Kumar Sinha v. Bihar State Electricity Board
2001-04-20
SHIVA KIRTI SINGH
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Shiva Kirti Singh, J. 1. This writ application basically relates to a dispute of seniority between two petitioners on the one hand and another set of employees of Bihar State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) on the other hand who were originally made respondents 5 to 23 but were sub-sequently deleted from the list of respondents at the risk of the petitioners. The prayer of the petitioners is for quashing the order no.2754 dated 28.5.1996, a copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure-1 by which the competent authority accepted the representation of the affected employees and ordered for modification of final gradation list dated 4.3.1992 (Annexure-15) so as to restore seniority of the affected employees over the petitioners and some others as per tentative gradation list dated 19.11.1990 (Annexure-13). The petitioners have also sought for quashing of the consequential gradation list published vide letter no. 987 dated 27.7.1996, a copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure-2. 2. The relevant facts for the purpose of deciding the dispute between the parties and which are not in dispute are as follows. Petitioner nos. 1 and 2 were appointed as Routine Clerks in the service of the respondent Board on 9.3.1977 and 25.5.1976 respectively. As per rules they had to complete 5 years of service as Routine Clerk in order to be eligible for promotion to the post of Routine Clerk. As per undisputed policy as reflected by notification dated 8.8.1968 issued under the provisions of Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), 20% of the vacancies in the rank of Lower Division Assistant (LD Assistant) were required to be filled up by promotion of Routine Clerks in the cadre of the Secretariat of the Board. For such promotion 5 years completed service was one of the minimum requirements and promotion depended upon result of the qualifying departmental examination on the basis of seniority combined with merit. Petitioners belong to such promotional quota for the post of LD Assistant. The other source of recruitment for filling up the remaining vacancies was by way of limited competitive examination open for all grades of Board employees without any eligibility qualification of a minimum service.
Petitioners belong to such promotional quota for the post of LD Assistant. The other source of recruitment for filling up the remaining vacancies was by way of limited competitive examination open for all grades of Board employees without any eligibility qualification of a minimum service. The private respondents who were sub-sequently deleted from the list of respondents belong to this mode of recruitment to the post of LD Assistant and the parties have described such a mode as direct recruitment in contrast to recruitment by promotion. Understood in this sence, the dispute is between promotees, who are petitioners and the direct recruits, who are no longer respondents. 3. As appears from Annexure-1 to one of the counter affidavits filed on behalf of respondent-Board and its officials, on 9.1.1980, 23 posts of LD Assistant along with 3 posts of Typists class II and 4 posts of Routine Clerk were identified to be vacant in the Boards Secretariat/Area Board Headquarters. A proposal was made for appointment of fresh hands to fill up all the noted vacant posts in existence internally by issuing an advertisement for the purpose of holding test. The consequent advertisement issued on 15.1.1980 (Annexure-J) invited applications from the workmen for filling all the three categories of posts including those of LD Assistant. The advertisement did not mention the number of vacancies but it was clearly in terms of decision contained in Annexure-1. Pursuant to advertisement dated 15.1.1980 and test held accordingly, admittedly only 5 posts could be filled up by direct recruitment due to limited number of persons found successful. Hence, another advertisement dated 3.5.1980 (Annexure-L) was issued for direct recruitment to various posts including that of LD Assistant. The advertisement/notice dated 3.5.1980 also did not disclose number of available vacancies for any of the posts. Original private respondents had applied for direct recruitment pursuant to the aforesaid advertisement/notice dated 3.5.1980. As per notice dated 1.10.1981 (Annexure-M) the competitive examination for the workmen of the Board for appointment to the post of LD Assistant was to be held on 15.10.1981 but for various reasons, the examination got postponed to 5.11.1981. It was ultimately held in April 1982 and the result of the said examination was published on 19.8.1982 showing 22 persons to be successful.
It was ultimately held in April 1982 and the result of the said examination was published on 19.8.1982 showing 22 persons to be successful. It is not in dispute that the petitioners had also applied for taking the said competitive examination but after taking the examination they could not find place in the list of successful candidates. By order dated 6.10.1982 (Annexure-11), all the 22 successful candidates were appointed as direct recruits to the post of LD Assistant. 4. From Annexure-4 to the writ application, a note-sheet dated 27.8.1982, it appears that before offering appointment to the successful 22 direct recruits, the Secretary considered the total vacancies available with the Board for appointment to the post of LD Assistant and around that date the total vacancies were noted to be 41. Accordingly, 8 posts which clearly correspond to 20% quota for promotees were ordered to be kept vacant for promotion from Routine Clerks and 10 posts were ordered to be kept vacant against scheduled caste/scheduled tribe quota. Against the remaining 23 posts again available for direct recruitment offer of appointment was directed to be given to the successful 22 candidates whose results, as noticed earlier, had already been published on 19.8.1982. Prior to note-sheet dated 27.8.1982 (Annexure- 14) the Board had issued a notice dated 19.4.1982 for holding departmental examination for promotion to the post of LD Assistant for such eligible Routine Clerks who had completed 5 years of service. As per said notice the departmental examination was scheduled to be held on 25th and 26th April, 1982 but the same was postponed and ultimately held on 5th and 7th December, 1982. The petitioners having completed the minimum length of service of 5 years appeared in the departmental examination, result whereof was published vide Annexure-8 on 3.5.1983. As per rules governing such a promotion the petitioners and two others were promoted to the post of LD Assistant vide order dated 1.10.1984 contained in Annexure-10. 5. In a tentative gradation list date 19.11.1990 as contained in Annexure-13 the former private respondents, the direct recruits, were shown senior to the petitioners, the promotees, apparently on the basis of their length of service as LD Assistant.
5. In a tentative gradation list date 19.11.1990 as contained in Annexure-13 the former private respondents, the direct recruits, were shown senior to the petitioners, the promotees, apparently on the basis of their length of service as LD Assistant. The petitioners in response to objections invited against the tentative gradation list objected to promotees who had been promoted in October 1984 being treated as juniors to the direct recruits appointed in October 1982 on the basis of regulation dated 8.5.1978 issued under Section 79(c) of the Act, a copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure- 14. The said regulation defines the term same transaction and provides that if appointment by promotion and direct recruitment takes place as a result of same transaction then irrespective of the date of appointment the promotees shall rank senior to the direct recruits. The objections of the promotees appear to have been accepted and as a result, in the final gradation list dated 4.3.1992 (Annexure-15) the promotees which include the petitioners, were shown senior to the direct recruits. Against the decision represented by the final gradation list the direct recruits filed representations which were finally considered by the competent authority, Board of Directors of the respondent- Board as per agenda item no.86 of 1995-96 (Annexure-A to the counter affidavit). The agenda note discloses and it is not in dispute that two of the promotees, namely, Sukhdeo Singh and Mushir Ahmad through their representation dated 9.1.1996 prayed to the Board for not disturbing their seniority. Their representation was a part of agenda note which was considered by the Board in its meeting held on 19.2.1996 and the Board resolved to restore the seniority of direct recruits as per the tentative gradation list dated 19.11.1990 and accordingly, the final gradation list dated 4.3.1992 was ordered to be modified. The Boards resolution has been annexed as Annexure-G to a supplementary counter affidavit. The order dated 28.5.1996 issued pursuant to the resolution of the Board of Directors and the modified gradation list have been annexed as Annexures 1 & 2 to this writ application and are under challenge as noticed earlier. 6. Prior to impugned order contained in Annexure-1 the petitioners, apparently on the basis of gradation list dated 4.3.1992 were granted selection grade and promoted as UD Assistant in December 1992. 7.
6. Prior to impugned order contained in Annexure-1 the petitioners, apparently on the basis of gradation list dated 4.3.1992 were granted selection grade and promoted as UD Assistant in December 1992. 7. From the facts noticed above it is clear that the dispute relating to seniority between the promotees and direct recruits involves determination of the question whether the process of appointment of the direct recruits in the year 1982 and of promotion of the promotees in the year 1984 were part of same transaction or not in terms of notification dated 8.5.1978 contained in Annexure-14. None of the parties have challenged the validity or legality of the aforesaid notification dated 8.5.1978 and hence, the question involved for decision is essentially a question of facts. Learned counsel for the petitioners sought to assail the impugned decision and gradation list mainly on three grounds. Firstly, it was submitted that a final gradation list already published could not be revised even by the order of the Board of Directors unless such a decision has the sanction of any statutory provision. According to him, there was no such provision. Secondly, the impugned decisions were assailed on the ground of violation of natural justice because no notice of show cause or hearing was given to the petitioners prior to passing of the impugned order contained in Annexure-1. This would, according to him, render the said order as well as the consequential gradation list contained in Annexure-2 illegal. Lastly, on merits it was submitted on the basis of Annexure-4, a note-sheet dated 27.8.1982, that decision to fill up the posts of LD Assistant vacant till then from the direct recruits as well as the promotees was taken together and at the same time on that date and hence, the direct recruitment made in October 1982 and promotion in October 1984 form same transaction as defined by the notification dated 8.5.1978 (Annexure-14). Hence, in terms of the said notification which is statutory, the petitioners being the promotees must rank senior to the direct recruits. Annexure-1 was further assailed on the ground that its wordings are not appropriate and not in accordance with notification dated 8.5.1978 which defines the term same transaction.
Hence, in terms of the said notification which is statutory, the petitioners being the promotees must rank senior to the direct recruits. Annexure-1 was further assailed on the ground that its wordings are not appropriate and not in accordance with notification dated 8.5.1978 which defines the term same transaction. According to petitioners, the ground for revision of seniority given in following words "since the two different examinations (first one in April 1982 and the second one in December 1982) cannot be treated as a single transaction and as such........" is misconceived. As per submission the use of the word single in place of same transaction as well as the reason mentioned for not treating the transaction as single or same are impermissible in view of provisions in the notification dated 8.5.1978. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent Board and its officials refuted the aforesaid submissions and on merits he submitted that in the facts of the case, Annexure-4 dated 27.8.1982 cannot be accepted as the common decision leading to direct recruitment in October 1982 and promotion in October 1984 because the transaction for direct recruitment had began in January 1980 with the issuance of first advertisement/notice on 15.1.1980 and continued for remaining vacancies under the second advertisement/notice dated 3.5.1980. At that stage i.e. in the year 1980 there was no decision to hold qualifying test for promotees and in their case decision to fill up certain posts by promotion and the related transaction began with notice for such test dated 26.4.1982 (Annexure-6), while the transaction for direct recruitment began pursuant to decision contained in Annexure-1, note-sheet dated 9.1.1980. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that in the year 1980 neither of the petitioners had completed minimum 5 years of service which was a necessary eligibility criteria for promotion in terms of notification dated 8.8.1968 (Annexure-5) and further, as would appear from Annexure-1, no vacancies were earmarked for being filled up by promotion and hence, non-mentioning of vacancies in the advertisements/notices issued in January and May 1980 will be of no help to the petitioners because the decision contained in Annexure-I related only to process of direct recruitment for all the 23 posts of LD Assistant. According to respondents, at that time there were no posts vacant within promotional quota.
According to respondents, at that time there were no posts vacant within promotional quota. Details of vacancies occurring sub-sequently are mentioned in the agenda note (Annexure-A) and from that it is clear that besides the 23 vacancies noticed in the year 1980, further vacancies occurred in the years 1981 and 1982 i.e. after the process for direct recruitment had already began in January 1980. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents further emphasised the fact that petitioners also appeared in the competitive examination pursuant to advertisement/notice dated 3.5.1980 and since they were unsuccessful hence, they could not be appointed to the post of LD Assistant as direct recruits. In such circumstances, they cannot be justified in claiming seniority over those who were successful and directly recruited in the year 1982. Lastly, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that after the deletion of names of all the private respondents at the risk of the petitioners, this writ application suffers from defect of parties and no relief can be given to the petitioners because it would directly affect the seniority and consequent rights of the affected direct recruits who have not been afforded any opportunity of hearing in this case. In support of this submission learned counsel relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court (i) (1996)2 SCC 19 (Rajbir Singh V/s. State of Haryana), (ii) (1991) Suppl. (2) SCC 183 (Government of A.P. V/s. M.A.Kareem), (iii) AIR 1991 SC 1244 (State of Bihar V/s. Akhouri Sachindra Nath) and upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1995(1) PLJR 265 (Arvind Kumar V/s. State of Bihar). 10. With regard to last submission on behalf of the respondents as noticed above, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that since the petitioners had challenged only the orders of the respondent-Board and its officials on the ground that they were not in accordance with the statutory notification dated 8.5.1978 (Annexure-14) hence, the dispute was merely a dispute relating to interpretation of statutory notification between the petitioners and the Board and hence, the direct recruits who may be adversely affected by any decision in this case are not necessary parties. In support of this proposition, he placed reliance upon following judgments of the Apex Court (i) AIR 1983 SC 769 (A. Janardhana V/s. Union of India) and (ii) AIR 1992 SC 1277 (State of H.P. V/s. Kailash Chand Mahajan). 11.
In support of this proposition, he placed reliance upon following judgments of the Apex Court (i) AIR 1983 SC 769 (A. Janardhana V/s. Union of India) and (ii) AIR 1992 SC 1277 (State of H.P. V/s. Kailash Chand Mahajan). 11. Learned counsel for the Board raised the issue of defect of parties after the writ application was heard on merits. However, by its nature, this issue should have been raised as a preliminary issue and in that view of the matter it is taken up first for decision. For deciding this issue it is necessary to have a close look at the nature of controversy and the relief which the petitioners are seeking. The vires or legality of the principles in determining seniority as laid down in notification dated 8.5.1978 (Annexure- 14) is not in question. No policy of the respondent Board is under challenge. What the petitioners seek to establish is a question of fact. According to them, decision to fill up the vacancies in the post of LD Assistant for direct recruits and for promotees must be held to have taken place at the same time. In support of such a factual stand the petitioners had given details in their representation/objection filed against the tentative gradation list dated 19.11.1990. When their claim was accepted as reflected by the final gradation list then the direct recruits filed representation giving their version of the events. Some of the promotees came to know of pendency of such dispute before the Board and they filed counter representation and on the basis of version of both the sides available before it the Board took the impugned decision reflected by Annexure-1. This writ application was filed to challenge the impugned orders and in substance, the challenge is on facts, the contention being that as a fact the transactions for recruitment of direct recruits as well as promotees were part of the same transaction. Initially, the direct recruits were made respondents but subsequently their names were deleted, as noticed earlier, at the risk of the petitioners. Now, this Court is being called upon to decide a question of fact which will have direct and immediate effect upon the seniority and consequential rights of the direct recruits, behind their back.
Initially, the direct recruits were made respondents but subsequently their names were deleted, as noticed earlier, at the risk of the petitioners. Now, this Court is being called upon to decide a question of fact which will have direct and immediate effect upon the seniority and consequential rights of the direct recruits, behind their back. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the direct recuirts were necessary parties to this writ application and this Court cannot decide the issues raised on behalf of the petitioners, behind their back. 12. In the case of A. Janardhana (supra), the case of the other side had not gone unrepresented as they had intervened and had been heard. It is further clear from that judgment as well as judgment in the other case relied upon by the petitioners and noticed earlier, that in those cases, on facts the proceedings were found to be analogous to one in which validity of a policy decision or constitutionality of a statutory rule is assailed. It is well settled that in such cases, although the striking down of the policy or rules may affect persons not parties to the proceeding but still such affected persons are not necessary parties. But in a case like the present one where the dispute involves determination of disputed questions of fact, the aforesaid principle will have no application. A case like the present one is covered by the judgments cited and relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the Board. As a result, the writ application must fail on the ground of defect of parties alone. 13. In view of finding recorded above, it is not necessary for this Court to go into details of other submissions raised by the parties, especially the petitioners. However, since those issues have been addressed hence, for the sake of being fair to the parties, this Court would like to indicate in brief its findings on the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 14. The first submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that in absence of any statutory provision the Board could not have revised the final gradation list is found to be without any substance. The preparation of gradation list is an administrative function and against the final gradation list, the direct recruit had a right of preferring appeal/representation.
The first submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that in absence of any statutory provision the Board could not have revised the final gradation list is found to be without any substance. The preparation of gradation list is an administrative function and against the final gradation list, the direct recruit had a right of preferring appeal/representation. A representation in such circumstances can be considered by the Board of Directors, the highest authority under its administrative power. Moreover, the certified standing orders of the Board also provide for an appeal to the Board to cover such eventuality. 15. So far as ground of violation of natural justice is concerned, as noticed earlier, the agenda note before the Board as well as the impugned order contained in Annexure-1 make it clear that some of the promotees like the petitioners had countered the representation of the direct recruits and it was after considering all the materials that the impugned orders were passed. It is well settled that rules of natural justice cannot be put in a strait jacket and must depend upon all the facts and circumstances of particular case. In the present case, it is clear that tentative gradation list which was in favour of the direct recruits, was modified on the basis of objections received from the promotees. There was no provision at that stage for receiving counter objections to meet the objections that may be filed against the tentative gradation list. In such circumstances, if the final gradation list contained changes in comparison to the tentative gradation list, those affected by such changes had a right to file a representation. At such a stage, the competent authority has before it the materials supplied to it by way of objections to the tentative gradation list as well as the case of the persons affected by the final gradation list and hence, a decision based on versions of both the parties cannot be held to be a decision in violation of principles of natural justice. Moreover, as noticed above, in this case some of the promotees like the petitioners had filed counter representation before the Board took the final decision resulting into the impugned orders.
Moreover, as noticed above, in this case some of the promotees like the petitioners had filed counter representation before the Board took the final decision resulting into the impugned orders. Learned counsel for the Board has further shown from the records that against the impugned orders petitioners had filed representations dated 25.5.1996 and 3.6.1996 which were considered and rejected as is apparent from communciation dated 23.8.1996 (Annexure-E). Such post decisional hearing, according to learned counsel for the respondent Board, also meets the requirement of natural justice. In view of all the aforesaid materials, this Court is satisfied that there is no unfairness on the part of respondent authorities nor the petitioners have suffered any prejudice and the decision making process leading to the impugned orders cannot be interfered with on the ground of its being in violation of principles of natural justice. 16. So far as the last submission on behalf of the petitioners relating to merit of the case is concerned, this Court finds that five of the direct recruits were appointed on the basis of advertisement dated 15.1.1980. Clearly the said advertisement was pursuant to decision contained in Annexure-1 dated 9.1.1980. The said decision read as a whole was a decision for filling up 23 vacancies in the post of LD Assistant only by direct recruitment. At that point of time there was no decision to initiate process for filling up post of LD Assistant by promotion. The remaining 18 vacancies which remained unfilled were clearly meant to be filled up through second advertisement/notice dated 3.5.1980. The petitioners have failed to show any material to enable this Court to hold that even till then there was any decision to fill up any post of LD Assistant by promotion. The only material produced on behalf of the petitioners is Annexure-4 which is dated 27.8.1982. From this document it appears that on the basis of vacancies available till that date, the Secretary decided to offer 22 posts to direct recruits and 8 posts were kept vacant for promotees. By that date, admittedly the departmental test for promotion of the petitioners had already been notified vide Annexure-6 dated 19.4.1982. Hence, it is clear that the decision to fill up 23 vacancies by direct recruitment was taken not on 27.8.1982 vide Annexure-4 but much earlier in January 1980.
By that date, admittedly the departmental test for promotion of the petitioners had already been notified vide Annexure-6 dated 19.4.1982. Hence, it is clear that the decision to fill up 23 vacancies by direct recruitment was taken not on 27.8.1982 vide Annexure-4 but much earlier in January 1980. The decision to fill up certain vacancies by promotion appears to have been taken around April 1982 which ted to the notice for promotional test contained in Annexure-6. On such materials it is difficult for this Court to accept the contention of the petitioners that their promotion should be treated as part of the same transaction which had led to appointment of 22 direct recruits in October 1982. Clearly, 18 direct recruits were appointed against posts already earmarked for direct recruitment in the year 1980. Only four direct recruits were appointed in October 1982 on account of subsequent vacancies. Only with regard to four direct recruits of October 1982 the petitioners may have a case that since their vacancies and vacancies available for the promotees were determined in clear terms on 27.8.1982 by Annexure-4 hence, the direct recruitment with regard to those four may be treated as part of same transaction which led to promotion of the petitioners in October 1984. However, since those four direct recruits are not before this Court, hence, as held earlier, no relief can be given to the petitioners even against them. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners had attempted to contend before this Court that the Boards stand that no vacancies for promotion were available in January 1980 was incorrect and impermissible in view of 20% quota provided for promotion. But this Court finds difficulty in deciding such a contention as there is no direct challenge to such decision of 1980 nor there are sufficient materials on record. Even if there was some irregularity in calculating the quota available for promotees, no such challenge was made by the persons entitled for promotion in the year 1980. Admittedly, petitioners had not completed the minimum length of service for being eligible for such promotion in the year 1980.
Even if there was some irregularity in calculating the quota available for promotees, no such challenge was made by the persons entitled for promotion in the year 1980. Admittedly, petitioners had not completed the minimum length of service for being eligible for such promotion in the year 1980. Moreover, for deciding seniority on the principle of same transaction as contained in the notification dated 8.5.1978, the relevant material is not only the date on which the vacancies were determined but also the date when decision was taken to fill up such vacancies and that aspect has already been considered earlier. 18. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is unable to grant any relief to the petitioners and the writ application is dismissed accordingly. In the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.