Order D.K. Seth, J.: An application, was made by the employer rising a preliminary issue as to the maintainability of the reference on the ground that the dispute raised by the workmen not being a substantial class of employees to maintain such a dispute. This application was set down for hearing as to whether this preliminary issue should be heard first or it should be heard a long with all other issues. After hearing the said application the learned Tribunal had passed an order on May 7, 2001 directing that the preliminary issue should be heard along with all other issues and therefore, had rejected the said application. But, before the ultimate decision was taken, it appears that the Tribunal had gone into the merits of the preliminary issue and held that the workmen represent a substantial number of workmen constituting a class. In fact, he has already decided the issue while again postponing the decision on the self-same issue along with the other issues. 2. Mr. Sengupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, had pointed out that this could not have been done; either it should have decided to hear the issue as preliminary issue or it could have postponed the same till the hearing of the other issues. Then he contends that having regard to the question this court should not remit the matter back to the Tribunal once again but should decide the question as to whether the issue should be decided as a preliminary issue or not. He had relied on a decision in the case of Management of Express News Papers (Private) Ltd., Madras vs. The Workers & Ors., reported in AIR 1963 sa 569, in support of his contention that when the preliminary issue relates to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it should be decided first. He has also sought to distinguish the case of D.P. Maheshwari vs. Delhi Admn. & Ors., reported in AIR 1984 SC 153 , on the ground that the direction contained in paragraph 1 is a sermon and not a ratio decidendi. Therefore, when it comes in conflict with the decision in the case of Management of Express News Papers (supra), the, ratio decided therein shall prevail and the sermon cannot supersede the express ratio decided in a case. Therefore, when it comes in conflict with the decision in the case of Management of Express News Papers (supra), the, ratio decided therein shall prevail and the sermon cannot supersede the express ratio decided in a case. He had also relied on a decision in the case of Hooghly Dock and Port Engineers Ltd. vs. Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal & Ors., reported in 1992 (II) CHN 161 , in which it was held by this court that the decision laid down in the case of D.P. Maheswari (supra) is not directed to be followed in every case. 3. Mr. Sundarananda Pal, learned counsel for the respondents submits, on the other hand, that the direction contained in the case of D. P. Maheswari (supra) is a ratio and that it should be followed by all other Courts as a sermon. He sought to make a distinction between the two decisions. He then contends that every decision of the supreme Court has to be followed by all other Courts by reason of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. He further contends that in the facts and circumstances of the case, this question should be dealt with along with all other issues. 4. In reply Mr. P. S. Sengupta contends that the present question does not require any decision on facts. It is the pure question of law. Therefore, it should be decided as a preliminary issue. He further submits that in case it goes against him, he will wait till the final Award and he will not challenge such issue except when challenging the other issues. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. Admittedly, the present one is an application for deciding as to whether the issue should be decided as a preliminary issue or not. While deciding this question, the Tribunal was not called upon to decide the merits of the issue raised and decide the issue itself. Therefore, the part of the order by which the Tribunal has sought to make certain observations with regard to the merit of the preliminary issue cannot be sustained and, therefore, such part of the Order shall be ignored and shall be treated to be non-est while deciding the issue raised is decided subsequently. It is also contended by Mr. Sengupta that while the said application was being heard, he has not supported the issue at all. It is also contended by Mr. Sengupta that while the said application was being heard, he has not supported the issue at all. Be that as it may, in this case the said finding shall be of no consequence. 6. So far as the question as to whether the issue should be decided as a preliminary issue or not, that is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. Even if it is a question of law, the sermon that was given in D.P. Maheswari (supra) was issued at a point of time which was much later than 1963. It has relied on the situation as was appearing in those days that this will lead to unnecessary delay in the matter of disposal. Therefore, it had observed that all Courts should carry out the instructions or sermon preached by it. Article 144 requires that any such direction or observation given by the Apex Court are to be complied with and all aids are to be extended by all authorities including the judiciary in compliance of the Apex Court's orders. 7. Article 144 makes it obligatory upon all authorities including the judiciary in India to act in aid of the Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court makes certain observation it does it on certain purpose. When it relates to a particular class of cases and relates to procedural matters aimed at advancing justice it has to be given due weight. It can not be ignored or overlooked. If such observation hints at certain matters to be followed, then it can not be brushed aside as a sermon without any purpose. Even if it is a sermon, it hints at a particular procedure which is expected by the Apex Court to be followed by the courts. An observation or sermon can not be brushed aside lightly. 8. In M/s. Spencer & Co. Ltd. vs. M/s. Viswadarshan Distributors (P) Ltd., 1994 AIR SCW 5188 at pp. 5191-2, it was held that language of request often employed by the Supreme Court is to be read by the High Court as an obligation in carrying out constitutional mandate under Article 144 of the Constitution of India. 9. Under Article 141 of the Constitution the decision of the Supreme Court is a law declared and is binding on all courts. In C.N. Rudra Murthy vs. K. Bartulla Khan, 1998(8) SCC 275 and Lt. Col. 9. Under Article 141 of the Constitution the decision of the Supreme Court is a law declared and is binding on all courts. In C.N. Rudra Murthy vs. K. Bartulla Khan, 1998(8) SCC 275 and Lt. Col. P.R. Chowdhuri vs. Municipal Corporation, New Delhi, 2000 (4) SCC 577 , it was held that decision of the Supreme Court is the law declared and is binding on High Court and it can not be brushed aside lightly or on the ground that the same does not conform to the statutory provision. Even an obiter, though not binding as precedent, of the Supreme Court, is worthy of respect and considerable weight. It was so held in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Vazir, AIR 1959 SC 814 ; and Income Tax Officer vs. Devinath, AIR 1968 SC 623 . 10. In D. P. Maheswari (supra) the sermon preached in paragraph 1 is related to the question which the Supreme Court was addressing itself. It is not something which was said out of context. Neither it was a case of a question which the Supreme Court was not called upon to adjudicate. The sermon is related to the question of delay in a proceeding before the Tribunal on the ground of decision in preliminary issue, which worried the Apex Court. Thus the observation though a sermon may not be an obiter. Even if it is so still it is to be respected having regard to the context in which it is given. 11. A “sermon”, as we find in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edn), is a discourse on a serious subject and containing instruction or extortation; something that affords instruction or example to preach and 'sermonize' is 'to preach: to talk seriously or earnestly; to bring into a specified condition by preaching'. Therefore the sermon in para 1 is not a pious wish. It is an instruction to bring about a condition of systemataizing a kind of procedure to be followed by courts in such cases. The first paragraph in D.P. Maheswari reads thus: “It was just the other” day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. It is an instruction to bring about a condition of systemataizing a kind of procedure to be followed by courts in such cases. The first paragraph in D.P. Maheswari reads thus: “It was just the other” day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that Tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all Tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special Tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues." 12. This makes it clear that the Supreme Court wanted to lay down a procedural policy. It is definitely a policy declared by the Apex Court. Even if it is assumed not to be a law declared, still then the Apex Court wanted to lay down an instruction as policy. Article 144 mandates the judiciary to come in aid of the Apex Court for the implementation of the policy. 13. The above passage also leaves liberty to the courts to address itself about the justifiability of part decision on preliminary issues. It laid down the criteria for the courts or Tribunals to address itself as to whether such an exercise is necessary and whether such exercise will lead to woeful consequences, and that its jurisdiction to decide the dispute is shifted by preliminary objections journeying up and down. Thus it is for the Tribunal to decide whether the decision in preliminary issue is a necessity and that it will ensure justice and not protract justice. It has to see whether it will avoid delay or invite delay. It is a sound proposition of procedural law which is only a vehicle to carry a proceedings to the end of justice. The court has to bear in mind that it is neither the technicality nor the procedure but justice real matters and is paramount. 14. It has to see whether it will avoid delay or invite delay. It is a sound proposition of procedural law which is only a vehicle to carry a proceedings to the end of justice. The court has to bear in mind that it is neither the technicality nor the procedure but justice real matters and is paramount. 14. Whether the question is a ratio or whether there is a conflict with the decision given in Express Newspaper (supra) becomes immaterial by reason of passage of time. When the Express Newspaper decision was given, it was in 1963 when the Courts were not so hard-pressed and the delay was not so much as to worry the whole judicial system. Now a time has come when by reason of everyday experience we find- that delay is a pressing and burning question staring at the face of the judiciary. Now if a preliminary issue is allowed and then it is encouraged to be questioned again at higher forum by the aggrieved party and thereafter another preliminary issue is raised and questioned again and if it travels from higher forum to the highest Court of the land and comes back, the result would be the same as was observed in D. P. Maheswari (supra). Long time has since passed after 1984. The pendency has accumulated. The Tribunals and courts are over burdened. Delay is one of the worst phenomenon in the function of the judiciary. Delay defeats justice. It is to be avoided at all costs. The procedure is the handmaid of justice. It can not surpass justice. No one can claim any right in the procedure. If a particular procedure cripples the justice delivery system then the one which will delay justice is to be avoided and the one which will advance is to be followed. 15. After 1984 in this New Millenium we are now facing not the same but more stringent contingencies in all our High Courts, other Tribunals and subordinate Judiciary. Ways and means are now being tried to find out various other manners in order to get rid of such contingency even by opening different types of Court such as Lok-adalat or the like which are something other than the known judicial system. Ways and means are now being tried to find out various other manners in order to get rid of such contingency even by opening different types of Court such as Lok-adalat or the like which are something other than the known judicial system. Therefore, the decision or the sermon that was preached in D.P. Maheswari (supra) holds good and needs to be more effective and is required to be followed by all Courts even when it comes into conflict with the ratio decided in Express Newspaper (supra) having regard to the present day situation, even though it may not have been referred to or overruled. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with that part of the order by which the preliminary issue was directed to be heard along with the other issues. However, it is expected that Tribunal will decide the dispute as early as possible preferably within a period of one year from the date of communication of this order. This application is disposed of. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking. Application disposed of.