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2001 DIGILAW 366 (BOM)

Alcon Cement Company Ltd. v. State of Goa

2001-04-24

MARLAPALLE

body2001
JUDGMENT Per Marlapalle, J . - Both these petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India pray for the same benefit i.e. the rebate of 25% in the tariff as per the notifications dated 30th September, 1991, 15th May, 1996 and 1st August, 1996 from the respondents and hence, they are being decided by common judgment. 2. In the first petition the petitioner/company applied for power supply on 17th September, 1992 and entered into an agreement with the respondent No.2 for supply of power on 29th September, 1993. The petitioner's factory at Surla in the state of Goa was given electric supply for the first time on 1st March, 1994 pursuant to the agreement dated 29th September, 1993. Whereas in the case of the second petitioner the agreement was entered on 3rd October, 1991 and the supply was charged on 2nd September, 1992. Sometime in October, 1996 the Executive Engineer in the office of respondent No. 2 had acknowledged and certified that the petitioners were entitled for 25% a rebate on energy charges and accordingly computed the total rebate for which the industrial units were entitled to. In the case of the second petitioner the amount of rebate was computed at Rs.1,04,70,762/- for the period from 2nd September, 1992 to 1st September, 1996 and it was further stated that the amount of arrears be credited in 60 instalments w.e.f. September, 1996 and each instalment was of Rs. 1.74.513/-. The respondents had adjusted an amount of Rs. 53.78.594/- as against the bills from September, 1996 to August, 1997 and further adjustment of Rs. 31.41.234/- was also b adjusted subsequently thus leaving a balance of Rs. 73.29.528/-. In the case of the first petitioner. the entitlement of 25% rebate was acknowledged and rebate in energy consumption was granted. The petitioner was given adjustment of 13 instalments quantified in the sum of Rs. 2.90.446/- leaving a balance of 47 instalments at Rs. 22.342/- of each instalment. In addition the balance of subsidy for the months of March, 1998 to July, 1998 was worked out at the rate of Rs. 4.24.671/- thus making a total sum of Rs. 14.74.755/-. 3. The State Government rescinded the benefit of 25% rebate extended by the notification dated 30th September, 1991 and the said notification was published on 30th January, 1995 thus withdrawing the benefit of rebate w.e.f. 1st April, 1995. 4.24.671/- thus making a total sum of Rs. 14.74.755/-. 3. The State Government rescinded the benefit of 25% rebate extended by the notification dated 30th September, 1991 and the said notification was published on 30th January, 1995 thus withdrawing the benefit of rebate w.e.f. 1st April, 1995. However, another notification came to be issued on 15th May, 1996 amending the earlier notification dated 30th September, 1991. By the said notification dated 15th May, 1996 the third category of Extra High Tension consumers was created and in any case in both these petitions the same notification is inapplicable in as much as both the industrial units do not fall in the newly created category of Extra High Tension and they fall in the High Tension consumers. The State Government issued yet another notification on 1st August, 1996 re-introducing the benefit of d 25% rebate on the current tariff as available from time to time through the industrial units who applied or availed electricity on or after 1st October, 1991. The same notification reads as under :- Notification 2/23/93/Power.-In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 23 read with Section 51-A of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (Central Act of 1910) and in supersession of the Government Notification No. 3/24/90-IND/Part (1) dated 30.9.1991 published in the Official Gazette series 1 No. 27 dated 3rd October, 1991 the Government of Goa hereby directs that all Industrial Units who apply or avail of Extra High Tension. High Tension or low tension power supply on or after the 1st October, 1991 for bona fide industrial activities and certified by the Electricity Department. Government of Goa as eligible for concessional tariffs shall be entitled to a rebate of 25% on energy charges only as per the prevailing tariff in force from time to time at which they are billed for a period of five years from the date on which the supply of a electricity is made available to such units. By order and in the name of the Governor of Goa. Smt. A. Manezes. Under Secretary (Power) Panaji, 1st August, 1996. 4. It is not known whether the petitioners have approached the respondent No. 1 or respondent No. 2 for the benefit of rebate at any time prior to 31st March, 1995 or even after 1st August, 1996. By order and in the name of the Governor of Goa. Smt. A. Manezes. Under Secretary (Power) Panaji, 1st August, 1996. 4. It is not known whether the petitioners have approached the respondent No. 1 or respondent No. 2 for the benefit of rebate at any time prior to 31st March, 1995 or even after 1st August, 1996. However, the fact remains that their entitlement has been duly certified b and the benefit of rebate' has been extended for part of the period of 5 years. The benefit of rebate was denied to them for the remaining period on the basis of the order dated 31st March, 1998 whereby the extension of rebate in tariff was suspended. This order came to be challenged in writ petition No. 199/98 and the other connected petitions. During the pendency of these petitions the State Government issued yet another notification dated 24th July, 1998 by which the benefit of rebate in tariff came to be withdrawn. The validity of this notification was also challenged in writ petition No. 199/98 and other connected petitions by amendment. This Court by its judgment dated 21st January, 1999 held that the order dated 31st March, 1998 was illegal and the notification dated 24th July, 1998 was upheld. It was further held that the industrial units were entitled for the benefit of 25% rebate on the basis of the notifications dated 30th September, 1991, 15th May, 1996 and 1st August, 1996 and 1st August, 1996 for the period of 5 years from the date of supply of electricity till the rebate benefit was withdrawn by the notification dated 24th July, 1990. Pursuant to the said judgment the petitioners claim that they raised a fresh demand for rebate before the respondent No.2 and as they failed to succeed they have approached this Court for directions to seek implementation of the judgment dated 21st January, 1999 for the remaining period upto 31st July, 1998. 5. The respondent No. 2 has filed an affidavit-in-reply initially on 20th March, 2001 and subsequently on 2nd April, 2001. In the first affidavit-in-reply it has been admitted that the petitioners were certified to be eligible for the benefit of 25% rebate in the tariff as per the notification invoked and the adjustment in that respect was partly made and thus the benefit was extended. In the first affidavit-in-reply it has been admitted that the petitioners were certified to be eligible for the benefit of 25% rebate in the tariff as per the notification invoked and the adjustment in that respect was partly made and thus the benefit was extended. The balance of the rebate amount as stated in the petitions has been' confirmed by respondent No. 2 and it is stated that they would not be entitled for the benefit of the judgment of this Court delivered on 21st January, 1999 as they were not the petitioners in the earlier batch of petitions, In the subsequent affidavit-in-reply filed by respondent No. 2 new plea has been taken and it is submitted that the benefit of rebate is not available to the petitioners as the provisions of Section 23 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 do not empower the State Government to extend such a benefit and relief claimed by the petitioners was factually de hors the provisions of the said Act. A number of decisions of the Apex Court have been cited in support of these contentions and it has been submitted that inspite of the judgment of this Court in the earlier batch of petitions, there is no case to entertain and invoke the extraordinary powers of Article 226 of the Constitution of India for giving directions as prayed for. The decisions relied upon are, Mafatlal Industry Limited v. Union of India, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 536 . A.P. Christians Medical Education Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1490 and Smt. Isabella Johnson v. M.A. Susai, reported in AIR 1991 SC 993 . 6. Shri A.N.S. Nadkarni, the learned Advocate General while expending his arguments opposing the petitions has submitted that (a) the issue regarding the power of the State Government to extend the benefit of 25% rebate in tariff under Section 23 of the Electricity Act was not raised in the earlier batch of petitions. (b) the issue of legality validity or propriety of the notifications dated 15th May, 1996 as well as 1st August, 1996 was not raised and replied to in the said petitions and, therefore, there was no occasion for this Court to record a finding on these notifications. (b) the issue of legality validity or propriety of the notifications dated 15th May, 1996 as well as 1st August, 1996 was not raised and replied to in the said petitions and, therefore, there was no occasion for this Court to record a finding on these notifications. (c) the petitioners' claim cannot be entertained on the basis of the judgment dated 21st January, 1999 delivered by this Court in the earlier batch of petitions even though, the said judgment has been confirmed by the Apex Court by order dated 13th February, 2001 rejecting the appeals filed by the State Government as well as some of the consumers. (d) the plea of promissory estoppel has not been pleaded and there is nothing to support such a plea and, therefore, the petitioners cannot rely upon the judgment of this Court ion the earlier batch of petitions which may at the most be cited as a precedent. (e) the judgment of this Court dated 21st January, 1999 cannot be made a binding precedent on d account of it being res judicata and suffering• from the doctrine of per incuriam and sub-silentio and (f) in any case, the notification dated 15th May, 1996 and 1st August, 1996 do not come to the rescue of the petitioners in support of their claim if they are held to be illegal by this Court in writ petition No. 316/98. In support of these arguments. Shri Nadkarni the learned Advocate General has relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court. M/s. Badri Prasad Jagan Prasad v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Lucknow, reported in AIR 1986 SCC 365 , Shri Bakul Oil Industries and Another reported in (1987) 1 SCC 31 . Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and others reported in (1991) 3 SCC 263 , Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheshwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in (l998) 2 SCC 502, State of Rajasthan and others v. Bhatnagar Cement Co. (P) Ltd., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 264 , State of Uttar Pradesh and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and another, reported in (1991) 4 SCC 139 . Krishna Kumar v. Union of India and others reported in IT 1990 (3) SC 173. (P) Ltd., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 264 , State of Uttar Pradesh and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and another, reported in (1991) 4 SCC 139 . Krishna Kumar v. Union of India and others reported in IT 1990 (3) SC 173. Union of India and others v. Dhanwanti Devi and others reported in (1996) 6 SCC 44 , Arnit Das v. State of Bihar reported in (2000) 5 SCC 488 . Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. District Magistrate Kamrup and others reported in AIR 1974 SCC 183, Ramkrishna Ramnath v. State of Maharashtra and another, reported in AIR 1964 Bom 51 . Union Carbide Corporation and others v. Union of India and others reported in (l991) 4 SCC 594 and Ester Industries Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board and others, reported in (l996) 11 SC 199. 7. Shri J .E. Coelho Pereira, the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners has referred to the averments made in the petition and submitted that the claim of the petitioners is sustainable on the ground of promissory estoppel as well as the judgment of this Court dated 21st January, 1999 in the earlier batch of petitions reported in 1999 (1) GLT 218. He also submitted that the respondent No.2 by his affidavit dated 20th March, 2001 has virtually admitted the claim of the petitioners and has taken an about turn by filing the second affidavit dated 2nd April, 2001 wherein the petition has been opposed on various legal grounds which is not open to the respondent No.2 in view of the judgment of this Court in the earlier batch of petitions. He also submitted that the benefit of 25% rebate was already extended to the petitioners and it was subsequently denied for the remaining period on the basis of administrative order dated 29th August, which was held to be illegal and non-est by the earlier judgment of this Court. He therefore, urged that the benefit of 25% rebate is available to the petitioners till 21st July, 1998. 8. Shri Pereira, learned Senior Advocate also advanced arguments on two legal points namely res judicata and the doctrine of merger. He therefore, urged that the benefit of 25% rebate is available to the petitioners till 21st July, 1998. 8. Shri Pereira, learned Senior Advocate also advanced arguments on two legal points namely res judicata and the doctrine of merger. He has submitted that the issue regarding the State Government's power under Section 23 of the Electricity Act has been duly considered d by this Court in its judgment dated 21st January, 1999 and held that such power is available to the State Government and, therefore, it is not open for the State Government to raise the said plea specially when the findings of this Court were confirmed by the Supreme Court in its order dated 13th February, 2001. Even otherwise the judgment of this Court dated 21st January, 1999 is merged with the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the appeals on 13th February, 2001. Shri Pereira also raised yet another point on the basis of the two affidavits filed by respondent No.2. He contended that when a factual submission was made in the first affidavit regarding the entitlement of the petitioners for 25% rebate in the tariff the said could not be challenged by taking legal grounds in the subsequent affidavit and he relied on the following decisions in support of these pleas : Chimajirao Kanhojirao Shirke and another v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 2000 SC 2532 . Channveerappa Gouda v. Land Acquisition Officer reported in (1989) 3 SCC 581 . Ambika a Prasad Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in AIR 1980 SC 1762 . T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. The State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in AIR 1973 SCC 974 and Forward Construction Co. and others v. Prabhat Mandal and others reported in AIR 1986 SC 391 . 9. The contentions raised in the petitions do make out a case for promissory estoppel and it has been clearly stated that the petitioners had decided to invest in the industrial units in the State of Goa on the basis of the rebate announced by the State Government vide its notification dated 30th September, 1991. 9. The contentions raised in the petitions do make out a case for promissory estoppel and it has been clearly stated that the petitioners had decided to invest in the industrial units in the State of Goa on the basis of the rebate announced by the State Government vide its notification dated 30th September, 1991. We therefore, do not find any force in the submissions of the learned Advocate General that b the benefit of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available to the petitioners for claiming the rebate of 25% in the tariff on the basis of the notification dated 30th September, 1991. 10. The petitioners were certified to be eligible for the benefit of rebate in the tariff and such a rebate has been admittedly extended for part of the period out of 5 years as stipulated in the notification dated 30th September, 1991. The respondents denied the further benefit initially on the basis of the order dated 31st March, 1998 which order has been quashed and set aside by this Court vide judgment dated 21st September, 1999 and secondly on the basis of the notification dated 24th July, 1998 which has been upheld by this Court in the said judgment. The operative part of this Court's earlier judgment is required to be reproduced. ORDER 1. It is hereby held that the circular dated 31st March, 1998 issued by respondent No.2. suspending release of rebate with immediate effect as well as suspension of rebate agreed to be given in sixty monthly instalments has no legal efficacy and it is invalid and inoperative. 2. The notification dated 24th July, 1998 published in the Official Gazette dated 27th July, 1998 which is challenged by tl1e petitioner in writ petition No. 239/98 is held to be legal valid and operative. It does not suffer from any infirmity. 3. All the petitioners are entitled to 25% rebate in power tariff for the periods as indicated in paragraph 56 of this judgment. 4. The rebate shall be adjusted in sixty equal instalments minus the instalments which have already been adjusted. 5. The rebate in all cases with effect from 1st August, 1996 till 24th July, 1998 shall be on energy charges only as per the prevailing tariff in force from time to time at which they were to be billed during the said period. 5. The rebate in all cases with effect from 1st August, 1996 till 24th July, 1998 shall be on energy charges only as per the prevailing tariff in force from time to time at which they were to be billed during the said period. In para 56 of the said judgment this Court has given the names of the industrial units entitled for the benefit of rebate of 25% in tariff in the respective periods and it is evident that the entitlement for the period from the date of power supply to 27th July, 1998 or for a period of 5 years upto 27th July, 1998 whichever is earlier has been upheld in respect of the said industrial units who were the petitioners. Once the order dated 31st March, 1998 has been held to be illegal by this Court the decision of the Government in denying the rebate for the remaining period to the petitioners does not remain in force and such a benefit would be available till 27th July, 1998 only. The petitioners are, therefore, justified in relying upon the said judgment in support of their claim. 6. The disconnection of electric connection of the petitioners in writ petition No. 239/98 and 244/98 is held to be not proper. 7. The power supply of the aforesaid two petitioner shall be restored (in case it is not already restored) by working out the dues of rebate payable to them as aforesaid in instalments. 8. The dues in any, minus first instalment shall be paid by the petitioners within a period of thirty days from today. 9. In the circumstances of the cases, we leave the parties to bear their respective costs. 11. In para 56 of the said judgment this Court has given the names of the industrial units entitled for the benefits of rebate of 25% in tariff in the respective periods and it is evident that the entitlement for the period from the date of power supply to 27th July. 1998 or for a period of 5 years upto 27th July, 1998 whichever is earlier has been upheld in respect of the said industrial units who were the petitioners. 1998 or for a period of 5 years upto 27th July, 1998 whichever is earlier has been upheld in respect of the said industrial units who were the petitioners. Once the order dated 31st March, 1998 has been held to be illegal by this Court the decision of the Government in denying the rebate for the remaining period to the petitioners does not remain in force and such a benefit would be available till 27th July, 1998 only. The petitioners are therefore, justified in relying upon the said judgment in support of their claim. 12. Coming to the legal points raised by Shri Nadkarni the learned Advocate General opposing the claim of the petitioners we will have to advert to the submissions made by Shri Pereira the learned Senior Advocate regarding the doctrine of merger. In the case of Kunhayanuned and others v. State of Kerala and another reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 the issue of doctrine of merger has been considered and decided. The conclusions of the Apex Court are summed up in para 44 of the said judgment and it would be useful to reproduce the same. (1) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a Court tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum medofies, reverses or affirms the decision put ion issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior Jurisdiction should be capable of reversing modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior Jurisdiction should be capable of reversing modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the Court, tribunal or authority below has stood a merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings, between the parties. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger, the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger, the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before b the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 47, Criminal Procedure Code. 12, The judgment of this Court dated 21st January, 1999 was challenged in special leave petition No. 6847-58 of 1999 and leave was granted by order dated 12th May, 1999. Subsequently, by order dated 13th February, 2001, the said appeals which were registered as civil appeal No. 3208-3217 of 1999 came to be dismissed along with the connected appeals filed by the consumers namely civil appeal Nos. 3218-3220/99 and 3221-3225/99. The said order dated 13th February, 2001 reads as under : The High Court by the impugned judgment has held that the circular dated 31st March, 1998 issued by the Government of Goa suspending the release of rebate with immediate effect as well as suspension of rebate agreed to be governed in sixty monthly instalments has no legal efficacy and, is therefore, invalid. The High Court has further held that the notification dated 24th July, 1998 is legal and void. Consequently the High Court directed that the Writ petitioners are entitled to 25% rebate in power tariff till 26th July, 1998. This has been challenged by means of the present appeals second set of appeals have been filed by the writ petitioners against the judgment of the High Court whereby an whereunder the High Court has held that notification dated 27th July, 1998 is valid. We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. The High Court has taken the aforesaid view after taking into consideration overall facts and circumstances and inasmuch as public interest which, according to us, is very balanced view of the matter. We therefore, are not inclined to interfere with the matters. Both the sets of appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. We agree with submissions that the judgment of this Court dated 21st January, 1999 has merged with-the above order of the Supreme Court and. We therefore, are not inclined to interfere with the matters. Both the sets of appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. We agree with submissions that the judgment of this Court dated 21st January, 1999 has merged with-the above order of the Supreme Court and. therefore it is not open for us to adjudicate upon any of the issues on which findings are recorded in the said earlier judgment of this Court. 14. The learned Advocate General invited our attention to the observations in aura 12 of the earlier judgment and submitted that neither the petitioners nor the State Government had raised any Issue regarding the power of the State Government under Section 23 of the Electricity Act to extend the benefit of rebate in tariff and, therefore it was not necessary for this Court to record findings in that regard. He urged that the present petitions warrant a decision on the availability of such power with the State Government by invoking Section 23 of the Electricity Act. We are afraid. we cannot do this and for the following reasons namely. (a) the findings of this Court are merged with the order of the Supreme Court and the reliance of the learned Advocate General on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and another (supra) is not applicable in view of the doctrine of merger. (b) the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (supra) has considered the issues as raised. The learned Advocate General before us and it would be useful to reproduce the relevant observations of the Apex Court "Every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. It is fundamental that the nation's constitution is not kept. In constant uncertainty by judicial review. In this view, other submissions sparkling with creative ingenuity and presented with high-pressure advocate cannot persuade us to re-open what was laid down for the guidance of the nation as a solemn proposition by the epic fundamental rights. From Rameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252 and Golak Nath (1967) through Kesavananda (1973) and Kannan Devan. In this view, other submissions sparkling with creative ingenuity and presented with high-pressure advocate cannot persuade us to re-open what was laid down for the guidance of the nation as a solemn proposition by the epic fundamental rights. From Rameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252 and Golak Nath (1967) through Kesavananda (1973) and Kannan Devan. (1973) 1 SCR 356 : AIR 1972 SC 2301 to Gwalior Rayons, (1974) 1 SCR 671 : AIR SC 2734 and after Article 31-A has stood judicial scrutiny although as stated earlier, we do not base the conclusion on Article 31-A. Even so, it is fundamental that the nation's Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every season because it paralyses by perennial suspense, all legislate and administrative action on vital issues deterred by the brooding threat of forensic blow-up. This, if permitted may well be a kind of judicial destabilisation of State action too dangerous to be in dulged in save where national crisis of real moment to the life liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at state or the basic direction of the nation itself is in peril of a shake-up. It is wise to remember that fatal flaws silenced by earlier rulings cannot survive after death because a decision does not loss its authority "merely because it was badly argued inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned. And none of these misfortunes can be imputed to Bharti’s case AIR 1973 SC 1461 (supra)." This view has been subsequently reiterated by the Apex Court. 15. However, we are mindful of the fact that in writ petition No. 316/98 we have today held that the notification dated 15t May, 1996 and 1st August, 1996 could not be termed as Government decisions and they are void ab initio. The said findings thus come in the way of the present petitioners. Even though they have relied upon our earlier judgment which has merged with the order of the Supreme Court. We have noted in our judgment in writ petition No. 316/98 that the issue regarding the legality, validity and propriety of the said notifications was not an issue raised and considered by this Court in the earlier batch of petitions and which was apparent in terms of the order passed by this Court in miscellaneous civil application No. 637/99 on 27th January, 2000. In view of our findings in writ petition No. 316/98. we do hold that the petitioners cannot claim the benefit of these notification dated 15th May, 1996 and 1st August, 1996 and they are entitled for the benefit of 25% rebate in tariff on the basis of the notification dated 30th September, 1991 only for the period from the date of supply of electricity till 31st March, 1995. 16. In the result, the writ petitions are partly allowed and it is held that the petitioners are entitled for rebate of 25% in tariff on the basis of the notification dated 30th September, 1991 for the period from the date of supply of electricity till 31st March, 1995 and we direct the respondents to extend the said benefit if it has not been already done. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. 17. At this stage, the learned Advocate General made a statement that the benefit of rebate pursuant to the notification dated 30th September, 1991 has already been extended for the period upto 30th September, 1995 and in fact excess benefits have been granted which are required to be recovered. It is for the State Government to take appropriate steps after verifying the record and we need not say anything on that issue.